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ABSTRACT 
This thesis focuses on identifying inter-relationships between three different types of mega projects, 
including mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban regeneration schemes and mega 
events, such as the Olympics. This research attempts to test the hypothesis that ‘MUTPs can be an 
effective agent for sustainable urban regeneration and mega events’. It further assumes that ‘A well-
functioning co-operation within this cluster of mega project can bring about a favourable outcome, i.e. 
maximum benefits and minimum costs’. The premise of the research discussed is that an appreciation 
of institutional arrangements and power relationships is vital in understanding the nature of 
complexity in decision-making regarding MUTP planning and delivery, and their associated 
developments. The methodology outlined is essentially a two-strand approach applied for purposes of 
illustration to a case study (the Channel Tunnel Rail Link). Strand one of the methodology is pre-
hypothesis led - based on an analysis of the narrative, whilst the other is hypothesis led - based on an 
analysis of the returns to conventional interview questionnaires. This methodology of case study is 
designed to answer the primary research questions, which are: (a) Can MUTPs play an effective role 
in delivering sustainable urban regeneration and mega events? (b) Can MUTPs, sustainable urban 
regeneration, and mega events be implemented in parallel? And if so, (C) in which contexts these 
three domains can co-operate well and contribute to the visions of sustainable development? 
 
This study concludes that conditions which allow one to coordinate the delivery of these three 
different types of mega projects include having a proactive partnership between the public and private 
sectors, a brokerage role played by local authorities, visionary politicians, streamlined planning 
powers, good stakeholder management, and continuous political commitment. Moreover, the 
locomotive role played by the MUTP which enables the urban regeneration schemes and mega events 
to happen could not implement without existing brownfield sites and the injection of significant public 
investments. In addition, the coalition of interests that forms itself around these projects is a leading 
dimension of these major developments. This coalition is mostly constituted by elite groups. It is also 
suggested that the coordination between these major projects remains rhetoric which is achieved by 
the interdependency between project discourses.   
 
Key words: mega urban transport project; sustainable urban regeneration; mega event; institutional 
arrangement; political power; decision-making 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Research Aims 
This research aims to address the question that when multiple mega projects are instigated in the 
same timeframe and same spatial context whether they can be integrated to produce synergistic 
outcomes that are greater than the sum of their parts? It seeks to identify the critical factors 
influencing the decision-making process within developments that are designed to encourage 
sustainable development and which have mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) at their core. It 
highlights the relationships between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events in 
terms of their planning frameworks. Furthermore, the research attempts to discover the extent to 
which the assumption that the major success of mega-project decision-making rests on institutional 
arrangements and power relations.  
 
MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega-event orientated development have long been used 
as strategic drivers of urban development, catalysts for economic growth, and as solutions for the 
current concerns regarding sustainability (Bianchini et al., 1992; Dimitriou, 2010; Burbank et al., 
2001; and Roche, 2000). Many studies that highlight the major issues of the relationship between 
transport infrastructure construction and urban development (e.g. Banister and Berechman, 2001; 
Gospodini, 2005 and Graham and Marvin, 2001) and also the relationship between mega events and 
urban planning (e.g. Burbank et al., 2002; Carrière and Demazière, 2002, and Hiller, 2000). However, 
the discussion of the interrelationship between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega 
events in terms of encouraging sustainable development is notably lacking. This is notwithstanding 
the works of Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) - who focus on the historic review of urban politics and 
mega-project investment; Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) – who emphasise mega-project risks and 
accountability in the decision-making process; and Vickerman (2008) – who deals with cost-benefit 
analysis and wider economic benefits from mega-project investment.  
  
Mega projects have been defined by Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) as physical, very expensive, and 
public. The general perceptions of mega projects, as paraphrased from the definition in SMEC, 2001, 
are that:  
 
• they absorb enormous amounts of capital over long periods;  
• they have less flexibility in development planning;  
• they are extremely complex to manage and seem in some cases to be beyond anyone’s control; 
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and 
• they create substantial environmental impacts which are often not readily calculable in advance. 
 
In addition, the debate over maintaining existing infrastructure versus embarking on new constructing 
has been growing, particularly in light of current budgetary pressures (Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003; 
Flyvbjerg et al., 2003; and Priemus et al., 2008). There is, as a result, increasing recognition of the 
need to broaden the scope of project evaluation, placing concerns of complexity, uncertainty, and risk-
taking at the heart of mega-project analysis and decision-making (Dimitriou, 2005).  
 
Vickerman (2002) also raised issues about the risks involved in the public and private provision of 
infrastructure. He summarises those as construction risks, revenue and maintenance risks, and 
planning and political risks. These compound the problem of inefficiencies in the management of 
mega projects. In order to evaluate the surplus of social-asset investments, actual capital involvement 
and the encumbrance of future generations as a result of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and 
mega events, the relationship between investments in these projects, the promotion of economic 
growth and the cities’ long-term development should be taken into account together. 
 
It is suggested that a supportive business environment to mega-project investments is crucial for the 
delivery of MUTPs (Banister and Berechman, 2001; Janelle and Beuthe, 1997; World Bank, 2002) 
and urban regeneration schemes (Bianchini et al, 1992; Loftman and Nevin, 1995; Percy, 2003). 
However, the uncertainty caused by political change seems to be the inevitable features of the 
planning environment. These factors, stemming from institutional contexts, are assumed to be of 
major significance and cannot be neglected (Banister and Berechman, 2001; Dimitriou, 2005). These 
issues, along with the noted gaps in the literature, prompted the hypotheses and research at the core of 
this thesis. 
 
Mounting evidence shows that these three types of mega project often fail to fulfil the initial project 
visions and promises when they are developed in isolation (e.g., Banister and Berechman, 2001; Hall, 
1985). It is significant to pursue whether project outcomes can be greater than the sums of the 
individual parts if these three types of urban developments can act in concert rather than in a 
competing environment. On top of this enquiry, this research looks into which is the optimum model 
of institutional arrangements for multiple mega project coordination as regards achievement of 
sustainable development visions. Throughout searching for answers to these enquiries, the new 
knowledge contributed by this research includes several developments:  
• The analysis of the stakeholder networks of mega-project development can identify the role of 
key stakeholders in decision-making process and the power distributions in the project-led 
network.  
• The analysis of the determining factors of mega-project decisions enhances our understanding of 
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the functions of institutional arrangements, the evolution patterns of the associated development 
policies, and the treatment of risks, uncertainty, and complexity.  
• The analysis of mega-project discourses explores the rationale underlying the use of such 
discourse. The findings reveal the principles behind how to eliminate the gaps between project 
rhetoric and the reality.  
• This research provides a new exploration of the integration of multiple mega projects. The 
research of the interrelationships between mega projects has increasing importance especially 
when major infrastructure investments are expected to surge in response to climate change, 
poverty, famine, natural disaster, and the shortage of energy resources.  
 
This chapter proceeds in 7 parts. Following the introduction of research aims, Section 1.2 explains the 
motivation to conduct in-depth research to uncover the potential synergies and impacts in coordination 
among multiple mega projects. Section 1.3 discusses the emergent issues which are the basis upon 
which the research premises and dimensions are built. It then presents the research questions and 
hypotheses, which are elaborated in Sections 1.4 and 1.5. The overall research methodology, the 
rationale behind case study selection, and the types of data sources used are illustrated in Section 1.6. 
This chapter concludes by offering the thesis structure.  
 
Figure 1.1: Overall Research Process 
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1.2 Research Motivation 
The three different types of urban development described above involves varied issues, ranging from 
the management of massive budgets, the clearance of large tracts of land to a wide range of 
stakeholders. Project development of such mega projects almost invariably draws controversy. 
Advocates hope that these developments can bring regional or sub-regional economic benefits in 
terms of jobs, real estate, and brownfield regeneration. Conversely, opposition concerns include the 
risks and the costs of the projects to the public, the negative impacts on the environment, and doubts 
about project-related promises on social equality and cohesion. A recent case in point is the building 
of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) in Britain, which section 1 started in 2001 and section 2 
completed in 2007 (see Figure 1.2). This project has been surrounded by controversy since its early 
promotion (see Faith, 2007; Gourvish, 2002; Pollalis, 2006). These controversies were amplified by 
the introduction of an innovative concessionary contract containing two major railway land 
regeneration schemes (Pollalis, 2006) that later was modified to incorporate concerns of the 2012 
London Olympics. These events triggered my interest to discover what are the main issues emerging 
from the interaction between these major developments and how are mega-project decisions made, 
particularly from the perspectives of the influence of institutional arrangements and political power 
relations.  
 
Figure 1.2: High Speed 1 
 
Source: Oxyman (2007) Eurostar, British Rail Class 373 at St Pancras railway station【WWW】
available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Eurostar_at_St_Pancras_railway_station.jpg【Accessed 
12/05/2011】 
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1.3 Research Premises 
This section focuses on the research premises that frame the scope of the research. According to the 
primary research question addressed at the outset of this chapter, the associated premises are 
elaborated here. This section is accompanied by a diagram of research scope, as presented in Figure 
1.3 below. 
1.3.1 Positive correlations  
Whether MUTPs can be a driver for urban regeneration is a context-specific question (see Banister 
and Berechman, 2001; Gospodini, 2005). Gospodini’s (2005) study attempts to examine the potential 
of urban transport infrastructure projects as a catalyst for urban development, redevelopment, and 
regeneration. The outcome of her research shows that, although urban transport infrastructure may 
have a catalytic effect on urban development, other influencing factors cannot be ignored. They 
include economic and political contexts. Gospodini (ibid.) further declares that the construction of 
new transport infrastructure projects encourages private investment by building a climate favourable 
to development. This phenomenon is especially evident when cities are being prepared to host global 
mega events. Here she implicitly indicates that the correlation between MUTPs, sustainable urban 
regeneration, and mega events can be mutually beneficial. Moreover, the commitment to deliver mega 
events can stimulate reform of politics in urban governance and the policies of mega projects, 
including transportation, urban regeneration, and sport and cultural events. A typical initiative 
governance reformation is the establishment of a fast-tracking process of project delivery associated 
with the mega events. Newman (2007) claims that the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games 
proposals reinforce the vision of the Mayor of London and Central Government through prioritising 
the urban regeneration policies in south east London.  
 
In this sense, whilst MUTPs encourage regeneration by introducing a more attractive climate for 
investment, mega events enhance the level of attractiveness for business through special policies and 
institutionalised processes, thus boosting the delivery of both transport and regeneration projects. This 
complex correlation needs to be better understood and considered in different contexts, a task this 
research seeks to undertake.  
1.3.2 Urban regeneration encouraged by mega urban transport projects 
Two most significant factors for successful urban regeneration encouraged by transport project 
investments according to Gospodini’s (2005) research are a flexible institutional framework and a 
positive political milieu. These factors heavily influence the impacts of urban regeneration in terms of 
economic development (see also Banister and Berechman 2001; Parkinson et al., 2006). Other 
conditions, also mentioned by Gospodini (2005), which are likely to determine the intensity and 
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efficacy of transport infrastructure projects on urban development, redevelopment, and regeneration 
(UDRR), include: 
 
• The stability of the local economic situation, which influences whether the effects of transport 
infrastructure projects can be predicted.  
• Large scale transport infrastructure tends to have a relatively bigger development potential in 
terms of effects upon UDRR. 
• New transport infrastructure projects have stronger effects in urban areas that are in decline or 
have declined rather than in well-developed already prosperous areas. 
• High existing local market demand for new space and the accommodation of new land uses will 
make new transport infrastructure projects a more effective catalyst for intensifying the 
redevelopment process of the area.  
 
Discussion of these issues will draw attention to which form of institutional arrangements can realise 
sustainable urban regeneration when using MUTPs as the core strategy. The role of political power 
will also be examined in terms of bargaining powers that operate within the project-led networks. 
1.3.3 Influence of politics in mega-project decision-making 
This research postulates that institutional arrangements and political power relations are two crucial 
factors of mega-project planning. Although the issues of inequality among various participants in the 
decision-making process and the misinterpretation of democratic processes have been much debated, 
the decision-makers continue to be those who hold more resources, i.e. investors with greater 
investments and politicians who have more influence (see Altshuler & Luberoff, 2003). The argument 
lies in the ultimate determining factor of the mega-project decision-making, which is political power 
rather than the power of the rationality of technocrats.  
 
This aspect needs in-depth study by way of three approaches. Firstly, the research draws on the 
characteristics of decision-making, including ‘disjointed incrementalism’ (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 
1963) and path-dependent decision-making (Pierson, 2000). Secondly, the research identifies 
contextual factors requiring further analysis in order to gain more insights into decision-making 
processes, such as institutional settings, political environment, and social and cultural milieu, which 
can contribute to the complexity and uncertainty of mega-project delivery (see Ben-Haim, 2001; 
Catlaw, 2006; Hajer, 2003a). Finally, the research studies how the mechanism of mega-project 
decision-making, which embraces the use of discourse power (see Hajer, 1995 and 2003a; Roche, 
2000) and a project-led networking (see Ansell, 2000; Beauregard, 2005; Castells, 1996; Low, 2005), 
can validate the premise which suggests that political power in mega-project decision-making is 
reinforced by the use of project discourse and project-led networking. Chapter 2 includes in-depth 
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discussion on these theoretical concepts.   
1.3.4 Visions of sustainable urban regeneration 
Sustainable urban regeneration, which has become a vision of policy-makers seeking to overcome 
urban problems in declining areas, encompasses issues such as poverty, inequality, economic decline, 
and the deterioration of the quality of life (see Dixon, 2007). Examples of the emergence of 
sustainable urban regeneration as a forefront issue can be seen in 2005 Planning Policy Statement 1 
(PPS1) (ODPM, 2005), The London Plan (2008), and the 2007 Planning White Paper (HM 
Government, 2007). Sustainable urban regeneration is seen as a means which leads to continuous 
urban operations accompanied by long-lasting improvements in economic, physical, social, and 
environmental conditions (Roberts, 2000; see also Healey, 1995; Hemphill, 2006; and Rydin, 2003). 
According to previous literature (for example, Camagni et al. 1997; Hjorth and Bagheri, 2006; 
Newman, 2006; Rydin et al. 2003), the achievement in sustainable urban regeneration in terms of 
economic growth, social equity, or environmental protection is driven, under the transformation 
process, by changes in economic structure, urban governance, and public perceptions. The importance 
of social equity and environmental protection is meanwhile rising. These factors influence MUTP 
developments, so we can assume that sustainability of urban regeneration where MUTP is the main 
strategy depends on the visions of decision-makers.  
 
Economic growth still remains the prime goal of many urban regeneration schemes, although the issue 
of the sustainability of such development has arisen over recent decades (Davies, 2002; Dixon, 2007). 
In this context, the economic performance influenced by MUTP development plays an essential role 
in sustainable urban regeneration. Banister and Berechman (2001) have investigated the conditions in 
which transport investment leads to economic development, and conclude: “the measurable and 
additional economic development benefits from transport development can be found only when 
economic investments, political policy, and institutions operate at the same time.” Economic 
performance may be catalysed effectively by the delivery of a mega project. However, the economic 
growth is merely a partial improvement for cities in terms of sustainable urban regeneration. It lacks 
comprehensive benefits and social integrity for the majority of city residents. For instance, many city 
regeneration projects in the USA and the UK show that, although urban regeneration policies 
successfully transform some urban zones into a business environment attractive to investors, the 
benefits of the output and jobs generated often did not trickle down to local people (Healey, 1995). 
Under this circumstance, it seems that there is a gap between sustainability and actual performance.  
 
According to the previous studies (e.g. Banister and Berechman, 2001; Gospodini, 2005), we may 
assume that sustainable urban regeneration could be attained when MUTPs act as the main strategy. 
This research assesses how the objectives of institutional arrangements and the vision of the actors in 
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the mega-project decision-making process impact on the level of achievement in sustainability. It also 
analyses how the stakeholders respond to the gaps between the sustainable development visions and 
the outcomes of the projects studied. 
1.3.5 Public-private coalitions and overcoming institutional barriers 
There has been much debate about the strength and misperception of public-private coalitions (e.g. 
Davies, 2003) as well as the criticism about the silo thinking and closed system within an institutional 
network (see Kingdon, 1995). When considering the role of MUTPs in urban regeneration planning, it 
is important to analyse the stakeholders network on a basis that the network structure is not only elite-
based but also pluralist-based (Judge, 1995; McCann, 2001; Ward, 2000).  
 
Thus the institutional networks, stakeholder power diffusion, urban change, and policy response, 
which are interdependent issues, need to be considered together. One of the objectives of this study is 
to analyse the pattern of stakeholder coalition and see how the institutional barriers built up by the 
path-dependent behaviour from the dominant actors impact on mega-project decision-making.  
 
Figure 1.3: Research Scope  
 
1.4 Research Questions 
Based on the associated premises and the research dimensions listed above, the primary research 
question and the sub-questions that this thesis seeks to answer are as follows:  
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
22 
 
 
When multiple mega projects are instigated in the same timeframe and same spatial context, 
can they be integrated to produce synergistic outcomes that are greater than the sum of their 
parts? 
 
The following sub-questions elaborate on the primary research question: 
 
(1) What is the role of mega urban transport projects in sustainable urban regeneration and mega 
events; and what are their relationships given the institutional contexts and frameworks that they 
have been planned, appraised, and delivered within? 
 
(2) How do institutional arrangements and decision-makers respond in order to manage changes of 
contexts and environments in the planning of MUTP, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega 
events? 
 
(3) Can several synchronised mega projects deliver a favourable outcome to stakeholders if they 
integrate and mutually reinforce each other, rather than compete for limited social, economic, 
political, and environmental resources? 
 
(4) Have mega project discourses been used as tools by key champions to convince others of the 
validity of the mega projects in the expectation that these discourses will be shared by a broader 
spectrum of stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the interests of 
these champions and empowering the project delivery network? 
1.5 Research Hypotheses 
The main hypothesis and its sub-hypotheses are elaborated in line with each research question and 
their associated premises (see Section 1.3). Also, on the basis of the previous discussion on MUTPs, 
sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events, the hypotheses focus on the role of MUTPs in 
promoting sustainable urban regeneration schemes and international mega events. The interplay 
between the roles of these three types of mega projects is also presented. In responding to the primary 
research question, the author hypothesises that: 
 
MUTPs can be an effective factor for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and 
international mega events; furthermore, mega events can positively catalyse both MUTP 
development and sustainable urban regeneration. Notwithstanding this, it is assumed that there 
are many other influencing factors which will lead to different outcomes for urban regeneration 
and mega events despite the use of MUTPs as a major strategic vehicle.  
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In accordance with previous study on ‘path dependency theory’ (North, 1993; Pierson, 2000), the 
research premise is that path-dependent institutional arrangements embedded in public-private 
coalitions and inter-organisational co-operation obstruct the process of the transformation of the 
decision-making mechanism into a more efficient form. Moreover, this inefficient structure will 
impede the progress of effective sustainable urban regeneration policies because vested interest groups 
who hold the power to shape the policies are in control of the main decisions, which they influence 
according to maximise their private benefits. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that previous patterns of urban political structures preserve influential 
“paths” for current or future urban development decision-making mechanisms (see Greener, 2005; 
Kallis, 2005; North, 1993; and Pierson, 2000). The transformation process of mega-project decision-
making needs to be evaluated over time in order to understand how mega-project policies respond to 
changes in urban political structures, and what the approach to sustainability within a bottom-up, 
place-specific, longer-term, and pluralistic environment. Within this context, the main research 
hypothesis is restated as the following three sub-hypotheses: 
 
(1) MUTPs have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration 
and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and sustainable urban 
regeneration development. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both 
sustainable urban regeneration and the Olympic development associated with its transport hubs. 
 
(2) Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the 
effective delivery and performance of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and 
mega-event-related development (see Jones and Evans, 2006; Rydin et al., 2003; Walter and 
Scholz, 2007; Roche, 2000). 
 
(3) Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban 
regeneration, and mega events can effectively foster integrated development and the achievement 
of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects. 
 
(4) Key champions of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events typically establish 
their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks 
of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with 
limited sense of corporate social responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse 
powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same 
discourse, even though they may have different agendas (see Hajer, 1995 and 2003a; Roche, 
2000). 
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1.6 Overall Research Methodology 
This section describes the overall research methodology. In order to answer the research questions, 
this research focuses on the analysis of institutional arrangements and power relations in mega-project 
decision-making processes and seeks to detect whether the collaboration between MUTP development, 
urban regeneration, and mega event planning can lead to sustainable development. The investigation 
will be undertaken by means of case study on a contextual analysis basis. This research proceeds in 
three phases (see Figure1.1):  
 
Phase 1 constitutes a literature review following two parallel tracks:  
• a literature review of practice to identify the critical issues in the scope of MUTPs connected 
with urban regeneration and mega events; and  
• a literature review of theory relevant to the mega-project decision-making process.  
 
Phase 2 consists of a UK case study to be examined using the theoretical framework and an analytical 
model generated from Phase 1.  
 
Phase 3 assesses the research hypotheses on the strength of the previous two phases and interprets the 
context-dependent lessons for future delivery of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega 
events. 
 
Figure 1.4: The Two-Pronged Approach of Case Study Methodology 
 
Source: OMEGA Centre (2007) 
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The methodology of case study is a two-pronged approach (see Figure1.4) which involves pre-
hypothesis investigations and hypothesis-led interviews. Both prongs are based on the implementation 
of story-telling (see Hajer, 1995) for data collection in order to gain more insights into the decision-
making process of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events. The detailed rationale of 
the case study method is elaborated in Chapter 3.  
1.7 Case Study Selection 
Criteria for case selection are:  
•  to elucidate the interrelationships between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega 
events; 
• to explore the possibility of the synergy between these three types of urban development; and 
• to detect the complex power relations and institutional arrangements among multiple layers of 
players. 
With these criteria in mind, the case selected for this research involve a wide range of stakeholders 
aiming at the delivery of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and international mega events. The 
UK case of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) is an ideal candidate. It has two major urban 
regeneration schemes and the 2012 London Olympics as the mega event adjacent to the stations 
(hubs), i.e., King’ Cross Central scheme next to the St Pancras International station and Stratford City 
scheme surrounding Stratford International station. A brief summary of this case follows (more detail 
is addressed in chapters 4-6): 
 
CTRL is the first high-speed railway link in Britain. The line is 109km in length and is split into two 
construction sections. Section 1 opened in September 2003 and runs from the Channel Tunnel to 
Fawkham Junction in north Kent. The majority of the new high-speed line runs alongside the M2 and 
M20 motorways through Kent. Section 2 of the project was opened on 14th November 2007. The 
track stretches from Ebbsfleet in Kent to London St. Pancras. All Eurostar trains used suburban lines 
to enter London at the Waterloo International Terminal until section 2 opened, at which point the 
Eurostar trains were routed to St. Pancras International.  
 
Delivery of the CTRL has prompted several vociferous debates relevant to the main theme of this 
research. These debates include, for instance, whether the urban regeneration promises accompanying 
the project are achievable; whether the Link was a key factor in London’s successful 2012 Olympic 
Bid; and whether sustainable development goals have modified decisions about the CTRL. According 
to the CTRL developer (London and Continental Railways Ltd.), urban regeneration benefits are vital 
as to justify the project delivery and to sway stakeholders. King’s Cross Central and Stratford City are 
located in the two main brownfield regeneration sites promoted by CTRL. Additionally, the 2012 
Olympic Park venue is located in Stratford, which also prompts significant issues associated with the 
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mega-event intervention.  
 
This investigation discusses the interrelationships between the CTRL project, the King’s Cross 
Central and the Stratford urban regeneration schemes, and the preparation for the 2012 London 
Olympics. It aims to identify the interaction within the cluster of this urban development and to 
further assess its effectiveness in realising sustainable development.   
1.8 Thesis Structure 
This thesis comprises 7 chapters. The first chapter consists of an introduction to the overall research 
methodology, including research background, scope, hypothesis setting, primary research questions, 
and a brief description of the research method. It is followed by a literature review on MUTPs, 
sustainable urban regeneration, mega events, and the theories of decision-making in Chapter 2. In 
Chapter 3, a methodology for the case study is introduced. The case study methodology employs a 
two-pronged approach comprising, the pre-hypothesis research based on the Cognitive Edge1 method 
and the hypothesis-led research based on a conventional structured questionnaire. The core of the case 
study methodology is based upon narrative analysis through capturing narratives among stakeholders. 
The term ‘narrative’ is used in a broad sense to include written articles and transcripts of spoken 
material. The Cognitive Edge methodology seeks to identify narrative patterns for dealing with 
complexity, uncertainty, and risk in order to facilitate decision-making rather than traditional 
strategies, which involve assumptions of order, of rational choice, and of intent. The data collection 
method, the analytical framework, and the comparative framework are also elaborated in this chapter. 
 
Chapters 4 through 6 consist of the case study, conducted in order to test hypotheses, reveal new 
issues, and ultimately answer the research questions. Chapter 4 covers the CTRL project with 
associated urban regeneration projects in King’s Cross area, known as King’s Cross Central (Chapter 
5), and Stratford City development in east London. The King’s Cross area contains the King’s Cross 
Railway Lands, home to the CTRL terminus at St Pancras International Station, while the Stratford 
City development is dominated by the Stratford International Station, another CTRL terminus in the 
heart of its developing site. The Stratford City regeneration scheme also plays a significant role as a 
gateway to the main 2012 London Olympic Games venues. The Stratford City scheme and the 2012 
London Olympic Games form the third part of the case study, discussed in Chapter 6. In the final 
layer, Chapter 7 draws conclusions from the findings of the overall research and case study, and 
recognises generic and context-sensitive lessons for future planning of major transport projects, 
sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events.  
                                                
1 Cognitive Edge Pty is a consultancy set up by David Snowden that addresses problems of complexity through knowledge 
management (see http://www.cognitive-edge.com/). 
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2 Literature Review of Mega Projects and their 
Decision-Making Process  
2.1 Introduction 
A core research question within this PhD investigation is “what are the critical interrelationships 
between mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban regeneration, and mega-events?” 
In seeking answers to that question, this chapter includes a literature review of these three types of 
mega projects and the theoretical dimensions of decision-making in mega project development.  
 
The discussion proceeds in six main phases: Section 2.1 gives clear definitions of MUTPs, sustainable 
urban regeneration, mega events, institutional arrangements, and power relations for this study. 
Clarification of these research subjects helps to establish a solid basis for discussion about the 
decision-making process in mega-project investments. Section 2.2 presents an analysis of key issues 
relating to the three types of urban development studied in this research. These key issues include 
initiatives of mega-project promotion, transport and mega-event investments for urban economic 
growth leading to regeneration, and forces of globalisation on mega-project investments. Section 2.3 
reviews relevant mega-project literature and establishes a theoretical framework for the case study 
analysis. This is followed by a discussion of gaps in the existing literature and how this research can 
fill them (Section 2.4). Section 2.5 summarises the emergent issues and the questions arising from 
these issues. These questions closely relate to the research questions and are the basis of the 
questionnaire design. Section 2.6 concludes this chapter. 
2.1.1 Defining mega urban transport projects 
This section gives the definitions of MUTPs. MUTPs provide the focus of this study along with their 
potential contributions to sustainable urban regeneration and mega events. This PhD research was 
conducted as part of the OMEGA Centre research programme in MUTPs financed by VREF
2, therefore the definition and case study examined here reflects the set of criteria provided by the 
OMEGA Centre (Dimitriou et al., 2008). The study by Bruzelius et al. (2002: 144) of large 
infrastructure investments in Denmark and Germany highlights certain features of mega projects. 
According to the two research programmes above, MUTPs are characterised as:  
                                                
2 See OMEGA Centre website: http://www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/ and the VREF website: http://www.vref.se/ 
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 Land-based transport infrastructure investments within and connecting ‘urban areas’ (as defined 
in the VREF FUT Policy Statement) in the form of bridge, tunnel, road and rail links, or 
combinations of these. 
 Projects that entail a construction cost of over US$ 1 billion at 1999 prices. 
 Projects that are perceived as critical to the success of major urban and metropolitan development 
initiatives. 
 Long life time of 50 years and more 
 Considerable uncertainty with respect to demand forecasts and cost estimations 
 A substantial role of project funding played by the state  
 Considerable share of indirect benefits which cannot be captured by the operator (benefits not 
occurring to the users of the project rather than to third parties). 
 
In the interests of manageability, the scope of this study is confined to land-based transport projects. 
The physical structure of these projects may be simply represented as a series of transport nodes, a 
transport line-haul, and their affiliated developments including regeneration schemes and mega events 
as illustrated in Figure 2.1.  
 
Figure 2.1: CTRL Line-Haul and Its Affiliated Developments 
 
Source: Author 
2.1.2 Defining sustainable urban regeneration 
Sustainable urban regeneration has become the dominant agenda of contemporary urban development 
policy that aims to facilitate cities maintaining and improving their competitiveness (see National 
Planning Policy Guidance: General policy and principles, 1997; The London Plan, 2004 and The 
Planning White Paper: Planning for a Sustainable Future, 2007). According to Roberts (2000: 17), 
urban regeneration is defined as “ comprehensive and integrated vision and action which leads to the 
resolution of urban problems and which seeks to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, 
physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subject to change.” The varied 
contexts include physical conditions, economic systems, the political situation and global trends 
attributed to different urban problems. Notwithstanding how diverse the problems are, the definition 
supports the premise that there is a common desire to prevent cities from declining, and that there is a 
need to attract inward investment and improve competitiveness.  
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From the wide range of urban regeneration projects, this research focuses on prestige urban 
regeneration schemes, with ‘sustainable development’ at the heart of their discourse. These projects 
are defined by Loftman and Nevin as “a pioneering or innovative, high profile, large-scale, self-
contained development which is primarily justified in terms of its ability to attract inward investment, 
create and promote new urban images and act as the hub of a radiating renaissance - facilitating 
increases in land values and development activities to adjacent areas” (1995: 300). According to 
Bianchini et al (1992) and Loftman and Nevin (1995), these prestige urban regeneration projects are 
characterised by the following features:  
• They are important instruments for the transformation of entrepreneurial urban governance; 
• They are the extension and reinforcement of property-led development; 
• They are adjacent to flagship architecture, landmark buildings, major office complexes, pivotal 
transport hubs or leisure and sporting facilities;  
• They involve the “rhetoric of partnership” and elite-dominated urban policy formation (Some 
would argue this is a biased observation in that “real partnership” have also taken place); 
• They are usually located in areas conducive to business opportunity and equipped with a 
‘convenient’ regulatory environment for attracting private-sector money, such as a central 
business district; 
• The public sector provides initiatives to attract private sector capital for the delivery of these 
projects by concessionary contracts; 
• They marshal powerful vested interests, elite groups, and politicians to form a project-led 
network; 
• They involve massive investment and high financial risk; whereby  
• They are financed by mechanisms including public-private partnerships, joint ventures or through 
the extensive provision of public grants or subsidies. 
2.1.3 Defining mega events 
This research concentrates on mega cultural and sporting events which are plan-led and which are 
supported by designated policies at local, national, and international levels, and examines the 
decision-making process at each level. Mega events can be defined as events which lead to radical 
changes in public perceptions (for example, in consumerism and modernity), local needs, and political 
demands, and which typically result in economic restructuring and the changing of policies in mega 
infrastructure investments (see Altshuler and Luberoff, 2003: 18). In this sense, mega events may be 
regarded as nodes on the historical path of economic and urban developments which shape the current 
context (see Arthur, 1994).  
 
Roche’s (2000) analysis considers the cultural aspects of mega events, including the changing cultural 
powers (of capitalism, nationalism, and imperialism), the role of cultural citizenship (consumerism 
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and internationalism), the mobility of tourism, the competition of the media, the localised identity as it 
sits with the global society, as well as the connection between the mega events and significant human 
life-style changes. 
 
According to Burbank et al. (2001: 7), a mega event is “a political production adopted for given 
agendas across different levels of stakeholders”. According to a number of scholars (see Andranovich 
et al., 2001; Burbank et al., 2001; Carrière and Demazière, 2002; Poynter, 2009; Preuss, 2004; Roche, 
2000; Shoval, 2002), mega events are characterised by the following features:  
• They are created, organised, and controlled by elite groups; 
• They are reinforced by ideological and propagandist discourses; 
• They have high adaptability toward the global political environment;  
• They benefit from a kind of ‘sacredness’ and protectionism that is inherent in the mega events; 
• They play an important role in nation-building, national identity reinforcement and national 
marketing; and 
• Mega events, especially the expos, lead to the initiation of touristic consumerism. 
2.1.4 Defining institutional arrangements and power relations 
According to Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999), institutional arrangements constitute a system that 
locates multiple project stakeholders and distributes powers of decision-making among them. This is 
not to say that institutional arrangements can necessarily empower all actors equally, for balance is 
often achieved by relying on the dominant powers within the hierarchical relationships of stakeholders. 
In this regard, institutional arrangements can be seen as a variety of coordinating mechanisms which 
“provide actors with vocabularies and logics for pursuing their goals, for defining what is valued, and 
for shaping the norms and rules by which they are to abide” (Hollingsworth and Boyer, 1999: 3). 
 
Discussion of power relations in this thesis focuses on the dynamics that produce distinctive patterns 
of stakeholder interactions and what effects these forces have on mega-project decision-making.  
Bruno Latour (1986) looks at power in the pursuit of understanding the power relations with a 
sociological approach. He introduced a ‘translation model’ which is premised on the belief that 
successful command transmitted results stem from “the action of a chain of agents each of whom 
‘translates’ it in accordance with his/her own projects [interests]”. In this sense Latour argues that this 
translation model has power composed by enrolling many actors in a given political and social 
scheme. His view differs from the traditional explanation of power which employs a ‘transmission 
model’ that transmits the same power albeit deflected or slowed down by various sources of frictions 
(lack of communication, ill will, opposition of interest groups, indifference, etc.) (Law, 1986: 264-
280). Both in the translation model and the transmission model of power, power relations within mega 
project decision-making processes are signified by a mobility of impetus within command and 
information networks and the reaction of stakeholders to these.  
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Latour’s translation model shows clearly that the way project stakeholders’ act determines the 
provisional bonds made in stakeholder networking. Because a healthy stakeholder network requires 
consistent engagement by all parties, Latour stresses this point by saying that power can be treated as 
the consequence of an intense activity of enrolling, convincing, and enlisting in practice (Latour, 1986: 
273). Under this concept, the primary initiative for a mega-project stakeholder to positively react is 
whether the given project discourse (i.e., project objectives, visions, and policies) can help him/her 
achieve their agendas and whether the institutional arrangements can give them opportunity to 
exercise their negotiation powers.  
 
As Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) illustrated in their model (see Figure 2.2), institutional 
arrangements combine two-dimensional elements: the nature of the action’s motive and the 
distribution of power it reflects. They pose six categories of institutional arrangements in their model: 
markets, hierarchies, communities, states, networks, and associations.  
 
Figure 2.2: Institutional Arrangement Model 
Source: Author, edited from Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999: 12) 
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Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999: 10) stress that institutional arrangements are constrained by the 
social context within which they are embedded. They suggest that in order to understand the structure 
of institutional coordination and its related power distribution, one needs to be sensitive to this social 
context and the features of their embeddedness.  
2.2 Key Issues  
In this section issues emerging from the published literature are explored. These include the impacts 
of institutional arrangements and power relations in the decision-making process and the 
interrelationship between large-scale investment in transport and mega events and the achievements of 
sustainable urban regeneration enabled by them.   
2.2.1 Initiatives involving the promotion of mega projects 
MUTP investments are often considered critical to enhance competitiveness in this era of economic 
globalisation. Such investments have the potential to tackle the twin challenges of recession and 
climate change (see Dimitriou, 2010; Greengauge 21, 2007a). Economic growth and development has 
been the rationale driving capital investment in large-scale transport infrastructure.  
 
We are in a phase of intense global competition, yet perversely we are in dire need of global 
coordination better to tackle challenges of poverty, famine, energy shortages, financial crisis and 
climate change at the global level (see Dimitriou, 2010). As a result of globalisation, there is an 
increasingly integrated global economy with international trade agreements and higher labour 
mobility together stimulating demand-sensitive logistical transportation (see Janelle and Beuthe, 
1997). These are consistent with many trends in global economic restructuring with deregulation and 
privatisation combining to enlarging the role of multinational corporations (ibid.). According to 
Dimitriou (2009), prior to the world economic downturn of 2008 global investment in infrastructure 
increased enormously in the preceding 10 years. He observes these investments are promoted by a 
global elite of players who are often ‘national champions’, politically well-connected and frequently 
pan-European. He argues that such investments not only produce financial returns but, more 
importantly, perhaps landmark projects seen to symbolise the economic virility of national or city 
economies. Multinational corporations or global investors (of which Deutsche Bank Group and 
Macquarie Bank Group are prime examples) have gradually come to play a primary role in the 
transport infrastructure development of many emerging economies by forming a strategic relationship 
with nation states that are eager to demonstrate themselves as successful sovereign nations. Janelle 
and Beuthe (1997) point out that states are proactive in providing these investment giants a supportive 
business environment and many such bodies play an active role in financing, marketing, and 
protecting the infrastructure market as well as endeavouring to attract more international businesses to 
locate their headquarters in their jurisdiction. The same trends also affect the initiatives of the 
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development of sustainable urban regeneration schemes.  
 
In the case of those prestige urban regeneration projects, certain styles of buildings and design seem 
dominant in many of the late 20th century regeneration schemes worldwide (Bianchini et al., 1992). 
This may be as a result of the influence of the global corporations involved in such developments, 
reinforced by the global financial interdependence and the trans-national values they bring with them 
in design, decision-making, marketing, and production. This trend has continued into the 21st century 
with corporations, such as Westfield Group, Lend Lease Group, and Mott MacDonald Group, are 
highly competent in pursuing the development opportunities of areas with high investment potential 
and a convenient regulatory environment. City leaders concurrently have a strong desire to retain 
designers with international reputations, deploy advanced technology and innovative building 
materials in their developments as well as the tendency to imitate models of development from other 
cities. These are factors in generating homogeneity in the vision of cities. The role of prestige urban 
regeneration schemes as a cornerstone for place-marketing, tourism, and a consumption-based city 
image has long been criticised by groups that support the idea of more organic and community-
orientated development. This is a long-standing perennial controversy for policy-makers who are all 
too often constrained by the need for quick and visible solutions to local economic challenges of 
decline.  
 
Advocates of the ‘trickle-down’ ideology maintain that the implementation of prestigious projects acts 
as a stimulus to positive impacts on urban regeneration. The results can, however, be mixed. 
Bianchini et al (1992), for example, argue that those prestige projects that are usually associated with 
prime property-led development actually bring more difficulties to small local businesses and low-
income residents by virtue of increased land and property rental values that they can ill-afford (ibid.: 
251-252).   
 
Proponents of mega events argue that they can spawn development that may otherwise not come 
about or certainly not at the speed generated by the mega-event timescales. Hiller (2000) argues that 
the advocacy of mega events can camouflage other interests hidden in the rhetoric about development. 
There is plentiful evidence of pressures emanating from diplomatic sources that suggests that these 
bids are more politically-driven than many others (Shoval, 2002). The promotion of economic growth 
as a justification for hosting mega events remains a point of contention across the world (see Shoval, 
2002). The premise postulated here is that other intangible objectives, such as global media exposure, 
national image and identity-building, establishing civic pride, and reinforcing government authority 
become major drivers for local and national political leaders to pursue such events.  
 
In times of recession in both USA in the 1930s and Japan in the 1980s and 1990s, mega project 
investments played a crucial role as economic stimuli (Dimitriou, 2009). Arguments in favour of the 
development of mega projects were addressed by SMEC (2001: 2) and are summarised as follows:  
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
34 
• mega projects are likely to attract development planners and political leaders as a single solution 
to interdependent and complex problems;  
• they are regarded as national symbols resulting from government developments;  
• the process of globalisation creates an enhanced global institutional capacity and financial 
network that encourages such large-scale projects to be built by international co-operation;  
• technological advancements underlying the change to a modern lifestyle and the increased 
dependency on technology; and 
• increasing demands on comprehensive transit networks which highlight the inter-dependency of 
transport projects and thereby augment the scale of mega projects. 
2.2.2 Transport investment for urban economic growth  
Dimitriou (2010) argues that the opportunities brought by the strategic investment in transport 
infrastructure can significantly boost an economy confronting great uncertainties. This was 
demonstrated in the US as part of the ‘New Deal’ in confronting the challenges of the recession in the 
1930s; in France where the investment in the high-speed railway network boosted its international 
economic competitiveness and continues to stimulate its economic vitality and sustainability; and in 
Hong Kong, where its massive port and airport infrastructure programme of projects in the years 
immediately before its handover to China created economic certainty and optimism where otherwise 
little would have existed.  
 
There is a large body of research investigating whether transport investment can significantly assist 
urban regeneration. The consensus is that transport investment alone cannot have a decisive influence 
(see Banister and Berechman, 2000 and 2002; Flyvbjerg, 2003; Gospodini, 2000; TTD and AITD, 
2007). It is instead generally believed that infrastructure investments, particularly in transport are 
essential in enabling and supporting economic growth and boosting competitiveness in association 
with other measures. Rietveld et al. (2001) emphasise the interdependence between transport 
infrastructure and economic growth. They contend that transport infrastructure is a necessity for the 
functioning of an economy through this vital support of the production and consumption processes. 
Rietveld et al. (2001) offer a brief review of practices in the economic evaluation of MUTPs in 
several countries, including UK, Germany, France, EU, Japan, and USA. The findings of the OMEGA 
Centre broadly endorse those of Rietveld et al, in particular that there are deep-rooted problems in the 
usage of traditional regional economic impact methodologies (such as Cost Benefit Analysis) to 
assess transport infrastructure investment. Rietveld et al., (2001: 7) see that  “...changes in transport 
provision may lead to specific local growth, but [that] much of this will be a redistribution of 
economic activity between regions or localities rather than net overall growth” The work of the 
OMEGA Centre suggests that broader multi-criteria appraisal methodologies can provide a more 
appropriate and transparent framework for MUTP appraisal with the additional benefit that it can 
track changes in political decisions as they transpire. This is seen to be especially useful when (despite 
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the rhetoric) the ‘sustainable business case’ is overridden by conventional more short term interests 
associated with ‘business as usual’ practices (Dimitriou et al., 2010). 
 
Gospodini’s (2005) study of twelve European cities, suggests there are five influencing factors, apart 
from the size of investment, on which the scale of the effects of urban development, redevelopment, 
and regeneration depend. These are: 
• The type of the transport infrastructure project 
• The condition of the built environment in the greater corridor area 
• Existing local market demand for new space and the accommodation of new land uses 
• The local economic situation 
• The local institutional framework and political milieu 
 
According to Banister and Berechman (2001), a “supportive business environment” embraces the 
contention that only when investment conditions and political and institutional conditions operating at 
the same time are measurable and the additional economic development benefits generated by 
transport investment can be identified will such a supportive business emerge. Buck et al. (2002) 
argue that the ‘urban triangle’ constituted by competitiveness, cohesion, and governance strategically 
shape the ideal sustainable function of urban environment. This issue is supported by Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2003: 72) who claim that, although the common situation for proponents of MUTPs is to claim that 
such projects will result in substantial development effects, the empirical evidence shows that such 
claims are rarely justified. The conditions required, they suggest, are similar to those identified by 
Banister and Berechman (2001) and Buck et al. (2002) in that they all include not only investment 
conditions but also the institutional and political environment. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003: 71) emphasise 
that “only under a number of specific conditions can one expect a significant positive impact of 
investments in transport infrastructure on regional economic growth.” According to the same source, 
these conditions include:  
• if serious capacity problems exist;  
• if there is a relocation of households and companies triggered by new capacity and significant 
transport savings; and  
• when there is a combination of various types of investments in both infrastructure and social 
capital attracted by proactive development policies. 
2.2.3 Mega event development for urban economic growth 
In the wake of the financial success of the 1984 Los Angeles Olympic Games, U.S. cities began to see 
the Olympics as a vehicle for a city’s transformation without consuming large sums of taxpayers’ 
money (Burbank et al., 2001: 7). Andranovich et al. (2001: 113) refer to the importance of mega 
events in economic development: “As cities compete for jobs and capital in the context of limited 
federal aid and increasing global economic competition, a new and potentially high-risk strategy for 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
36 
stimulating local economic growth has emerged. This strategy, called the mega-event strategy, entails 
the quest for a high-profile event to serve as a stimulus to, and justification for, local development”. 
People turning their attention toward activities in leisure, entertainment, tourism, and sports is an 
irreversible tendency. This is one of the stimuli to enhance the attraction of the mega events 
(Andranovich et al., 2001). Although cities will take risks in hosting a mega event since even bidding 
for the events is not without considerable cost, the allure of hosting a mega event will remain. This 
illuminates some questions, such as how are policies concerning mega events made? What roles do 
promoters of mega events play? One way to decrease risks is to extend the planning in the bidding 
stage; if a city loses out in the bidding, the substitute plan can be introduced to carry on improving the 
city’s development. However, there is no simple answer to reducing the risks for cities competing to 
host mega events. 
 
Burbank et al. (2001) claim that advocates of mega events as attractive generators of competitive 
economic growth will continuously use the symbolic value of such events to try and influence policy-
making and to claim that, with careful planning, this in turn will fulfil the local agendas, such as urban 
regeneration benefits. The same source also claims that in the case of the Olympics, they are explicitly 
used to promote consumption-oriented goals of economic development and not for establishing better 
public-private partnership mechanisms to implement Olympic developments that entail meaningful 
citizen participation in the process of Olympic delivery. This they claim has led to the needs of the 
locality often suffering in the pursuit of the visions of the Olympics ideal.  
 
The success of the Barcelona 1992 Olympics has become an exemplar for many followers. It 
dramatically illustrates the transformation, as a result of the Games from a city with a declining local 
economy to one that has subsequently flourished as a new international centre for service and tourism 
(see Monclús, 2003). A mega-event is not a panacea. Olympic host cities Montreal (1976) and Athens 
(2004) incurred major financial deficits in staging the Games and subsequent venue maintenance  
throwing a long-term financial burden on local taxpayers and a legacy of ‘white elephant’ facilities.  
 
Mega events in different ways can be instrumental in creating a plausible new vision of the urban 
development for the city and inspire others to follow it. Once investors are attracted, large amounts of 
international investment are expected to flow into the city that otherwise would not have been 
received. What is less appreciated however, is that the success in the competition for international 
funds for the successful host city can bring with it competition at the local level, resulting from the 
diversion of funds from earlier earmarked local investments. This has been the case of the 2012 
London Olympic where the high costs of this mega-event are largely being raised by the National 
Lottery in conjunction with private sector investment and increasing levels of government funds. How 
decisions were made to divert these resources ultimately relates to the discoursing power which will 
be further illustrated in the case study chapter (Chapter 6). There is finally the question of whether the 
economic growth brought about by the mega event subsequently can be modified to meets local needs 
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and, if so, whether the same outcome could be achieved without involving such grandiose plans, 
involving far less risk and much less cost. 
2.2.4 Forces of globalisation on mega-project decision-making 
We are in a phase of intense global competition, and are in a dire need of global coordination to better 
tackle the global challenges of poverty, famine, energy shortages, financial crises and climate change 
(see Dimitriou, 2010). As a result of globalisation, there is an increasingly integrated global economy 
with international trade agreements and higher labour mobility all provoking demand-sensitive 
logistical transportation and infrastructure investments (see Janelle and Beuthe, 1997). These are 
consistent with many trends in global economic restructuring with deregulation and privatisation 
collectively enlarging the role of multinational corporations (ibid.). 
 
Multinational corporations and global investors (such as Deutsche Bank Group and Macquarie Bank 
Group) have come to play a primary role in mega project development in many emerging economies 
by forming strategic relationships with nation states that are eager to prove themselves as viable 
sovereign nations. Janelle and Beuthe (1997) point out that states are proactive in providing these 
investment giants a supportive business environment and many such bodies play an active role in 
financing, marketing, and protecting the infrastructure market as well as endeavouring to attract more 
international businesses to locate their headquarters in their jurisdiction. The reasoning behind these 
state investments still focuses on the competitiveness of the cities in the global arena. Large-scale 
infrastructure investments raise the issues of the rise of the private sector with their over-
empowerment as a result of the effects of globalisation and weakened allegiance to public interest 
through mega-project decision-making process.  
 
The globalisation phenomenon is ignited by the reinforcement between hard and soft networks (see 
Castells, 1996). There is then a growing regional economic cooperation in large infrastructure 
developments which is incentivised by the forces of globalisation, which, in return, reinforce the 
trends of globalisation. The following quotation from TTD and AITD (2007: 39) summarises this 
situation:  
There has been a proliferation of overlapping bilateral and multilateral infrastructure-related 
agreements, which highlights the increased importance of coordination and harmonization at the 
regional level.  
 
The influence of globalisation is pervasive, especially on the creation of (new) regionalism. The 
combination of these two characterises a specific kind of risk that large infrastructure investments face. 
They are known as “systemic risks” (TTD and AITD, 2007) that include the issues of political 
relations in a complex transnational infrastructure project network where certain groups grow to 
posses the power to control key infrastructure links and nodes. For example, the project proponent 
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groups become dominant actors that have the potential to capture most of the resources within the 
network and step by step take control of the decision-making process if unchallenged. This regional 
coordination which involves the integration into an increasingly homogeneous body of cross-nation 
standards for transport implementation and governance which according to Janelle and Beuthe (1997) 
displays a certain degree of path-dependent effect derived from locking-in standards that discourage 
innovation. 
 
Janelle and Beuthe (1997) further suggest that flexibility and mobility in following the markets - for 
capital, human resources, raw material resources, favourable regulatory and taxation environments, 
labour and consumption patterns - as the properties of multinational corporations, provide them with a 
superior negotiation position and persuade them to involve large-scale transport infrastructure 
developments. The interests in efficiency and liberalisation of international trade, both encouraged by 
the development of infrastructure, favour less state intervention. Nevertheless, the environmental and 
social concerns for the consequences of mega project development urge the government to take 
further action. In addition, the regional entities, such as NAFTA, the European Union and the World 
Bank, already impose more rigorous standards, protocols, transparency and accountability 
mechanisms to place environmental and social sustainability firmly in their development paradigm 
(Infrastructure Network, 2006).  
2.3 Theoretical Framework 
This section includes discussions on decision-making in mega-project planning, appraisal, and 
delivery, and the theories of ‘institutional arrangements’, ‘power relations’, ‘disjointed 
incrementalism’ and ‘path dependency’ as applied in the analysis of the mega-project decision-
making process. Section 2.3.1 reviews several scholars’ works on mega-project planning, appraisal, 
and delivery. The section is comprised of the main issues raised in the literature and a discussion of 
the treatments of risks and uncertainties in mega-project decision-making and the factors that 
determine project success or failure. Section 2.3.2 shifts the focus to a review of the theories and key 
lines of reasoning for certain distinctive types of institutional arrangements and power relations which 
have significant impacts on mega-project decision-making.   
2.3.1 Literature review on mega-project planning, appraisal, and delivery 
Friend and Jessop (1969) in ‘Local Government and Strategic Choice’ develop a typology of 
uncertainties characteristic of planning issues. Peter Hall in ‘Great Planning Disasters’ (1980) 
suggests that mega-project decisions are often made on the basis of prioritising political interests 
before considerations of costs. Friend and Hickling in ‘Planning under Pressure: the strategic choice 
approach’ (1987) introduce ‘sustainable development’ as a criterion in their perspective on the public 
planning process, though they continue to focus on the interactions between central and local 
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governments. Peter Morris (1994) in ‘The Management of Projects’ focuses on the process of project 
management from its earliest stages of conception to its post-commissioning phases, although he 
ascribes factors of success and failure of mega project delivery to broader contexts. Kris Olds in 
‘Globalization and Urban Change: Capital, Culture, and Pacific Rim Mega-Projects’ (2001) refers to 
the influence of the forces of globalisation on mega-project decision-making. Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) 
in ‘Megaprojects and Risk: an anatomy of ambition’ share the opinion that project cost overruns and 
over-optimistic projections of project demands and effects are the result of fulfilling project 
advocates’ agendas. Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) in ‘Mega Urban Transport Projects: the Changing 
Politics of Urban Public Investment’, though have a different focus. They suggest that the projects 
they analysed were all initiated by civil servants and interest groups who formed political coalitions. 
Dimitriou’s research (2009 and 2010) focuses on the contextual factors that impact mega-project 
decision-making and stresses the influences of gloabalisation. 
 
John Friend, Norman Jessop, and Allen Hickling 
Friend and Jessop (1969) conducted a case study of decision-making within local government and 
developed a typology of uncertainties encountered in planning decision-making:  
• UE - uncertainties in knowledge of the present and future environment,  
• UR - uncertainties as to intentions in related fields of choice, and  
• UV - uncertainties as to appropriate value judgements 
 
They claim that their analysis of the public planning process has some validity at different levels of 
governmental agencies, including international, national, regional, and local levels. They indicate that 
the dynamic of planning is regarded as a process of strategic choice (Friend and Jessop, 1969: 101). 
The ‘dialogue’ model between governmental system and community system3 consists of “a continuing 
interchange of information and influence across the interface between them” (Friend and Jessop, 1969: 
102). In the model, it indicates that pressure for a particular kind of change in the context of 
operations is created from a perception of significant uncertainties in any one of the three directions 
UE, UR, and UV (Friend and Jessop, 1969: 107).  
 
STRATrisk (Einstein Network, 2006) published its guide to project risk management in 2006. It 
suggests that system thinking is the appropriate strategic approach project risks because traditional 
reductionism in science by which problems are decomposed to manageable elements is inappropriate 
to the analysis of strategic risk in complex behavioural systems. This is similar to what Friend and 
Jessop contend: robust planning solutions, must incorporate the widest possible set of full solutions by 
providing flexibility under uncertainties (Friend and Jessop, 1969: 112; also see Hall, 1980: 252).   
                                                
3 Friend and Jessop (1969: 102) claim that the definition of “governmental system” should extends beyond its formal and legal 
aspects and a combination of social, political, economic, functional, and many other frames of references is needed to 
adequately describe it. As to “community system”, the authors suggest it includes a rich network of relationships between 
people and the environment in which they live.  
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Friend and Hickling (2005) describe their philosophy of a broader view of planning as a continuous 
process of making strategic decisions through time. They contend though, that any process of strategic 
decision-making should be holistic in its vision and in its time span; such idealistic aspirations are 
rarely achieved in practice. This can be compared to Lindblom’s (1959) “successive limited 
comparison” which will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter. These three authors share the 
view that a comprehensive comparison of alternatives of decisions is not manageable and brings 
inefficiency, especially when under the pressure of issues requiring immediate attention. 
 
Using the case study on Coventry County Council between 1963 and 1967, Friend and Hickling (2005: 
5) describe four features of dilemmas in decision-making in complex circumstances:  
• First, in the decision-making process, people often held varied and continually shifting 
perceptions of the issues; 
• Secondly, there were constant pressures for decision-makers to commit to actions in an 
incremental way although there was a willingness to take a more comprehensive approach if they 
could;  
• Thirdly, associated with the above, there was a continuing dilemma of balancing urgency against 
uncertainty in decision-making processes; and  
 
In the third edition of Friend and Hickling (2005: 367)4, the authors include the broader consideration 
of sustainable development connecting to local capacities to fulfil visions of sustainability and 
sustainable urban regeneration. Their emphasis still lies on the reciprocal relationship between local 
demands and central policy sources. In their study, there is growing awareness of increasing 
interdependence of mega project planning between nations, such as impacts of global markets and 
reliance on funding from international financial agencies.  
 
Peter Hall 
Hall (1980) reviews several mega projects and evaluates factors contributing to their failure. He 
illustrates the lessons from these case studies in the light of his eclectic theories which explain how 
people behave, and their motivations when seeking to influence decision-making processes. He 
concludes by presenting a normative theory of decision-making and discusses how the decision-
making process might be improved.  
 
Hall asserts that failures in tackling uncertainty in the environment are attributable to bad forecasting 
particularly of demand and cost. He suggests that the most appropriate approach to forecasting will 
combine quantitative and non-quantitative exploratory and self-critical methods (Hall, 1980: 253). 
The reason for inaccurate economic forecasts in Britain, Hall points out, is essentially over-optimism, 
                                                
4 The first edition was published in 1987. 
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furthermore, and the cost-escalation problem is often exacerbated by a failure of demand forecasting 
(Hall, 1980: 7). This is pertinent to the discussions on the difficulties and constraints of monetisation 
of factors of project delivery in the OMEGA study (Dimitriou et al., 2010).  It also reflects the 
argument about claims of urban regeneration benefits that can be brought about by major transport 
investment. Similarly, these inaccurate forecasts cast doubt on political promises about economic 
growth and job opportunities encouraged by mega events.  
 
Hall’s observation on the third London airport indicates that a clear political decision can be a critical 
impetus to mega-project delivery, especially when it is in an environment of high uncertainty. This 
case also demonstrates the influence of value judgements when society’s judgement of risk is 
profoundly affected by prevailing feelings of optimism or pessimism about the future (Hall, 1980: 55). 
This shares some similarities with issues on challenges of project financing during economic 
downturn and the significant amount of mega-project investments in the “great mega-project era” 
identified by Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) in the 1950’s and ‘60’s (see below). 
 
The discussion of London’s orbital motorway (the M25) in Hall’s book concludes that hard planning 
solutions are inappropriate to deal with the uncertainties in mega projects; instead, a more flexible 
system in which policies are consistently adjusted by changing Zeitgeist (Hall, 1980: 86) can be more 
capable of tackling the complex risks and uncertainties in mega-project delivery.  
 
Another incentive of mega-project decision-making mentioned in Hall’s book is ‘prestige’ in which, 
under this mindset, interest groups pay no attention to mundane market realities. In the case of the 
Anglo-French Concorde, there was intense lobbying to convince the government to move from the 
stage of espousal of a project policy to government commitments. According to Hall, this is a major 
step and it requires heavy lobbying and bargaining. This is echoed in the arguments of SMEC (2001), 
Altshuler and Luberoff (2003), and Dimitriou et al. (2008) that the role of a visionary and persuasive 
‘project champion’ accompanied by intense lobbying and negotiation is essential in mega-project 
decision-making.  
 
Peter Morris 
Peter Morris (1994) through examining the management of mega projects concludes that factors of 
project cost overruns include:  
• Poor estimating; 
• Increased order quantities;  
• Poor technology management;  
• Design faults;  
• Contracting and legal difficulties; 
• Governmental, labour, or social issues; and  
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• Geophysical problems 
 
Although he addressed the issues relating to project externalities that have impacts on mega-project 
decision-making, such as the changing context in varied project sectors, the political risks, the 
increasing awareness of environmental protection, and the growing trend for sourcing financing from 
private sector and through international finance agencies, the main factors that he suggests for the 
success of mega projects remain in the field of project management.  
 
Morris highlights emerging patterns of mega project development that include:  
• The fluidity and uncertainty of today’s project environment, mean that mega projects will more 
frequently be carried out in a modular form where integration of these modular parts of the 
project becomes a new challenge (p.289).    
• There is increasing attention to the role of the project owner whose responsibilities and 
performance often becomes the dominant influence on the way the project will be managed 
(p.290). 
• Human resources have much greater significance on project development strategies.  
• Education and fuller participation of all in the stages of the development process will enhance 
the chances of project success.  
• Increasing co-option of, or alliances with, opinion shapers; thereby tune in closer to the political 
environment; feed politicians ideas and relate project schedules to political timetables are 
inevitable as part of the project development process. 
 
Kris Olds 
The forces of globalisation to mega-project decision-making are addressed by Kris Olds (2001) in his 
book “Globalization and Urban Change: Capital, Culture, and Pacific Rim Mega-Projects”. He 
maintains that mega-project developments are likely to be influenced by globalisation and he 
identifies five classes of impacts (Olds, 2001: 20):  
• The development and restructuring of the international financial system has changed the nature 
of finance capital availability; 
• Property markets have become interwoven with trends of the global economy and patterns of 
regional development processes;  
• The transnational corporation is the main project stakeholder that benefits from the restructuring 
of the global financial system and of the development of world property markets; 
• The stretching of social relations, world social networks and epistemic communities5 forming 
knowledge-based experts networks that have the resources and power (or access to power) to 
impact on decisions of, for example, economic policy, property development and mega-project 
                                                
5 According to Olds (2001: 26), “epistemic communities” are “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area 
(Haas, 1992: 3)”. 
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planning; and 
• The increasing amount of travelling and networking being undertaken by project stakeholders 
(such as politicians, developers, architects, and planners) allows the acquisition of direct 
knowledge about the sites and sources. 
 
Kris Olds (2001) emphasises the importance of both the most localised details and the most global 
structures in the study of mega projects. He suggests that, given the legal, financial, and regulatory 
trends in globalisation, greater attention should be paid to transnational cultures and their effects on 
both the host cities and patterns of mega-project investments. 
 
Alan Altshuler and David Luberoff 
Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) chronicle the shifts of politics and policies of large-scale public 
investments in and around major American cities (including Boston, Denver, Los Angeles, New York 
City, Chicago, Atlanta, Dallas, Portland, and Seattle) from the 1950s to the start of 21st Century. They 
identified four distinct eras of mega project development, as follows (ibid.: 220-221): 
• The ‘pre-1950 era’, when the Federal Government was dominant in mega-project development 
process and local communities were passive recipients of the Federal proposals 
• The ‘great mega-project era’, when there was an unprecedented surge of mega public 
investments in American cities during the 1950s and 1960s; 
• The ‘transition era’, when many mega projects were derailed as they were swept aside by a wave 
of social upheavals during the late 1960s and early 1970s; and  
• The ‘do no harm era’, in which post-1970’s political impulses shaped a new pattern of mega-
project planning, appraisal and delivery processes. 
 
Their research on mega-project planning from the 1970s observed the evolution of a ‘do no harm’ 
paradigm which involved greater expenditure on mitigating negative impacts generated by these 
projects. This was mainly due to mega-project policy-makers responding to rising environmental 
consciousness and the growing demands for wider community consultation on planning issues. The 
priorities in mega project delivery changed in an effort to offset all harmful consequences. Therefore, 
understanding the underlying political and social processes that determine the motivation and 
behaviour of stakeholders can help to eliminate the risks embedded in the design and implementation 
of project initiatives.  
 
Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) emphasise the role of local politics as a mediator that brings 
government power to induce private investments for mega-project development. They claim that the 
system of urban governance in American cities has continually been very adaptive to changes in the 
broader contexts, such as society, economy, and national polity; however, they make no claim about 
the influences of global trends and the challenges at international level.  
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Altshuler and Luberoff’s (2003) comprehensive observations on mega-project history in American 
cities include that: 
• business-led growth coalitions are central in urban development politics and often proposals that 
succeed are tailor-made from the outset to attract business support; 
• the important role of public entrepreneurships lies in political executives who mobilise and 
nurture private support coalitions; 
• the disposition of cities to compete proactively for investments; 
• after the transition era of mega-project development constraints occurred and stimulated 
alterations in the process of mega-project planning, appraisal, and delivery  
• the related point is that these same changes, simultaneously, represent the responses of mega-
project policies to the shifts in the overall character of urban politics over time;  
• project robustness is essential to the treatment of uncertainties relating to mega-project 
development; and  
• the consistent underestimation of costs and timescales damages public confidence and trust in 
government when developing mega projects. 
 
In all areas addressed by Altshuler and Luberoff, mega-project decisions are controlled by political 
power rather than the identified demand for the infrastructure, which has ‘seemingly’ become the 
basis of the arguments of the key actors.  
 
Bent Flyvbjerg, Nils Bruzelius, and Werner Rothengatter 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) assert that more and larger mega projects are built despite the poor 
performance record of many projects because of risk-negligence, meaning inadequate, or deliberate 
lack of attention to risks, and lack of accountability in the project decision-making process. Flyvbjerg 
et al. claim that project advocates and promoters are likely to have self-serving interest in being over 
optimistic about costs and demand as well as in overlooking environmental impacts and over-
promising in development benefits resulting from the construction of projects. In this context, 
Flyvbjerg et al. focuses on conspiracy theory within which decision-makers ignore project risks by 
using biased Cost-Benefit Analysis in order to promote their political ambitions.  
 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003: 77) identifies four types of risk of relevance to both a financial and an 
economic perspective in mega-project development. They are: 
 
• project-specific risks,  
• market risks,  
• sector-policy risks and  
• capital-market risks.  
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The same source claims that these risks and associated costs are not avoidable, no matter whether they 
involve a private concession company or a state-owned enterprise or those promoters of projects 
backed by sovereign guarantees. They further emphasise this by raising an issue regarding sovereign 
guarantees addressed by the World Bank, namely that lenders backed by sovereign guarantees tend to 
transfer their stress, risk and supervision responsibility for a project to the government, thus in some 
respects offsetting risks as a result of such relaxed pressure.  
 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) cite the application of inaccurate methods, poor data quality, and unexpected 
changes in exogenous factors not directly relevant to policy-makers’ behaviour as additional reasons. 
They conclude that more account should be taken of poor performance in mega-project delivery that 
results from power interventions by politicians and key decision-makers. One of the factors cited by 
Flyvbjerg et al. (2003: 30) is the “unexpected political activities or missing realisation of 
complementary policies”. They further point to the use of default scenario forecasts that depend 
heavily on a political description of what the future will look like. When unexpected political 
activities and unfulfilled political promises occur, however, this scenario is never achieved and a gap 
emerges between predicted and actual outcomes that colour judgments about a project’s success. 
 
Harry Dimitriou and the OMEGA Centre 
In the ten years leading up to the world economic downturn of 2008, global investment in 
infrastructure increased enormously. Dimitriou (2009) points to trends suggesting that these 
investments were promoted by a global elite of players seen as ‘national champions’, politically well-
connected and often pan-European. He argues that such investments not only produce financial 
returns but, more importantly, perhaps landmark projects seen to symbolise the economic virility of 
national or city economies.  
 
The OMEGA research (Dimitriou et al., 2010 and 2011) indicates that project appraisals are 
determined by path dependency as in the case of the use of Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) which 
focuses on monetisation the factors of project delivery. The same source demonstrates that the factors 
get monetised are likely to be the more accessible ones and even within these factors there is a 
tendency to constraint its measurement to the direct effects (Dimitriou et al., 2010: 8). If policy-
makers then follow the results of the CBA, their decision-making processes are subjected to the 
‘limited information’ (Woodlef, 1998) component of Path Dependency Theory discussed later (see 
Section 2.3.2). In this context, barriers within policy-making are thus built as key actors function in 
this decision-making cycle which is locked into a dominant pattern over time.  
 
 The OMEGA Centre research (Dimitriou et al., 2008 and 2010) concludes that risks of MUTPs 
derived from some of their nature which can be summarised as follows: 
• Certain components of the MUTP are ‘frozen’ during different phases in order to make 
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implementation more comprehensible. This constrains its ability to respond to changing contexts. 
• MUTPs are often considered as ‘closed systems’. Similar to the above, this is the case where the 
project outcomes are expected to be both controllable and in accordance with pre-determined 
programmes. This is why that past MUTP planning and delivery having frequently failed to deal 
with or adapt to the complexity of the environment which they are placed.  
 
The characteristics of the ‘frozen components’ and ‘closed system’ of the MUTPs also contribute to 
the path dependency which features a lock-in effect irrespective of higher cost than if apply new 
system.  
 
Figure 2.3: The Scope of the Issues in Selected Mega-Project Literature 
 
Source: Author 
 
Discussions of mega infrastructure investments at the international level are relatively fewer and less 
detailed in the literature discussed above (see Figure 2.3). According to the empirical literature review 
in earlier section (Section 2.2), we can see there are emerging issues that are at global level. For 
example, there are increasing number of international co-operations or cross-national joint ventures 
that play an important role in mega infrastructure investments; also there are concerns over urban 
regeneration projects which are highly influenced by global trends and are often overly dependent on 
international financial markets and consumer behaviour trends; and needless to say there is the case of 
mega events which are closely related to international relations, reputations of nations at the global 
stage and national competitiveness.  
 
Using the above literature review on mega projects as a starting point, we can now look more 
critically at some of these elements of mega-project decision-making theories. This review of the 
literature on theory is used to guide the structuring of the PhD investigation and to explain patterns 
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and shifts in mega-project decision-making with which the research questions are concerned. 
2.3.2 Theories on institutional arrangements, power relations, and decision-making  
Institutional arrangements 
Concerning the principal research questions posed by this study (see Section 1.4) and the scale of 
mega projects in which globalising tendencies are omnipresent, the institutional arrangement model, 
this research borrowed and edited from Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) shown in Figure 2.2, 
manifests itself at the global level. It shows a line crossing the overall model with the ‘market’ at one 
end, and a ‘hierarchy’ at the other end. The main issue that is raised involves the position in which the 
market and the state should locate themselves when the institutional arrangements regarding the 
efficiency and productivity of the outcomes of mega-project delivery are set up. Neo-liberal theorists 
believe that market-led institutional arrangements should govern the capitalist economy; however, 
while Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999: 10) claim that the rules codified by the public authority are 
essential taking precedence to the patterns of coordinating economic transactions with the result that 
governmental intervention in mega projects is all important. Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999: 13) 
make reference to Romer’s New Growth Theory (see Romer, 1986, 1990, 1994) which “considers the 
spillover effects of innovations, educations, and various types of infrastructure, [and argues that] some 
supply-oriented interventions by the state may promote efficiency and long run growth”. Whereas, 
Catlaw (2006) claims that the shift of our trust to the market (as advocated by neo-liberalism) is based 
on a belief that markets can resolve problems of uncertainty and that by implication public sector 
intervention can disturb these solutions and thus often inject uncertainty into decision-making, he 
argues that the reality of the market model is actually underlined by higher uncertainty. He concludes 
that, “markets certainty disperse authority and decision and challenge the dominion of political 
representation, but they entirely neglect the other critical, generative functions that authority serves” 
(Catlaw, 2006: 114) namely: regulations, government financing, etc.  
 
Patsy Healey’s studies (1990, 1992, and 1994) look into development with regard to institutional 
arrangements. Healey recognises the importance of a variety of agencies, agency relations, activities, 
and events involved in development projects. She stresses that considerations of development 
processes should embrace the general tendencies in social relations connecting to macro-economic 
and political questions. Her approach, which aims to identify models that reveal economic processes, 
event sequences, and agency behaviours, is based on neoclassical and Marxist economics. The 
institutional model established by Healey (see Healey, 1992) seeks to assess whether particular 
driving forces produce distinctive patterns of stakeholder interrelationships and project externalities.  
 
Healey (1992) introduces four levels of observations on development processes with the institutional 
arrangements and agency power relations as the core: 
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• Identification of key events and agencies involved and the outcomes produced through a 
mapping exercise of the development process. 
• Identification of roles and power relations that evolve between the agencies in the production 
and consumption of the development. 
• Development of theories regarding the strategies and interests of actors in determining the way 
different roles are played and how relationships develop. 
• Formulating theories on the nature of project development and identifying the societal 
circumstances in which the development is embedded. 
 
The third item above suggests that resources, regulations, and ideologies (Healey, 1990), which 
constitute the institutional arrangements and determine stakeholder power relations, need to be taken 
into account. The theorisation step forms a framework within which how actors reproduce, reinforce, 
and transform their power relations can be observed and interpreted. With regard to the institutional 
relations, government intervention is one of the significant factors impacting the development process 
(Healey, 1994). Healey (1994: 178) believes that the public sector plays an important role in 
providing initiatives that aim at breaking development inertia and further allowing the development 
industry to respond to market demand. The current research is based on Healey’s concepts of 
conducting case studies which focus on the roles and power relations of key stakeholders, the 
planning contexts and institutional structures of mega-project investments, and the forms and 
strategies used by actors to command better negotiation power.   
Power relations 
This research hypothesises that the dynamics of a stakeholder’s power to manoeuvre in mega-project 
decision-making are greatly determined by the use of discourses. According to Hajer (1995), the 
concepts of prevailing terms, such as ‘sustainable development’, ‘sustainable communities’, and 
‘corporate social responsibility’ have all become dominant in discourses for urban development 
internationally since the mid 1990s. However, there is growing evidence of increasing barriers to 
sustainability implementation within and outside the UK (Dixon, 2007). These barriers are 
characterised by institutional, technical, and financial complexities involving significant uncertainties 
and risks. This is crucial since mega projects usually require investors to provide long-term capital 
and attract sustained political support. This makes any lack of financial resources a major obstacle in 
mega project development that seeks to promote sustainable development. Another challenge to mega 
projects stems from the complex stakeholder networks involved. Here the plethora of agencies 
operating at so many different levels is frequently denounced (see Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 
2007) as is the excessive bureaucracy leading to rhetoric and lack of efficiency (Adair, 2002: 2391; 
also see Adair, 2003 and 2005). 
 
Discourse among decision-makers cannot itself guarantee to make a difference. Those stakeholders 
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who possess superior credentials and power should empower other less privileged stakeholders. In so 
doing, discourse is often employed as a tool by vested interest groups to promote and protect their 
positions and power. In so far as this is the case, “… the organisational contexts in which discursive 
practices operate are also sites of power relationships and contestation” (Atkinson, 1999: 60). Because 
discourses occur in a discursive context - reflecting relations of power and domination (ibid.: 61) - a 
dominant discourse can restrict other possibilities and steer other discourses congruent with it.  
 
According to Hajer (1995 and 2003), “discourse power” is defined as a force with the following 
attributes:  
• is constitutive of a network;  
• pulls all actors together and gives them political identities;  
• can discursively reduce the complexity of policy issues;  
• allocates or redistributes resources;  
• can reinforce the structure of a network and create exclusionary effects;  
• provides initiatives to institutionalise political interests; and  
• can link up discourses in different policy domains and generate a more powerful effectiveness.   
 
Each of these functions is elaborated in this section. The first three are associated with the formulation 
of relationships between agents (stakeholders) and structures. For the first two functions, Hajer (2003) 
claimed that policy intervention triggers the awareness of “stand-by politicians” (ibid.: 98) who then 
become politically active. He suggests that this ignites the creation of political community networks 
that share the same interests and recognise a bond because they are all affected by a particular policy 
intervention of mega project development. Hajer suggests it is the practices of policy making that 
provides the sites for people to deliberate over political issues and form political communities. In 
terms of reducing the complexity of policy issues - story lines embedded in a particular discourse 
allow an individual contextual background (i.e. knowledge, experience, or expertise) to connect with 
the wider scope of a policy debate (Hajer, 2003; Browning and Boudès, 2003; Kurtz and Snowden, 
2003; Jovchelovitch and Bauer, 2000). Under the context of mega-project decision-making, it means 
that the force of discourse power can simplify complex policy issues and focus on certain dominant 
ones supported by powerful project advocates.  
 
The third function is associated with the fourth and fifth functions of discourse power cited by Hajer 
are about how it mobilises visions, ideologies, and resources. They represent the process of 
structuring a network and prioritising particular interests. Through amplifying the political agenda, the 
main proponents gain sway over the limited resources for which many are competing, and while this 
is unlikely to reveal new resources it can change their dynamics in favour of vested interests. This 
kind of network is in effect a by-product of particular policy-making; therefore the process of 
reinforcing and marginalising is never concluded until a new policy replaces the prevailing status of 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
50 
the current one. For example, transport planning at the local level often adapts to the planning of 
large-scale transport projects which are accompanied by more investments and opportunities. (This 
idea can be extended to urban planning schemes, which tend to adapt to mega projects for the same 
reason.) The concept of reinforcement and exclusion highlights the concept of ‘project-led networks’ 
which is a mechanism in mega project development decision-making that has the potential to grow 
bigger if the project-oriented discourse performs well. The components of the project-oriented 
discourse may change from time to time since they strongly rely on temporal contexts.  
 
The sixth and seventh functions signify a more mature state of discourse power. After engaging 
scientific evidence to justify political positions, discourse power is further strengthened and moves 
into the process of institutionalisation. Institutionalisation then leads into the delivery of higher 
certainty whereby advocates are more likely to be able to achieve their goals. This can streamline and 
accelerate resource distribution and lead to several privileged domains of different policy discourses 
seeking to link up and reinforce the various discourse functions. This development is illustrated by the 
planning and delivery of the Olympic Games (see Chapter 6).  
Disjointed Incrementalism 
The term “disjointed incrementalism” was introduced into the policy-making literature and coined by 
Lindblom in the late 1950s and elaborated subsequently (see Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963; 
Lindblom, 1959 and 1979; Lindblom and Hirschman, 1962) in the form of a successive limited 
comparison (Lindblom, 1959) in the policy-making process. He argued that the essence of the policy-
making process is mostly achieved by continually building out from the current situation (ibid.: 174). 
Lindblom (1959) described the rational-comprehensive method (as advocated by March and Simon, 
1958) as a root method which begins its approach from fundamentals anew each time and criticises 
this for being very costly. Lindblom (1959) justified his argument by explaining that decisions on 
policies are essentially choices between different combinations of objective values. He claims that 
because the values of social objectives are varied in different circumstances, policy-makers have 
difficulty in clarifying one value over another. Hence, he believes that the most effective discussion of 
the ‘correctness’ of policies takes the form of a limited comparison as a comprehensive comparison is 
unmanageable to this level of efficiency. In the same source, Lindblom (ibid.) argues that the 
agreement on policies among policy-making agencies becomes the only practical test of the policy’s 
correctness (ibid.: 180) and that every important interest has its own watchdog to protect it (ibid.: 184). 
Lindblom concludes that successive limited comparisons are equivalent to ‘comprehensiveness’ with 
the added note that government agencies are often sensitive to the pressures of other influential groups 
who pursue their common interests (ibid.: 184).  
 
Lindblom claims that bargaining - a form of mutual adjustments to be achieved among government 
agencies and interests’ watchdogs (see Lindblom, 1955 and 1959) is the ultimate basis of decision 
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making in public policy. He emphasised that this mutual adjustment as a negotiation process can 
better adapt to a wider range of interests than ‘silo thinking’ (1959: 184). Lindblom’s theory of 
disjointed incrementalism of policy-making decisions may be summarised as an on-going process that 
is in fact remedial, serial, and fragmented (Lindblom and Hirschman, 1962). The same source claims 
that both intentionally- and accidentally-neglected repercussions of chosen policies and decisions are 
often readily regarded as a remedy for the original policy or other stakeholders whose interests are 
affected and that current policies are the accumulation of historical policy-makers’ decisions as a 
whole, instead of an individual, or a particular period of time (Lindblom, 1959: 208). This implies that 
mega-project decision-making processes exhibit similar characteristics. 
 
There are some issues in Lindblom’s theories that require further examination in the light of earlier 
discussions about MUTPs, mega sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega events.  
 
• First, the claim that every interest has its watchdog: In the case of mega project developments, it 
is apparent that key stakeholders seek to obtain more bargaining power during the project 
negotiation process better to secure their positions, while less influential stakeholders, such as 
those who have access to fewer resources, are more easily compromised (see Greener, 2005). 
Lindblom argues that the neglected interest can however (sometimes) become the centre of the 
policy-making process later. He believes that adjustments in decision making will be 
continuously propelled by the bargaining powers exerted and only reach an optimal degree of 
imbalance6 (Lindblom, 1959: 193) between the values various interests.  
 
• Second, the claim that the mutual adjustments process is more likely to happen when there is 
sufficient trust existing within the policy-making network (see Burt, 2000; Koppenjan and Klijn, 
2004). ‘Trust’ is the element binding the project stakeholder network together yet trust does not 
happen overnight; it takes time to develop between agencies and players. It is built on a good 
track record between project partners and experiences gained from previous co-operation. 
 
• Third, the claim that if policy-makers prefer to confine their pattern of decision-making to that 
stemming directly from their familiar historical experience and knowledge then the policy-
making processes are likely to be locked into a ‘silo-thinking’ and path-dependent culture. 
Lindblom explains that the barrier to effective decision making lies in poor communications 
(Lindblom, 1959: 189). However, even this could progress at a too slow pace in mega-project 
delivery, especially when analysis and policy making are remedial. Policy-making agents tend to 
direct policies toward the removal of ills rather than toward known objectives.  
 
• The fourth claim is that uncertainties, accidents, even catastrophes can impel dramatic step–
                                                
6 “Optimal degree of imbalance” is a term borrowed from Hirschman’s (1958) theory of economic development. 
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changes of policy. Lindblom and Hirschman assert that, because of all the unforeseeable 
uncertainties, a system is never complete; instead, it is on a constant configuration and 
development process (Lindblom and Hirschman, 1962). They go on to indicate that “the 
incompleteness of the system is forcefully brought to our attention through accidents, eye 
irritations, and through new types of infections” (ibid.: 201). In their opinion, one way to 
overcome situations when we cannot afford to learn the “hard way” is to develop special 
institutions to detect existing and emerging system imbalances. This reinforces the claim that 
practitioners and policy-makers need to devise strategies for mega-project developments that are 
highly adaptable to uncertainties, global trends and political environment. 
Path Dependency 
‘Path dependency’ has two properties that are especially relevant to this research (see Arthur, 1987, 
1988 and 1994; Greener, 2005; Kay, 2005; Liebowitz and Margolis, 1995; and Pierson, 2000):  
• First, its power of reinforcement which can be recognised in what has been described as 
“bandwagon behaviour” and network effects. This exhibits parallels with the ‘tipping point’ 
thesis of Malcolm Gladwell (2000). 
• Secondly, the critical junctures, which are composed of accidental events and the actions taken 
to respond to them.  
Both of these properties are elements of decision-making and policy formulation that are echoed by 
the serendipity arguments advanced in the work of the OMEGA Centre (OMEGA, 2008). 
 
The concept of path dependency is widely used in many disciplines, including technology, economics 
and politics. This research focuses on the discussion of its adaptation to political process, including 
institutional arrangements for stakeholder network formation, reinforcement of political power, and 
discourse power in bargaining processes that affect the decision making in mega projects. 
 
Greener (2005) provided a review on the use of ‘path dependency’ in theoretical contents and 
empirical applications as it is applied to the fields of political studies. He argues that the lack of an 
explicit analytical framework and a consistent approach in the usage of the term ‘‘path dependency’’ 
put it in danger of becoming meaningless. Greener postulates that a path-dependent system is most 
likely to emerge where both structural (the realm of institutions) and cultural (the realm of ideas) 
vested interest groups have strong interdependency in obtaining power. This echoes the empirical 
literature review in section 2.2 that project advocates and project promoters are likely to form a strong 
coalition as the core decision-makers of mega-project developments. He further suggests that the 
combination of these powerful structural interests and mutually compatible ideas creates the most 
stable “morphostatic cycles” for ‘path dependency’ to occur. Greener (2005) offers a framework for 
analysing ‘path dependency’ in the political process which requires an appreciation of the following:  
• First, Greener argues that there should be a number of alternatives for policy formulation or 
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decision-making in its inception.  
• Second, ‘path dependency’ should occur as contingent events7  within political processes. 
Greener argues they play a substantial role in establishing policies and creating political 
outcomes.  
• Thirdly, recognition that path-dependent systems spawn increasing returns8 and are characterised 
by a lock-in effect.  
 
Pierson (2000) demonstrates that the sequence, timing, and critical junctures are critically important 
aspects of a path-dependent analytical framework. He argues that ‘increasing returns’ is an essential 
base when employing ‘‘path dependency’’ to describe political processes. He introduces the 
characteristics of the ‘increasing returns processes’ summarised by Arthur (1994: 112-113), namely: 
unpredictability, inflexibility, nonergodicity9, and potential path inefficiency. Because the events that 
happen in the process are important but partly random, the outcomes are unpredictable. Pierson 
further argues that inflexibility is caused in the process by the situation in which it progresses, making 
it harder to shift from one path to another, resulting in it being trapped in a lock-in situation. Pierson 
uses Levi’s interpretation (see Levi, 1997) to emphasise this characteristic: 
“… once a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high. There will 
be other choice points, but the entrenchments of certain institutional arrangements obstruct an easy 
reversal of the initial choice” (Pierson, 2000: 252).  
 
Arthur (1994) points out that potential path inefficiency stems from the long-term result, with benefits 
that may be lower than for a previous alternative while the outcome becomes locked in. Pierson adds 
that another feature of increasing return processes, namely, the claim their lock-in character has 
greater importance earlier than later in the process (Pierson, 2000). This lock-in effect contradicts 
Lindblom’s concept of mutual adjustments in policy-making. The lock-in effect indicates that the 
earlier the interest group declares the importance of policy values, the harder it is for the other 
opposition groups to remove or change them. Meanwhile, Lindblom’s concept of ‘mutual 
adjustments’ suggest that there will always be interest guardians who protect important interests and 
values while adjustments are negotiated over time. In path-dependency theory, the overthrow of this 
reinforcement relies on influential negotiation power or, more effectively, depends on unforeseen 
external forces, such as disasters, failures, and catastrophes.  
 
This point is echoed in ‘critical juncture’, characteristic of ‘path dependency’. Here accidents or crises 
                                                
7 According to Pierson (2000: 263), contingent events are relatively small events, if they occur at the right moment, can have 
large and enduring consequences.  
8 Pierson (2000: 251) illustrates that “increasing returns”, which is used by economists, “could also be described as self-
reinforcing or positive feedback processes”. He further claims  that increasing returns capture two key elements that are 
essential to making sense of path dependence: “First, they pinpoint how the costs of switching from one alternative to another 
will, in certain social contexts, increase markedly over time. Second, and related, they draw attention to issues of timing and 
sequence, distinguishing formative moments or conjunctures from the periods that reinforce divergent paths”.     
9 Pierson (2000: 253) explains “nonergodicity” means: “accidental events early in a sequence do not cancel out. They cannot be 
treated (which is to say, ignored) as “noise,” because they feed back into future choices. Small events are remembered”.  
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that happen on the trajectory of a political decision-making process cause critical junctures and can 
often divert the political decisions such that previously neglected or compromised interest values are 
revived. Greener (2005) stresses that the mechanisms for change in the path-dependent system reside 
in the interactions between cultural and structural spheres of decision making and institutional 
arrangements. He believes that there are constant changes in path-dependent systems as a result of the 
accumulation of increasing returns with the result that the concept of ‘path dependency’ cannot be 
about consistency; instead it is more about constant changes resulting from historical events. In this 
respect, the system is actually open to intrusions and diversions. Greener calls them ‘emergent 
properties’. This notion is similar to the concept of ‘emergent order’, a fundamental of complexity 
theory (see Snowden, 2003; Batty, 2007; Dimitriou et al., 2008).  He argues that it is very difficult 
and costly to keep a system on its particular path, a direct contradiction of Pierson’s (2000) argument. 
 
At the outset of this section, ‘disjointed incrementalism’ theory and ‘path dependency’ theory were 
both presented as two main elements that could characterise the theoretical decision-making processes 
for mega projects. If we compare the two, one may conclude that ‘disjointed incrementalism’ 
concentrates on the policy-makers’ mindset and behaviour. ‘path dependency’, however, represents 
the nature of a mechanism by which related political outcomes are generated and policies formulated. 
2.4 Gaps of Existing Literature and Knowledge Contribution  
The literature reviews on each type of mega project studied in this research, reveal that the current 
body of literature offers little insight into whether a cluster of mega projects such as MUTPs, mega 
urban regeneration schemes, and mega events can be progressed through a process of integrated 
planning and whether they can significantly reinforce each other. They suggest this mutual supportive 
relationship is more an ideology since the scale of mega projects and their associated uncertainties 
generate massive difficulties for their coordination. A possible response is that in reality, it is probably 
not appropriate to pursue a fully coordinated programme as, according to Lindblom and Hirschman 
(1962), projects will evolve into a “better imbalance” over time of their own volition. Others would 
argue that this more evolutionary approach can result in excessive costs and irremediable damage that 
might have been avoided by conscious attempts to learn lessons from past experience. A detailed 
investigation of this issue will be shown in the case study featured in Chapters 4-6. 
 
The ‘disjointed incrementalism’ theory is used as a model to map the decision-making process of each 
case study. It aims to discover what factors along the trajectory of the accumulative process 
determined the final outcomes we see today. Hall (1981) claims that using an incremental model to 
explain observations of decision-making is over-simplistic because it ignores social change and 
innovation which comes about through incorporation of new social values. This research also 
employed the theoretical perspective of ‘path dependency’ theory to complement the use of 
‘disjointed incrementalism’ theory in terms of evaluating the ‘critical junctures’ (i.e., key events that 
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change the path of decision-making). This combination of theoretical aspects facilitates more 
understanding of the research questions of this thesis. This literature review confirms that the study of 
historical events and development trajectories is necessary in order to gain greater insights into the 
determining factors of mega-project development over time. 
 
An investigation into the role of each of the three types of project in this integration can enhance the 
body of mega project research. It will also partly fill a gap in the existing literature on research into 
coordination between different types of mega projects. Based on the review in this chapter, the 
preliminary conclusion suggests that MUTPs are the essential element of urban regeneration and 
economic growth. In addition, it implies that the objectives set by these mega projects are unlikely to 
be achieved by an individual project. Under these circumstances, many project visions and promises 
remain merely rhetoric. This research will strengthen the knowledge about the different roles of the 
three types of mega project that can improve efficiency and outcomes of integration within a 
synchronised timeframe. Friend and Hickling (2005) in their case study highlighted that there was 
persistent competition between technical and political power in influencing decisions. This research 
contributes much needed evidence in comparing these two aspects of power in decision-making 
process through the selected cases. 
 
As stressed by Banister and Berechman (2000) and Gospodini (2000), institutional framework which 
is composed of plethora of agencies and power distributions has significant impact on mega-project 
development. There is still a lack of understanding of the dynamics of the power relationships among 
the key stakeholders of these mega projects, in particular, when the institutional arrangements are 
further complicated by the coordination of several mega projects. The research of this kind should 
seek out the views of a wide spectrum of stakeholders, and not rely on the views of those who ‘shout 
loudest’ such as opposition groups and the leading proponents of the projects.   
 
The findings relating to discourse power have revealed its function in mega-project decisions, 
including the claim that discourses can link up different policy domains and generate greater 
effectiveness. One outstanding question, not informed by the literature, relates to the extent to which 
the force derived from the combination of mega-project discourses changes over time in response to 
risk, uncertainty, and complexity. Surmounting this, the research on mega-project decision-making 
processes should address ways to harness the force of integrated mega-project discourses in order to 
negate ill-founded criticism that project visions and promises are nothing more than rhetoric. 
2.5 Emergent Issues and Related Questions 
Through the articulation of the many issues of mega projects set out above, we may conclude that the 
rational justification for building transport projects of this kind is mainly driven by economic and 
political forces to achieve economic and political ends. However, the overarching question that 
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continually arises in project reviews is whether these projects deliver what has been promised and 
whether there are alternative and better ways to achieve the same public interest objectives. This leads 
to further related questions, including how is it best to identify objectives, how should they be 
prioritised what negotiation process is needed to resolve competing and conflicting objectives? These 
discussions, which are closely associated with the research questions posted in Chapter 1, are 
summarised as a list of emergent issues and questions presented in this section.  
 
The primary research question is elaborated on the following sub-questions and accompanied by the 
issues and their subsequent questions identified through the literature review in this chapter.  
 
Research question #1 
What is the role of mega urban transport projects in sustainable urban regeneration and mega events; 
and what are their relationships given the institutional contexts and frameworks that they have been 
planned, appraised, and delivered within? 
 
Related issues and questions 
The extent to which sustainable urban regeneration and mega events can be facilitated by major urban 
transport investments, particularly MUTPs is driven as much by a belief and a concentrated 
commitment of joint and reinforced investment as it is by quantifiable evidence. According to this 
literature review, initiatives of sustainable urban regeneration should be linked with transport 
infrastructure investment, since in a number of cases transport development is seen as a catalyst to 
other inward investment. In addition, urban regeneration benefits are increasingly the prime 
justification used by MUTP and mega-event proponents for the promotion of their projects. Inevitably, 
this regeneration-led discourse requires a political agenda and sustained political commitment that can 
add credibility beyond the mere rhetoric of urban regeneration.  
 
There is mounting evidence that many mega-project decisions are driven by political reasoning rather 
than by their engineering or accounting dimensions. It also follows that the main causes of escalation 
and underestimation of the costs of mega projects stem from political decisions and that by-and-large 
they are not attributable to technical errors. The appropriateness of CBA as the principal project 
appraisal tool is brought into question (see Dimitriou et al., 2010). This research explores how the key 
stakeholders of these projects respond to the gaps between the expectations encouraged by project 
promoters and the outcomes derived from the synchronisation of multiple projects.  
 
Research question #2 
How do institutional arrangements and decision-makers respond in order to manage changes of 
contexts and environments in the planning of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega 
events? 
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Related issues and questions 
This chapter reveals that optimum mega-project governance is through public-private partnerships. 
The imperative of private sector involvement is intended to avoid imposing risks onto the taxpayers 
and to eliminate the over-dependency of the private sector on public sector and government 
guarantees. Within this, governments have an important role to provide the appropriate regulatory and 
enabling environments to safeguard and promote the public interest. In the absence of those 
provisions, legal challenges could lead to costly time delays. As to the public, they become active 
only when they are aware of a policy intervention of mega-project development affecting their 
interests. At the time when the project proposal is made widely known, especially to those on whom it 
will have immediate impacts, the network closure starts to be challenged. The degree of network 
inclusiveness is tested by opponent groups.  
 
This research is looking into ways in which institutional arrangements should be reformed in order to 
meet these objectives. What is the most appropriate leadership model in mega-project decision-
making? Should it be based on project champions or an equilibrium of stakeholders with no single 
dominant player?  
 
Research question #3 
Can several synchronised mega projects deliver a favourable outcome to stakeholders if they integrate 
and mutually reinforce each other, rather than compete with limited social, economic, political, and 
environmental resources? 
 
Related issues 
Most recent major urban development initiatives have become project-led, involving large mixed-use 
developments and flagship projects, rather than relying on a more confined property-led approach. 
Moreover, given the characteristics of most MUTPs and prestige urban regeneration projects, they are 
typically planned, promoted, and controlled by elite groups of investors and political supporters who 
ultimately have to confront the trade-off dilemma of retaining business profits or addressing social 
and environmental concerns of sustainability. Under these circumstances, the outcomes of 
synchronised mega projects are constrained by financial reality.  
 
Based on the issues above, who are the pre-eminent actors, when and why are they engaged in the 
complex project-led network of stakeholder agencies typically associated with mega-project 
developments? 
 
Research question #4 
Have discourses of mega projects been used as a tool by key champions to convince others of the 
validity of their positions in the expectation that these will be shared by a broader spectrum of 
stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the interests of these champions 
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and empowering the project delivery network? 
 
Related issues and questions 
It is claimed that, from this literature review, while mega projects increasingly stress the concern of 
the emerging crises of the global economic recession and climate change challenges, this influence is 
all too often merely part of the rhetoric that surrounds the mega-project discourse for promoting and 
marketing these investments. Also, based on the path-dependent process in mega-project decision-
making, discourses can produce self-reinforcing policies and obstructs the possibility of policy 
improvement for more effective project planning, appraisal, and delivery. 
 
There is widespread public scepticism surrounding political promises on major infrastructure 
investments, especially, when financing is inevitably an issue for mega projects given the scale of 
their costs.  How realistic is the common claim that the returns will pay off the costs of construction 
and operation? To what extent are there genuine trickle-down effects from mega project investments? 
Is the ideology of mega project delivery simply a ploy to convince the public sector and investors that 
specific benefits are both achievable and sustainable?  
 
These questions are addressed in this research and generate the criteria for the questionnaire design in 
the hypothesis-led investigations. The issues and subsequent questions revealed in this chapter are 
reviewed and validated by the case study. The rational linking the research questions, the research 
methodology, and the questionnaire design is described in the next chapter (Chapter 3).  
2.6 Conclusions 
This chapter has introduced the three major urban developments that are the subject of this research. 
Each has been defined and characteristics described. The motivations and agendas behind promoting 
such projects are addressed based on an examination of the issues that typically surrounds them. 
These include public initiatives of mega-project investments, MUTPs and mega events as agents of 
economic growth and urban regeneration, and the role that the power of discourse plays in the 
decision-making process.  
 
The review of the published literature and the associated cases sheds light on the overarching issues 
and obstacles of mega-project development. It also reveals the gaps in the existing literature and 
where this research can contribute new knowledge. ‘Disjointed incrementalism’ and ‘path 
dependency’ are two theories that are brought together to form the theoretical framework against 
which selected cases are analysed and interpretation of the findings is facilitated. The issues and 
concerns underpinning the rational of the questionnaire design have also been addressed.  
 
The case study approach is employed in order to answer the research questions posted in Chapter 1 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
59 
and fill the gaps of the existing literature in the mega-project research. The detailed articulation of the 
relationship between the research questions, hypotheses, and dimension of the case studies is 
presented in next chapter. Chapter 3 describes how the findings from the mixed method of data 
collection and data analysis are synthesised, and describes the contributions this makes to the overall 
research conclusions.  
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3 Research Methodology for Case Study 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the methodology employed in the case study. The methods comprise a two-
stranded approach to data collection and analysis plus the use of a ‘mixed method’ of data analysis 
(see Figure 3.1). The two-stranded approach involves, on the one hand, traditional hypothesis-led 
questionnaire approaches for collecting pertinent case study information regarding the principal 
questions and hypotheses of the overall research posed in Chapter 1, and on the other hand, the 
collection of information through the use of unstructured (pre-hypothesis) questionnaires
10.  Both approaches focus on a case study of the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL, also known as 
High Speed 1) and two of its associated hub developments at St. Pancras/Kings Cross and Stratford. 
The relationship of the case study to the overall research study approach was explained in Chapter 1. 
A distinctive feature of the case study data collection and analysis is a strong reliance on narrative 
‘storytelling’, which proved to be especially informative with regard to the importance of institutional 
structures and power relations that surround mega-project discourses (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003). 
 
To reiterate, this research aims to investigate the relationship between the objectives and investments 
of mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, and the 
extent to which these can be made mutually reinforcing. An appreciation of the key institutions and 
their frameworks together with their connectivity and interaction is vital to understanding the nature of 
complexity in decision-making involving mega project planning, appraisal, and delivery. The research 
utilises the CTRL case study to draw out specific evidence-based conclusions. The questions this 
research seeks to answer are: 
 
 What kind of role can MUTPs play in sustainable urban regeneration and mega events?  
 What are the prerequisites for MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events needed 
to establish a consolidated and collaborative network?  
 Who provides leadership in this network?  
                                                 
10 Pre-hypothesis questionnaire is introduced by Cognitive Edge which advocates the use of pre-hypothesis techniques, 
“namely to provide a quantitative technique, which is supported by the rich context of supporting self-interpreted narrative” 
(Snowden, 2010: 8). Unstructured questions or prompting questions are based on the following principles that established by 
Cognitive Edge method (Snowden, 2010: 9):  
 “They should be about the whole of the experience and should be designed to elicit narrative material rather than a simple 
statement. 
 The question should be asked in such a way as to elicit a meaningful context in the imagination of the subject. 
 The question should not privilege positive or negative experiences but should seek both. 
 The subject should be allowed to answer in the third person.” 
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 Which type of project should be the engine to drive this consolidated network to a better overall 
outcome? 
 
The answers to these questions potentially offer a greater understanding of the interrelationships 
between these three different types of mega projects. The focus of the case studies will be on the 
decision-making processes, the key project stakeholders involved, and the rationale that underpins the 
key decisions. The case study methodology seeks to harness the ways in which human beings 
exchange knowledge through storytelling where the story-tellers not only express perceptions, 
emotions, and the dynamics of situations, but also construct the sequence of episodes according to 
their beliefs and intentions. An underlying premise of this approach is that the more comprehensive 
the understanding of the context of the case in question, the more insights the investigation offers in 
the discovery of the root causes of the issues embedded in it.  
 
The following discussion provides an overview of the two-pronged approach adopted for the case 
study and the rationale behind interviewee selection (see Section 3.2), supported by details of the 
philosophy underlying this kind of approach. It is followed by an overview of the significance of data 
sources and the methods of data collection and analysis (see Section 3.3). Section 3.4 outlines the 
relationship between the questionnaire design and the research aims, questions, and hypotheses. 
Section 3.5 explains the comparative framework of the findings derived from the pre-hypothesis and 
hypothesis-led investigations, how any synergies between the two different approaches are identified, 
and what contributions they make to the overall conclusions. Section 3.6 includes conclusions from 
this chapter. 
3.2 Two-pronged Approach 
The principal components, tasks, and sequences employed for the case study are shown in Figure 3.1. 
This illustrates its dual reliance on pre-hypothesis investigations and hypothesis-led investigations, 
disaggregated for data collection, data analysis, and synthesis. The approach is akin to that developed 
by the OMEGA Centre Team at UCL (2005), of which the author was a member, which was used to 
compare and contrast decision-making in other fields in thirty mega urban transport cases studies in 
ten countries.   
 
To compare the two strands of this case study investigation, the pre-hypothesis research extracts 
anecdotes and experiences from a wide range of stakeholders through naïve interview11 (Cognitive 
Edge, 2006) with prompting questions12, whilst traditional hypothesis-led investigations use semi-
                                                 
11 Naïve interview is one of the techniques suggested by Cognitive Edge (2006) method for collecting data.  Cognitive Edge 
favours that Naïve Interviews conducted by students or people who are not involve in the subject case directly or have 
limited knowledge. It claims that, in this way, the interviewee can better avoid researchers’ bias and elicit more insights into 
the case. 
12 According to Cognitive Edge (2006: 2), a prompting question is: “an indirect question which places people in a context they 
can understand and which allows them to tell a story about themselves or someone they know.” 
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structured interviews to target those who are most involved in MUTP decision-making process.
The aim of the former approach is to employ the wider scope and non-hierarchically nature of story-
telling to elicit ‘hidden signals’, which, as claimed by Kurtz and Snowden, could be easily ignored in 
hypothesis-led investigations. According to the Cognitive Edge Pty website13  (2007), this “provides 
[a] natural and intuitive approach to gaining multiple perspectives and new insights into complex 
problems that have hitherto proved intractable for both strategic management methods and software.”  
The aim of the latter approach, the hypothesis-led research (see Creswell, 2003; Punch, 2005), is to 
use research questions as interrogative statements, based on hypotheses, which investigators seek to 
answer through exploration in interviews, observations, documents, and archival material. 
 
Figure 3.1: Case Study Process  
 
 
The majority of data is collected by interviews. The literature reviews in Chapter 2 indicate who 
should be chosen as key types of stakeholders for the case study. To comply with the aims of this 
research, the interviewees were chosen from core stakeholder parties who were close to the decision-
making process affecting one or more of the studied mega projects. These were representatives of 
organisations or groups, ranging from international organisations, central government, governmental 
agencies, local government authorities, developers and consultancies, private sector interest groups, 
and local communities (see Appendix 1 for list of interviewees). Senior stakeholders are defined as 
key decision makers in the development of the projects studied. In this study, the cases include the 
CTRL project, King’s Cross Central and Stratford City regeneration schemes, and the 2012 London 
Olympics.  
 
Although there are differences in the two research approaches, they have some conceptual ground in 
common. This section elaborates the central idea of ‘storytelling’ as employed in both the hypothesis-
led and pre-hypothesis investigations through three aspects, namely: 
 the concepts of the Cynefin model (Kurtz and Snowden, 2003),  
                                                 
13 See http://www.cognitive-edge.com/. 
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 the role of narratives in decision-making, and  
 the power of discourses in mega-project developments.  
 
The following three sub-sections explain the connections between the methodology of case study and 
the research questions. The final part of this section concludes with a review of the principles of 
Content Analysis used in hypothesis-led investigations and Narrative Pattern Analysis employed in 
pre-hypothesis investigations. 
3.2.1 Sense-making in complex decision-making processes 
The incentive to employ a sense-making approach to the research enquiry pursued here came from 
working in the OMEGA Centre at UCL and the specific exposure to the work of Kurtz and Snowden 
(2003) and their development of the Cynefin framework (see Figure 3.2). Kurtz and Snowden 
consider this framework to be particularly useful in collective sense-making of observed phenomena, 
and, in the context of decision-making analysis, it is seen to offer constructs that make better sense of 
complex problems and how these problems may be tackled in innovative ways. According to its 
authors, the essence of the framework is that it focuses on the dynamics of situations, decisions, 
perspectives, conflicts, and changes so as to build up consensus amidst uncertainty in decision-making 
(Kurtz and Snowden, 2003: 468).  
 
  Figure 3.2: Cynefin Framework 
 
Source: Kurtz and Snowden (2003: 468) 
 
The case study of the three mega projects investigates the known, complex, knowable, and chaotic 
domains of decision-making through both pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations. The 
premise of the Cynefin Framework is that pre-hypothesis investigations offer more insightful results 
than the hypothesis-led investigations because the latter confines itself to enquiries of the ‘knowable’ 
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domain.  
 
The case study seeks to identify and make sense of a variety of issues through the observations 
generated by its pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations and to plot these against the Cynefin 
framework, with a view to exploring types of situations that require intervention in the mega project 
decision-making process.   
3.2.2 The role of narratives 
Much has been made of the potential value of the narrative as a source for understanding decision-
making in mega project developments, where the ‘narrative’ may be defined as “a type of 
communication that happens in conversation, is composed of discourse, appears in a sequence, and is 
interpreted retrospectively” (Browning and Boudès, 2005: 32).  In this sense, storytelling is one kind 
of narrative. Jovchelovitch and Bauer (2000) claim that by telling stories people can put experience 
into sequence and find explanations within their own intentions or knowledge. It gives them the power 
to play with the chain of events that shape individual and social life. In the narrative, the hidden 
information they contain is primarily considered a potential knowledge base to be explored, a concept 
shared by Kurtz and Snowden (2003).  
 
In order to collect valuable data from an interviewee, Kurtz and Snowden emphasise the importance 
of noting history, identifying turning points (also see Gladwell, 2000), and uncovering small events 
that caused large changes (see Taleb, 2007). This is compatible with the theory of ‘path dependence’, 
as expounded by Arthur (1987) and Pierson (2000), which emphasises that ostensibly small events 
may be highly influential, and may lead to large scale changes (see Chapter 2). The pre-hypothesis 
research advocated by Kurtz and Snowden and employed for the case study uses prompting, tacit, and 
indirect questions in interviews (see Appendix 2) to extract hidden information. The questions posed 
in the questionnaire are purposely void of hypotheses so as to avoid interviewer bias in the 
investigation.  
3.2.3 Discourse and power 
As reviewed in the previous chapter, this research attempts to examine the force of mega-project 
discourses in negotiating and lobbying in the decision-making process. This section explains the 
theoretical background to Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) (Fairclough, 2003) which is a potentially 
useful tool for analysing discourse in a mega-project decision-making network. Discourse patterns 
emerging within institutional environments represent the positions of discourse generators, such as 
project promoters.  
 
The purpose of employing the concept of CDA in this investigation is twofold:  
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 to gauge political power by examining discourses produced by diverse stakeholders interviewed 
for the case study; and  
 to see how the power of discourse performs in the competing or co-operating relationships 
between stakeholders observed in the case study.  
 
Fairclough (2003) states that the study of relations between different organisations is an analysis of the 
relations between different ‘orders of discourse’. This research will analyse the discourses employed 
in the case of CTRL, hub development, and the 2012 London Olympics.  Fairclough (2003) claims 
that inter-discursive analysis is the most significant feature of CDA because:  
 It allows the contextualising of the analysis of texts – in this case the mega-project planning, 
appraisal, and delivery framework in the UK; and 
 it shows the relationships between the social events and social practices that have moulded the 
project under study.  
 
According to Fairclough’s (2003) interpretation of CDA, the study of mega-project decision-making 
requires examination of ways in which mega-project policies are articulated in terms of institutional 
arrangements and project stakeholder networks and the relationships between them. Thus, the study of 
mega-project discourses and their evolution aims to analyse key stakeholders’ power values in the 
institutional framework. Also, based on Atkinson’s (1999:59) argument, the study of mega-project 
discourses and power relations in decision-making means the study of the process of privileging 
official discourses, as this process helps the stakeholders create boundaries and control directions for 
others.  
 
The concept of CDA is applied to identify the role of power intervention in the decision-making 
processes of the selected projects studied in this research. Discourses are generated for an act of 
performance and the production of stakeholders’ agendas (Browning and Boudès, 2005; Hajer, 1995). 
The data analysis for the case study in this thesis critically reviews the interview transcripts from the 
hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations, and examines features of the project discourses as 
well as their advocates.   
3.2.4 Content Analysis and Narrative Pattern Analysis  
Content Analysis, according to Krippendorff (2004: 3), is “a systematic reading of texts, images, and 
symbolic matter”. Data collected by hypothesis-led research is analysed using Content Analysis, an 
approach appropriate to the research objectives. Krippendorff (2004: 18) defines Content Analysis as 
“a research technique for making replicable and valid inferences from texts (or other meaningful 
matter) to the contexts of their use.” Here Krippendorff stresses that ‘text’ is not restricted to written 
material, but rather includes those data that can be sensed or observed, such as images, maps, sounds, 
signs, symbols, and numerical records (see Krippendorff, 2004: 19).  
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Based on the same source (Krippendorff, 2004: 32), Content Analysis features specific contexts from 
which data is derived by compensating for analysts’ inability to observe the following: 
 phenomena pertain to the characteristics of writers or readers; 
 happenings hidden behind intentional information barriers; and 
 events in a distant past or future. 
 
Krippendorff (2004: 40) uses Heisenberg’s uncertainty principles to interpret the constraints of using 
Content Analysis, namely measurements that interfere with the data assessment which then results in 
biased observations. Narrative Pattern Analysis is distinct from Content Analysis in its potential to 
identify weak signals by analysing narrative patterns of knowledge and by avoiding researcher biases.  
 
A comparison of Narrative Pattern Analysis and Grounded Theory (see Glaser and Strauss, 1967) as 
presented suggests that the former has similar features to the latter as they do not rely on literature 
review as a source for the formation of hypotheses. Indeed, Glaser and Strauss specifically argue that 
in order to understand the complexity of social phenomena, facts should be investigated as they 
present themselves in the real world and data analysis should be undertaken without preconceived 
hypotheses. As in the case of Narrative Pattern Analysis, they believe that hypotheses and theories 
should be generated during or after the investigation and not prior to the investigation.  
 
Grounded Theory sets out to identify the hypotheses and theories behind the social phenomena 
observed through survey data coding, issue conceptualising, and data categorisation. From this 
perspective, Narrative Pattern Analysis may be regarded as an extended version of Grounded Theory 
because it aims to identify narrative patterns of knowledge by systematising sense-making items14. 
The principal distinguishing characteristic between these two qualitative research methods (see Table 
3.1) lies in the Grounded Theory’s use of coding by practitioners as opposed to the self-indexing 
methodology of the interviewees employed by Narrative Pattern Analysis.  
 
The similarities between the two approaches may be summarised as follows:  
 They both look for patterns in observations, collect qualitative data, and seek to translate this into 
quantitative data by systematising them.  
 They both try to understand observations without preconceived hypotheses.  
 They both use any material bearing on the topic which can help make sense of the world.  
 Finally, in each case data collection is mainly, but not exclusively, through interviews.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
14 See Section 3.3.1 for the definition of sense-making items.  
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Table 3.1: Comparison of Pre-hypothesis Investigations and the Grounded Theory Approach 
3.3 Data Collection and Analytical Methodologies  
The following discussion summarises the types of data sources and the steps undertaken in the data 
collection and analysis for both the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations.  
3.3.1 Data sources and collection methods 
Data are collected by a mixed-method approach, including interviews and documentary sources such 
as organisational reports, governmental study reports, published literature, newspaper articles, and 
electronic archives. In addition, data include a subset of interview transcripts from the OMEGA study. 
For the pre-hypothesis investigations the primary data is mainly drawn from naïve interviews whilst 
the hypothesis-led research uses semi-structured open-ended interviews. Official reports and archives 
were also examined to help build the project profile.  
 
This section describes the utility of these data sources to the research and the reasons for choosing 
these methods of data collection, as well as their limitations in practical use. The large number of 
anecdotes collected from desktop study and interviews help to piece together a miscellany of data. 
With appropriate analysis, this confluence of data facilitates a more comprehensive understanding of 
the key stages and interrelationships among the MUTP under study, the hubs’ development, and the 
2012 London Olympic preparations. 
  
Data collection for pre-hypothesis investigations (after Cognitive Edge, 2006)  
Data was collected through ten naïve interviews eliciting anecdotes and narratives of experiences 
through the concept of storytelling. These stories contain themes and issues according to the different 
emphases for participants and representatives from a variety of organisations, helping to disclose 
Research 
Approach 
Pre-Hypothesis Research 
(Narrative Pattern Analysis) Grounded Theory Approach 
Looking for Narrative Patterns Codes/Concepts/Categories 
Hypothesis No pre-set hypothesis 
Investigate the actualities in the real 
world and analyse the data with no 
preconceived hypothesis 
Data type 
Sense-making items, including 
anything that helps people make 
sense of the world they live in 
Use any material bearing in the area 
Data collection Naïve Interviews Data collection mainly from interviews 
Indices Self-indexing / Camouflage of hypothesis Codes are identified by practitioners 
Data analysis SenseMaker software  Micro study 
Dilemma How many sense-making items should be collected 
When to finish the analysis: when 
the theory is emerging 
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diverse information relating to the case studies. Prompting questions were employed to encourage the 
interviewees to give detailed information while allowing the investigator to detect correlations 
between issues and events. Data of this kind has been proved invaluable when later conducting data 
analysis to find out emergent issues, themes, and hypotheses.  
Naïve Interviews 
An interviewer conducting the pre-hypothesis investigations should have only limited knowledge 
about the research subject in order to avoid pre-perception of the research question that can lead to a 
biased attitude and subjective opinions imposed into prompting questions. This PhD candidate was 
also the interviewer for the Naïve Interviews and this compromised the method through prior 
knowledge of the research topic and research questions, possibly introducing bias into the prompting 
questions posed during the interview process. 
 
Prompting Questions 
The questions asked in the pre-hypothesis research (see Appendix 2) were devised to prompt 
participants into a narrative form of disclosure on topics relating to the thesis research questions. The 
essence of Cognitive Edge methodology is to minimise the intervention of expert opinion or bias, 
which can often corrupt the original data. The interview technique is to ask ‘indirect’ questions and 
give participants a third-person role that allows them to produce sufficient story material without 
necessarily taking responsibility. In this writer’s experience as an interviewer, it is necessary to 
introduce supplementary questions in order to elicit responses of sufficient breadth and depth.  
 
Sense-making Items 
Sense-making items are defined by Kurtz and Snowden (2010: 9) as “anything that allows people to 
make sense of the complexity.” They range from anecdotes, drawings, and pictures to other digital 
forms, including governmental documents, reports, websites, minutes, and archives. The employment 
of the Cognitive Edge sense-making software (SenseMaker) for the case study analysis enabled 
narratives to be extracted from the manuscripts of the pre-hypothesis interviews without expert-led 
supervision. This collection of large numbers of narratives was undertaken in order to detect ‘weak 
signals 15 ’ among the observations reported that would otherwise not have been identified in 
conventional interview data collection methods. In practice, this writer believes that the small number 
of interviews conducted in this study limits the effectiveness of this analytical tool which was 
designed to be applied to larger data sets.  
 
Indexing16 
                                                 
15 According to Snowden (2010: 7), the reason Narrative Pattern Analysis can more easily elicit important, yet weak, signals is 
based on the concept presented by Lazaroff and Snowden (2006) “that human brains are more sensitised to narrative forms of 
knowledge about a situation than they are to analytical processes, in effect agreeing with the general criticism of sense-datum 
processing as a model of human intelligence.” 
16 Four types of indexing are used. They are as follows (Cognitive Edge, 2006): 
Abstract indicators – these are used when issues cannot be covered by questions with a range of options.  
Multi-choice questions: Generic / Hypothesis-type – generic questions are generic in nature and provide useful search 
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The Cognitive Edge methodology stresses the importance of self-indexing of observations because it 
is believed that anecdotes themselves do not fully represent reported experiences. The process of 
constructing a set of indices for the case study allows the storyteller to add comments to their own 
story. The anecdotes indexed by the interviewees provided a greater understanding of the reported 
experiences about mega-project decision-making. This operation helps reduce ambiguity and helps 
respondents’ understanding of the questions. This author encountered a number of difficulties using 
pre-hypothesis method at this stage. One was the issue of striking the right balance in index design, 
which should reflect the research questions but must avoid leading interviewees to predetermined 
responses. Another was the procrastination of interviewees in response to the indexing task, which 
was most frustrating for the author.  
 
Data collection for hypothesis-led investigations 
There were nine respondents to the hypothesis-led semi-structured questionnaire. Each was a 
stakeholder closely involved in at least one of the projects in question. The questionnaire was 
designed around the research questions and the hypotheses described in Chapter 1. The detailed 
questions and the rationale that underpins each of them are covered in the Section 3.4.2. Data 
collected by this method were used to gauge the extent to which there was any synergy between 
MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega-event-related developments. In addition, a 
number of hypotheses that were cited at the outset of the study are included here to help explain how 
the CTRL and its transport hubs at King’s Cross and Stratford were developed and what relationships, 
if any, were established with the 2012 London Olympics project. 
 
Semi-structured open-ended questionnaires 
This approach is based on the principles of qualitative research described by Creswell (2003). The 
hypothesis-led research undertaken for the case study was divided into two parts (see Appendix 3). 
Part one focuses on the overarching research questions derived from the literature and documentation 
reviewed. Part two focuses on the hypotheses and questions about the developments of the CTRL 
itself and its transport hubs at King’s Cross and Stratford, and their expected associations with the 
2012 London Olympics. The questions posed in part two invited interviewees to respond to the 
plausibility of each of these hypotheses. The terminology used in the questionnaires requires clear 
definition in order for interviewees to understand the questions and reduce ambiguity.  
 
Indexing 
In the hypothesis-led investigations of CTRL / King’s Cross Central / Stratford City / 2012 London 
                                                                                                                                          
criteria and points of analysis. Hypothesis-type questions are based upon indirect questions and ask originators to index their 
own stories elicited from the participation process (questionnaire or interview). 
Key word identification – the storyteller or indexer decides which words in the story are significant according to their 
understanding of the story. Thus, this process is not performed by a computer programme working on universal assumptions 
about the nature of language. 
Free text – the making of comments or clarifications is allowed, especially when the material has not been indexed by the 
originator.  
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Olympics (referred to as the ‘Mega Projects’), an index sheet (see Appendix 3) was designed for the 
interviewees to complete in order to facilitate the analysis of interview data.  The indices are divided 
into two parts: 
 About the interviewees - questions about interviewees and their involvement in the Mega 
Projects and/or its associated developments (see Appendix 3, Questions 1-3); 
 Interviewees’ views on Mega Projects (see Appendix 3, Questions 4-6); 
 
The statistics of the indexing results are quantitative evidence which can be used to support the 
following inquires:  
 Which types of contextual factors are the most important in the planning of the Mega Projects? 
 Which aspects of the sustainable development challenges are addressed and how successfully 
have the Mega Projects coped with them? 
 Which attributes are the most important for an efficient and effective stakeholder network to 
deliver Mega Projects? 
 
The request to the interviewees to carry out their own indexing met with difficulties similar to those 
encountered in conducting the pre-hypothesis investigations. The hypothesis-led questionnaire 
contains a total of 14 questions, although the second part allowed the interviewees to select which 
they wished to answer. Most opted to answer all of them. Each interview took more than one hour. 
This lengthy process brought a general reluctance to invest additional time in completing the indexing 
sheet. In this situation, five (out of nine) responses were indexed by the researcher. Despite every 
effort to faithfully reflect the views of the interviewee, this intervention is bound to have compromised 
results. 
 
Data extracted from the OMEGA study  
In addition to the primary data sources addressed above, the data analysis was supplemented by access 
to transcripts and results from 25 further interviews covering related fields of enquiry undertaken by 
the OMEGA Centre at UCL, where the author held a PhD research fellowship. Data was extracted 
from the OMEGA enquiries where two of the questions overlapped with this PhD hypothesis-led 
questionnaire design (see Appendix 3, the overarching research question #1 and the hypothesis-led 
research question #3).  Access to these hypothesis-led interview transcripts was highly instructive. 
Several findings quoted in the case study chapters (Chapters 4-6) are referred to the OMEGA study. 
Data extracted from the OMEGA pre-hypothesis investigations was not used extensively because the 
questionnaire and indexing design were based on different research questions. However, this data did 
supplement basic knowledge and understanding of the projects.  
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3.3.2 Data analysis 
Types of data analysed here include interview recordings (written transcripts), questionnaire responses, 
and varied texts from secondary sources. For the pre-hypothesis research, a data analysis framework 
was constructed by the SenseMaker program and NVivo program (see Appendix 7 for the data 
analysis by these two software applications). The main function of SenseMaker program is to select 
key sense-making items for further studies, whilst the NVivo program helps to identify emergent 
issues and emergent hypotheses. The NVivo application subsequently proved valuable in the 
comparison between, and synthesis of, the pre-hypothesis investigations and the hypothesis-led 
interviews (see Appendix 8).  
 
The results derived from the application of the two packages provided the basis for identifying 
distinctive narrative patterns and the interrelationships between the given narratives collected for the 
overall research questions. These findings were found to be of value for the further analysis of 
institutional networks and for insights into the power relations between stakeholders that became 
evident in specific decision-making scenarios in the case study. For the hypothesis-led research, the 
concept of Content Analysis was applied to the analysis of the interview transcripts collected from 
hypothesis-led interviews. This involved manually categorising the interview transcripts according to 
the questions posed in the questionnaire and the hypotheses. The grouped data was later compared 
with the findings of pre-hypothesis investigations. This comparison brought further insights into the 
research questions.  
 
The issues and themes identified through the methods above are, in part, compatible with the 
arguments established in this research (see Chapter 1). Some, however, are newly developed through 
this exploratory analysis approach. An iterative process of reviewing data was adopted in all the 
analytical methods used in order better to incorporate new elements emerging from data with those 
previously identified.  
 
The small number of the interviews casts some doubt on the level of confidence one can have in the 
reliability of the research findings as a basis for further action. The selection of interviewees was 
based on the literature reviews and desktop research on the projects, and the content of the research 
questions. Personal participation in the OMEGA pilot study also helped the author identify potential 
interviewees. This list was supplemented when the author attended the public enquiry of the King’s 
Cross Central project. Each interview is detailed and rich in content, and categorisation and analysis 
was a protracted process. As a result of time, manpower, and social connection constraints, only 20 
individuals agreed to be interviewed for this research. One individual from the private sector was 
reluctant to answer my questions on the grounds of commercial confidentiality. The small number of 
interviews was offset to an extent by using the data extracted from the OMEGA pilot study.  
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3.4 Questionnaire Construction 
This section explains the rationale of the questionnaire design and the relationship between the 
research questions, hypotheses, and the questionnaire. It first explains the rationale of indexing design 
in the pre-hypothesis investigations to show how these indices can help to identify key stories from 
the interview data and why these stories are most closely related to the research questions. The second 
part of this section focuses on the explanation of the relationship between the research questions, 
hypotheses, and the hypothesis-led questionnaire. It describes the reasons behind posing these 
questions in the questionnaire.  
3.4.1 Indexing design of pre-hypothesis investigations 
As indicated earlier, questions used in pre-hypothesis investigations were designed to encourage 
interviewees to relate stories about their experiences when involved in the projects in question. At the 
same time, these questions had to be free of bias, without imposing hypotheses, and the investigator’s 
opinions (see Appendix 2). Thus, the connection between the research questions and the pre-
hypothesis investigations lies in the indexing design. Appendix 2 shows that there are 10 sections of 
indices. Among these, indices 8 and 9 directly connect to the research questions. The former asks what 
themes are relevant to the stories the interviewees provide, whilst the latter explores what kind of 
situations are most suitable to represent these stories. With these aims, selections in index 8 include 
the themes of ‘political intervention in the project’, ‘sustainability concerns’, ‘institutional 
arrangements’, and ‘bargaining power’; selections in index 9 range from ‘forming the vision for the 
project’ and ‘reaching agreement on project financing’ to ‘experiencing project under performance’ 
(please see Appendix 2 for the complete selection of indices). Other indices were designed for latter 
stages to identify the most relevant stories relating to a range of topics. For example, indices 5, 10, 
and 11 focus on the identification of stakeholders, their roles, and influences in the project 
development process. Index 4 asks about the timing of events referred to in stories. This assists the 
construction of a project timeline. Index 7 asks the interviewees to highlight keywords or phrases 
about the stories they offered in order to indicate major issues in the projects.   
 
The purpose of this operation was to reduce ambiguity of the data and to assist the respondents’ 
understanding of the questions. This process was not without difficulties. For example, indices 8 and 9 
incorporated too many selections, leading in part to the protracted indexing period and the reluctance 
of others to engage in the process in any way. Notwithstanding this, the stage of self-indexing is 
critical to identify key data for the analysis in the pre-hypothesis investigations, as these indices are 
different from the hypothesis-led questionnaire design and exhibit clear links between the research 
questions, hypotheses, and the interview questionnaire.   
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3.4.2 Hypothesis-led questionnaire design 
As indicated earlier, there are two parts of the questions in the hypothesis-led investigations. Part one 
is composed of overarching research questions that are designed to detect the synergistic effects 
between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events. Part two comprises the questions 
that are employed to test the hypotheses and focuses on the interviewees’ experiences and insights into 
the case studies. This section describes the contents of these questions and the reasoning behind them. 
  
Overarching Research Question (ORQ) #1: Do you agree that MUTPs are impacted 
significantly by mega events, if so, why and how? 
 
This question aims to find out the role of mega events in MUTP development in order to answer the 
primary question and to reveal the interrelationship between the cluster of the three types of mega 
projects. Many mega events claim positive impacts on transport infrastructure development in the host 
cities, especially for pre-existing long-term development projects which lack political support and 
financial resources. It is suggested that the example of 2004 Athens Olympics concentrated a 25-year 
transport development programme into a five-year timeframe (Bovy, 2006b). This question attempts 
to answer whether these mega events give reasons and justifications to approve and implement plans 
that have been dormant for many years. In this research, this question aims to discover the degree of 
impact of the 2012 London Olympics on public transportation.  
 
ORQ #2: In your view, under which circumstances can one coordinate the delivery of MUTPs, 
sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, and simultaneously achieve visions of 
sustainable development17? 
 
One of the premises of this research is that institutional arrangements and power relations are the most 
influential factors in mega-project decision-making. This question aims to prove this premise and also 
reveal any other factors that are of significance to this decision-making process. It also seeks to 
discover what kind of context can bring all actors to work together within the mega-project network, 
and what model of coordination can function most effectively and efficiently. Based on the literature 
review in Chapter 2, the visions of sustainable development depend on the degree of consensus on the 
meaning of ‘sustainable development’ among the relevant actors and the interpretation they adopt. 
This question simultaneously shows the stakeholders’ understanding of this term in mega-project 
development. 
 
 
                                                 
17 Interviewees should have their own perception of Sustainable Development. If not, we can use Brundtland Report which is 
well known and often cited: "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs." 
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ORQ #3: Where this trilogy of development exists, which agency or institution provides or 
should provide leadership? Which of the three types of developments studied here becomes the 
locomotive of change that drives the others to achieve favourable and integrated outcomes for 
the principal stakeholders? 
 
This question seeks to find out which form of coordination between these three types of mega projects 
can produce the most favourable and integrated outcome. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
suggests that a proactive partnership is the most effective form of mega-project governance. Within 
this, the responsibility between the public and private sectors needs to be articulated. This question 
aims to find out which of the three types of developments is the most influential within the multiple 
networks and which agency can furnish the strategy to maximise the synergy between these three 
types of development. 
 
ORQ #4: Do MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events share resources at the 
local, regional, and national scale, or is one promoted at the expense of the others?  
 
The issue is whether resources are shared among these three types of mega projects, or does one type 
of project dominate in the allocation of resources. Thus, Question #4 aims to find out if any resource 
diversion or programme reprioritisation exists within mega-project integration in order to fulfil 
demands of any one of the developments to the detriment of the others. If this is the case, what kind of 
impact does it have on the subordinate projects and any programmes that are omitted or postponed 
during this process? This leads to questions about which forces contribute to resource allocation 
decisions.  
 
Hypothesis 1: Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for 
the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can 
speed-up MUTP and sustainable urban regeneration developments. On this basis, CTRL 
constitutes an important positive catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and the 
Olympic developments associated with its transport hubs.  
 
This hypothesis is readdressed into two related questions: 
 
Hypothesis-related Research Question (HRQ) #1:  Do you agree with this hypothesis in general 
terms and as it relates more specifically to the Channel Tunnel Rail Link project? 
 
HRQ #2: What are the distinct roles of the CTRL in terms of the urban regeneration process of 
KX Central and Stratford City, and what role (if any) has the CTRL played in the Olympic 
Games Project? 
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This research hypothesises that under certain circumstances a MUTP can drive the delivery of 
sustainable urban regeneration schemes, while mega events have a temporal imperative in the shape of 
a strict timeframe which can drive event-related transport projects and urban regeneration schemes in 
the prioritisation and scale of investments. This research further premises that the realisation of mega 
events prevails so that more political resources will ultimately be concentrated in completing these 
projects. The second question posed to test this hypothesis is more straightforward. It aims to clarify 
the role of the CTRL in the hub developments and the 2012 London Olympics. The literature review 
on the catalytic role of MUTPs in urban development and economic growth already suggests that the 
transport projects alone cannot fulfil expectations, such as improvement of economic growth, 
enhancement of social cohesion, and achievement of sustainability. However, this research premises 
that MUTPs can act as an agent which can drive changes and helps to achieve the envisaged goals in 
long term.  
 
Hypothesis 2: Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors 
influencing the effective delivery and performance of Mega Urban Transport Projects, 
sustainable urban regeneration and mega event schemes. 
 
HRQ #3: Is the ultimate determining factor of the decision-making process in MUTP planning, 
appraisal, evaluation, and delivery that of political power and not the power of the rationality of 
technocrats? 
 
According to the ‘path dependency’ theory, key decisions are determined by political power at a 
specific conjuncture of events and circumstances. Pierson (2004) claims that “once a dense network of 
institutions and interests develop”, such as patterns of political mobilisation, institutional settings, and 
the public perception about the political world, it will often generate self-reinforcing dynamics to 
decision-making. He further contends that policies that once looked promising may become 
irretrievably lost (ibid.), leading to negative impacts on political outcomes or massive costs to the 
public. The aim of testing this question in various contexts is to elicit information that establishes 
whether political or technocratic rationality is the dominant power in the mega-project decision-
making process.  
 
HRQ #4: What factors can enhance stakeholders’ ‘bargaining power’ in the delivery of CTRL as 
a whole, the KX Central, Stratford City schemes, or 2012 London Olympics and why? 
 
This question aims to examine the power relations between project stakeholders and the ways in 
which they gain and strengthen their bargaining power in the decision-making process. Bargaining 
power, in Lindblom’s (1955) opinion, is inevitable and is the alternative to hierarchy and the price 
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mechanism (i.e., market). He argues that higher hierarchical authority does not necessarily equate to 
higher bargaining power, since hierarchical authority is merely one weapon among many, including 
personality, characteristics, and articulacy. He furthermore regards these as minor factors. The most 
influential factor to bargaining power, he argues, is one’s position in the market. Another 
interpretation is that the value of bargaining power relies on the role of one actor within the bargaining 
field.  He goes on to suggest that the way one pursues bargaining power is through alliances. Here he 
implies the importance of inter-governmental and inter-organisational networks. Although there is a 
belief that the public interest and common value should be taken into account in the decision-making 
process, a problem emerges in the difficulty of determining any consensus on what constitutes public 
interest across stakeholders. The needs of the least vociferous tend to be ignored. Hence, the so-called 
public interest is represented by an agreement between a narrow group of bargaining players who are 
active in the decision-making process (Lindblom, 1955: 151-158).    
 
Hypothesis 3: Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, 
sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events can better foster integrated development and 
the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual 
projects. 
 
HRQ #5: Will the completion of the 2012 London Olympics project significantly divert 
resources away from other major development initiatives? If so, are the spin-off benefits of this 
re-prioritisation justified? 
 
This question explores under what circumstances, if any, consolidation of the three types of mega 
projects can generate synergies and efficient and effective co-operation. According to the review of 
mega events in Chapter 2, HRQ #5 premises that coordination can result in ‘robbing Peter to pay Paul’ 
since mega events are likely to divert finite resources away from other projects. In addition, while the 
prioritisation of mega events reallocates resources which are initially scheduled for other projects, we 
should ask whether this is a result of multi-project co-operation or compromise. Lindblom (1955) 
compared bargaining arrangements and hierarchical arrangements, and concluded that policy-makers 
are more mobile in bargaining settings which allow them to change their policy focus quickly 
according to prevailing political agenda at the time. Hierarchical arrangements, in contrast, contain a 
more rigid designation of responsibility, with the authority of individual policy-makers confined to 
closely specified domains. This signifies that certain special institutional arrangements need to be 
made to legitimise the prioritised project, invariably the mega event. Under these circumstances, mega 
events can be regarded as products of the concentration of political, financial, and institutional 
resources. This question explores whether this re-prioritisation process can be justified by the 
outcomes of mega events. 
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HRQ #6: Do you agree that some important aims of the CTRL project, the 2012 London 
Olympics project, and the urban regeneration schemes for Stratford City and King’s Cross are 
in reality mutually reinforcing, or are the product of important compromises? 
 
Responses to this question are informative as to whether the integration of this cluster of mega 
projects is a win-win strategy for the projects and for the wider range of stakeholders. According to 
the theory of bargaining power (Lindblom, 1955), the outcome of political decisions is achieved as a 
result of compromise after bargaining among many conflicting interests. Reflecting research question 
#3 posed in Chapter 1, this question looks into whether synchronised mega projects can complement 
each other and generate favourable, synergistic outcomes for stakeholders. This question attempts to 
discover the extent to which integration involves competition for limited social, economic, political, 
and environmental resources, and which of the projects is dominant and for what reasons.  
 
HRQ #7: How effective will the new CTRL Stratford Station be as a catalyst for new 
development? Will it attract new public and private sector development in east London or 
merely encourage the further concentration of such development in central London? 
 
Responses to this question reveal the extent of the impacts of Stratford International Station on the 
development of the new CTRL hubs. It also examines the promises and visions promulgated by 
promoters of Stratford International as catalysts for development in east London. The associated 
research question challenges the definition of sustainable development. One level of enquiry is the 
extent to which any synergy between these three types of mega projects can bring favourable 
outcomes to stakeholders. A second level of enquiry examines the extent to which integrated 
development leads to sustainable development. Within this, coordination between these mega projects 
may foster a robust, resilient, and impervious network that constitutes an institutional barrier, as 
suggested in Chapter 2. This closed network can become self-reinforcing, but can also weaken those 
lower-profile projects by occupying major resources to the exclusion of other claims.  
 
HRQ #8: How would you respond to the claim that there is a gap between the rhetoric and 
reality in the vision that mega events, such as the 2012 London Olympics, can significantly 
stimulate sustainable urban regeneration? 
 
According to the literature review in Chapter 2, many global concerns, such as world peace, human 
rights, sustainable development, and climate change, are cited in the case for mega events. However, 
in today’s business and political environments they remain as little more than part of the promotional 
and marketing rhetoric prior to major decisions.  In the case of the 2012 London Olympics, the goals 
emphasised by the project organisers are to promote sports, reduce unemployment, incentivise 
development investments, and stimulate sustainable communities in east London. However, the many 
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mega-event impact studies (see Blake, 2005; PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2005; Experian, 2006; 
Kornblatt, 2006; UBS, 2006; Atkinson et al, 2008; Collins and Jackson, 2008) indicate that there will 
be gaps between the initial visions and the eventual outcomes. Here, the author aims to find out 
reasons behind these gaps, and how stakeholders handle unfulfilled promises.  
 
Hypothesis 4: Key champions of mega urban transport projects, sustainable urban 
regeneration, and mega events typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to 
become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to 
promote their agendas and interests above all else with a limited sense of social corporate 
responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen their network 
in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though they may 
have different agendas. 
 
HRQ #9: Do you agree that discourses of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega 
events have been used as tools by key champions to convince others of the validity of their 
positions in the expectation that these will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, 
simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the interests of these champions and 
empowering the project delivery network? 
 
HRQ #10: Who are the primary champions and decision-makers that supported and opposed: 
the CTRL project, King’s Cross Central, Stratford City or 2012 London Olympics? And what 
were their major intentions? 
 
Low (2005: 9) argues that “discourse is what forms a network, allowing ideas to travel, rather than the 
network shaping discourse. It is the discursive factor in networks, I want to propose, that makes them 
such formidable and impenetrable barriers to paradigm change”. The research question #4 posed in 
Chapter 1 focuses on usage and forces of mega-project discourses in the decision-making process. 
HRQ #9 and #10 aim to uncover whether these discourses have been used as a tool by key project 
champions to convince others of the validity of their positions.  The expectation is that these 
discourses will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, will marginalise those who do not 
share the interests of these champions, and will ultimately empower the project delivery network.  
 
Low (2005) stresses the importance of storylines, which include the visions, promises, and objectives 
of promoters when marketing a project. Based on Low’s (2005: 51) argument, discourses composed of 
storylines are prime vehicles of change to political agendas. They can legitimise political stances, 
position actors, exclude others who do not subscribe to the same discourses from influence and 
facilitate coalitions within the project-led network. This research expects to discover more insights 
into this mega-project discourse coalition through the case studies. At the same time, these two 
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questions aim to identify the primary decision-makers and the motivations behind their propositions.   
3.5 Comparison and Synthesis of Findings 
This section explains the framework within which the findings generated from the two strands of 
research are compared, and how the synthesis of the outcomes can help to answer the research 
questions.  
3.5.1 Theory generation and verification 
These terms, pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led research, are equivalent to the terms used by Punch 
(2005) as theory generation and theory verification research. This research does not favour one over 
the other, but employs both of them and uses their synthesis in order to achieve more comprehensive 
results. The author believes both approaches are legitimate and necessary. Moreover, the synthesis of 
findings from each strand, when combined, strengthens confidence in the overall research results. 
There is a general correlation between style and approach, which is well captured by Punch:  
 
“Theory verification research, by definition, is more likely to have clear-cut research questions 
leading to hypotheses, a tightly structured design, and pre-established categories for data. Theory 
generation research, by contrast, will more likely use an approach where specific research questions 
unfold as the study develops, and where codes and categories for the data are empirically derived” 
(Punch, 2005: 25). 
 
In this research, pre-hypothesis fieldwork was undertaken, and, in parallel hypotheses were drawn-up 
which were derived from the literature review as part of the hypothesis-led investigation. The concept 
was to devise hypotheses without using the emerging issues generated from the process of pre-
hypothesis investigations, and then eventually to bring the two strands of findings together for 
comparison. The heart of the process is to compare the established hypotheses with the emergent 
hypotheses generated from the pre-hypothesis investigations.  
3.5.2 Comparative framework 
The comparative framework is constructed to generate answers to the respective research questions 
and to test the hypotheses by hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis research. The comparison is based 
upon hypotheses and hypothesis-led questions. It includes two comparison methods which are 
described below and accompanied by the table of summarised steps (see Table 3.2):  
 
Comparison with the aid of the NVivo software application 
This comparison aims to identify relevant anecdotes in the pre-hypothesis investigations that correlate 
to questions posed in the hypothesis-led questionnaire (see Appendix 8). It shows the extent to which 
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the relevant data in the pre-hypothesis investigations substantiate the responses collected from 
hypothesis-led investigations.  
 
Manually comparing and analysing the responses collected 
According to the interviewees’ responses to the hypothesis-led questions, the researcher assigns a 
rating which reflects degree of agreement to the hypotheses and the questionnaire questions. This 
helps to gauge the strength of the confirmation or rejection towards each hypothesis and question. 
Also, this comparison approach discovers the extent to which the relevant data in the pre-hypothesis 
investigations are consistent with the result of the hypothesis-led investigation by way of reviewing 
sense-making items identified by the relevant indices.  
 
Table 3.2: Comparative Framework 
 Comparison with the aid of NVivo software application 
Manually comparing and analysing the responses 
collected 
Sources Hypothesis-led interview questions 
Related data in the 
pre-hypothesis 
investigations 
identified by NVivo 
Responses from the 
hypothesis-led 
interviews 
Related data in the pre-
hypothesis 
investigations 
identified by 
SenseMaker 
Actions 
 Identify keywords. 
 
 Identify data coded 
to the keywords 
derived from the 
questions. 
 
 Summarise each 
response.  
 Give ranks of 
agreement to each 
response. 
 Identify data relating 
to the questions 
among the key sense-
making items which 
were derived from 
narrative patterns.   
Purposes 
 Keywords are as 
codes used in next 
step to detect pre-
hypothesis data 
 Identify confirmatory 
and disconfirming 
data between these 
two-stranded 
research approaches. 
 Identify emergent 
issues and 
hypotheses. 
 Recognise the 
strength of the 
confirmation / 
rejection towards 
each hypothesis and 
research question. 
 Identify confirmatory 
and disconfirming 
data. 
 Identify emergent 
issues and 
hypotheses. 
 
3.6 Conclusions 
The methodology for the case studies has been introduced in this chapter. The case study methodology 
employs a parallel approach, one side being the pre-hypothesis research based on the Cognitive Edge 
method, the other being hypothesis-led research based on a conventional questionnaire. The core of 
the case study methodology is based upon narrative analysis through capturing narratives among 
stakeholders. The term ‘narrative’ is used in a broad sense to include written articles and transcripts of 
spoken material. In order to facilitate understanding of decision-making process, Cognitive Edge 
methodology was employed to identify narrative patterns. This innovative approach was selected over 
more traditional strategies, which involve assumptions of order, rational choice, and intent (see Kurtz 
and Snowden, 2003). The significance of the data sources, data collection methods, analytical 
framework, and comparative framework were all described in this chapter. 
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Case study methodology is applied to gain insights into the CTRL project and its station developments. 
Chapters 4-6 describe the context of the selected projects together with their prevailing issues and 
findings. These observations are drawn from the exploration of the CTRL project, King’s Cross area 
development, Stratford City regeneration scheme, and 2012 London Olympics. They are compared 
with the conclusions derived from the literature reviews of the three development types (MUTPs, 
sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events) and theories concerning decision-making, power 
relations, and institutional arrangements (see Chapter 2).   
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4 Case Study of Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents, as a case study, the UK Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) - also known as 
‘High Speed One’. It comprises of four elements (see Figures 4.1 and 4.2): the line haul (i.e., the 
railway link from the Channel Tunnel to London St. Pancras) which for the purposes of this study is 
seen as a mega urban transport project (MUTP), two major urban regeneration schemes (around the 
CTRL stations of Stratford and London St. Pancras), and an international mega event (the 2012 
London Olympic Games) and its associated development. This chapter begins with an introduction to 
the context of the CTRL as a MUTP, its champion protagonists, and the role of the various main 
stakeholders (Section 4.1). It is followed by an account of the project’s storyline and timeline of key 
stages of the project’s development in Section 4.2. This provides insights into the CTRL decision-
making process, the project initiatives, and aspects linked to the project’s periods of stagnation and 
breakthrough. Section 4.3 examines the inter-relationships between the station developments and the 
CTRL project, paying particular attention to the Stratford and London St. Pancras stations along with 
the related political debates. Section 4.4 investigates the gap between the project promises on 
sustainability and the financial realities. The prospects of the UK high-speed railway network are 
examined too. Section 4.5 analyses the issues which emerged from the CTRL decision-making 
process and negotiation powers involved in route selection and its financing arrangements, including 
the concessionary contract, negotiating power, risk transference, and the over-optimistic transport 
forecasts. Section 4.6 highlights the results of the hypothesis-testing and summarises the emergent 
issues and insights into theories that have been derived from the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis 
investigations, and discusses these in the light of the observations made in Chapter 2. The chapter 
closes with a summary of the key findings.   
 
The presentation of the case study is based to a great extent on a large number of anecdotes collected 
from various sources (as outlined in the previous chapter). These are compiled to form a miscellany of 
information in order to help build a more comprehensive picture of the development of the key stages 
and interrelationships of the MUTP under study with its two most northern stations and the 2012 
London Olympic preparations. In presenting this material this chapter seeks to analyse the principal 
issues and challenges encountered through a review of related literature and other secondary data, 
complemented by findings from primary questionnaire investigations, in an attempt to answer to the 
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research questions and test the hypotheses raised at the outset of the research. 
4.1.1 Project facts35 
The Channel Tunnel Rail Link is a highly complex MUTP which comprises the following 
components: 
 A double track high speed rail link between the Channel Tunnel and London St Pancras 
International (opened on 14th November 2007).  This represents the ‘Line haul’ component of 
the project.   
 Stations/ Transport Termini, comprising:  the London Terminus (the International Station at St 
Pancras) and Intermediate Stations located at: Stratford International (east London); Ebbsfleet 
(north Kent) and; Ashford International in mid-Kent (see Figure 4.1).  
 Construction Structures of the CTRL: 
– The total length of the CTRL is 113 km, including Section 1: 74km and Section 2: 
39km 
– 60% of the route (55km) is built within existing road or rail transport corridors 
– 152 bridges along the route 
– 25% (26km) of the route is in tunnel 
– 51% of CTRL Section 2 is in tunnel since it mainly runs across already packed 
central London 
– Majority of Section 1 runs across open countryside with numerous bridge crossings. 
The route formation was ardently debated from late 80s to early 90s. One of the 
issues was environmental impact on the Kent landscape which is often described as 
garden of England. The Section 1 route does however include massive cut-and-
cover works required to bring the CTRL through the centre of Ashford and the 
North Downs tunnel. 
– The CTRL is one of the 30 priority projects of the TEN-T High-speed railway. The 
axis Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam-London (the ‘PBKAL network) (EC 2005, 
Trans-European Transport Network: TENT-T priority axes and projects, Belgium) 
 Major regeneration schemes around the intermediate stations/transport hubs associated with 
CTRL at: 
– King’s Cross/St Pancras Station in central London  
                                                 
35 This discussion is based on data and literature provided by the OMEGA Centre, at UCL (see OMEGA Centre, 2008). The 
major part of this text has been drawn from: London and Continental Railways ‘LCR – An Incredible Journey’. 【WWW】
available from: www.lcrhq.co.uk 【Accessed: 24/10/2006】. 
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– Stratford International Station in east London  
– Ebbsfleet International Station in North Kent 
– Ashford International Station in mid-Kent 
 
Figure 4.1: Location of CTRL Route and Its Stations 
Source: Faith (2007: 159) 
 
St Pancras International Station is the largest of its kind in Europe and is expected to handle some 50 
million passengers per year.  In terms of construction phasing, the CTRL was split into two principal 
sections (see Figure 4.2).  
 
Section 1 – Channel Tunnel to Fawkham Junction. Construction of this section commenced in 
October 1998 and opened for use in September 2003. Earlier international services made use of 
primarily existing lines and connected the Channel Tunnel with Waterloo Station which was the 
temporary London Terminus for Eurostar services from 1993 until St Pancras opened in November 
2007, although the initial plan was that Waterloo International would continue to operate in alongside 
the St Pancras Terminus. 
 
Section 2 – Southfleet Junction to St Pancras. Construction commenced in July 2001 and was 
completed in November 2007. 
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Figure 4.2: Channel Tunnel Rail Link Section 1 and 2 
Source: Transport Issues (2006) Route Selection for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link【WWW】
available at: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/transportissues/appraisal_ctrl.shtml 【Accessed 
12/10/2007】 
4.1.2 Key stakeholders and their power relations 
The role of several stakeholders who were most influential in the evolution of the CTRL decision-
making process is explored in this section. They include consultancy Ove Arup, Kent County Council, 
Newham Council, British Rail, and the political champions, Michael Heseltine36 and John Prescott37. 
The key stakeholders and their network links are shown in Figure 4.3.  
 
According to Faith (2007: 120), one of the crucial factors of Ove Arup’s success in promoting their 
easterly route was their strategic hiring of a specialist Maureen Tomison as their public affairs 
consultant. Tomison’s role was to ensure that Arup’s proposal had the backing from all the MPs 
affected by the route of the CTRL. Another influential factor was the special interest and competence 
of Kent County Council which demonstrated strong negotiating powers. In retrospect, many regard 
                                                 
36 Michael Heseltine was a Member of Parliament from 1966 to 2001. He entered the Cabinet in 1979 as Secretary of State for 
the Environment and became Secretary of Defence by 1983. Under John Major, in 1995 to 1997, Heseltine became the 
Deputy Prime Minister and First Secretary of State. He was also the key advocate of the Millennium Dome (see Heseltine, 
2000).   
37 John Prescott is a former Deputy Prime Minister and First Secretary of State of the UK after the Labour’s victory in the 1997 
election.  
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this as the impetus that forced Government to accept the need for a new link to the Channel Tunnel. 
Another party that displayed admirable negotiating skills during the planning and development of the 
CTRL was Newham Council, notably in its lobbying efforts for the Stratford station.  
 
An organisation that displayed less competence in the CTRL development experience was British Rail 
(BR) which clearly struggled throughout the CTRL project development and always seemed to be in a 
quandary as regards its main direction. Gourvish (2002: 328) explains this by arguing that the BR 
Board “often found itself sandwiched between the Government’s ambitions on the one hand, and the 
commercial interest of Eurotunnel and speculative investors from the private sector on the other”. 
Factors which in particular weakened BR’s negotiation power and put them into the difficult situation 
were (after Fiath, 2007; Gourvish, 2002):  
 its lack of professionalism;  
 the on-going distractions of the threat of the privatisation and fragmentation of the organisation;  
 the Government’s unwillingness to pay for a project given its large scale;  
 the economic recession during 1989-93;  
 BR’s organisational culture.  
 
The battle between the key stakeholders during the CTRL decision-making reflects the analysis of the 
power of discourse in Chapter 2. The findings of this case study reinforce points mentioned earlier in 
the exploration of the functions of discourse power, as follows:  
 Discourse among decision-making parties is empowered by those stakeholders who obtain 
superior credentials and power to other less privileged parties. 
 The force of discourse power can simplify complex policy issues and focus on certain dominant 
ones supported by powerful project advocates. 
 Project discourses represent the process of structuring a network and prioritising particular 
interests. Through amplifying the political agenda, the main proponents gain sway over the 
limited resources that many are scrambling for. 
 Key mega project stakeholders adhered to the discourses set out in the various changing agendas 
with government commitments and political support gaining a stronger negotiation position over 
time.  
 
Discourse functions are explored and illustrated in the following sections. According to the synthesis 
of findings from this research, it can be concluded that effective bargaining powers possessed by 
stakeholders, underpinned by negotiation, lobbying, and the use of discourse, are critical in mega 
project decision-making. 
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Figure 4.3: CTRL Stakeholder Network 
 
Source: Author, information based on the websites of HS1 Ltd (n.d.) 【WWW】 available at:  http://www.highspeed1.com/about/ 【Accessed on 03/11/2010】and 
LCR (n.d.) 【WWW】 available at: www.lcrhq.co.uk【Accessed on 25/10/2006】
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4.2 History of the CTRL Project Development  
This thesis seeks to identify the role of MUTPs in providing sustainable urban regeneration schemes 
and effectively delivering a major international mega event. King’s Cross Central and Stratford City 
are two of the main regeneration projects fostered by the CTRL. The 2012 London Olympic Games 
development, which has a much shorter history than the CTRL, potentially offers enormous 
development momentum for east London. To understand the interrelationships that have developed 
among this cluster of mega projects, we need to briefly trace the histories of each project; 
commencing with the CTRL (explained in this chapter) and the elaboration of the others 
(subsequently in Chapters 5 and 6). 
4.2.1 Background
The project development timeline (see Table 4.1) effectively illustrates the evolution of the project, 
given its large scale and long history. An examination of the project’s history is important because it 
may offer important lessons for future MUTPs. The CTRL project timeline illustrated in Table 4.1 is 
drawn from the work of the OMEGA Centre (2008: 68-78) and places all the key events into a 
detailed sequence of development. 
 
Beginning in 1971, the idea of the CTRL first appeared during the study of Channel Tunnel proposal 
between BR and SNCF (see Pollalis, 2006). The UK Government abandoned the plan to build a tunnel 
under the Channel and the links to other cities in 1975, as it bowed to political pressure and took an 
easier political option38 (Pollalis, 2006: 4). According to Gourvish, the CTRL main development era 
can be viewed in three phases; each based on the involvement of BR’s activities (Gourvish, 2002: 
328-340; summarised by OMEGA Centre, 2008):  
 Period 1: 1988-1990: initial identification of possible routes and establishment of a JV with 
Eurorail that was scuppered by the government in the summer of 1990, 
 Period 2: 1990-autumn 1991: further study of possible routes which the government rejected, 
 Period 3: BR’s subsidiary (Union Rail) undertook further development work until the government 
announced its preferred route in 1994 (see Figure 4.4). 
 
 
 
                                                 
38 At that time, there were overwhelming public opposition and environment concerns of the negative impacts arising from 
faster and more frequent trains. 
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Figure 4.4: The Government 1994 Preferred CTRL Route 
Source: Pollalis (2006: 4), Figure 5 
 
The CTRL project decision confirmed 
The decision to build the Channel Tunnel provided the early impetus for the CTRL since the 
agreement between British and French Governments obliged both countries to provide sufficient links 
to their respective capital cities. Although it did not require delivering a high-speed link in this 
circumstance, the British Government were embarrassed by the contrast with the success of its 
partners who delivered their high-speed network successfully. Only when the publication of ‘Kent 
Impact Study’ in 198739 (see Hay et al., 2004) demonstrated that the existing capacity would not be 
sufficient by the end of the century (20th), did BR carry out a review of the CTRL route and terminal 
capacity and subsequently published a report in July 1988 entitled ‘Channel Tunnel Train Services’ in 
which four routes were identified (see Figure 4.5). In 1989, BR decided that the second terminal (after 
Waterloo Station) would be built as the lower-level station at King’s Cross. This decision was rather 
suddenly announced at the time and some argue that BR’s intention was to take advantage of the 
property-oriented proposal submitted by the London Regeneration Consortium (LRC), assembled by 
Rosehaugh and Stanhope, to develop the unoccupied railway lands around the King’s Cross and St 
Pancras area (Faith, 2007: 69).  
 
 
 
                                                 
39 Since 1986, there were a series of ‘Kent Impact Study’ reports published, i.e., 1986, 1987, 1988, 1990 and 1991.  
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Figure 4.5: BR, TALIS , and RACHEL Routes in 1988 
Source: Faith (2007: 63) 
 
Route formation  
In March 1990, Ove Arup published an alternative route proposal (see Figure 4.6) which suggested 
penetrating London from the east via Stratford. Representatives of the BR-Eurorail joint venture 
argued that the proposal could not be funded commercially due to high tunnelling costs with the result 
that it was decided to defer the CTRL Bill and instead submit an alternative Bill in November 1990. 
Until October 1993, the Government and BR were still unable to decide between the two terminal 
options presented, namely King’s Cross and St Pancras. Meanwhile, the Stratford Promoter Group40 
was constantly lobbying for Stratford International and submitted proposals for a combined 
                                                 
40 This group is made up of (Florio and Edwards 2001: 106):  
· Land Securities Properties—owners of the Stratford shopping mall 
· Carpenters Company—a City of London charitable company owning land in the area 
· P&O Developments—major development and construction company 
· Link Parks 
· University of East London 
· Regalian Groups of Companies—developers 
· Tarmac Construction—developers and house builders 
· John Mowlem & Co. Plc—construction and civil engineering company 
· Laing Civil Engineering—civil engineering company 
· London Docklands Development Corporation 
· Stratford Development Partnership Ltd1 
· London Borough of Newham 
· Rialto Homes Plc—house builders 
· Fairview New Homes Plc—house builders 
· Persimmon Homes—house builders 
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International and Domestic Station at Stratford at the time. In January 1994, the Secretary of State for 
Transport, Brian Mawhinney, declared the choice of the east London route over the other options with 
St Pancras as the London terminus and the provision of an intermediate station between Ashford and 
London. In 1996, with the appointment of London & Continental Railways (LCR) came the decision 
to include the station at Stratford, which was to be a key part of the commercial arrangement between 
the Government and the LCR (LCR was awarded the development rights at King’s Cross and 
Stratford Railway Lands). The political fight between the Kent County Council and BR as well as the 
hard lobbying from the Stratford Promoter Group over the route selection and decision of terminal 
serves to highlight the part played by powerful political intervention in complex decision-making on 
the CTRL project. 
 
Figure 4.6: The Four Routes Proposed in 1990 
Source: Pollalis (2006: 5), Figure 4 
 
Selection of a private sector partner 
In early 1995, after the evaluation of the bids for the construction of CTRL, Eurorail CTRL Ltd. and 
London & Continental Railways (LCR) were invited to proceed to the final stage of the competition. 
Ashford International was selected as the most southern station in East Kent and opened for Eurostar 
train services in early 1996. In February 1996, the Government and LCR signed the contract for the 
project to design, build, finance, and operate the CTRL, with LCR acquiring ownership of Union 
Railways Ltd (by now a Government company) and European Passenger Services Ltd (the UK arm of 
the Eurostar train services). LCR won the competition because its bid had the lowest requirement on 
Government’s direct grants, and, in the Department’s view, the LCR proposal had a more favourable 
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distribution of risks than the other bidders. Its forecast of Eurostar UK revenues subsequently proved 
to be over-optimistic. The hypothesis-led interview shows that mega projects are easily affected by 
optimism bias in projections of traffic and revenue. According to the literature review in Chapter 2 
and the interview data, it presents that these optimistic demand forecasts are largely affected by the 
political agenda (see Flyvbjerg et al., 2003). With the contract signed, Stratford International station 
was also confirmed following a long and hard lobbying process (see Florio and Edwards, 2001 and 
detailed discussion in Chapter 6).  
 
Opening of the High Speed 1 
Not long after the CTRL public-private partnership contract was signed between the Government and 
the LCR, LCR soon realised that they were unable to raise the financing needed for the CTRL project 
and approached the Department for Transport with a request for £1.2 billion of additional direct grant 
money.  The Deputy Prime Minister of the time (John Prescott) refused to agree to this request and 
instead suggested LCR prepare a revised proposal. In June 1998, after negotiation between the 
Government and LCR, the proposal for financial restructuring was accepted by the Government and a 
new financial arrangement announced. In this, the CTRL project was to be phased in two stages 
instead of the original one. Work began on site to construct Section 1 in October 1998 under a five-
year contract to be completed by 30 September 2003. In 2000, Argent St George41 was appointed as 
the developer of the King's Cross Railway Land. September 2003, Prime Minister Tony Blair opened 
Section 1 for commercial services and claimed that the project was on time and on budget. From the 
development trajectory of the CTRL project, we can see that this claim ignores the financial 
restructurings, project re-phasing, and the overall cost of the associated development at the hubs. 
Furthermore, the actual cost 42  is still unknown (see OMEGA Centre, 2008). This is what one 
interviewee had to say on the matter:  
 
“We ended up with a more matured system, which will validate the claims of the people who delivered 
it that it was a great victory and what they had always intended, whatever little relationship it has got 
                                                 
41 Argent St George later changed to Argent (King’s Cross) Limited because of St George’s withdrawal from the regeneration 
scheme. The two developers, Argent and St George ,were in a contract involving the £1bn regeneration scheme for King's 
Cross in 2001. Argent St George, a joint venture between the two developers, has entered into an acquisition and 
development agreement with London & Continental Railways (LCR) and Exel over the 67-acre site, which is north of King's 
Cross mainline station (source: The Lawyer website (2001) Argent St George sticks with Lovells for £1bn job. 【WWW】 
avaialbe at: http://www.thelawyer.com/argent-st-george-sticks-with-lovells-for-%C2%A31bn-job/103497.article accessed 
22/09/2008).  
42 According to the Department for Transport: “The total cost of the [CTRL] project is approximately £5.9 billion42, of which 
the Department for Transport is committed to give a total of £1.8 billion (NPV) of grants after taking account of the expected 
net recoveries from the Government's share of property sale profits and rental income. It was agreed that the remainder of the 
money would be raised by the promoter who would be given permission to issue Government Guaranteed Bonds to raise 
£3.75 billion”. 
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with the original aims because they always rely on people forgetting them.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, 
a person from the local community group, 12/06/2008) 
 
Section 2 was completed and opened to operation in November 2007 when the CTRL project changed 
its name to High Speed 1.   
4.2.2 Project initiatives and obstacles 
The high-speed domestic services from Ebbsfleet to St Pancras began in 2009. Being the first high-
speed rail line in the UK, CTRL was only really approved when BR was convinced that there was a 
necessity for a high-speed rail service to meet the demands of the international passenger services 
from the continent to London. Tracing the project back to its project initiation, whilst BR worked in 
conjunction with French Railways (SNCF) on a combined scheme for the Channel Tunnel, respective 
rail links to their capital cities were also considered in 1971. One decade later, in 1981, BR and SNCF 
reached agreement to build a tunnel and to be responsible for certain levels of accessibility to each end 
of the Tunnel. Owing to the Thatcher government’s aversion to major public sector project 
investments at the time and its subsequent favouring of privatisation, the Channel Tunnel Act 1987 
specifically stipulated that no UK Government support would be forthcoming for the construction of a 
new rail link.  
 
There is considerable evidence (see Faith, 2007; OMEGA Centre, 2008) to suggest that the real 
impetus for the project came from Kent County Council where there was at the time a strong 
professional team and strong political commitment for promoting the high-speed rail link. The 1987 
Kent Impact Report challenged the BR view on the transport capacity forecast commissioned in 1986. 
The subsequent process on the CTRL route selection was a protracted one and involved numerous 
issues, which are described in Section 4.5.1.  
 
The birth of UK’s first high-speed rail suffered from a number of prolonged and intractable problems 
in addition to those related directly to the delay of Channel Tunnel project. These include (after Faith, 
2007: 21):  
 the Treasury’s obsession with cutting costs;  
 the opposition from the residents in Kent;  
 the lack of incentive for BR to promote the CTRL project;  
 the frequent changes of ministers at the Department of Transport;  
 the capacity of BR to deal with the large scale of investment worsened as a consequence of 
tension derived from BR’s 1993-1997 privatisation;  
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 the pessimistic forecasts of traffic impact  that preceded the opening of the Tunnel; 
 the cultural perspective, whereby the public perception and attitudes in the UK at the time 
appeared less supportive of grand infrastructure projects of the kind more readily accepted by the 
French and Japanese public.    
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Table 4.1: CTRL Project Timeline 
 
Source: Author, based on DfT website【WWW】 available at: 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/rail/pi/ctrl/chronologyofthechanneltunnelli1【Accessed on 27/10/2010】 
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4.3 Coordination between Railway and Hubs’ Development 
This section examines whether the developments surrounding the CTRL hubs have been significantly 
influenced by the high-speed rail project. It should be noted that each hub has its own context, 
including local planning aspirations, development plans, local political culture, planning pressures, 
opportunities, and constraints. Some of these considerations have to be analysed separately, and 
eventually an integrated view taken on their development, especially concerning competition between 
passenger numbers, franchisers, and inward investment. 
4.3.1 History of the coordination 
Sir Michael Heseltine, the Conservative Party politician and a shareholder of Blue Circle (which 
owned much land in the Thames Gateway), was an influential figure in the Thames Gateway 
development (also see Chapter 6). As a result of his believe that the new high-speed railway project 
could play a role to assist the continuous growth in the East End Corridor, he became a strong and 
influential advocate of the high-speed link’s easterly route through North Kent.  
 
In the 1980s, Michael Heseltine established a property-oriented and state-funded agency, the London 
Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC, operated between July 1981 and March 1998 as one of 
several UDCs in the country), which transformed the north and south banks of the Thames in east 
London into a modern business zone. The government’s designation of the organisation as an Urban 
Development Corporations (UDC) along with others in the UK was at the time seen as one of the 
means of marginalising and weakening the local authorities. The creation of the LDDC was 
undoubtedly a threat to the radical opposition of the boroughs who lost control of the docklands. In 
1987, on the basis of a joint campaign for the ‘East Thames Corridor’ (later ‘Thames Gateway’) 
promoted by the Government, Newham Council and LDDC showed more consensus and willingness 
to cooperate as they subsequently both came to believe that an international station at Stratford could 
help the borough attract more private investment and encourage initiatives for the remaining 
development on the site of the Royal Docks (Florio and Edwards, 2001).  
 
The Pieda report (1991) also argued that all of the proposed CTRL routes are likely to make similar 
contributions to the development of East Kent and would be unlikely to be a significant factor in 
redressing the imbalance of economic activity between west and east London. The Pieda study was 
commissioned by BR in 1991. It seems that the Pieda report demonstrates a lack of fairness in making 
judgements since BR was keen to justify their southerly route during late 1980s and early 1990s.  
 
In short, the process of the CTRL route selection and the promotion of development benefits reflect 
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the analysis in power relations and the influence of institutional arrangements in Chapter 2 which 
claims that the power of discourse generated by the dominant stakeholder can a) allocate or 
redistribute resources; b) reinforce the structure of a network and create exclusionary effects; c) 
provide initiatives to institutionalise political interests; and d) link up discourses in different policy 
domains and generate a more powerful effectiveness. The argument reveals that, as far as the main 
research question about the relationships between multiple mega projects is concerned, they were 
more likely to be in a competitive rather than cooperative environment, particularly as economic 
circumstances deteriorated.  
4.3.2 Role of CTRL  
King’s Cross Station 
King’s Cross was long favoured as one of the hubs by British Rail in the early stage of the project 
history. According to the evidence collected by the desktop research and the pre-hypothesis 
investigations, some argue that the reasons for British Rail’s choice of King’s Cross as the CTRL 
terminal was that it was a convenient decision for themselves because they were keen to use the 
existing line to run the Eurostar to central London. In 1989, however, BR suddenly announced their 
preferred second London terminal for the CTRL as King’s Cross (after Waterloo) (Faith, 2007: 69). 
This is despite the fact that it was originally said to need a two-year study before arriving at such a 
decision. It has been argued that the property development initiatives prevalent at the time helped to 
speed-up the pace of their decision-making since they were eager to rely on the property developers to 
pay for the construction of the terminal in King’s Cross. At the time, the LRC was proposing to 
develop the derelict railway land between King’s Cross and St Pancras stations. The Pieda report 
“Socio-Economic and Development Impacts” published in 1991 for BR paradoxically showed that the 
CTRL was likely to play no definitive role in developing these prospects (Pieda, 1991).  
 
St Pancras International Station 
The emergence of St Pancras station as an alternative London terminus to King’s Cross was only 
mentioned in the report submitted by the Union Railways (BR’s subsidiary) to the Secretary of State 
as late as January 1993. This report mentions that further work was undertaken to address an 
alternative option from Stratford to a terminus at St Pancras. This work is only described in the final 
chapter of that report (Chapter 8), but is not taken into account elsewhere in the report which 
advocates abandoning the proposed high-cost, lower-level station at King’s Cross.  
 
Ashford and Waterloo International Station 
Ashford and Waterloo stations both suffered from the shift of the Eurostar international services to the 
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St. Pancras destination. Incentives provided for business by the introduction of international high-
speed rail services in Ashford were heavily diluted when Eurostar reduced its services to Ashford43 
and closed the station at Waterloo (see Figures 4.7 and 4.8). The International Station at Ashford was 
built in 1996 at a cost of around €120 million (£100 million). Railfuture director (Trevor Jones) 
expressed concern that the interests of the local community and business in Ashford were being 
ignored in the Cross-border Working Group of the European Passenger Federation with both Eurostar 
and the Government.  He argued: "The cuts will cause a massive loss of revenue for local businesses 
which rely on these passengers’ custom. People are indignant that they have not been properly 
consulted and that a service like Eurostar, which has been built on public funding, should be able to 
completely overlook the needs of the community” (Railfuture, 2008). It could be asked why the 
operator or the Government did not foresee these consequences earlier in a risk assessment exercise as 
this has major opportunity cost implications.  
 
Figure 4.7: Waterloo Opportunity Area  
Source: Waterloo Opportunity Area Planning Framework (2007: 13), Figure 5 
 
                                                 
43 In September 2006, Eurostar announced that it was to halve Ashford’s train links with Paris and stop the Ashford service to 
Lille and Brussels completely in 2008.  This somewhat undermined the Government’s earlier initiative of declaring Ashford a 
major priority urban development area for South East England. 
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Figure 4.8: Waterloo Opportunity Area Aerial View 
Source: Waterloo Opportunity Area Planning Framework (2007), front cover, figure 1. 
 
Ebbsfleet International Station 
Ebbsfleet international station was chosen as a key hub on the CTRL route in 1993 because of CTRL’s 
important role in transport improvements and the regeneration stimulus it offers in the Thames 
Gateway, especially following the 1991 housing market slump where extra impetus was needed to 
meet the additional predicted housing needs of the Greater London Area. Land adjoining the CTRL at 
Ebbsfleet International station is part of the Ebbsfleet Valley development area (see Figure 4.9). The 
major land holder and developer in Ebbsfleet Valley is Land Securities, one of the UK’s leading real 
estate and commercial developers. The campaign groups44 who urged Eurostar to reconsider their plan 
argue that it is not appropriate to concentrate international services at Ebbsfleet on the grounds that the 
motorway network is already highly congested and that the train links to surrounding areas at 
Ebbsfleet International are rather limited. Such circumstances reflect theories of path dependency that 
institutional barriers are formed and reinforced by the effect of ‘increasing returns’ (see Pierson, 2000). 
The observation of this case study also suggests that discourses occur in a discursive and incremental 
manner where the dominant discourse by the more convincing stakeholder can stifle some and steer 
yet other stakeholders to comply with it (see Hajer, 2003).  
 
                                                 
44 These include: Railfuture, in conjunction with European rail passenger organisations; and also many others including local 
MPs, Kent County Council, Ashford Council, etc. 
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Figure 4.9: Ebbsfleet Valley Development Zones 
Source: Ebbsfleet Village website (n.d.) Development Zones【WWW】 available at: 
http://www.ebbsfleetvalley.co.uk/【Accessed on 27/04/2011】 
 
Stratford International Station  
Stratford international station was the subject of heavy lobbying by the Stratford Promoter Group, 
particularly Newham Council, from the late 1980s after BR announced in 1989 that the second 
London Terminal would be in King’s Cross. At the time, the concentration of development benefits 
which the Newham Council long sought had shifted to Stratford after they lost control of docklands to 
the London Docklands Development Corporation (LDDC). Following these developments, the 
Council sought to exploit transport improvements as a strategic planning instrument to counter the 
downturn in the property market experienced since the 1980s. They believed that an international 
station located in Stratford would attract more investment to the locality and even the region – a 
conclusion not shared by the Pieda Study (1991). The Pieda Study suggested that a considerable 
investment from the public sector in the wider Stratford and Lea Valley area was a necessary condition 
to bring development benefits. In this sense, the consultants argued that the development impacts of 
the high-speed railway were being overstated and that the further development benefits, if any, should 
be credited to the Government’s wider urban regeneration investments (as in the case of the Kings 
Cross regeneration proposals).  
 
Since 2005 Olympic development at Stratford City (see Figure 4.10) has become one of the overriding 
objectives, as have the associated developments at Stratford International. After the announcement of 
2012 London Olympics in 2005, the planning power was handed over to the Olympic Delivery 
Authority (ODA). The reprioritisation of project programme caused by the Olympic development and 
the planning power intervention in Stratford City decision-making have had significant impacts on the 
allocation of planning, political, and financial resources which further affect the nature of the Stratford 
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City regeneration scheme and the operation of Stratford International. The related issues are described 
in detail in Chapter 6. 
 
It was argued that international services calling at Stratford would add eight minutes to the journey 
time between London and Paris (stopping only 7 minutes after leaving St Pancras) and that this 
undermined journey time improvements of Eurostar services. This could lead to the use of Stratford 
International station being confined to domestic services (HST Impact Study Consortium, 2008: 24). 
This, it has been claimed, would repeat some of the same drawbacks experienced with Ashford 
International where the investment in the station area became undermined by changes to train 
operations. The impacts of revoking the original plan for the international service trains calling at 
Stratford International could thus severely undermine value to investors. This claim that Stratford 
International could be a ‘white elephant’ has been a prominent topic in the interview data from the 
pre-hypothesis investigations (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Stratford International Station is a 
white elephant”). 
 
What can be concluded at this stage is that CTRL (i.e. a MUTP) alone cannot be regarded as the sole 
contributory factor generating urban development, but that it is certain to play a role as an agent to 
stimulate other investments and developments in the associated areas of the project. Context-specific 
discussions concerning the CTRL case and development at its hubs, as addressed in the following two 
chapters (see Chapters 5 and 6), illustrate this conclusion. Although some believe, according to the 
interview data, that the development of an international station in Stratford is of little consequence 
(since the urban regeneration will happen anyway), it is worth noting that the CTRL project provided 
an impetus for people in Newham to embark on building a supportive local business environment with 
the assistance of many urban regeneration schemes, such as the Stratford City Challenge45.  
 
An interviewee offered views on the role played by the CTRL project as the catalyst for urban 
regeneration： 
 
“CTRL is primarily a catalyst for the regeneration which is taking place here in King’s Cross and 
Stratford and further east through the Thames Gateway. This is a catalyst project with 3 objectives: 
providing international train travel, to improve commuting train travel from Kent, and to provide a 
catalyst for regeneration.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a private sector developer, 11/06/2008) 
 
 
                                                 
45 According to Roberts (2000: 31), City Challenge, introduced in May 1991, was a regeneration fund “ invited local authorities 
to bid for funds in partnership with other public sector, private and voluntary bodies.” 
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Figure 4.10: Stratford City in the 2012 London Olympic Context 
Source: Author, the image was edited from Westfield Stratford Shopping Centre website 【WWW】 
available at: http://uk.westfield.com/stratfordcity/vision/olympic-context/ 【Accessed on 
14/03/2011】 
4.4 Visions and Sustainability of the High-Speed Railway Network 
The urban regeneration developments and opportunities at the four hubs (St Pancras, Stratford, 
Ebbsfleet, and Ashford) each present very different experiences. Both the King’s Cross Central and 
Stratford City regeneration schemes are part of the concession agreement to attract private sector 
involvement through PFI financing mechanisms. The impacts of the CTRL project on sustainable 
urban regeneration and the achievements of sustainability visions of the high-speed railway network 
in the UK are illustrated in the following two sections. They include the explorations of the political 
promises on economic growth which are suggested will be stimulated by the CTRL. Also, the 
observations of the expected contributions to sustainability by the future high-speed railway network 
that are currently under scrutiny will enhance our understanding of the anatomy of project discourses 
and negotiation powers among the stakeholders.  
4.4.1 Impacts and legacy of the CTRL project 
While it is commonly presumed that the construction of a major fast train rail link can bring with it 
positive economic growth to its station areas, the cases at St Pancras and Stratford present very 
different experiences. Not every impact of urban regeneration can be assessed in monetary terms; 
nevertheless, several official studies in the late 1980s and early 1990s attempted to use monetary 
measures as a principal basis to inform their decision. These were commissioned by BR in 
circumstance when evidence-based justifications for the project were desperately required to convince 
the Treasury and the Secretary of State for Transport for the cases made46.  
                                                 
46 Reports referred to this section are: a) The Channel Tunnel High Speed Link And Terminal: Is There A Commercial Option? 
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The impacts of the CTRL project on sustainable urban regeneration are categorised as the follows: 
employment, land value, sustainability, drivers of urban regeneration delivery and investment: 
 
Employment 
The Pieda’s Report (1991) argued that, although the easterly CTRL approach schemes predicted an 
enhancement of employment opportunities, it saw the future provision of development-related 
employment creation mainly in terms of a redistribution of economic activity in Kent and London, 
rather than the creation of new job opportunities.  
 
Land value 
Whether land values or property developments have increased because of the CTRL station 
development at King’s Cross and Stratford remains a controversial issue. The argument presented by 
some is that the development of the King’s Cross Railway Lands have long been planned and that the 
delayed decision of the London CTRL Terminal, if anything, had blighted the progress of the King’s 
Cross development for many years with the result that property owners have experienced difficulty in 
deciding what to do with their assets. With these missed deadlines and opportunities, and the 
subsequent rising costs, the interviewees who support this point of view see things very differently 
from those who argue that the CTRL has acted as a development stimulus. As regards to Stratford, the 
difference in land values of areas around the station before and after the international station was 
announced is far more obvious. In large part, this is because of its initial lower land values and 
because of the 2012 London Olympic Games investment pouring into this area. It is thus very hard to 
distinguish which factor is more influential in raising the property values. What is clear is that the 
increases on the scale predicted could not have been achieved in the absence of the CTRL and an 
international mega event such as the Olympics.  
 
Sustainability 
Sustainability as a vision and as a basis for a development agenda has become a lingua franca in 
recent years for a very wide range of development initiatives in the UK and wider afield, including for 
community development, infrastructure development and regeneration schemes. The Royal Town 
Planning Institute (RTPI) Planning Awards for 2008 included an award for the performance of the 
                                                                                                                                          
produced by Colin Buchanan and Partners on behalf of the London Borough of Newham, published in September 1989; b) 
Rail Link Project: Comparison of Traffic, Revenues and Benefits, A Report Prepared For The British Railways Board 
conducted by Coopers & Lybrand Deloitte and published in May 1991; c) The Socio-Economic And Development Impacts 
Study undertaken by PIEDA plc which was appointed by BR in November 1900; d) the Environmental Impact Study 
provided by Environmental Resources Ltd; and e) W S Atkins’  Independent Review: Interim Report To Rail Link Project in 
February 1991. 
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CTRL project as a key facilitator of sustainable urban development. Its contribution to heritage 
conservation has been especially noted in the Kings Cross area, particularly the rebirth of Barlow’s 
Grade 1 listed St Pancras Station. Other mentioned contributions include the promotion of 
environmental sensitivity in the CTRL code of construction practices, including spoil disposal strategy, 
measures to mitigate noise, and creation of wildlife habitat. This involved imposing the concept of not 
introducing worse environmental standards than exist at present (NEWT) and employing a baseline 
design assessed on these terms in the Environmental Statement (see RTPI 2009: 3, 34). Here the 
sustainability credits assigned to the CTRL project merely focus on environmental aspects and are 
narrower than the project’s declared objectives, which also include social and economic perspectives. 
The question of whether the CTRL project has actually complied with its sustainable development 
targets, rather than merely using sustainability rhetoric for marketing purposes, requires further 
investigation in order to secure more solid evidence. 
  
Drivers of urban regeneration delivery 
The goal of providing a regeneration stimulus to its surrounding areas has been at the core of the 
CTRL’s development objectives in recent decades. As already mentioned, this aim is particularly 
significant to the Thames Gateway, as Michael Heseltine, Professor Sir Peter Hall, the Stratford 
Promoter Group, and many other champions of the project have long argued. The RTPI Judges 
suggested that the regeneration benefits brought by the project are significant not only for the Thames 
Corridor but also for North Kent. They also applauded the fact that the CTRL was mentioned by the 
Olympic International Committee as a favourable contributing factor that led to the UK winning the 
right to host the 2012 Olympic Games.  However, the assessment undertaken by Pieda in 1990 
indicated that regeneration gains are attributable to any of the proposed route options. Although the 
Pieda Study did conclude that the easterly approach schemes (favoured by Ove Arup and Rail-Europe) 
have more opportunities in assisting urban regeneration by enhancing the property value, it further 
depreciated the significance of the construction of the Rail Link for the East Thames Corridor (as 
discussed in Chapter 6 of this thesis). Notwithstanding the vagueness of the urban regeneration 
benefits and the difficulty of expressing the benefits in monetary terms that could be captured directly 
by the Rail Link operator, the regeneration benefits became an essential component of the public 
spending justification during the financial restructuring in 1998. Despite the time that has elapsed 
since this period, there remains a continuing debate on the criteria that should be considered when 
scrutinising a mega project such as CTRL (see Dimitriou, 2010).   
 
Positive legacy of the CTRL project development 
Aspects of the CTRL project offer a positive legacy and lessons that could be emulated by future 
projects. For example, the high degree of partnership engagement between the developers and the 
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other CTRL stakeholders (notably, the other 25 local authorities along the route) received much 
attention. The RTPI Judge’s report concluded that this partnership (between Central Government, 
Local Government, and the private sector) was the key to making the project a “success”. The extent 
to which public consultation and involvement had been encouraged along the route, especially with 
residents around St Pancras station, had attracted much support. Once again, the RTPI Judges were 
especially impressed by the capacity and commitment of the team when dealing with efforts to 
accommodate the people’s concerns about the project’s development.  
4.4.2 Visions of the UK high-speed railway network 
The financing arrangements were unprecedented and considered as effective for securing the CTRL 
project (see Bayley, 2003). Bayley (2003) argues that it can offer a template for future PFI/PPP 
projects for MUTPs, especially the later innovative mechanisms, concerning: 
 the segregation of the construction and revenue risks;  
 implementing the project in phases; 
 the introduction of a cost overrun protection programme; and  
 the special-purpose vehicle, which rescued the project in three restructuring efforts. 
 
Following the completion of the CTRL, an impetus emerged for the development of a High Speed 
Rail Network in the United Kingdom. This idea was actually implied in Section 40 of the Channel 
Tunnel Act (1987), which required BR to produce a plan (by the end of 1989) showing how it 
intended to secure the provision of international rail services to various parts of the UK. This ‘regional 
service’ role, however, has never been fully exploited by the provision of a direct link between the 
CTRL and cities such as Birmingham, Manchester, and Edinburgh. Related to the previous section, 
the same criticism was raised in the responses to the pre-hypothesis interview which indicates that 
political promises are likely to become rhetoric on the basis of narratives for building a more attractive 
business case. BR’s proposed through service was largely seen as nothing more than a tantalising 
gesture and a means of gaining support. One of the interviewees points out that: 
 
“At the time, there was much opposition from the North of England, Scotland, and Wales against the 
high-speed railway construction unless it provided services for the whole of the country.  So British 
Rail were required to produce a proposal for through services, which they were not prepared to do. 
The hypocrisy of pretending that there would be high-speed services for the rest of the country locked-
in the decision to have the station at King’s Cross/St Pancras. This is  a sub-optimal solution, and it 
provides an example of path dependency.  The intention behind this promise is derived from the 
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property development potential of the King’s Cross derelict railway lands.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, 
a person from the local community group, 12/06/2008) 
 
Figure 4.11: The Five Proposed Routes for High-Speed Railway Network 
Source: Greenguage 21(2007: 4) 
 
The lobby group Greengauge 21 launched a study in 2007 to investigate the feasibility and potential 
for five high-speed lines across the UK (see Figure 4.11)47. This formed the starting point of a study 
commissioned by Greengauge 21 and Birmingham City Council and undertaken by Steer Davies 
Gleave in 2008 (see Greengauge 21, 2009) to look at a second high-speed rail line in Britain along the 
North West Corridor, which would connect the centre of London with the centre of Birmingham and 
with the North West. This study argues that the new project has the potential to deliver significant 
benefits to the national economy, and contribute significantly to the regeneration of Birmingham and 
the West Midlands.  
 
This so-called ‘High Speed Two’ project is estimated to cost £32.7 billion (in 2011 prices) and would 
give access to Heathrow international airport for the whole country. The competition between air and 
high-speed rail has in recent years become more intense in Britain, especially given the recent fuel 
price changes (in 2007/2008).  This increased interest in a national high-speed rail network has put 
extra pressure on aviation companies both in terms of domestic movements and fast and easy access to 
                                                 
47 These include from London to Manchester via Birmingham, London to the North East via Cambridge, London to Cardiff and 
Trans-Pennine and Anglo-Scottish routes. 
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the country’s main international airports. The Government gave go-ahead to the High Speed 2 project 
(Figure 4.12) on 10th January 2012. The first phase (about £16.4 billion) from London to Birmingham 
is expected to be completed in 2026. The second phase, taking High Speed 2 to Manchester and Leeds 
is expected to be completed in 2032/33. The Government estimates that the new high-speed railway 
can generate economic benefits of £47 billion and fare revenues of £34 billion over 60 years. It also 
asserts that the completion of High Speed 2 will bring significant additional wider economic benefits 
as it will enable businesses to operate more efficiently. The value of these additional benefits is 
projected to be approximately £6 billion to £12 billion. However, the Government also notes that there 
are also additional drawbacks, such as the impact on the natural landscape, which is difficult to be 
quantified. 
 
Figure 4.12: The High Speed 2 Network 
Source: DfT (2012: 15) 
 
In terms of long-haul international flights served by Heathrow Airport, it is argued by advocates of the 
proposed expansion of the high-speed rail network that providing fast and efficient train access to 
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Heathrow would reinforce its value. This raises broader questions as to whether faster and bigger 
transport projects are an inevitable phenomenon of our long-term future, and if so, which modes of 
transport best meet the transport challenges in terms of financial and environmental costs. The 
expansion of an airport means more flights and more disturbances to the surrounding neighbourhoods, 
as well as more carbon emissions. In the case of high-speed rail links, the more that are built, the more 
blight they will cause along their corridors. Given these circumstances, it is important to identify 
whether there are alternatives available to MUTPs of this kind, and if so, whether MUTP advocates 
can accept them as part of their development agenda for a sustainable future.  
4.5 Decision-Making Process and Negotiation Powers  
Section 4.5 describes issues raised by the restructuring of the CTRL finances.  It focuses on the root 
causes of the project’s financial crisis in 1996, which almost sabotaged the entire project. It examines 
how ‘solutions’ were arrived at and the justification for the three attempts48 to restructure finances in 
order to restore viability to the project. This examination demonstrates the significance of the political 
champions, their negotiation powers, and the institutional arrangements that impact on the decision-
making process. In retrospect it is very clear that the Government backing, particularly as provided by 
John Prescott, had a pivotal role in the delivery of the project.  
4.5.1 Political champions  
As a result of conflicting agendas from different stakeholders (see Section 4.1.2), the lengthy and 
complicated route and terminal selection process can well represent the influence of the political 
champions. Political support from the highest level of government is required to make mega projects 
happen because of their financial scale and high risk profile. Often the private sector is unable and 
unwilling to tackle them alone. There is much evidence to suggest that individual political champions 
of MUTPs are also a vital constituent to driving a project forward (see OMEGA Centre, 2008). In the 
case of the CTRL project, for example, under a Conservative government Michael Heseltine’s 
involvement was critical in deciding the alignment of the CTRL in 1980s. Later under the Labour 
administration John Prescott was subsequently important, particularly after he became convinced by 
the Newham lobby group of the merits of an international station at Stratford.    
 
Gourvish (2002: 340) argued that the prolonged CTRL project delivery could be blamed on the 
government’s attitude. The government at the time struggled to appease opposing interests in Kent, 
South-East London, and the Regions; in fact the authors suggest that their response appeared to 
                                                 
48 There were three times financing restructuring. They were in1998, 2001, and 2002. 
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produce further difficulties. The political benefits of the project seemed to be obscure and the risks 
hard to ameliorate. This led to an increased reliance on further consultancy studies, which grew more 
numerous and led to much more time and resources spent on preparations. This issue was confirmed 
by the findings of the OMEGA pilot study Hypothesis 2 Question #14 (Wright, 2008). However, the 
more appraisals that took place, the more the financial viability of the project was presented in 
pessimistic terms. According to the evidence derived from the hypothesis-led investigations (see 
Appendix 5, ORQ #2), this prolongation of CTRL delivery was ultimately overcome by a bold, 
visionary political commitment, and substantial political influence was generated as a result of the 
project breakthroughs. This was despite studies which argued that the CTRL project did not have a 
positive business case as diagnosed by conventional appraisal methods. Later, when the project was 
confronted with its financial crisis in 1996, the evidence-based forecasts were shown to be unreliable 
and led to political vision overriding economic rationalism (see Dimitriou et al., 2008). The 
hypothesis-led investigations of Hypothesis-related Research Question (HRQ) #3 also supports this 
finding on the dominating influence of political power over the rationality of technocrats in mega 
project decision-making. Here are some quotations from the interviewees responding to HRQ #3:  
 
“Political output is a dominant concern and far more influential than the cost that it takes to deliver 
that outcome.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a private sector developer, 13/08/2008) 
 
“Without political buy-in and delivery of that project, it is not going to happen irrespective of whether 
it is a fantastic idea or technical requirement.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person from the 
government agency, 13/08/2008) 
 
“The political decision might be based on something that isn’t proven in that kind of rational way, but 
politically it is a good idea.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008) 
 
This raises the issue of appraisal criteria for assessing MUTPS and this is addressed below in the 
section on “Financing arrangements”.  Over and above these challenges, indecision over the CTRL 
route and terminal selection added to the uncertainty surrounding the project and had a major impact 
on the King’s Cross Railway Lands development, as examined in the next chapter. 
 
4.5.2 Political power and institutional arrangements 
This section describes how the CTRL financial arrangement overrode the government’s ideological 
aversion to public funding, how the role and the political power of the public and private sectors 
changed over time, and the lessons learned from the CTRL for future institutional arrangements for 
MUTPs. 
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Over-optimistic forecasts 
The CTRL financing arrangements presented in 1998 complied with the Private Financial Initiative 
(PFI) mechanisms introduced by the Government of the time which believed that the risks inherent in 
large-scale infrastructure projects would be better managed by the public, rather than private, sector. 
Looking back49, when the Government announced the launch of the competition for the CTRL tender, 
two specific criteria were laid down to assess the qualification of the candidates. The first was the 
amount of the Government grant required by the bidder. The second was the willingness of the private 
sector to take on the financial risk that the project posed. In this sense, according to Faith (2007: 157), 
the amount of direct grants proposed in the LCR bid was closely related to its forecast of Eurostar UK 
revenues, which were subsequently (in 1996) proven to be over-optimistic. In retrospect, not only 
were the traffic forecasts by Eurostar UK inaccurate, but so were those made by the consultants and 
issued by the Government to potential bidders (see Figure 4.13). The forecasts of passenger traffic 
were grossly in excess of the actual number when in operation, which was unavoidable to some extent 
given the unforeseen deregulation of air travel and the subsequent emergence of the low-cost airlines, 
which had a major impact on the market share that rail had been forecast to attract (Pollalis, 2006: 8, 
10). The factors of over-optimistic forecasts in mega-project development are addressed in an earlier 
chapter of this thesis (see Chapter 2, the discussion of the works of Peter Hall, Harry Dimitriou, and 
Flyvbjerg et al.). 
 
Figure 4.13: Planned vs. Actual Passenger Traffic for Eurostar 
Source: Author, based on Pollalis (2006:10), Figure 9 and Nkocharh (2011) 【WWW】 available at: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Chunnel_traffic.svg【Accessed on 14/03/2011】 
 
 
Unconventional concession contract 
With over-optimistic passenger forecasts and the evidence that actual revenues of Waterloo-based 
                                                 
49 On 29th February 1996, LCR was announced the winner to build the Link and operate Eurostar UK under a 999 year 
concession. The legal title to the rail link - held by the Government - signed over a 90-year lease to LCR, ending in 2086. 
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Eurostar UK were growing far slower than projected (see Figure 4.13), the CTRL project was no 
longer seen as a good investment by the private sector. In 1996 LCR found it was unable to raise the 
financing needed from the private sector to construct the line and operate Eurostar UK (NAO 2001: 11) 
with the result that it sought and received government support in the form of guaranteed bonds. This 
experience embodies lessons for the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) financial arrangement between the Government and the consortium. Professor Pollalis at the 
Harvard Design School identified three unconventional terms in this contract that highlighted the risk 
transfer-pathway, as follows (Pollalis, 2006: 7-8):  
 The developer was given the ownership of Union Railways Limited and its 100-person team, 
which had worked on the CTRL project from its inception. Hence, the continuity of the team 
meant that the direct access to substantial intellectual capital and the capacity to deal with the 
interface that this project had to confront was maintained. One of the interviewees in pre-
hypothesis investigations addressed the same issue and stressed the importance of continuity in 
staffing and institutionalised knowledge (see Appendix 4 under the topic “Institutionalise 
knowledge’).  
 It granted large areas of land and buildings to LCR, mainly at King’s Cross and Stratford, which 
offered development opportunities. This is echoed by the findings of the hypothesis-led 
investigations, which highlight that the convergence of interests that forms around these projects 
is a leading dimension of these major developments. This coalition is mostly constituted by 
politicians and developers, and, as found in the literature review (Chapter 2), authorities are often 
proactive in providing developers a ‘convenient’ regulatory environment (Janelle and Beuthe, 
1997).  
 It combined the CTRL project and the operation of Eurostar UK. This was the most influential 
term of the concession. This is claimed by Pollalis to be the first public-private partnership deal 
to include an operating business in loss, which, as a result of the poor performance of Eurostar 
UK, forced the 1998 financial rearrangement. 
 
One of the motives behind the PFI mechanism, which was designed to deliver mega projects, was the 
jaundiced view towards nationalised industry. Gourvish (2002) argued that the Treasury held the most 
negative attitude towards the capability of nationalised industry to manage large-scale projects. 
According to the findings from both of the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations (see 
Appendix 8, Table A8.13), these circumstances, including the public’s lack of trust in less-powerful 
local authorities, have in turn created an adversarial culture surrounding mega projects. The challenge 
to the developers is then how to breakdown this mistrust and suspicion. One of the statements from an 
interviewee highlights the expectation of a gap between mega-project promises and reality: 
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“David Cameron said he wants High Speed 2 and this is about selling the political vision. It hits a lot 
of buttons, quite clever. There is always going to be a gap but I think the gap is around what is needed 
to sell the projects, to make sure that they happen.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the 
local authority, 30/09/2008) 
 
On this basis, it then argued that large-scale investment is inherently risky for both public and private 
sectors where flawed investment appraisals were all too familiar (Gourvish, 2002). The CTRL 
experience has shown that the Government intervention and strong monetary backup were key 
elements contributing to the project’s completion. This finding supports the theories of (Healey, 1994) 
and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) who claim that governmental intervention play significant role in 
mega project development (also see Chapter 2).  Thus, the roles of the public and private sectors need 
to be redefined in terms of handling major investment in such projects. 
 
Best negotiation position for risk transferring 
In the original financial arrangement for the CTRL prior to 1998, the financial risk was planned to be 
transferred from the Government to the private sector. Initially, LCR intended to raise the required 
funding (about £800 million), from the London Stock Exchange through an Initial Public Offering 
(IPO). According to Pollalis (2006: 10), this showed LCR’s attempt to transfer the risk of the CTRL 
operations to the investors in the stock market. However, the financial restructuring changed LCR’s 
original idea of risk transfer to the new financial arrangement whereby it separated the risk of 
Eurostar’s performance and the risk of the rail link construction into different strands. By this 
arrangement, the risk of Eurostar’s performance was shared by InterCapital and Regional Railways 
Limited (ICRR), whose shareholders are National Express Group, SNCF, SNCB, and British Airways 
(see Table 4.2).  
 
The other strand of risk was generated from the construction work and was shared by Railtrack (a new 
organisation, ostensibly a private company but set up entirely with public funds in 1994), which took 
up the responsibilities of the infrastructure assets of BR (i.e. rail network, stations and associated 
lands). The entire CTRL project was phased into two sections in order to enable Railtrack to 
contribute to the project according to phases. By these arrangements, Railtrack agreed to purchase 
Section 1 of the Link at a price linked to the actual construction cost. It also opened the option for 
Railtrack to purchase Section 2. Although these arrangements gave Railtrack the incentives for 
purchasing Section 2, they did not exercise this option, and in 2002 withdrew altogether from the 
project following the entry of its subsidiary, Railway Plc, into administration. During the pre-
hypothesis interview, one of the interviewees revealed that Railtrack exploited the CTRL’s financial 
crisis and attempted to extract a better deal from the Government, as quoted below: 
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“When Railtrack was invited to participate in the arrangement to buy the railway, they clearly saw 
that they were in a very advantageous position in negotiating the terms. They certainly exploited that 
situation. Again when it came to putting in place arrangements to proceed with Section 2, Railtrack 
were reluctant to concede that they were not able to exercise their option and again attempted to 
extract from the government a revised better deal which government assessed to be completely 
unacceptable to them.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a private sector developer, 11/06/2008) 
 
This Railtrack instance aligns with the theories of ‘disjointed incrementalism’ (Lindblom and 
Hirschman, 1962) and ‘path dependency’ (Pierson, 2000) which suggest that crises and major 
problems can sometimes in fact trigger opportunities (see Chapter 2).  
 
Table 4.2: Shareholdings in Inter-Capital and Regional Rail (ICRR) 
Shareholdings in ICRR 
Member Percentage shareholding 
National Express Group* 40 
SNCF* 35 
SNCB 15 
British Airways 10 
TOTAL 100 
* NEG and SNCF are also shareholders in LCR 
Source: NAO (2001: 18), Figure 9 
 
With the under-performance of Eurostar UK, the project came under pressure from negative public 
opinion and failed to secure project investment from the private sector. This led to the potential 
regeneration benefits associated with the project emerging as an important economic justification for 
this project during the government’s appraisal as part of the 1998 financial restructuring. In 2001, the 
Treasury conducted a new appraisal of the costs and benefits of Section 2 which embraced 
regeneration benefits as one of the economic justifications for the project, thereby moving the goal-
posts of rail project appraisal in the UK (unlike in France, where this has long been standard practice). 
The potential achievement of regeneration benefits have since been consistently promoted by 
Government as a key indicator of the success of the CTRL project with associated schemes mainly in 
the Thames Gateway and the lands surrounded the international stations at St Pancras, Stratford, and 
Ebbsfleet (NAO, 2006: 5). Similar arguments have been advanced to justify the London Olympic 
Games and, according to the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations, the regeneration 
benefits are the major point in promoting the Games, although many argue that such benefits are 
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marginal whilst others insist that the future benefits of the Olympic legacy cannot be overstated. Since 
2008, with the continuing economic downturn in the UK, these potential gains also are regarded as 
over optimistic.  
 
The core of this restructured agreement (based on the Government guaranteed bonds) meant that the 
taxpayer was subsequently exposed to considerable financial risk if Eurostar UK did not perform as 
well as expected against the revised forecasts. Myddelton (2007) criticised the excessive Government 
subsidy (reported to be at least £3 billion) on the grounds that it contradicted the zero government 
spending idea of a ‘fully commercial’ project (Myddelton, 2007: 152).  
 
In summary, it is clear that the risk of the CTRL project was not genuinely transferred from the public 
to the private sector, nor was risk optimally shared according to the declared PFI financing mechanism 
in this project. Wolmar (2005) argues that there is a very inaccurate perception of the PFI or PPP 
mechanism. In this regard, Bing et al. (2005) claimed that PPP should not be seen as a device for 
finding “new money” for investment in public services, but instead should be expected to improve 
efficiency or creativity for delivering services, and in this sense it sees the investment of public funds 
in the CTRL as misconceived. The literature review (Chapter 2) showed that mega projects are often 
recognised as projects of national significance and, as such, attract special planning, as well as a 
different level of institutional, and financial resources. Prioritisation processes frequently favour the 
promotion of high profile mega projects and are likely to be locked into the path in which any 
cancellation option carries unacceptable financial and political consequences. The findings of the 
hypothesis-led research suggest that in the UK, neither the technocrats nor the politicians has absolute 
power in decision-making for major infrastructure investments largely because they are constrained by 
financial realities. Inevitably, taxpayers are the ultimate risk-takers. 
4.6 Hypothesis Testing and Theoretical Insights 
This section brings together findings from the commentary above, the literature review of the projects 
and both strands of field based research, in order to test the hypotheses and address the overall 
questions posed at the outset of the study (Section 4.6.1). Section 4.6.2 covers insights into theory and 
new issues emerging from this case study investigation.  
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4.6.1 Testing findings against hypotheses 
HYPOTHESIS 1 – The Role of MUTPs 
Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of 
sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and 
sustainable urban regeneration developments. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive 
catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and ME developments associated with its transport 
hubs. 
 
This first hypothesis is based on the premise that MUTPs such as the CTRL have the potential to act 
as significant agents for the delivery of both sustainable urban regeneration and mega events such as 
the Olympic Games, and that while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTPs and sustainable urban 
regeneration developments, this is very much dependent upon the institutional collaboration among 
the various parties and the frameworks in place to facilitate such coordination. The follow-on 
hypothesis is that the CTRL as a catalyst offers specific opportunities for both sustainable urban 
regeneration and mega event development associated with its transport hubs.  
 
According to the literature review of the CTRL project in this chapter, the positive evidence for 
proving that the CTRL is an effective vehicle for sustainable urban regeneration and mega events 
remains elusive. Based on Chapter 2, this premise should be accompanied by other conditions, such as 
vast public investment in other infrastructure and facilities which can entice investors to inject cash 
into the regeneration area, thereby making the area attractive to businesses and residents alike.  
 
The findings of the hypothesis-led investigations reveal a widespread perception, that in reality, the 
operational meaning of sustainable development and public engagement remains ‘fuzzy’, imprecise 
and ill-defined, though much propelled by rhetoric, particularly as it pertains to the King’s Cross 
Central and Stratford City schemes (see Appendix 4 under the topic “Property-oriented development” 
and Appendix 5 for summary responses to HRQ #2). The pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led 
investigations revealed that profit-driven MUTP developments often strain the credibility of claims 
made by the government and subsequently reduce the confidence of the public toward sustainable 
urban regeneration projects. This perception that there is more rhetoric than reality in efforts to 
achieve sustainability was confirmed by a number of respondents to both the pre-hypothesis and 
hypothesis-led enquiries (see Appendix 4 under the topic “Rhetoric and political promises” and 
Appendix 5, HRQ #8). The following quote is an example of this claim: 
 
“The vision of sustainability was not a strong driver, although it did help the narrative around the 
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business case for the high-speed rail link.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local 
authority, 30/09/2008) 
 
As regards the 2012 London Olympics, because the initial agenda of the CTRL had never considered a 
role as a facilitator for a mega event such as the Olympic Games, the role of the CTRL in the Games 
is viewed more as an opportunity. In this regard, the CTRL project (as a project that strengthened the 
London Bid) was fortuitous for the Olympic bid being ‘in the right place at the right time’ rather than 
strategically planned with the event in mind. This view was reflected in the responses to HRQ #1 in 
hypothesis-led investigation and the findings on ‘window of opportunity’ in pre-hypothesis 
investigation undertaken in connections with this research.  
 
The 2012 London Olympics appeared to take advantage of the introduction of the high-speed rail link 
to Stratford. It is suggested by many interviewees that the existence of the CTRL project was a 
determining factor for London to become the host city of the 2012 Olympic Games. Mega events are 
often seen as opportunistic. Here the Olympics were developed and created on the foundation of 
available site and a major transport link. These points are illustrated by selected quotes from the 
interviewees:  
 
“As far as the mega events, they are quite often opportunistic. They see an opportunity has been 
created by having the site and the big transport link and they ride on the back of that.” (Hypothesis-
led interview, a person from local authority, 23/07/2008) 
 
“The high-speed railway station at Stratford triggered a chain reaction. The Stratford International 
Station helped the decision made about the Games. Then the Olympics helped to speed up other 
projects and gave certainty to the Stratford City development.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person 
from the Olympic Delivery Authority, 31/07/2008) 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 – Political Decision 
Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the 
effective delivery and performance of mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban 
regeneration and mega event schemes.  
 
This hypothesis states that the institutional arrangements which provide the delivery framework for 
mega projects are dependent upon the power relations that safeguard the decision-makers’ agenda, and 
that these are ultimately the most significant factors influencing the delivery and performance of mega 
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projects. This argument was reflected in the findings of the hypothesis-led investigation which showed 
that political power overrides other concerns but that the power of the rationality of technocrats cannot 
be neglected either (see Appendix 5, HRQ #3). One of the interviewees stated that:  
 
“Political decisions are vulnerable to global economic forces and the perception of a city’s image. 
Therefore these high-profile major projects are inter-connected with the highest level of strategic 
politics and political decisions where things like financial viability are secondary.” (Hypothesis-led 
interview, a community planner, 22/08/2008)  
 
The dominance of these two types of power (i.e., the political power and the power of rationality of 
technocrats) periodically attributed these problems to the sectoralisation and privatisation of the 
railway industry in the 1980s. One could argue that these developments were reasons why 
opportunities to build the CTRL project earlier and at lower cost were squandered. Another conclusion 
from the case study review in this chapter is that the process of project tendering resulted in defaults 
on financing arrangements. Gourvish (2002) claims this outcome reflected the problems with the 
government’s public-private partnership mechanisms for the project, and on this basis urged that this 
kind of institutional arrangement should be re-assessed and re-defined. In commenting on power 
relations among the various mega project stakeholders, Gourvish claims that “many of the difficulties 
created by the Channel Tunnel project stemmed from political machinations and from the overblown 
expectations of the British regions that direct services would be viable” (Gourvish, 2002: 447). This 
was also reinforced by the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations. An example is shown below:  
 
“CTRL has failed so far as something that is going to serve the regions in this country and yet it is all 
designed that you can just go straight from Stratford up to the North East, and to the North West 
without even stopping at St Pancras. … The promise of those regional connections to Europe is not 
delivered.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008) 
 
Discussions relating to this perspective are seen to be associated with ‘wrangles’ within the 
negotiation process. Findings from this fieldwork (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Path-dependent 
behaviour” and Appendix 5, HRQ #3) reveal that project stakeholders did not feature as a 
countervailing force in the negotiations. Instead, some key players were dominant. In the case of the 
CTRL project in particular, the case study review suggests that the major stakeholders were locked 
into a series of agendas over the period of the development of the project. One of the path-dependent 
behaviours identified by the pre-hypothesis investigation is the legacy of the Thatcher government: 
privatisation. The ideology of privatisation appears to be a feature of the UK government’s culture and 
is reinforced by its institutional arrangements. Although there are doubts about the principle of no 
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public funding for the CTRL project, the new Labour government did not modify its predecessor’s 
policy. It is suggested that the concern was that there would be further delay if it were to be re-
negotiate and re-tender the contract. Notwithstanding, the financial restructuring could be an 
opportunity to adjust the roles of the government and the developer 
 
The Government’s commitment to deliver the CTRL project was sustained however and its 
negotiation power shifted over time as a result of changing agendas in Government policies. The 
regeneration discourse formed by the coordination between the CTRL project and the regeneration of 
the East Thames Corridor successfully facilitated Arup’s east route proposal and fulfilled the 
regeneration objectives of Kent County Council and Newham. This indicates that key project 
stakeholders adhered to the discourses set out in these various changing agendas with government 
commitments and political support they gained a better negotiation position over time. The discourse 
also positively affected the LRC’s proposal for the King’s Cross Railway Lands Redevelopment Plan. 
Camden Council, which is responsible for the King’s Cross Area Development, necessarily adjusted 
its attitudes to this new agenda with the purpose of sharing benefits derived from the mega 
regeneration project, namely reputation and prestige for the locality and the local authority.  This is 
illustrated by quotations from hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations respectively: 
 
“In the case of KXC project, a willing council who dedicated planning resources to the project and the 
developer who were prepared to play the lead role are two key factors.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a 
person from local authority, 23/07.2008) 
 
“All they [the Camden Council] are getting are the things they got in Section 106 because they 
thought that was their job to agree what the developer proposed more or less. The Camden Council 
negotiated very poorly because the developers knew they will push and open the door.” (Pre-
hypothesis interview, a person from the local community group, 12/06/2008) 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3 – Synergy of Network 
Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban 
regeneration, and mega events can better foster integrated development and the achievement of 
sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.  
 
While a full discussion on related issues is better offered at the end of this study (see Chapter 7), the 
preliminary conclusion from findings within this chapter suggests that in order to achieve sustainable 
development visions, consensus, and compromise needs to be achieved among the stakeholders of the 
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three categories of mega projects. This conclusion was reinforced by the hypothesis-led investigations 
(see Appendix 5 for summary responses to Hypothesis 3) as were the conclusions offered by the 
NETLIPSE Project (see Hertogh et al., 2008: 37) which indicates that “an open culture within and 
between project delivery organisations and with external parties and stakeholders is critical to the 
smooth progression of a scheme”. The interviewee reinforced the point that the gap between the 
rhetoric and the reality of a sustainable development vision can be concealed by saying that:  
 
“There is little relationship [of the final project outcome] with the original aims because they always 
rely on people forgetting [what project promises have been made]. Some bits of [project outcomes] 
will be better and some will be worse. It depends on who gets the bits that are worse”. (Pre-hypothesis 
interview, a person from local community group, 12/06/2008) 
 
The exploration in this chapter as well as from Chapter 2 show that the characteristics of many mega 
projects in the UK lead to a less conducive climate and a less constructive framework for achieving 
sustainable visions and public participation.  
 
The CTRL project per se offered a window of opportunity which led to multiple project coordination. 
Once this window opened, many existing proposals congregated around it, including station area 
developments at Stratford, Ebbsfleet, and Thames Gateway. These proposals have long been planned 
but they linked themselves to the CTRL project and became part of the agenda. This mutual 
aggrandisement between the CTRL project and its associated developments formed a better business 
proposition as a whole package. With all the stakeholders eager to share in the opportunity, they made 
a lot of political noises as they began positioning themselves. Similar to the concept of the ‘window of 
opportunity’, one of the interviewees indicated that the major project development relies heavily on 
the ‘planetary alignment’ concept which requires that all the components of the project are correctly 
positioned in time and space. It implies that the major project developments also need the elements of 
both serendipity and planning.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 4 – Discourse Power 
Key champions of Mega Urban Transport Projects, Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events 
typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the 
stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests 
above all else with a limited sense of social corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ 
their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe 
to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas. 
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The review of the case study suggests that there is a delicate balance between the effectiveness of 
institutional arrangements to control the delivery of mega projects and the mobility of power relations 
for decision-makers to retain the efficiency of the stakeholder network.  
In accordance with the hypothesis the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations reveal that the 
CTRL case was bounded with several different discourses over time but also suggested that it is the 
nature of business (see Appendix 5 for summary responses to Hypothesis #4). The transformation 
patterns of these discourses depended very much on the changes in Government’s policies and its 
project agenda for the CTRL. One of the early key stakeholders for the project was its delivery 
organisation (namely British Rail), which was responsible for establishing a framework that 
conformed to government policies, and was consistent with the PPP mechanism at the time. As 
observed earlier in this chapter, the agenda of the CTRL project delivery changed from an obligation 
of the Channel Tunnel agreement with the French to one that sought to fulfil the demands of transport 
capacity, the engagement of the private sector for investment, the coordination of property 
development and station development, the striving for public funding by improving commuter 
services, and the regeneration of the East Thames Corridor. What may be observed from the returns to 
the hypothesis-led investigations (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Changing the discourse”) is that 
the substance of the MUTP discourse for the CTRL consisted of all these agendas having different 
impacts in different places over different periods throughout the project timeline (see Table 4.1).  It is 
evident that the institutional arrangements and associated political powers were both essential and 
mutually reinforcing elements to strengthen mega project discourses.  
One type of mega-project discourse cited in this set of findings is the coalitions of leading local 
businessmen and politicians who market mega projects based on the belief that what is good for 
business is good for all. Several respondents to the pre-hypothesis investigations suggested that in 
reality these entrepreneurs neglect (or choose to overlook) the negative social impacts caused by many 
such projects, especially on disadvantaged groups in the project neighbourhoods. 
4.6.2 Discussion 
The previous section contained an examination of the four hypotheses posted in this thesis. It presents 
the corroborating and conflicting evidence relating to these premises, and this is covered in greater 
detail in Chapters 5 and 6.  
 
There are several insights into theoretical concepts and issues that have emerged from the 
investigation of the CTRL project. These are described below: 
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Flexibility is a prerequisite for mega projects to adapt to the changing political agendas  
Looking back at the CTRL’s project timeline (Table 4.1), Governments changed their agendas on 
several occasions throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  
 Initially, the Government was pressured to build a link which could fulfil the agreement with the 
French to accommodate the traffic generated by the Channel Tunnel. 
 The Kent Impact Study published by Kent County Council in 1987 then proved that there was 
the necessity for a high-speed link to serve the increasing demands.  
 Before 1988, the justification for the project was essentially transport-oriented and mainly based 
on efforts to improve the traffic capacity in order to meet the forecast passenger numbers.  
 By 1989, the Government was keen to have private investment involved in the project and even 
speeded up the King’s Cross lower-level terminus decision (Faith, 2007: 150).  
 Subsequently, in 1990, the commuter benefits received greater attention because BR wanted to 
convince the Government of the need for releasing a subsidy.  
 Later, the urban regeneration benefits emerged as highly significant, especially in the Thames 
Gateway, and consequently around the station areas.   
 
One of the interviewees in hypothesis-led investigations claimed that: 
 
“Overall, there is constant strategic allocation of resources between projects, which depends on their 
scale, stage of progress and their position on the political agenda. As the result of a combination of 
strategic and political alterations, these resource allocations are not static but change over time.” 
(Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 30/09/2008) 
 
This behaviour fits the theory of ‘disjointed incrementalism’ (Lindblom, 1959) in that this research 
reveals that policies associated with mega project development are continuously adjusted as new 
crises or major problems occur, and as contextual changes come about (see Chapter 2). 
 
Loss of value of the mega projects stemming from the time lags involved 
The original purpose of the CTRL project was to connect London and the Continent so as to enhance 
commercial and economic benefits across Europe. Because the CTRL project is part of the trans-
European transport network, the delay of the CTRL project decision-making at the planning stage 
(1971-1996) not only increased the cost of the project but also led to a diminution of the overall 
(trans-European transport network) project value. This may also be the case for the Britain’s high-
speed railway network. The plan for High Speed Two - the national high-speed link from London to 
the north of England  - is still in its infancy and battle lines have been drawn between those in support 
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of the project and the wider vision of a national fast train network and those against. High Speed Two 
is proposed for the early 2020s, in which case its advocates argue that work would need to commence 
immediately. As already indicated, the high-speed rail campaign group (Greengauge 21) have argued 
extensively that the high-speed rail network is imperative for the country’s economy and that it can, 
by substitution of mode, do much to assist in reducing carbon emission from other forms of transport. 
Its proponents argue that the urgency of the project means that the lengthy approval process of the 
current planning system needs to be radically overhauled if it is to deliver speedy and efficient 
decisions on its implementation. This topic has been long-debated with the result that in 2007 the 
Government proposed the establishment of a new Infrastructure Planning Commission (IPC)50 to 
provide a streamlined planning process that would speed-up the planning process of mega 
infrastructure projects of all kinds (see HM Government, 2007). This proposal (now implemented) 
however, attracted considerable criticism on the grounds that the resultant speeded-up approval 
process would remove certain planning powers from local authorities, erode local democracy, and 
undermine the Government’s decentralisation agenda.  
 
The Killian Pretty Review of 2008 sought to investigate opportunities for improving the planning 
application process of all critical major infrastructure projects. It made a number of very broad-brush 
recommendations, (see Killian and Pretty, 2008) as follows: 
 make the planning process of national critical mega projects more proportionate; 
 make the planning process of national critical mega projects more effective; 
 improve stakeholder engagement and public consultation; 
 clarify the role of Council members; 
 ensure developments meet the needs of the whole community;  
 achieve changes in culture to provide incentives for better quality applications; and 
 remove unnecessary complexity in the planning policy and legislative framework. 
 
The government’s response to these recommendations (see DCLG provided in March 2009) defended 
the perspective that people are sceptical about the level of democracy involved in the new planning 
system but stressed the importance of the IPC working with stakeholders so that a way to provide a 
genuinely streamlined process that is practicable, fair, and transparent to all parties can be found. A 
new Planning Partnership guide to speed up new large-scale developments was published in June 
                                                 
50  The IPC began operating on 1st October 2009 as the examining and decision-making body for proposed nationally 
significant infrastructure projects in the UK. Following the General Election of May 2010, the Coalition Government intends 
to abolish IPC consenting through the Decentralisation and Localism Bill. The IPC will become a Major Infrastructure Unit 
(MIU) within the Planning Inspectorate. If the Bill comes into force, it is proposed that the MIU will be given power to 
administer applications for mega infrastructure development from April 2012. (Source: IPC website: 
http://infrastructure.independent.gov.uk/ Accessed: 29/09/2010) 
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2008 by the Planning Minister, while up to date developments suggest that the future destiny of the 
IPC under a new political administration may be a little different to that initially expected under New 
Labour. Here, the significance of institutional arrangements, which determine patterns of mega-project 
decision-making and stakeholder power relations, echoes Healey’s (1994) view on the actors 
interrelationships (see Chapter 2). The policy intervention for more efficient mega-project 
development is also stressed by the works of Healey (1994) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999).  
 
Unintended consequences of CTRL decisions 
The detailed examination of the CTRL project reveals several decisions that led to problematic 
unintended consequences for the later development of the CTRL:  
 
The first of these problems was the much-debated decision over tender selection scrutiny, particularly 
the highly optimistic passenger number forecasts (see Section 4.5.2). It is very common that revenue 
forecasts for start-up businesses are subject to great uncertainty and risk and yet the forecasts were 
afforded too much credibility in the decision-making process and there was little or no attention to 
contingency planning which led to bouts of crisis management at a later date.  
 
The second of the problems concerned Eurostar’s announcement on switching their international 
services to Ebbsfleet in 1996, which greatly upset many local MPs and business groups in and around 
Ashford who had invested heavily on the clear understanding that an international train service would 
be provided. This dramatically illustrated to stakeholders the critical difference between the provision 
of infrastructure and the provision services using that infrastructure, and the difficulties that stem from 
each being the responsibility of separate independent enterprises. How Eurostar and the Government 
respond to the problems resulting from this change of commitment has yet to be resolved. 
 
The third problem relates to the consequences of re-routing of the CTRL terminus to St. Pancras away 
from Waterloo Station. Maintaining a balance between the rationale of needing to operate the high-
speed train business and the interests of local communities and businesses around stations has proven 
an extremely difficult challenge. The outcomes of the newly published masterplan for the Waterloo 
Opportunity Area (see Figures 4.8 and 4.9) and whether this regeneration programme is as appealing 
as the international stations has yet to be tested.  
 
These three consequences partly resulted from what Hall (1980) and Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) criticised 
as ‘over-optimism’ about economic benefits that can be derived from mega-project development (see 
Chapter 2).   
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High-speed railway network represents challenges and opportunities for green infrastructure in 
the UK 
As mentioned above (see Section 4.4.2), the proposal for a national high-speed network in the UK re-
entered the debate after the opening of St. Pancras International station among both Labour 
Government spokesmen and Conservative Party representatives. The Conservative Party leader, David 
Cameron (now Prime Minister), for instance, pledged the idea of using high-speed rail transport to 
boost the regional economy at the 2008 Conservative Party conference. The idea of a high-speed 
national network is further reinforced under two current pressing issues of the government: climate 
change and economic recovery (see Section 2.2). With green infrastructure now ostensibly embraced 
by all parties in their rhetoric and policies to deal with the UK’s current economic growth challenges, 
it increasingly features as an important topic in political statements.  
 
A critical question, however, is whether the green infrastructure discourse can be extricated from the 
realms of rhetoric and translated into reality. Shilleto (2009) claims that three pre-requisites are 
needed to move green strategic plans into delivery.  The first is to gain political support for making 
this change, the second is to engage interested parties in partnership arrangements, and the third is to 
promote a more co-operative approach to green problem resolution. The three elements need to be 
underpinned by well-functioning institutional arrangements and power relations to establish efficient 
project networks and further enable improved project delivery. This phenomenon of promoting high-
speed rail fits the theory of discourse power, as defined by Hajer (1995 and 2003), which suggests that 
discourse plays the role of establishing networks where all actors share common interests or ideology. 
This process of pulling like-minded actors together through discourse power results in the 
strengthening and streamlining of networks, but also leads to the exclusion of differing voices (see 
Chapter 2). 
 
Lessons learned from the innovative CTRL contract arrangements 
Mega infrastructure projects, with their typical complex contexts, offer major opportunities for 
innovative contract arrangements as witnessed by the CTRL case which provided several novel 
financing mechanisms to secure its delivery, such as segregating construction and revenue risks, 
implementing the project in phases, introducing a cost overrun protection programme and employing 
special-purpose financing restructuring vehicles in 1998, 2001, and 2002. Lessons in relation to the 
PPP arrangements are especially important. Findings of the hypothesis-led investigations (see 
Appendix 5) confirm that the delivery of public services should not overly rely on financial resources 
from the private sector. They also indicated, more importantly, that the provision of substantial 
monetary support from Central Government fostered confidence for the investors and encouraged 
sponsorships but that this meant the public sector was obliged to take on a greater share of the risk 
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than was its initial intention. Responses from the hypothesis-led investigations suggest that, in these 
circumstances, the private sector can be expected to further improve its efficiency and creativity in 
delivering mega projects, particularly with regard to contract management arrangements and the 
respective responsibilities of the public and private sectors (see Appendix 5). A network with clearly 
defined roles and responsibilities among stakeholders can facilitate effective power interactions 
between actors. Such project-led networking reflects what Latour (1986) claimed is the consequence 
of the intense activity of enrolling, persuading, and enlisting, which in practice constitute ‘power 
translation’ in stakeholder network (see Chapter2). 
4.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has analysed several issues ranging from route planning, financing, political intervention, 
risk sharing, and public-private partnerships to concerns about its environmental, economic, and social 
impacts. This case study focuses on institutional arrangements and power relationships between senior 
project stakeholders, i.e., the ‘hierarchical power relationships’ they displayed over time, each 
possessing their own agendas. This relates back to the discussion provided in Chapter 2 where a more 
generic literature review of institutional relationships and decision-making for MUTPs is included.  
 
Since 1971, the idea of a CTRL project has been a component in the appraisal of the viability of the 
Channel Tunnel project. The completion of this high-speed railway was delayed for another three 
decades. This prolonged gestation came about through factors such as lack of political will, 
government risk aversion, financial barriers, local opposition, lack of trust in forecasts, and lack of 
operator ambition.  
 
The coordination between railway and station developments appears to be an ideology that took early 
root in CTRL project development. However, ignoring the public voice and the over reliance on 
property market and the private sectors financing triggered many obstacles to the project. This also 
further downgraded the promises on economic growth offered by the high-speed railway and raised 
doubts on the expected urban regeneration benefits promoted by the mega-project advocates.  
 
This chapter has proved that CTRL played an influential role in urban development in terms of 
attracting investments and developments. The complex stakeholder network and the hierarchical 
negotiation power in the decision-making process reinforce the use of the project discourses and at the 
same time highlights the significance of political champions and continuity of political support.  
 
The outcomes of the UK high-speed railway network’s development are yet to be known, and under 
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the current planning system and power structure may take decades to unfold. Although the CTRL 
project is unique in many respects, a number of lessons can be derived from the project’s experience, 
particularly from its financial arrangements, and borne in mind for future similar projects. 
 
Chapter 5 focuses on the development of one particular CTRL hub. It explores the interaction between 
the railway development and the sustainable urban regeneration scheme, the dynamics of the 
negotiation power within the stakeholder network, and the visions of sustainability promoted during 
the formation of project discourses. Through the analysis, the links between the theoretical framework 
established in Chapter 2 are examined, and the hypotheses postulated at the outset of this thesis are 
further tested.   
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5 Case Study of Urban Regeneration in the King’s 
Cross Area 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers in detail the second major investigative theme of this thesis by posing the question 
whether the CTRL project can stimulate sustainable urban regeneration at its hub areas. The focus of 
this chapter is on development around the St Pancras International, terminus of the CTRL in London. 
Another case study for the CTRL hub development, the Stratford City scheme, will be discussed in the 
next chapter. These two were chosen, from the four CTRL hubs, for the following reasons: 
 First, there is a legal obligation of site development embedded in the CTRL contract, which 
stipulates that the ‘developer’ (i.e., LCR), owns the property and development land interests both 
at King’s Cross area51 (see Figure 5.1) and Stratford.  
 Second, the regeneration scheme timetable coincides with that of the CTRL delivery. 
 
The King’s Cross Central scheme, adjacent to St Pancras, and the development at Stratford (home to 
the 2012 London Olympics) offer an opportunity to observe institutional arrangements and power 
relationships, such as 
 whether the CTRL project is considered to be a hindrance or stimulus to the King’s Cross and 
Stratford redevelopments;  
 whether globalisation forces impact differently on the King’s Cross and Stratford redevelopments, 
and  
 whether there are significant differences between the competitiveness of contextually different 
and geographical divergent (inner-city and edge-city) redevelopments with dissimilar institutional 
structures.  
 
This chapter is structured in six parts and takes the King’s Cross Central regeneration scheme as its 
case study. Section 5.1 provides an introductory setting to the context of the King’s Cross Central 
scheme and the key stakeholders involved. In Section 5.2, the historical background of the King’s 
Cross Central development is outlined together with its project timeline (see Table 5.2). Section 5.3 
explores the changing underlying principles of railway development and urban development. Based 
on the first three sections, Section 5.4 investigates the visions and the political promises of sustainable 
urban regeneration at King’s Cross Central. The observed negotiation powers embedded in the 
                                                 
51 St Pancras International Station as the London terminal of the CTRL project located at the King’s Cross area and also next to 
the King’s Cross Station. 
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decision-making of the King’s Cross Central scheme are summarised in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 deals 
with testing the hypotheses according to the findings of the literature review and the findings of 
hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations together with insights into theory revealed through 
this case study. Section 5.7 concludes the chapter with a summary of the key findings, including the 
emergent hypotheses and issues which have arisen from the case study and its two streams of 
investigation.   
 
Figure 5.1: King’s Cross Area  
Source: Argent St George, LCR, and Exel (2004: 11), Figure 5  
5.1.1 Project facts 
According to Edwards (2008), the King’s Cross area became prosperous during the period of rapid 
industrial growth in the 1850s, and was regarded as a prime example of British industrialisation. 
However, following the decline of industry, deprivation, crime, drug dealing, and prostitution became 
the image of the King’s Cross area for decades (see Holgersen, 2007). There was a surge in the land 
values in the King’s Cross area during the boom in the property market from 2000 to early 2007 
(Edwards, 2008). It further prompted the issue of gentrification. At present, the population of the 
King’s Cross area is mixed in terms of income and ethnicity.   
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King's Cross lies at a major public transport interchange in central London and was identified by the 
London Plan (2004) as offering the best public transport accessibility in London. The completion of 
the CTRL in 2007 extended its transport services to north Kent and to Europe at the same time as 
London Underground Ltd was undertaking a major refurbishment and expansion of the existing 
King’s Cross-St Pancras underground station. This involved development of a new Thameslink station 
at St Pancras, intended to provide high public transport accessibility to the high density and mixed-use 
developments in the King’s Cross Opportunity Area, covering parts of the boroughs of Camden and 
Islington (see Figure 5.2). 
 
Figure 5.2: King’s Cross Opportunity Area 
Source: Camden Council and Islington Council (2004) King’s Cross Opportunity Area Planning and 
Development Brief 
 
The King’s Cross Central Planning Permission (see Table 5.1) was granted in December 2006 for a 
high density development of nearly 8 million sq ft. The site includes two major rail termini - St 
Pancras International and the adjacent King's Cross Main Line station (see Figures 5.1) serving east 
coast routes. They provide London with high-accessibility public transport including 10 different rail 
and London Underground lines. 
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Table 5.1: Elements of King’s Cross Central Planning Permission  
 67 acres brownfield development site; 
 750,000 sq m (8m sq ft) of mixed use development;  
 25 new office buildings totalling some 4.9 million sq ft.; 
 2,000 homes and serviced apartments; 
 25 acres of 20 new public routes and 10 new open spaces; 
 the restoration and refurbishment of 20 historic buildings and structures;  
 the development of 250 new businesses; 
 the creation of 30,000 new jobs; and 
 the provision of up to 50 eating establishments. 
Source: London & Continental Railways (2006) 【WWW】available at: http://www.lcrhq.co.uk/
【Accessed 12/10/2008】 
 
The outline of the King’s Cross Central planning applications was submitted by Argent St George, 
London & Continental Railways (LCR), and Exel PLC in May 2004. The land for the King’s Cross 
Central development covered 67 acres and was categorised as the “Main Site” in Camden and the 
“Triangle Site” in both Camden and Islington. There were separate applications submitted 
respectively for the two sites. In addition, four listed building consent applications were made and 
four conservation area consent applications requested.  
5.1.2 Key stakeholders and their power relations 
This section analyses the role and negotiation power of each key stakeholder in the King’s Cross 
Central development process in order to see whether there is a dominant power in this project-led 
network (see Figure 5.3). Also, this section explores circumstances in which some stakeholders have 
become powerful while some have been marginalised. 
 
King’s Cross Railway Lands Group (KXRLG) 
KXRLG, which was founded in 1987, is a local pressure group that has been both an influential and 
active community campaign group. It represents the interests of groups and individuals living or 
working in the areas around the Railway Lands in Kings Cross and St. Pancras. It campaigns for the 
regeneration of the Railway Lands in the area and the needs of the local population throughout the 
project development process. KXRLG played an effective role by engaging in public consultation and 
debates on the LRC scheme, the CTRL second London Terminal selection and the KXC planning 
application (see KXRLG, 2008).  
 
As already indicated, in the mid 1990s the inability of Central Government to implement its policy on 
transport and its neglect of social concerns surrounding the sector prompted community groups to 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
 
 131 
 
unite and dedicate themselves to a series of campaigns to seek to influence proposals. This 
phenomenon fits Hajer’s (2003a) theory of “stand-by politicians” (see Chapter 2). Their efforts and 
skills to exploit publicity opportunities through the media had significant impacts on the King’s Cross 
area development, especially the LRC scheme in the late 1980s to early 1990s. This influence was 
facilitated by a combination of changing political agendas and growing awareness on all fronts of 
issues of sustainable development. The alternative schemes submitted by the Railway London Group 
in 1991 (see Edwards, 1992) emphasised the benefits that could be enjoyed through a more bottom-up 
planning approach to the area. These proposals were recognised by the RTPI and RIBA for the 
London region by with prizes for innovation on the work undertaken. This story, as illustrated by the 
pre-hypothesis investigation through the representative of the KXRLG and the bottom-up approach to 
planning, is echoed by the interviewee from Planning Aid for London in the hypothesis-led 
investigation: 
 
“It does not help to achieve visions of sustainable development if sustainability is not owned by local 
population.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a community planner, 14/08/2008) 
 
The Mayor of London 
The London Mayor (Ken Livingstone initially, and then Boris Johnson more recently52), upon taking 
office, became head of the planning authority of all the London Boroughs in 2000. This position was 
to become highly influential in the decisions about development projects in the Greater London area, 
including King’s Cross. The Mayor published the draft London Plan in 2001 followed by the London 
Plan in 2004. Both of the reports identified King’s Cross as one of its so called ‘Opportunity Areas’. 
The London Plan envisaged that the King’s Cross Opportunity Area could maximise its 
redevelopment value by pursuing a mixed-use, high-density development project adjacent to a major 
transport node. Given that the local authority (Camden Council) is obliged to comply with planning 
and policy guidance set by the Mayor, this document was to prove very important to all parties 
involved in the project. 
                                                 
52 Ken Livingstone is the first Mayor of London from 2000 to 2008. Boris Johnson is the second Mayor of London from 2008 
to the present.  
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Figure 5.3: King’s Cross Key Stakeholder Network 
 
Source: Author, based on King's Cross Central Limited Partnership website (2008) 【WWW】available at: http://www.kingscrosscentral.com/delivery_team【Accessed 
05/08/2010
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Camden Council  
Although the London Boroughs’ role had been weakened after the first directly-elected London 
Mayor assumed power, some of the local boroughs still played a mediator role in the decision-making 
process by bringing all stakeholders together in order to build consensus. Camden Council is the 
prime example in the King’s Cross Central scheme. The political commitment and support that the 
developer received from Camden Council was critical to the realisation of this regeneration scheme. 
So critical, in fact, that many of the community groups argued it to be too close and neglectful of their 
interests. This is evidence of the ‘discourse power’ referred to in Hypothesis 4 (as outlined in Chapter 
1). This hypothesis assumes that a network formed by the central stakeholders (i.e. developers) is 
constantly strengthened by the discourse that they establish which in turn further marginalises others 
who do not advocate the same discourse as their own. Organisations or groups need to affiliate 
themselves with the mainstream network in order to influence the decision-making process. The 
following quotation from the pre-hypothesis investigation reflects the change of power relations in 
project decision-making that is affected by the changing institutional arrangements: 
 
“Camden was the planning authority for King’s Cross whereas now it is the Mayor. The new 
planning rules changed everything. The Mayor or the GLA in the early days were very keen to take 
control of the project. We needed the agreement of GLA and support of the GLA. The GLA will often 
try to control the key things. They didn’t succeed but the law has now changed. If we were starting 
now, the Camden council would have much less role in King’s Cross.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a 
planner from the local authority, 25/06/2008) 
 
London & Continental Railways (LCR) 
LCR won the contract to deliver and operate the CTRL project in 1996 (see Chapter 4). It was also 
awarded the concession agreement that included the Eurostar European Passenger Service between 
London and Paris/Brussels plus the development rights to a number of key sites and buildings 
adjacent to some of the CTRL stations. These assets - previously in public ownership – included: 
Waterloo Station, St Pancras Chambers, St Pancras Station, 120 acres of land in Stratford, 635 
properties along the route and King’s Cross Railway Lands (Holgersen, 2007: 64). The power and 
influence of the LCR was ultimately circumscribed by, driven by, and dependent on the CTRL project 
agreement with the government, mostly (as indicated in Chapter 4) as a result of the concessional 
contract and later the government backing of guaranteed bonds in 1998. This resulted, to a great 
extent, from a shared vision of railway development related urban regeneration benefits by selected 
private sector interests and leading politicians, particularly Heseltine and Prescott (see Dimitriou et al., 
2010). This is reflected in the data from the pre-hypothesis investigation:  
 
“The reason that John Prescott supported the CTRL project, probably the most important thing, 
however, was the ability of the new railway to support regeneration. In that, he was continuing a 
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policy which his predecessor Deputy Prime Minister Michael Heseltine supported in the previous 
Tory government…” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a person from private sector developer, 11/06/2008) 
  
Argent (King's Cross) Limited  
Argent St George (now Argent King’s Cross Ltd.) was selected as the preferred developer for the 
King’s Cross Central scheme in March 2000 from an initial shortlist of 17 major developers by the 
landowners, LCR, and Excel. The Argent Group PLC was founded in 1981 as Argent Estates Limited. 
In 1997, the British Telecom Pension Scheme acquired the Argent Group PLC and subsequently 
established a firm foundation for the financing challenges ahead which proved essential to the 
development at King’s Cross given market uncertainties at the time. As already indicated, Argent’s 
property-oriented scheme for the King’s Cross Central was criticised by several parties, especially 
local community groups, for an excess of office space, and too little affordable housing. These groups 
expressed a fear that the development would mean displacement of many existing businesses and 
local residents, and destruction of ethnic minority communities in the area as a result of subsequent 
increases in land value. Argent King’s Cross Ltd together with Camden Council held a very different 
view of the future from that of the community groups. The two believed that the regeneration scheme 
would bring new economic benefits that would contribute to changing the image of the area in such a 
way that new investment would be attracted to it, and that this in turn would generate new wealth for 
the area.  
 
In 2009 the banking crisis (see Brown, 2009) generated doubts whether the scheme would survive. 
However, the King’s Cross Central Limited Partnership injected £150 million of its own funds to 
safeguard Phase One of the scheme in March 2009 and later, in October the same year, a £42 million 
public funding package was granted from the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA) for 284 
affordable homes. Again, in March 2010, the Partners committed a further £50 million for vital 
infrastructure across the King’s Cross Central site (see King’s Cross Central Limited Partnership, 
2010). The King’s Cross Central scheme embodies many advantages through its highly accessible 
location and adjacency to St Pancras International Station. Argent, which is soundly funded and has 
demonstrated sufficient economic strength to (so far) cope with the fall-out of the recent banking 
crisis, has enhanced its negotiation powers with all parties involved in the scheme. This contributes to 
the research question in hypothesis-led investigations (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Determining 
factors and features of mega project decision”) relating to the attributes that are most important for an 
efficient and effective stakeholder network to deliver the King’s Cross Central project. The responses 
of Hypothesis-related Research Question (HRQ) #4 also revealed that the coalition between leading 
businesses, politicians, and local bureaucrats is likely to shape public policies to benefit businesses 
due to their command of economic resources (see Appendix 5). 
 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
 
 135 
 
5.2 History of the King’s Cross Central Project Development 
5.2.1 Background 
The regeneration potential and needs of the King’s Cross railway lands were recognised for over 30 
years prior to planning permission being granted in 2006. However, the planning policy impetus for 
large-scale regeneration of the main site was protracted in part for economic reasons, because of 
uncertainty over the alignment and delivery of related mega transport projects; namely:  the CTRL, 
Thameslink53, the East Coast Mainline upgrading programme, Crossrail 2 and (to a lesser extent) the 
Cross River Tram.  
 
The King’s Cross District sits in central London (see Figure 5.4) and possesses high accessibility with 
varied transport systems, including railway links to Scotland, and to the North East and Midlands of 
England. It has access to the biggest London Underground interchange station (King’s Cross St. 
Pancras tube station) which has six lines connecting it to the city, and to Thameslink railway routes to 
south east London. Moreover, Kings Cross is a node on an extensive bus network for Greater London. 
The King’s Cross District, however, remains one of the poorest areas in London. It has 10 per cent 
unemployment (higher than the average national rate of seven per cent) and about 60 per cent of its 
households earn an annual income of less than £20,000 (Edwards, 2008).  
 
This section demonstrates the key events of the King’s Cross railway lands development as a context 
for better understanding of the issues associated with this regeneration scheme. The detailed project 
timeline is displayed in Table 5.2. 
 
There is clearly tension between the developers’ more commercially oriented scheme and the local 
community’s more resident friendly plans. One prominent and emerging issue is whether it is the 
developer’s responsibility to tackle the areas’ many local poverty problems; It is a matter of debate 
whether urban regeneration projects on the scale of the Kings Cross proposals can claim to have a 
genuine sustainability vision if they do not address these problems. According to the responses of 
Overall Research Question (ORQ) ＃2, the responsibility to secure local needs lies on the local 
authorities which should play a proactive role as a bridge among stakeholders in mega-project 
decision-making processes (see Appendix 5). Also, a streamlined planning power is shown to be 
necessary in mega-project development. However, if this power does not safeguard the general 
interests while protecting minority interests, it is deemed unsustainable (see Appendix 4, under the 
                                                
53 Thameslink (known as Thameslink 2000) had been through a complex and prolonged planning process, which officially 
began in November 1997. On 18th October 2006, Network Rail was finally given planning permission and legal powers. 
The funding for the required work was approved on 24 July 2007. Construction began on 24 October 2007 and the 
provisional completion date is 2015. 
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topic “Property-oriented development”). More detailed analysis on these questions is presented in 
Section 5.4. 
 
Figure 5.4: Kings Cross Central Illustrative Model 
Source: King's Cross Central Limited Partnership (2008) 【WWW】available at:  
http://www.kingscrosscentral.com/gallery【Accessed 04/08/2010】 
5.2.2 Project initiatives and obstacles 
The initiation of the King’s Cross Railway Lands’ development can be traced back to when the BR 
Board announced in July 1987 that King’s Cross Station was to be the second terminal of the CTRL. 
In the following year, it chose the London Regeneration Consortium (LRC) - composed of Rosehaugh 
and Stanhope (two major property developers) - to develop the 135 acres of derelict railway lands at 
King’s Cross with Foster Associates as the master planners (see Edwards, 1992: 129). LRC made an 
outline planning application for the redevelopment of the railway lands in April 1989, but this was 
eventually withdrawn in 1994 due to the poor economic climate at the time and the then 
Government’s decision to bring the CTRL to St Pancras station (Holgersen, 2007). The local authority 
fast-tracked the planning decision process for LRC, but the decline of the property market in early 
1990s eventually paralysed this plan. A revised CTRL route option proposal was submitted in 1991 
by BR which sought to reduce costs by taking the line via south Kent to King’s Cross in the hope that 
LRC would pay for the station construction. However, in 1994, the Government decided to bring the 
CTRL into St. Pancras station mainly due to the prohibitive cost of low-level station at King’s Cross.  
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In April 1996, The King’s Cross Partnership was formed and acted as a framework for a £3.75 billion, 
7-year regeneration programme (1996-2003) under the Government’s Single Regeneration Budget54 
initiative. In May 2004, Argent King’s Cross Limited, LCR, and Exel submitted the planning and 
heritage applications for the King’s Cross Central Regeneration Project. In March 2006, Ken 
Livingstone, as Mayor of London, gave the Argent scheme his go-ahead. However, at the end of the 
same month, John Prescott, Deputy Prime Minister, called in the proposal in order to have more time 
to consider the scheme in response to a deluge of objections from a variety of parties55. In July of the 
same year, the King’s Cross Railway Lands Group (KXRLG), in alliance with member groups and 
others, campaigned for a re-think about the proposals for the railway lands.  
 
The campaign groups raised numerous issues about the King’s Cross Central project and hence 
attracted public inquiries and Judicial Reviews. These interruptions are criticised by some 
interviewees from the pre-hypothesis investigations. The respondents claimed that the public inquiry 
and Judicial Review are the tactics used by the opposition groups in order to derail the project:  
 
“The process of setting up the public inquiry and especially one involving local authorities, the 
developer, and the local residents, took a great deal of time and that’s the delay. Judicial Reviews 
have a high potential for delay and that’s part of the motivation for people who call for a Judicial 
Review. Delay can kill the scheme. That’s where you sabotage [the project] even if you are not 
successful in Judicial Review. The fact that you delay things, it can mean that confidence [towards the 
project] is lost or the project is in its down turn or banks will call in the debts. It is the delay that 
causes problems.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a planner from the local authority, 25/06/2008) 
 
The proposal for the King’s Cross Central scheme was that a 3-phase (15-20-year) development plan 
would be launched in 2007, after the scheduled completion of the railway works. The plan was to 
                                                
54 According to Rhodes et al. (2003), in 1994, the Single Regeneration Budget Challenge Fund moved forward the concept of 
partnership working in delivery of regeneration projects and extended the breadth of the partner-base to include many 
different parts of government and at a more locally devolved regional level.  
55 Quoted from King’s Cross Railway Lands Group website (2006): “Following Camden Council's decision on 9 March 2006 
to grant planning permission to Argent, many organisations and individuals in the area have written to Mr John Prescott, 
Deputy Prime Minister (and the minister in charge of planning) calling on him to "call in" this decision and make it himself 
on the basis of a public inquiry held by the independent Planning Inspectorate. The following organisations have written to 
Mr Prescott, or to the Government Office for London ("GOL") which administers his powers locally.  
• King's Cross Railway Lands Group KXRLG  
• King's Cross Conservation Area Advisory Committee  
• Cally Rail Group  
• Regent's Canal Conservation Area Advisory Committee  
• SAVE Britain's Heritage  
• The Goldington Street Tenants and Residents' Association 
• Coopers Lane Tenants and Residents Association 
• Churchway Estate and Residents from Chalton St, Medburn St, Penryn St and Goldington St NW1  
• Regent's Network  
• Camden Green Party  
• Industrial Buildings Preservation Trust”  
Source: KXRLG website (2006) Local organisations call for a public inquiry. Available at www: 
http://www.kxrlg.org.uk/news/callindemands.htm accessed 04/08/2007. 
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transform the long-abandoned lands behind the CTRL Terminus, St. Pancras station, and King’s 
Cross station into a ‘mixed’ commercial, residential, and leisure activities regeneration area at the 
same time as local opposition groups endeavoured to ensure that these proposals met local needs.  
 
Table 5.2: King’s Cross Central Regeneration Scheme Timeline 
 
Source: Compiled by the author, based on King's Cross Central Limited Partnership website (2008) 
【WWW】available at: http://www.kingscrosscentral.com/index【Accessed 04/08/2010】 
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5.3 Coordination between Railway and Urban Development 
An examination of the trajectory of the King’s Cross development from 1945 to 1990 (see Table 5.2) 
reveal that several factors prolonged delays and contributed to several missed opportunities to 
incorporate new initiatives into the development (see Haywood, 2005). For example, according to 
Edwards (2008), the uncertain system, which resulted in many long term planning uncertainties 
pertaining to this land, discouraged prospective investors from becoming involved in the project. 
Long negotiation battles among the various stakeholders (centred on the commercial and community 
divide) also contributed to delays, as did the construction blight that stemmed from the CTRL project. 
For although the initial impetus to the Kings Cross development came from a mutual reinforcement 
between the railway station development and property development, it was seriously jeopardised by 
both the gloomy office market of the early 1990s and the delays incurred by alterations in the CTRL 
route and termini selection (between 1989 and 1996), as well as by the financial restructuring of the 
project (see Chapter 4). The following two sections elaborate on the issues emerged from the 
evolution process of the coordination between railway and urban development. Also, the role of St 
Pancras International in the King’s Cross area development is illustrated. 
5.3.1 History of the coordination 
The pattern of changes in government attitudes towards coordination between railway development 
and urban development helps understanding of the way in which the project evolved. According to 
Haywood (2005) a number of periods in UK history clearly show when the ideology of coordination 
between railway development and urban development occurred. He explained that the earliest signs of 
interest in integrating railway and urban development emerged soon after the Railway Age began in 
the 19th Century when market forces generated numerous new rail-accessible locations. He argued, 
however, that these developments subsequently ground to a halt because of increasing concerns over 
urban sprawl and competition from trunk roads after 1918. In 1948, a new UK statutory planning 
system was introduced against a backcloth of the development of a nationalised rail industry which 
was supposed to bring greater coordination between railway development and urban development. 
However, the reality of the time was that post-war thinking on rail planning lagged behind overall 
strategic planning. Instead, railway management continued its path-dependent traditional focus on 
operations and was reluctant to go beyond this realm of focus. The economic recession in the mid-
1970s contributed further to the lack of coordinated planning, and although the economy recovered in 
the mid-1980s, the Thatcherite ideology of privatisation had no intention of seeking greater 
integration between railway development and urban development (Haywood, 2005: 75). 
 
There was, furthermore, no additional commitment to the initial investment in rail from the public 
sector whilst the privatisation of British Rail took place under the Conservatives between 1994 and 
1997.  This period saw railway management becoming more business-driven, with the result that, in 
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order to sustain railway profits, the sale of station lands to property developers and railway developers 
became widespread throughout the country. This did, however, lead to several new schemes that 
introduced much greater integration of development around some major stations. The most notable 
recent example was the Broadgate Development Scheme adjacent to Liverpool Street station in 
London. Construction began in 1985 and was completed in 1990. This project was developed by 
Rosehaugh Stanhope and BR, with BR receiving a generous share of the development profits 
(Bertolini and Spit, 1998: 183).  
 
The later sectorisation of BR, whereby franchises were sold off to train operating companies, attracted 
large international investment interests to the UK railway industry. This was especially promoted by 
the office market boom in the mid-to-late 1980s (Haywood, 2005). The commercial success of the 
Broadgate project was to prove difficult to replicate as economic recession hit in the early 1990’s.  
Wider objectives in the shape of social-economic sustainability through integrated urban and railway 
developments were not on the agenda at that stage. Nevertheless, about that time Professor Sir Peter 
Hall (1985: 169) pointed out:  
 
“Rail cannot save the city, if the city is going down (economically), because the forces that are taking 
it down are far wider and far deeper than mere questions of accessibility. That is not to deny the 
potential importance of transport investments to the regeneration of a city's economy. It is to say that 
they would need to be planned in the context of a far better understanding of that city's malaise.”  
 
Haywood (2005) emphasises that the increasingly complex institutional arrangements within the rail 
industry and management after BR’s privatisation contributed to the failure of coordination between 
railway and urban development. Privatisation and fragmentation of the railways presented a 
complicated interface between the railway industry and local authorities, the opposite of the simple 
and well-focused institutional arrangements that were needed to foster effective integrated 
development (Haywood, 2005: 77). The laissez-faire management approach of the railway industry 
erected a high institutional barrier towards integration between urban and rail planning.  
5.3.2 Role of St Pancras International  
This section examines the role of St Pancras from two perspectives: the first is the impact the 
selection of St Pancras International Station (as the main London terminal for the CTRL) had on the 
King’s Cross Central scheme at a time of global and national economic downturn. The second is the 
impact that protracted decision-making on the location of the London Terminal for the CTRL has had 
on the King’s Cross Central development.  
 
Although the King’s Cross Area has been designated as a site with a high potential for ‘mixed use 
development’, the London Planning Advisory Committee (LPAC) in 1991 expressed a concern that 
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the redevelopment in King’s Cross would have the effect of further concentrating development in 
central London. This, it was argued, would result in expanding employment and population beyond 
the capacity of its transport network and of its housing stock (Edwards, 1992: 175). Others argued that 
a better outcome would be achieved by relocating employment from the current over-crowded central 
London to east London, where government policies were geared to encourage further regeneration on 
a substantial scale. The competition for planning resources brought about by these debates was 
reflected in a report prepared by Colin Buchanan and Partners for Newham Council in 1989 (see 
Colin Buchanan and Partners, 1989), when the consultants were invited to examine the benefits of 
Stratford International Station over King’s Cross.  
 
The responses to the associated question (HRQ #7) on the distribution of development resources 
between the east London and central London indicate that St Pancras International is far more 
powerful than Stratford International in attracting further investments in development. One of the 
responses is quoted here to explain this concern and shows that the King’s Cross District is more 
attractive to investors.  
 
“Stratford is hardly able to compete effectively with central London at the moment. The Olympics 
diverted resources away from the Thames Gateway area. The Thames Gateway needs a streamlined 
and fully-empowered body to deliver the development because if the market is to be depended on to 
develop in a commercially sensitive environment, the investors are likely to go to the west.” 
(Hypothesis-led interview, a community planner, 22/08/2008) 
 
Notwithstanding the above, not all impacts on St Pancras International Station and on the King’s 
Cross development area have been negative – far from it. Many of the projects affected by the CTRL 
accumulated stronger attraction for investors and brought positive reputation to this area. For example, 
the restoration of King’s Cross station, the construction of the Western Concourse (see Figure 5.5), 
and the refurbishment of St Pancras International Station, have transformed the two stations as 
landmarks of London. The restoration and conversion of the Grade 1 listed building to a 5 star 
Renaissance Marriott hotel (see Figure 5.6) and the transformation of the Greater Northern Hotel into 
a luxury boutique hotel with some new apartments (see Figure 5.7) are also expected to effectively 
add value to the King’s Cross area. Camden Council considers the reconstruction and refurbishment 
of the St Pancras International to be an early beacon of regeneration for the Opportunity Area 
(Camden Council and Islington Council, 2004: 89) and a remarkable feat of engineering with great 
aesthetic value. The positive effects of the St Pancras International are echoed by the response from 
the hypothesis-led investigations: 
 
“Everybody has an interest in that land [King’s Cross Railway land], and arguably all those interests 
are aligned. … The commercial companies worked out that they want to put King’s Cross and St 
Pancras into their portfolio and they want to maintain their networks and positions because they have 
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good contacts in government, good contacts with banking, and good contacts with everything else. 
They traded off the success story of King’s Cross.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the 
local authority, 30/09/2008) 
 
Figure 5.5: King’s Cross Station Western Concourse - Under Construction  
Source:  Meinhold, B. (2011) Amazing Renovation of King’s Cross and New Western Concourse in 
Progress. In: inhabitat website【WWW】available at:  http://inhabitat.com/photos-amazing-
renovation-of-kings-cross-station-new-western-concourse-in-progress/【Accessed 15/08/2011】 
 
 
Figure 5.6: St Pancras International 
Source: Sturrock, J. (2008a) Press. In: King's Cross Central Limited Partnership website【WWW】
available at:  http://www.kingscrosscentral.com/gallery【Accessed 04/08/2010】 
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Figure 5.7: The Great Northern Hotel 
Source: Sturrock, J. (2008b) Press. In: King's Cross Central Limited Partnership website 【WWW】
available at:  http://www.kingscrosscentral.com/press【Accessed 04/08/2010】 
 
St Pancras International Station has now become one of London’s attractions irrespective of the need 
to travel. The architectural restoration, at a cost £800 million, has brought a more attractive 
investment climate to the area and very much enhanced its image. The fit-out of the Thameslink 
station, built beneath St Pancras station, did not receive government funding until February 2006. As 
a consequence, it was completed by LCR in December 2007, soon after the St Pancras International 
Station officially opened in November the same year. Additional government funding for the 
Thameslink St Pancras station was set to be further delayed, however, as the thrust of the St Pancras 
International and London 2012 Olympics added urgency to the release of capital. This is evidenced in 
the hypothesis-led investigation:  
 
“The 2012 Olympics are a mega event and clearly provide a new imperative to complete CTRL and 
LUL works at King's Cross.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 
30/09/2008) 
 
As suggested by Peter Hall (see Section 5.3.1), it is both impossible and unwise to rely on railway 
stations alone to address complex urban regeneration problems in an area such as Kings Cross and St. 
Pancras. Their environs are more closely associated with urban decay, social deprivation, drugs, 
prostitution, crime, unemployment, poverty, etc. Effective responses to these problems instead require 
additional supportive policies funded with central government assistance in association with 
concerted efforts by local authorities with sufficient resources. According to Michael Parkinson 
(2009), at the time of writing, many developers are seeking to renegotiate their Section 106 deals as a 
result of the recession in an effort to cut their obligations. This suggests that local authorities need 
carefully to guard their balance sheets when it comes to the local benefits that such 106 agreements 
are supposed to ensure. Current economic circumstances can easily provide an excuse for developers 
not to fulfil their obligations and commitments which, in turn, will increase the obstacles in the 
negotiation process associated with regeneration projects. The real decision-making powers 
underlying collaborative urban regeneration efforts lie in the establishment of a well coordinated 
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network composed of effective negotiating entities and is well resourced by institutional arrangements. 
This hypothesis is discussed in further depth in Section 5.5.  
5.4 Visions and Sustainability of Urban Regeneration 
Quite apart from the commercially-oriented coordination addressed in the previous section, a vision of 
sustainable urban regeneration that links railway and urban development has been revived in recent 
years. This is a concept that looks to providing communities with better accessibility to ‘brownfield’ 
sites in order to enhance their use in a sustainable manner. However, visions of sustainable urban 
regeneration are often assumed to be nothing more than rhetoric because of a shortage of public 
funding and the dominance of concerns about commercial revenues, which tend to conflict with issues 
of sustainability.  
 
An underlying premise of this PhD research postulates that the general criteria for assessing 
sustainable urban regeneration schemes concentrate on those that claim to construct and maintain 
sustainable project lifecycles within an institutional framework that is capable of sustaining its 
economic activities, environmental assets, and social well-being.  
 
The objectives of the King’s Cross Central project as defined by Argent St George, LCR, and Exel 
(see Argent St George et al., 2001: 10) are fourfold:  
• To have King’s Cross play a major part in facilitating economic development and contributing to 
the capital’s continued economic growth.  
• To have the regeneration of King’s Cross deliver significant benefits to existing local 
communities and assist in the improvement of local opportunities for jobs, training, and housing 
and facilitate better access to healthcare, education, and other services. 
• To assist in the redevelopment of the King’s Cross lands so as to present opportunities that 
greatly enhance the quality of the townscape and public realm.  
• To infuse the area with wider sustainability principles in terms of, for example, energy efficiency, 
water conservation, and the recycling of materials. 
 
Private sector developers inevitably emphasise the economic aspects of urban regeneration schemes 
as a result of the commercial imperative they employ. In the case of the Kings Cross railway lands 
development, for example, the developers argued that fulfilling the commercial imperative optimises 
the economic value of the King’s Cross land and its redevelopment, which, in turn, automatically 
facilitates the optimisation of community benefits and the meeting of local needs (Argent St George et 
al., 2001: 11).   
 
The developers have on many occasions presented themselves as ‘champions’ of sustainable urban 
regeneration, where such schemes are seen as means of creating “long-lasting places that can adapt to 
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people’s changing patterns of social and economic behaviour over time” (Argent St George et al., 
2001: 11). They claim, for example, that they have been very responsive to the political agenda in 
relation to sustainable development and socially inclusive regeneration. The developers have referred 
to their efforts to reduce their carbon footprint during the construction period, meeting standards of 
high efficiency buildings56, and being respectful and caring of public realms and the conservation of 
historic assets. 
 
On the above grounds, although sustainable urban regeneration is a very abstract and ambiguous 
concept, there is evidence to suggest that the Kings Cross regeneration scheme has done much to 
facilitate sustained economic benefits for this area, as well as to make significant progress in meeting 
local needs in the longer term. This is despite reservations surrounding the debate as to whether the 
commercially-oriented approach pursued by the developers and favoured by many national 
governments, the London Mayor and Camden Council, will acknowledge the needs of the poor. The 
transformation of the area currently underway is not only physical but also involves a displacement of 
the population. A bias exists which favours middle-class households and flagship businesses who can 
afford the housing and rental prices in the new developments.  
 
Those who doubt the ability of a property-led commercial approach to deliver sustainable urban 
regeneration schemes typically advocate a bottom-up (grass-roots) approach to planning rather than a 
top-down more centralised approach. This reflects the review of the characteristics of mega projects 
in Chapter 2 - they are usually dominated by a powerful set of key stakeholders that controls the 
decision-making powers of the mega project and ultimately marginalises the less privileged and less 
influential. Michael Edwards who has been involved and worked with local communities in Kings 
Cross for many years has argued that many disagreements were dismissed and regarded as unrealistic 
by the key decision-makers. He argues that even the local politicians, who challenged the business-led 
development plan for the King’s Cross railway lands, have been marginalised or excluded from 
decision-making committees (Edwards, 2008: 11). Referring to the findings of the pre-hypothesis 
investigations, in the process of King’s Cross regeneration, the various local community campaign 
groups had welcomed the CTRL project and King’s Cross Central development project in principle, 
in the hope of these mega projects delivering ‘real regeneration’ that would meet local needs.  
5.5 Decision-Making Process and Negotiation Powers  
Section 5.5 includes an analysis of the negotiation powers and interactions among the various key 
stakeholders in the process of King’s Cross development. It describes the power relations that 
emerged, the role and features of the institutional arrangements, and other contextual factors, 
including global economic forces.   
                                                
56 All new buildings were designed to achieve high BREEAM and EcoHomes ratings (Argent St George et al., 2004: 16). 
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5.5.1 Contexts of negotiation process 
This analysis of the key events in the negotiation process of the Kings Cross development draws on 
the writings of both Edwards (1992) and Bertolini and Spit (1998). Edwards (ibid.) offers a clear 
interpretation of the ‘context’ of negotiation powers between players of the King’s Cross area 
redevelopment during the late 1980s and the early 1990s. He pinpointed five significant contextual 
issues:  
 
Revenue-focus development 
Edwards (ibid) raised concerns about the proposed production of large floor-plate office buildings. He 
argued that building production in the UK does not follow a demand-supply logic but is instead 
dependent on the continuing scarcity of office buildings and on the confidence of property value 
growth. This revenue-focus development resulted in the opening of room for negotiation over 
planning proposals for financiers of the development, especially when local authorities are eager to 
attract investment from the private sector. It also shaped, he argued, an already fragile market which 
could quickly topple into a downward spiral, such as in the case of the early 1990s’ recession and the 
current economic downturn (as at 2011 in the UK). Edwards concludes that in this context, 
commercial-oriented development has an unfair dominant position. Financiers are better placed in 
negotiating terms because local authorities will often readily streamline the planning decision process 
in order to facilitate the attraction of additional funding from the private sector. 
 
The privatisation of BR led the new institutional arrangements (led by Railtrack57) to adopt private-
sector accountancy practices which favoured short-term financial returns more than long term benefits. 
This short-term mentality, Edwards (ibid) contends, unfairly underpinned the decision-making 
judgements of Railtrack, the Government, and, needless to say, the various franchised operators. This 
phenomenon was, and continues to be, a driving force in the negotiation process, prevailing in the 
market-driven planning environment that has such an impact on mega project decision-making.  
 
Ignorance of corporate social responsibility 
The tender evaluation criteria for development rights established by landowners were based on 
profitability. The market-driven planning environment for mega projects is characterised by property 
developers who pursue quick revenue returns by seeking to maximise the amount of expensive 
residential and office floor space. In this regard, some local community groups claim that these 
developers ignore their corporate social responsibility (CSR). They justify their actions by blaming 
the inevitable reality of market forces. This kind of competition generates pressures for developers to 
downgrade their standard for sustainable development in order to enhance profitability. In terms of 
negotiation power, landowners and developers are able to build a strong relationship in this context.  
                                                
57 Railtrack set up in 1994 took over the ownership and management of all track, signalling, infrastructure, buildings and 
operational land as BR was privatised (Bertolini and Spit, 1998: 193).  
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Fiscal pressures on the local authorities 
The abolition of the Greater London Council (GLC) in 1986 removed the obstacle to King’s Cross’ 
redevelopment as the planning approval powers were subsequently transferred to the London Borough 
of Camden. However, at that time, London boroughs were suffering from fiscal problems under the 
Thatcher Administration. These fiscal pressures put Camden Council in a position where it was ready 
to be convinced by the developers that the alternatives to their proposals were not realistic and that a 
public inquiry would prove too costly to the Council. An unspoken consensus emerged between the 
developers and the local authorities to pursue the developers’ vision. 
 
Fragmented institutional arrangements in the government 
The dislocation of Central Government departments and fragmented institutional arrangements in 
spatial planning in 1980s were the fifth contextual factor. For example, policy and action on land use, 
transport, industrial growth, and labour markets and training were the responsibility of four separate 
government ministers (see Edwards, 1992: 175). This dislocation brought about the failure of 
matching the investment and demand in transport policy for the King’s Cross development. The deep 
resentment from the community groups against Central Government during 1980s developed as a 
result of the uncertainty over decisions on the CTRL routes and the London terminal. This climate did 
much to encourage the orchestration of local resistance that successfully delayed the King’s Cross Bill, 
which was portrayed as ignoring demands made by the local community. This development seemed to 
enhance the negotiation power of community groups at the time and saw it as germinating continuous 
subsequent endeavours to monitor the regeneration process at King’s Cross thereafter.  
 
Many of these concerns discussed above, according to the findings of this research, remain the same. 
Proposals for the regeneration of the King’s Cross area from the early 1990s until today are discussed 
and analysed below as they relate to the CTRL project. The changing planning policy contexts which 
subsequently enabled or constrained the King’s Cross development are also investigated.  
5.5.2 Political power and institutional arrangements 
It is notable that one of the essential components of an urban regeneration partnership of the kind 
pursued for the King’s Cross development is a capability of all parties to compromise. A laudable aim 
of the partnership process is thus to minimise conflicts that can cause increased costs. On this basis, if 
any player in the partnership obtains dominant power, it will turn the policy of partnership into a 
token rather than a practical reality. According to Bertolini and Spit (1998: 186-195) the 
transformation of political power and institutional arrangements in decision-making of King’s Cross 
area regeneration proceeded in four phases:  
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1987-1992 
This is the era of the rise and fall of a property-led approach. There was a complicated, multilateral 
dispute between Central Government, the Borough of Camden, LRC, BR, and the local community 
groups. As a result of the perception that profits from an office-oriented development was the only 
solution to the spiralling costs of the King’s Cross area development, the decisions made in 
negotiations between the Borough of Camden and LRC overlooked the risks that office bias brought 
to the project.   
 
1993-1995 
This is the phase that involved withdrawal and new planning proposals to redefine the objectives of 
King’s Cross development. The significant changes in the Government agenda (see LPAC, 1993) 
provided new strategic planning objectives for King’s Cross area and emphasised the importance of 
the delivery of all the planned infrastructure. Although at the time LRC and BR were perceived as 
having strong negotiating positions, the later CTRL Bill presented by Union Railways58 in November 
1994 ended the prospect of an international station at King’s Cross underground. The successful 
September 1995 bid59 to the Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) drew the spotlight onto King’s Cross 
railway lands as well as the CTRL London terminal at St Pancras. 
 
1996-1997 
This is a period of movement towards parallel transport- and regeneration-led approaches. The 
prolonged CTRL Bill finally received its Royal assent in 1996 thereby removing legal uncertainty 
from King’s Cross development. However, the scheduled CTRL construction timetable meant that 
King’s Cross Central regeneration project could not be started until the completion of the CTRL.  
 
1998-2003 
This is the original planned implementation period. At the time, Bertolini and Spit (1998) recorded 
that LCR planned to begin the building of the CTRL in 1998 and complete it by 2003. This reveals 
that the claim made by the Government and LCR that the CTRL project was completed in time and on 
budget was only valid in relation to the revised timetable post the financial restructuring (St Pancras 
International was opened in 2007). 
 
Overall, plans for the King’s Cross area from 1987 to 1997 were widely seen as a weak institutional 
framework for negotiations (see Ball, 2004; Bertolini and Spit, 1998; Edwards, 1992 and 2008). From 
the mid-1980s, there were increasing pressures to take socioeconomic issues into account. Affordable 
housing became a prerequisite for development, at least on paper. The concept of sustainability at the 
                                                
58 According to Bertolini and Spit (1998: 190), Union Railways was the independent company set up in 1992 by BR to develop 
the high-speed link to the continent. 
59 Borough of Camden and Borough of Islington were in conjunction with local community, voluntary sector, private sector 
participation (P&O) developments, National Freight Corporation, Railtrack and Union Railways bid to the SRB and later set 
up King’s Cross Partnership for a 7-year regeneration initiative (see Bertolini and Spit, 1998: 192-193). 
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time was in its infancy and the objectives of achieving a sustainable community were continuously 
developing but remained vague. Although the 1987 Camden Borough Plan tried to embrace social 
aims, this plan lacked quantification, which left it open to negotiation with future developers (ibid.: 
188). This reveals that the discourse about sustainable urban regeneration was not yet deeply 
established in government or the built environment professionals. Negotiating power in the realm of 
mega project developments such as the King’s Cross urban regeneration scheme therefore remained 
with the key stakeholders committed to profit-making rather than any sustainability agenda. The 
events addressed below explain the ebb and flow of the negotiation process of the King’s Cross 
Central project: 
 
The Negotiation set-up 
According to Bertolini and Spit (1998), in the first phase of the negotiation process for the Kings 
Cross development, two submissions from BR established the backdrop for all the debates which 
followed. One was the King’s Cross Railways Bill which BR submitted to Parliament in November 
1988.  The other was the outline planning application (OPA) to the Borough of Camden in April 1989. 
Negotiations between BR and the London Borough of Camden were more likely to reach a consensus 
at the time since between them they possessed the necessary legal and financial resources to make an 
agreement work. They each had sound negotiation positions and they were able to conduct fruitful 
negotiations on the King’s Cross development.  
 
Market-driven development and sustainable urban regeneration 
There is no doubt that the negotiating position of LRC was greatly strengthened by the widely held 
view that profit-driven property developments was ‘the way ahead’. The collapse of the property 
market in 1992 did little to dampen this perception. The influence of social dimensions of 
sustainability started to emerge in mid 1970s (see Chapter 2), partly because of the negotiation power 
that was derived from the collaborative efforts of local groups, and partly because of the globalisation 
forces that increased the awareness of sustainability. The ‘do no harm era’ observed by Altshuler and 
Luberoff (2003) highlights how the priorities in mega-project delivery changed in an effort to offset 
harmful consequences (see Chapter 2). 
 
The findings of the pre-hypothesis research also indicate that the market-driven approach became 
progressively disguised by rhetoric about sustainable development, leading some to wonder whether 
the sustainable development discourse had actually overturned the vision of integrated property and 
railway development (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Property-oriented development”). The 
integration of these two sectors was unlikely to be beneficial following changes to the political and 
financial contexts whereby the ideology of integrated planning had been weakened with an increased 
reliance on fragmented delivery mechanisms and on the private sector to deliver public goods and 
services.  
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Interventions in the CTRL project and its impact on the King’s Cross development 
The decision to make St. Pancras the London terminal of the CTRL and to change the route alignment 
of the link through east London had a major impact on the prospects of King’s Cross as a mega urban 
regeneration area. The new agenda that CTRL introduced - which was to coordinate the development 
of a high-speed rail link project and urban regeneration in east London - was promoted by Michael 
Heseltine and his advisor Professor Sir Peter Hall (see Chapter 4).  
 
Uncertainties surrounding the King’s Cross development were expected to evaporate after the CTRL 
Act was passed in December 1996 (Bertolini and Spit, 1998). On the contrary, the influence of the 
King’s Cross Partnership was undermined by the construction of the CTRL because the negotiating 
power of the King’s Cross development shifted to its new landowner (London & Continental 
Railways). The following quotation from the hypothesis-led investigation highlights the merits and 
obstacles the CTRL brought to the King’s Cross District development:  
 
“CTRL is a driver of change, but it also brings uncertainty because of the blight it has created. It 
delayed the King’s Cross redevelopment for 20 years. The railway is a driver of change because it 
means you can deliver better and bigger regenerative development, along with the international 
dimension, etc. People were arguing that the gentrification problems will be brought about by 
Argent’s plan, but you can’t do much about it then because it is the market, and it was the railway 
that made the change initially, not the development.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the 
local authority, 30/09/2008) 
 
Difficulties in achieving inclusive urban regeneration 
Ball (2004) identified a number of issues concerning the engagement of the public in urban policies 
such as the King’s Cross development scheme. The difficulties of public engagement occurred in both 
the community groups and non-community partners. Within the community group, the difficulties 
were summarised as: 
• over-representation,  
• clearly defining communities,  
• high levels of public apathy, and  
• the lack of accountability of community leadership.  
 
The diverse local agendas were also seen by Ball (2004) are causing conflicts and damaging the 
trusting relationships between stakeholders. The limited incentives for the local community compared 
to other non-community partners who had statutory requirements or financial pressure also had a 
bearing. The non-community partners, especially developers, furthermore, were also seen by Ball 
(ibid.) often confront extreme or intransigent positions in community politics which coloured their 
response to the community cause. The potential of community groups to delay a project and thereby 
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diminish revenues in some cases lead to scepticism about the project’s viability. In this respect, Ball 
asserts that community groups are in a far stronger negotiating position than is normally assumed in 
the regeneration literature (Ball, 2004: 128). Opposition groups use the tactic of delay to leverage 
their negotiating power as indicated in Section 5.2.2. Imrie (2009) concludes that the King’s Cross 
Central scheme failed to provide an adequate institutional framework which would also help to 
transform the power inequalities involved or the hierarchical social relations in the development 
process. Under this circumstance we may judge that the engagement from the local groups did not 
realise the inclusive policy agenda that had been outlined in the Urban White Paper for urban 
regeneration (Imrie, 2009: 95).   
 
The challenges for a contemporary urban regeneration scheme lie, therefore, in steering a balanced 
course between the nature of the market and the local demands, including those of minorities, in order 
to maximise benefits and minimise negative impacts. Taking one issue at the expense of others could 
result in displacing problems to other areas of the project, allowing unemployment or the lack of 
affordable housing, for example, to emerge elsewhere in the development process. One may conclude 
from this that local issues should be looked at collectively by the local communities, the developers, 
and the local authorities. Adequate resources, including planning powers and financial support, should 
be given to local authorities to tackle these local issues. It is very important not to expect a single 
property-led regeneration programme to solve all problems.  
 
The role of local authorities 
A visionary local authority can play a strategic role in improving the quality of life for the 
communities and also the image of their locality. As mediators between the players at the strategic 
planning level (i.e., the level of concern of the Mayor of London, the private developers, and the local 
communities), these local authorities can promote mega projects and encourage private investment 
into their areas. In the current UK planning system, planning powers are more centralised than in its 
European counterparts. This has significant impacts on the efficiency and performance of the delivery 
of urban regeneration schemes. Notwithstanding this, a report published by the Joseph Rowntree 
Foundation in 2008 (see Cadell et al., 2008) suggested that UK local authorities have played a crucial 
role in providing leadership for urban regeneration, and contributed to many notable successes. Couch 
et al. (2003) suggest that this success has much to do with recent initiatives by Central Government 
that stress the importance of the devolution of power to the local authorities working in partnerships 
with local communities. The authors also identify a well-funded local leadership and an environment 
of mutual trust as pre-requisites to securing a successful urban regeneration scheme (see Cadell et al., 
2008).  
 
The merits of locally-controlled regeneration schemes and centralised development powers need to be 
discussed in context. In some cases, streamlined powers given to government-appointed bodies offer a 
mechanism for effective project delivery, especially when the project involves multiple local 
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authorities and varied levels of stakeholders. The London Dockland Development Corporation 
(LDDC) is one of the examples where streamlined bodies are in a better position to control project 
delivery. This reinforces the idea that a simple institutional structure is an essential attribute of 
successful project delivery in that it can provide a more comprehensible interface for partnerships (see 
the discussion in Section 5.3.1).   
 
Various attempts have been made to distribute more powers to local government on regeneration 
projects at a local level. Heseltine claimed that the Urban Programme60 was a strategy that relied on 
local initiative and public-private partnerships (PPPs), which proved to be significant in the later City 
Challenge initiatives and Michael Howard’s City Pride projects (Heseltine, 2000: 205). Michael 
Heseltine, during his second term as the Secretary of State for the Environment, strongly advocated 
devolution and partnerships between central and local government, as well as professionals within the 
public and private sectors. His philosophy of enabling local government and his favouring of public-
private partnerships is illustrated by the following quotation (Heseltine, 2000: 204):  
 
“My personal instinct was – and remains – to grant local government considerable freedom to 
initiate policies and experiment between different ways of delivering services. I like the idea of 
enabling authorities. Their responsibility should be to make sure that services of quality are delivered, 
rather than providing them themselves. They will usually be well advised to buy in these services, 
their quality defined contractually, from outside providers after competitive tendering. It is a question 
of political philosophy. Is local government to be more an agent than an initiator, carrying out the 
wishes of an all-powerful central government? Or should it be seen as relatively free to pursue a 
local agenda, devised by local councillors responsible to a local electorate? I believe we are an over-
centralised society with decision-making too tightly controlled by Whitehall.”  
 
Institutional arrangements for resource allocation  
According to Robson et al. (2000), Heseltine’s approach to urban regeneration contains a mix of 
merits and defects. The institutional arrangements, promoted by Heseltine, that relied on partnership 
as the key principle which fostered collaboration that crossed disciplines, local politicians, businesses, 
and officials, highlighted the importance of lobbying skills and encouraged strategic thinking. 
However, the resource allocation mechanisms, which were based on competition rather than needs, 
generated many tensions and provoked many doubts. ‘The State of English Cities’ report, prepared for 
DETR by Robson et al. (2000), reviewed the strengths and weaknesses of these government 
commissioned initiatives and concluded that the Single Regeneration Budget scheme diluted the 
effectiveness of resources by being spread too thinly across many projects and regions, resulting in a 
failure to target regeneration programmes (Robson et al. 2000: 29, 30).  This point was also 
reinforced by Parkinson (see Parkinson et al., 2006: 15).  He claims that the institutional arrangements 
                                                
60 The Urban Programme was first launched by Michael Heseltine when he was the Secretary of State for the Environment 
between 1979 and 1983. 
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must have a balance between control and constructive interaction for mega-project decision-making to 
be efficient and effective, but that this must be accompanied by provisions for government 
intervention, as necessary, to ensure economic growth compatible with social and environmental 
considerations.   
 
The synthesis of findings derived from both strands of investigation addresses the issue of which 
institutional arrangements are best suited to mega-project decision-making. Of the respondents to the 
hypothesis-led investigations, two related to HRQ #3 conveyed a belief that the mega project 
decision-making process in the UK depends very much on a democratic mechanism. It was pointed 
out that, on the one hand, it can prove to be an obstacle for project delivery, while on the other it can 
also help to prevent an overconcentration on narrow interests. This conclusion was similarly 
reinforced by the findings of the OMEGA Study (Wright, 2008). Overall, the respondents agreed that 
the consequences of the existing democratic system in the UK prevent politicians from making long-
term major decisions for mega projects and lead to prolonged process of project delivery. Two of the 
respondents of the Omega Centre interview pointed out that there are no long-term national plans for 
mega projects in the UK, and that this contributes to an observed ‘muddling through’ approach to 
mega-project planning and the lack of visions for such developments in this country. 
5.6 Hypothesis Testing and Theoretical Insights 
After the exploration of the King’s Cross Central scheme, Section 5.6.1 examines the findings derived 
from this chapter against the findings of both strands of research investigations. The examination is 
presented in accordance with the four hypotheses postulated at the outset of this thesis. Section 5.6.2 
further illustrates insights into theory and new issues revealed from the observations of King’s Cross 
Central case study.  
5.6.1 Testing findings against hypotheses   
HYPOTHESIS 1 – The Role of MUTPs 
Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of 
sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and 
sustainable urban regeneration development. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive 
catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and mega-event development associated with its 
transport hubs. 
 
The premise within the first hypothesis is that the CTRL project constitutes an influential positive 
catalyst for the sustainable urban regeneration of the King’s Cross area on the basis that the CTRL 
acted as an agent for the delivery of sustainable regeneration. Based on the observations from the 
literature review, the results of testing Hypothesis 1 show firstly, that there is a discrepancy in the way 
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sustainable urban regeneration is perceived and subsequent actions formulated between the bottom-up 
and top-down planning approaches employed by the developers and local authorities, on the one hand, 
and the local community groups on the other.  This was confirmed by the findings of the hypothesis-
led and pre-hypothesis led investigations (Also see Section 5.4). Secondly, according to the both 
strands of investigation, the CTRL project, although providing long-awaited certainties to the King’s 
Cross Railway Lands development, was also a cause for the delayed land development and in this 
respect held-up prospective investments. Ultimately, as a result, the key stakeholders of the King’s 
Cross Central scheme had to compromise on its progress in light of the CTRL delivery. Under these 
circumstances, it may be concluded that the CTRL project did produce the thrust to overcome 
political conflicts and provided a backdrop conducive to compromise, negotiation, and consensus. 
However, it also contributed to significant problems, including missed development opportunities and 
increased costs and complexity of the project.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 – Political Decision 
Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the 
effective delivery and performance of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega event 
schemes.  
 
In Chapter 1, the author hypothesised that one of the most effective factors of a ‘successful’ mega-
project delivery lies in the institutional arrangements and power relations between project 
stakeholders. The review of the King’s Cross redevelopment history reaffirms the view that the 
inadequate institutional structures that framed the cluster of mega projects damaged the opportunities 
for successful outcomes to the coordination between railway development and urban regeneration 
schemes. The institutional arrangements also play the role for the transformation of stakeholders’ 
power and the allocation of resources which determine a mega project development timeframe. Mega-
project power relations were complex and dynamic. In some cases, they were constrained over time 
by changing political agendas, changing property markets, and conflicting aspirations between the 
local community and the principal project stakeholders, particularly the developers. In addition, a 
limited commitment to sustainability and inclusive urban regeneration also impacts such power 
structures. These conclusions were born out by the findings of the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis 
investigations as discussed in Section 5.1.2 (also see Appendix 8, Table A8.8). Nonetheless, further 
study is needed for more concrete evidence to demonstrate the importance of institutional 
arrangements and power relations in mega-project development. The result is presented in Chapter 6. 
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HYPOTHESIS 3 – Synergy of Network 
Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban 
regeneration, and mega events can better foster integrated development and the achievement of 
sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.  
 
The anticipated synergy of urban regeneration and transport station development cited in study 
Hypothesis #3 is, according to the results of the literature review, too simplistic a view. The case of 
the King’s Cross area redevelopment instead shows that achieving such synergistic qualities was 
undermined by two types of problems. One was its heavy reliance on property and land value gains. 
The other problem relates to the prolonged project delivery both of the CTRL project and the King’s 
Cross development. The latter delay resulted from the many uncertainties arising from the planning 
policies for the King’s Cross Railway Lands and the progress of the adjacent transport projects. As to 
the interaction between the King’s Cross development and the 2012 London Olympics, the literature 
review suggests there is a lack of evidence indicating that these two mega projects have a strong 
linkage. This finding is not, however, substantiated entirely by the findings of the hypothesis-led 
investigation where some interviews argue that the Games-oriented development gave strong thrust to 
the associated transport projects development in King’s Cross area.  
 
Compromise agreement embedded implicitly in the negotiation that underlined the inter-agency co-
operation was one of the components of the synergistic relations. In the King’s Cross case, the CTRL 
project predominated and it was influential in the characteristics and timeframe of the King’s Cross 
redevelopment. The test is whether the network between MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and 
mega events brings synergistic benefits to the integration of development and the achievement of 
sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects. Is there a shared 
vision of integrated development and of sustainable development that brings far-reaching benefits for 
everyone? This evaluation relates to Hypothesis #3 on the factors of an effective project-led network 
in the hypothesis-led investigation (see Appendix 5). One of the interviewees who disagrees with this 
premise stated that:  
 
“CTRL is an unsustainable project in terms of encouraging the development along its stations. They 
all follow the modern model and create disadvantages to local communities.” (Hypothesis-led 
interview, a person from the local community, 10/07/2008) 
 
This resonates with the analysis of mega project promotion activities in Chapter 2. It claims that such 
development is increasingly encouraged by global trends, cross-national firms, and investment banks. 
This case study concludes that within the context of democracy, the multiple levels of stakeholders 
and their different agendas are obstacles to inter-agency co-operation, and far from being the 
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synergistic power to achieve sustainable development visions.     
  
HYPOTHESIS 4 – Discourse Power 
Key champions of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events typically establish their 
discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or 
more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with a limited sense 
of social corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen 
their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though 
they may have different agendas. 
Whatever the good intentions and willingness of the planners, policy makers, and developers involved 
in the mega projects reviewed, their overriding concerns were ultimately determined by profit-
sustaining and cost-reducing issues. This has been amplified by the circumstances of the economic 
recession present at the time of writing. This observation was substantiated by the hypothesis-led and 
pre-hypothesis investigations (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Property-oriented development”; 
Appendix 5, HRQ #9) as discussed in Section 5.5.1. It is illustrated, as already indicated in Section 
5.3.2, by the present rush of developers seeking to renegotiate Section 106 agreements in order to 
reduce the costs of their obligations of contributing to the locality. 
 
Despite ‘inclusive’ urban regeneration being regarded as one of the essential approaches to a real 
sustainable development vision, the findings of the case study analysis presented thus far suggest that 
considerable difficulties were encountered in this area. These were found to essentially stem from a 
profit-driven property development and did much to distort the principle of inclusion in planning 
decision-making. For instance, in the case of community development, it was noted there were 
substantial difficulties in defining communities socially, geographically, and temporally. The case 
study highlighted problems of over-representation (even suspected mis-representation) which emerge 
as especially problematic where public apathy prevails and when deciding whose concerns should 
ultimately be considered when formulating the project response. These issues were reflected in the 
hypothesis-led investigation carried out by the OMEGA pilot study (see Wright, 2008). An interview 
transcript states that the local campaign group that opposed the King’s Cross Central scheme does not 
represent the wider community. According to the developer’s own survey, the majority of local 
people they talked to expressed their concerns about the prolonged debate and acrimony on the 
regeneration project. The local people hope the scheme can go ahead. For the non-community 
perspective, the motivation to reach a consensus and to manage dissent led to a closure of the public 
participation process that ultimately enabled properties within the King’s Cross Central scheme to be 
developed from a basis of developers’ self-interest (Imrie, 2009). One may conclude from this that the 
visions of sustainable development employed ultimately become inextricably entwined with the 
discourse used and that this discourse in turn was employed in a manner that reinforced the dominant 
powers of the project discourse network and marginalised local group interests.  
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5.6.2 Discussion 
Based on the review of literature on theory in Chapter 2, the evidence found in the King’s Cross 
Central case study supports the arguments regarding the role of institutional arrangements and power 
relations in mega-project decision-making, and endorses the characteristics of such decision-making 
processes (i.e., ’disjointed incrementalism’ and ‘path dependency’) and the use of project discourse.  
 
Apart from the discussions presented so far in this chapter, there are several additional hypotheses or 
issues that emerged from the investigation of the King’s Cross Central scheme. These are described 
below:  
 
Inequality in bargaining is a necessary element for achieving mega project delivery 
Both Chapters 4 and 5 reveal that the consensus in the decision-making process for mega projects is 
achieved by constant bargaining and compromises in a manner that conforms to the ‘disjointed 
incrementalism’ theory of Braybrook and Lindblom discussed in Chapter 2. The investigation of the 
case study demonstrates that this bargaining power was not equally distributed among the various 
stakeholders of the CTRL project and the King’s Cross Central scheme and that the compromises and 
consensus reached were often undertaken with a marginal involvement of local community groups. 
What is apparent is that, according to Edwards (2008), the existing institutional arrangements do not 
offer equal power to each stakeholder in the network – some actors play a more dominant role as a 
result of the scale of their financial investment and risks – and that advantageous positions can be re-
enforced over time as the project develops. As concluded by Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) and 
Catlaw (2006), a certain level of central control and government intervention can contribute to an 
effective project-led coordination, even while there is increasing emphasis on networking among 
multiple stakeholders (see Chapter 2). This can be seen in the responses from the ORQ #3 in the 
hypothesis-led investigation relating to the issue of where leadership should reside within a cluster of 
mega project developments.  
 
The King’s Cross Central urban regeneration scheme is over reliant on developer contributions 
A review of the case study literature reveals a notable scarcity of funds to deliver the various mega 
projects and how this impeded progress in both new MUTP investments but also urban regeneration 
projects. The case study analyses also reveal how competition-based funding schemes, such as the 
City Challenge and Single Regeneration Budget, have revealed negative impacts, including the 
dilution of financial and planning resources by being spread across too many regions and projects. 
The challenge subsequently lies in how to identify regeneration schemes that are most needed and 
make decisions that incorporate a strong public interest and at the same time manage the realities of 
short-term political or business benefits. It was also noted from the investigations of the case study 
that the current project financing mechanism locked politicians, developers, and other stakeholders 
into a financial cycle which lead to expensive housing, high-rise offices, and over-development. This 
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over-reliance on developer contributions constrains the local authorities’ negotiation power which is 
supposed to ensure that private sector developers fulfil their social responsibility. Such constrains 
accompanying prestigious projects are often the result of policy-makers seeking high-profile, short-
term benefits to stimulate economic growth. Furthermore, the investments of prestigious projects are 
at inordinate risk to be locked into high political and financial costs. These costs can be greater than 
the prices if withdraw the projects (Pierson, 2000; also see Chapter 2). 
 
There is a lack of an integrated planning strategy between transport and property development 
It is very apparent, both from the case study examined here and the UK experience overall, that there 
is little evidence to support claims that urban transport and property developments in the UK have 
been integrated efficiently and effectively over any significant period of time. This, it is understood, 
can be attributed to fragmentation and lack of coordination between the institutional parties 
responsible for planning and delivering projects in each domain. The problem highlights the critical 
need for a better planning framework which contains long-term development visions that provide 
integrated urban transport and land-use planning. This topic has long been discussed and researched 
both in the UK and overseas but, unfortunately, remains an elusive vision in the UK. Coordination 
between the sectors is highly desirable. It requires, however, sufficient and sustained public funding 
and pressure to resist the market forces of short-term gain.  
5.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the sustainable urban regeneration scheme - King’s Cross Central – in 
detail. In particular, it has examined its development history and the evolution of power relations in 
the decision-making process. It has shown the dynamics of the coordination between rail and urban 
development, as well as the controversy between political promises on sustainable development and 
the financial constraints.  
 
It remains a matter of debate whether the CTRL project can stimulate sustainable urban regeneration 
at its hub areas. The King’s Cross Central scheme has been greatly affected by the high-speed railway 
decision-making timeframe. The indecisive and prolonged decision-making of the CTRL had delayed 
the King’s Cross development for two decades. The uncertainties generated by the extended planning 
process discouraged prospective investments. There are also positive impacts of the CTRL project on 
the King’s Cross area, such as the newly refurbished St Pancras International which has become one 
of the London’s visitor attractions in its own right. This CTRL terminal has also revived investor 
confidence in the area. 
 
The actions taken by the opposition groups conform to Hajer’s (2003a) theory of “stand-by 
politicians” who then became politically active (also see Chapter 2). The dynamics of negotiation 
powers showed that the community groups committed themselves to a series of campaigns in order to 
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make changes to the project specification. However, under the existing planning system, political 
climate, and economic situation, the developers remain in the most powerful position in the 
negotiation process.  
 
Sustainability remains part of the urban regeneration discourse which is used to promote the project. 
Camden Council, in the promotion of sustainable urban regeneration at King’s Cross area, played a 
mediator role which has been very influential. It concludes that if there can be an input of resources, 
this can further help to gain influence. Although this does not provide absolute power, the local 
authority can participate in decision-making on project specifications and securing local needs by 
proactive involvement, or as one interviewee put it:  
 
“If you are not at the table, you are on the menu.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local 
authority, 30/09/2008) 
 
The integrated development between MUTPs and sustainable urban regeneration schemes has 
generated two opposite opinions. On the one hand, there is criticism that collaboration between mega 
projects is inevitable since project champions all copy similar modern models of development styles. 
The force of globalisation and the increasing interdependency of international economics have 
persuaded mega-project decision-makers to follow the trend while ignoring the local context. On the 
other hand, this kind of development integration is considered beneficial by some interviewees who 
explained that a stronger business case could be built through mega-project integration, although 
some beneficial outcomes might be intangible and others emerge only after a lengthy passage of time. 
There is a degree of cynicism towards the achievement of sustainability visions in terms of its essence, 
manoeuvring, and ownership.  
 
After the examination of the relationship between the MUTP and its associated sustainable urban 
regeneration scheme, the next chapter will focus on another CTRL hub development – Stratford 
International – and the 2012 London Olympics site which is located next to the high-speed railway 
station. Apart from the King’s Cross railway lands, the Stratford City is the second part of railway 
real estate assets given to a developer, the LCR, for its property development. However, the 
introduction of the Olympic-oriented projects within the same neighbourhood has caused controversy 
and problems to the already complex project decision-making network. Chapter 6 explores the 
decision-making process of the Stratford City scheme and the London Olympics as well as the 
dynamics of the negotiation battle among its stakeholders.   
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6 Case Study of Urban Regeneration in Stratford 
and the 2012 London Olympic Games 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter comprises a critical review the role of a mega event – the 2012 London Olympics - as the 
third main theme of the case study, and studies its impact on the urban regeneration scheme at 
Stratford in the vicinity of the new CTRL station. Stratford City, under construction at the time of 
writing (see Figure 6.1), is an urban regeneration scheme situated adjacent to Stratford International 
Station.  It is located within the main site of the 2012 London Olympic Games (see Figure 6.2).   
 
Figure 6.1: Stratford City – Under Construction in May 2010 
Source: Author, the image is edited from the website of Westfield Stratford City (2010) Site Progress. 
【WWW】 available at:  http://uk.westfield.com/stratfordcity/vision/site-progress/ 【Accessed on 
13/06/2010】 
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Figure 6.2: Stratford City Scheme with the Context of 2012 London Olympics Site 
Source: Author, the image is edited from the website of Westfield Stratford City (2009) Olympic 
Context. 【WWW】 available at:  http://uk.westfield.com/stratfordcity/vision/olympic-context/ 
【Accessed on 13/06/2010】 
 
For the purpose of this study, the term ‘mega events’ are defined as (also see the definition in Chapter 
2, Section 2.1.3) “large-scale cultural, including commercial and sporting, events which have a 
dramatic character, mass popular appeal, and international significance. They are typically organised 
by variable combinations of national governmental and international non-governmental organisations 
and thus can be said to be important elements in ‘official’ versions of public culture” (Roche, 2000:1). 
In the context of this case study the Games are both a mega event and a mega project that are being 
completed as the final phase of the development of the CTRL, alongside its other principal transport 
hub developments.  This cluster of mega projects and their interrelationships over time, in space, and 
institutionally is the subject of this case study. The role and impact of the Games and the urban 
regeneration around Stratford International Station on this cluster of developments are examined.  
 
Stratford City and the 2012 London Olympic Games are chosen in order to address the research 
questions posed in this study. Section 6.1 outlines the conception of the Stratford City scheme and the 
2012 London Olympic Games project. This involves an examination of the complex inter-
relationships among the key stakeholders, and their negotiating positions during the decision-making 
process. Section 6.2 delves into each of the project development history and the pivotal events along 
the way, including its rising costs, impacts, opportunities, and the institutional power relations among 
the various project stakeholder networks that moulded both mega projects. This discussion is 
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accompanied by a presentation of the timeline for both projects (see Table 6.2). Section 6.3 elaborates 
on the main issues and challenges associated with the coordination between the High Speed 1 terminal, 
the Stratford City scheme, and the 2012 Games. It explores the rationale behind reprioritising 
resources and the contextual forces operating in collaboration or competition that ultimately helped all 
of these three projects to be implemented. Section 6.4 focuses on the visions and political pledges of 
the 2012 Games. It closes with a review of several studies critical of the impacts of the Games, and 
views this alongside the synthesis of the case study investigations. Particular emphasis is placed on 
the forecasts of economic growth and job creation to be generated by the Games. Section 6.5 evaluates 
influence of political champions and dynamics of political power in the negotiation and decision-
making process among the complex stakeholder networks. Section 6.6 summarises the results of the 
hypothesis-testing and highlights the emergent theories and issues derived from the hypothesis-led and 
pre-hypothesis investigations. They are discussed in light of the observations made in Chapter 2. The 
final section concludes the chapter with a summary of the key findings. 
6.1.1 Project facts  
Facts and figures of the Stratford City scheme 
Stratford City is one of several urban regeneration schemes stimulated by the CTRL project (see Table 
6.1). The 73-hectare new development is dominated by the Stratford International Station in the centre 
of the site (see Figure 6.3). Stratford Regional Station is only 400 metres away and provides access to 
domestic public transport services, including buses, railways, light rail (Docklands Light Railway) and 
London Underground. The domestic passenger line began operation in 2009 as part of the CTRL 
services. Stratford City is also intended to become a major gateway for those attending the 2012 
London Olympic Games. In 2012, the Olympic Javelin train service will run through Ebbsfleet, 
Stratford, and central London carrying spectators to and from the Olympic site (Figure 6.4). 
 
The construction work for Stratford City began on site in early 2007. After the announcement of 2012 
London Olympics in 2005, the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA), London Development Agency 
(LDA), and London & Continental Railways (LCR) entered into a collaborative agreement to manage 
and monitor the delivery of the Stratford City Scheme. The Stratford City site (see Figure 6.3) is the 
former railway marshalling yards. This area is ‘brownfield’ land (previously built upon but cleared for 
development), adjacent to excellent transport links and in an urban regeneration priority area that is 
eligible for government and EU funding. 
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Table 6.1: Stratford City Regeneration Scheme Facts and Figures  
Project 
Highlights 
The largest single mixed-use urban regeneration project in Europe (LCR website) 
Site of 
Project 
73 hectares (180 acres) of former railway marshalling yards 
Project 
Connectivity 
 Regional rail services into Liverpool Street 
 Several underground lines: the North London Line, the Central and Jubilee Lines  
 Docklands Light Railway 
 A CTRL international and domestic station  
Olympic 
context 
LCR and the developers of Stratford City are working with the LDA to construct the 
Olympic Village and the Olympic International Zone. 
Project 
phasing 
 Phased over time, the development will establish a new, dense, urban quarter 
nearby to major retail and leisure facilities for east London, together with 
significant new office development and around 4,850 new homes (7,000 homes 
after the 2012 Olympics).  
 Phase 1 of the development programme will deliver 140,000 m2 (1.5m ft2) of retail 
space, 37,000 m2 (400,000 ft2) of leisure space and 500 homes by 2010. 
Construction 
 Construction is due to start in late 2006/early 2007, with the first phase of the 
development due for completion in late 2009. The entire development is scheduled 
to be complete by 2020. 
Project key 
features61: 
 
 1.25 million sq m (13.5m sq ft) of regeneration 
 £4 billion investment 
 4,850 new homes of which 1,455 will be affordable housing 
 930,000 sq m (10m sq ft) of commercial & residential property 
 140,000 sq m (1.5m sq ft) of retail 
 37,000 sq m (400,000 sq ft) of leisure space 
 2,000 hotel bedrooms 
 34,000 new jobs generated for the regional economy 
Source: OMEGA Centre (2008) 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 Source: London and Continental Railways ‘LCR – An Incredible Journey’, available from: www.lcrhq.co.uk, accessed 
24/10/2006. 
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Figure 6.3: Stratford City Development Zones 
Source: Stratford City Development Limited (2007: 4) 
 
Facts and figures of the 2012 London Olympics (see Table 6.3) 
Preparations for the 2012 bid had been underway since 1997 with the country’s intention to submit a 
bid officially announced by Prime Minister Tony Blair and London Mayor Ken Livingstone on 15th 
May 2003. The announcement by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) that London had won 
the right to host the 2012 Olympics was made by its President on 6 July 2005. This was merely eight 
years after the declared intention to bid. In terms of mega project development, this represents a very 
fast-track set of decisions as the incubation period of many mega projects spans several decades.  
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Following the IOC announcement the UK Government set up the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) 
in 200662, and subsequently assigned to it planning powers in its own right. Its overall responsibility, 
as its name suggests, is to develop and deliver the new venues and infrastructure for the conduct of the 
Games, and planning for legacy use after 2012. The organisation structure of the ODA is shown in 
Figure 6.6. It began operating on 1st April 2006. Table 6.2 illustrates the pivotal events of the 
development history of the Stratford City scheme and the 2012 Olympics. A detailed discussion of 
these events is presented throughout this chapter. 
 
Figure 6.4: 2012 London Olympic Stadium under Construction 
Source: London 2012 website (2010) Aerial View of the Olympic Stadium 【WWW】available at: 
http://www.london2012.com/photos/2010/7/aerial-view-of-the-olympic-stadium-69337.php 
【Accessed 04/08/2010】 
                                                 
62 The ODA is a corporate body established by Section 3 of the London Olympic Games and Paralympics Games Act of 2006. 
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Table 6.2: Timeline of the Stratford City Scheme and the 2012 Olympic Project Developments 
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Source: Compiled by the Author 
 
 
Table 6.3: Parameters of Olympic Park Developments (OPDs) 
Site 
- 246 hectares 
- The Olympic Park is built around the valley of the river Lea which runs from the 
Eurostar train station at Stratford to the Thames. 
Legacy 
- In order to recoup costs for the event, the Olympic park will narrow and much of the 
land is going to be sold 
- The Olympic Park will open to the public in 2014  
- 4,500 housing are going to be converted from the Athletes Village 
Features 
- Approximately 4,500 homes from the conversion of the Athletes Village;  
- 150,000 sq metres of new retail space at Stratford City 
- 465,000 sq metres of new offices space 
Source: ODA (2007: 6) 
6.1.2 Key stakeholders and their power relations  
Key project stakeholders of the Stratford Centre scheme are not easily distinguished from those of the 
Games (see Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6); this overlap will be addressed in the discussion which follows. 
Identifying the key stakeholders of each of these mega projects is needed to compare and contrast 
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their respective roles, interrelationships, and their individual strategies for improving their negotiating 
positions.  
 
Central Government 
The London Olympics Bill (Barclay et al., 2005), as introduced in the House of Commons, designated 
the UK Government as the Guarantor for the Games, which includes meeting any ultimate shortfall 
between costs and revenues of the ODA and LOCOG from the Games (NAO, 2008: 7). The UK 
government at the time subsequently set up the Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) to 
provide the government’s leadership and overall responsibility for the Games. Its main responsibility 
is to meet the obligations of the London Olympic Games and Paralympic Games Act 2006, the overall 
finances of the Games and sponsorship of the Olympic Delivery Authority.  
 
Political support from central government is essential for all mega projects, including mega events, 
largely because they incur such high cost and high risk that the private sector could not and would not 
take them on. The mix of support from government varies from country to country, with regional and 
local authorities also playing significant roles. In the UK, while the Central Government tends to 
dominate these decisions, local support is an essential ingredient. The UK’s top-down approach 
facilitates interventions from the Central Government that enable procedures and decisions to be more 
easily streamlined in the interest of improving the efficiency and effectiveness of project delivery. The 
case of the regeneration in east London is an example of this top-down approach. Findings from the 
hypothesis-led investigations suggest that if the vision is to attract more investment to east London 
rather than concentrate all resources on central London, some degree of government intervention is 
needed, because, left to the market and the private sector forces, development would gravitate towards 
West London (see Appendix 8, Table A8.11). This finding confirms the results of the CTRL case study 
(see Chapter 4) as well as the theories claimed by Healey (1994) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) 
on the significance of governmental intervention in mega project development processes (see Chapter 
2).  
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Figure 6.5: Stratford City Urban Regeneration Scheme Key Stakeholders 
 
Source: Author 
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Figure 6.6: Stakeholder Network of the London 2012 Olympic Project 
 
 
Source: Author, based on NAO (2008: 12, 13)
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Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) 
Given the responsibility for delivering the Games, the ODA is permitted to buy, sell and hold land, 
develop and build the new venues and infrastructure for the Games, and develop a transport plan for 
the Games. Other agencies are obliged to cooperate with the decisions of the ODA. Its existence 
represents an incursion into local authority powers and has created some conflicts and tensions while 
at the same time opening up new areas of collaboration. While the London Olympic and Paralympic 
Games Act 2006 underpins the legal powers of the ODA to be the local planning authority for the 
Olympic Park, there is a lack of distinction between the powers of the LDA and those of the local 
authorities on some aspects of land use planning and transport infrastructure development. This has 
led to a number of political disagreements, most of which have been resolved over time. The ODA 
Board consists of representatives from the public and private sectors and works with the LDA, 
Transport for London (TfL), Thames Gateway, and five designated Olympic local authorities. 
 
The ODA, with its ultimate goal of the delivery of the 2012 London Olympic Games, also 
simultaneously pursues a number of other development objectives which can be viewed as providing 
the building blocks for the 2012 Olympic discourse.  However, both the delay in producing the final 
budget and the more than doubling of the cost of the Games has had a significant impact on the 
credibility of the Olympic programme in London and its subsequent attractiveness to potential 
sponsors. These circumstances have been exacerbated by the economic recession at the time of 
writing which makes it difficult for the Games to obtain the level of private funding support it had 
initially envisaged. What is most significant about these developments is that they have together 
weakened the ODA’s negotiating power in its dealings with the private sector, with likely future 
repercussions in project outcomes. This was substantiated by the findings of both streams of the 
investigations which suggest that private entities obtain better negotiating positions because 
uncertainties and risks are written off by the government in the case of the 2012 London Olympics 
(see Appendix 4, under the topic “Mega events provide certainty” and Appendix 5, HRQ #4). Below 
is a quotation from the hypothesis-led interviews:  
 
“There is a debate about the IOC wouldn’t grant us the privilege of the host city contract without 
almost being seduced by large brand new railway station. The Games has hugely accelerated the 
interests and increased the certainty of the development.” (Hypothesis-led interview, government 
agency, 31/07/2008) 
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The Mayor of London, the Greater London Authority Group, and the London Development 
Agency 
As the first directly-elected Mayor of London in March 2000, Ken Livingston was regarded as the key 
figure for London engaging in the 2012 Olympic Bid. He stated that the Games could bring 
significant regeneration benefits to east London. Boris Johnson succeeded Livingston as Mayor on 
4th May 2008, and he co-chairs the Olympic Board to oversee the 2012 project. The Mayor of 
London works with the Greater London Authority (GLA) Group to oversee the Olympic project. As 
the landowner, the LDA is responsible for leading skills and employment initiatives and programmes 
to increase grass-roots sport participation and promote London as a place for business investment. 
The LDA is also responsible for the physical, social, and economic legacy of the Olympic Park area, 
and more generally, the delivery of sustainable communities and regeneration of Greater London 
overall. It undertook the land acquisition for the Olympic Park which includes the Athletes Village as 
part of the Stratford City scheme.  
 
As indicated in Chapter 5, the role of the Mayor in London is particularly influential at the strategic 
planning level. The London Plan is the Mayor’s spatial development strategy for London and it 
provides high-level guidelines for the local planning policies within London boroughs. The Stratford 
City plan is located in an area designated as the east London sub-region63. It acknowledges that one of 
the key strategic priorities is to promote and enable the comprehensive development of Stratford as a 
“mixed-use area” of London. It further suggests that the pivotal role of Stratford (as the connection 
between European links, the London-Stansted-Cambridge corridor and the Thames Gateway growth 
area) is highly strategic.    
 
Under the Mayor’s direction, TfL is investing £10 billion to deliver a transport legacy for east London 
before 2012. The invested projects include: the east London Line extension, the Docklands Light 
Railway extension, and the upgrading of the Northern Line (tube). Relevant issues of the relationship 
between the Games and these transport developments are discussed in Section 6.3.2. The Mayor of 
London has set up an Olympic Park Regeneration Steering Group (OPRSG)64 to provide the overall 
direction for the Olympic legacy agenda for east and southeast London. This focuses particularly on 
the development and delivery of the Legacy Masterplan Framework. The Olympic Park Legacy 
Company65 was set up in May 2009 by the Mayor of London and Central Government as a quango 
                                                 
63 The London Plan focuses on the development strategies for five broad sub-regions: West London, North London, Central 
London, South London and East London, including the Thames Gateway. 
64 OPRSG consists of the Mayor of London, Boris Johnson; Olympic Minister, Tessa Jowell; Housing Minister, Margaret 
Beckett; Leader of Greenwich Council, Chris Roberts; Mayor of Hackney, Jules Pipe; Mayor of Newham, Sir Robin Wales; 
Leader of Tower Hamlets Council, Jutfur Rahman and Leader of Waltham Forest Council, Clyde Loakes. 
65 The Company’s partners include the five Olympic host boroughs, LOCOG, ODA, LTGDC, LVRPA (Lee Valley Regional 
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responsible for the planning, development, management, and maintenance of the Olympic Park and its 
facilities after the London 2012 Games.  
 
Apart from the physical legacies of mega events, other significant impacts are the institutional 
reforms and strategic governance that take place within the host city and its central government. Mega 
events can be used by authorities as an instrument to reinforce the political powers of incumbent 
administrations through successfully delivering such events with newly-established or amended 
policies. This argument is subscribed by Newman (2007:265) who claims that both the Mayor of 
London and the Prime Minister very much shared the Olympic stage for the 2012 Olympic Games bid 
and took the opportunity to introduce new aspects to their vision of city governance. In London’s case, 
the Olympic bid took place at the time when the power of the Mayor had just been enhanced and 
some new institutional arrangements emerged between London and Central Government. The current 
Mayor, Boris Johnson, has been able to use the potential of delivering the mega event to consolidate 
his power, whilst the politicians have strengthened their positions and ideologies by favouring the 
event (see Hill, 2010). This observation also echoes the theories of discourse power reviewed in 
Chapter 2. It suggests that key actors employ dominant discourse, such as the Games discourse, to 
restrict other possibilities and steer other stakeholders to be congruent with it (Hajer 1995 and 2003). 
The same argument is reflected in the findings from the hypothesis-led research questions (HRQ) #9 
and #10 (see Appendix 5). Here are two quotations derived from the responses made by the 
interviewees:  
 
“Ken Livingston had the power to tell people what a great idea it would be to bid for the Olympics so 
he persuaded the government and ensured that a bid was made. He had no money, only personality, 
charisma, connections, and energy. Moreover, Ken Livingston, Gordon Brown, Tony Blair, and 
Sebastian Coe were all simultaneously in agreement. Their political commitment and determination 
pushed the Olympic project through. In this process, the discourse might prove effective and other 
concerns might be neglected unintentionally.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local 
authority, 30/09/2008) 
 
“Politicians want to be associated with successful sports for the sake of their reputation and 
identification. They are seeking the ‘feel good’ factor.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a person from the 
local community, 10/07/2008) 
                                                                                                                                          
Park Authority) and LDA. 
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Local Authorities 
There are five London Boroughs directly involved in the Games, these are: Newham, Waltham Forest, 
Hackney, Tower Hamlets, and Greenwich. While they are reported to be pleased to see resources 
concentrated in their localities to meet the development needs of the Games and its legacy, other local 
authorities within London are reported to feel indifferent to the Olympic Games despite being 
represented within the GLA.  
 
As already addressed in Chapter 4, the importance of Newham Council and the Stratford Promoter 
Group (see Table 6.4) in the promotion of Stratford International Station and Stratford City urban 
regeneration emerged under the transformation of the planning context of east London throughout the 
1980s and 1990s. This change was developed when confrontation pressures occurred between central 
and local government, especially in terms of the centralised control of planning power and the 
reduction of local budgets. The 1980s, more particularly, saw tensions develop between Newham 
Council (a Labour controlled London Borough) and the London Docklands Development Corporation 
(LDDC, established by a Conservative Government). As already indicated in Chapter 4, this 
streamlined planning power led Newham Council to turn what remained of its planning powers away 
from the Docklands area, and instead towards Stratford, one of the main town centres in its 
jurisdiction. Newham Council began to support the idea of Stratford International in 1987 after British 
Rail announced that it was considering Stratford as a station on the CTRL. Newham became a serious 
opponent of the King’s Cross Bill, and in November 1989 organised a conference, ‘A National Focus 
on the Channel Tunnel’, as part of its efforts to promote an easterly approach with a station rather than 
a terminus at Stratford – an idea supported by John Prescott, the Labour shadow Secretary of State for 
Transport. 
 
According to the pre-hypothesis investigations, their efforts triggered a chain-reaction of key 
decisions which began with CTRL route selection, the designation of Stratford International, the 
Stratford City scheme, the Olympics, and then the go-ahead for Crossrail. Some argue that the Games 
can also represent a massive ‘opportunity cost’ when resources are diverted from other critical projects 
to meet the needs of the Olympics. Below is a quotation from one of the members of the Stratford 
Promoter Group:  
 
“We thought this is the project that can really unlock that area. We consistently worked from 1988 
through to 1997/8 to promote the idea that it would bring the engine, the catalyst for changing at 
Stratford.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, an officer from the local authority, 23/06/2008) 
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Table 6.4: Partners of Stratford Promoter Group 
 Land Securities Properties—owners of the Stratford shopping mall 
 Carpenters Company—a City of London charitable company owning land in the area 
 P&O Developments—major development and construction company 
 Link Parks 
 University of East London 
 Regalian Groups of Companies—developers 
 Tarmac Construction—developers and house builders 
 John Mowlem & Co. Plc—construction and civil engineering company 
 Laing Civil Engineering—civil engineering company 
 London Docklands Development Corporation 
 Stratford Development Partnership Ltd 
 London Borough of Newham 
 Rialto Homes Plc—house builders 
 Fairview New Homes Plc—house builders 
 Persimmon Homes—house builders 
Source: Florio and Edwards (2001: 106) 
 
 
London Thames Gateway Development Corporation (LTGDC) 
LTGDC is a government agency established to oversee the developments in the Thames Gateway 
development area, within which Stratford stands at the western end. The original idea of the 
regeneration for the Thames Corridor (see Figure 6.7) in east London came from Michael Heseltine 
(see Chapter 4). LTGDC came into existence on 26th June 2004 and it was sponsored by the 
Department for Communities and Local Governments (DCLG) with an indicative lifespan of 10 years. 
It is designated as a vehicle to deliver jobs and housing to meet the aspirations of the government’s 
Sustainable Communities Plan. The planning control powers given to the LTGDC, excluding the 
Stratford City and the Olympic zone, have been in effect since 31st October 2005.  As indicated earlier, 
between 1997 and 2010, according to Poynter (2009: 136), the LTGDC received strong support from 
the Labour government through the DCLG, as well as through other London agencies including the 
London Mayor’s Office, the GLA, the LDA, and the local authorities located within the region. 
However, the fragmented nature of this governance and its lack of integration of stakeholder interests 
did much to undermine the effectiveness of the LTGDC (see Raco, 2005). The LTGDC now claims 
that the project needs more financial support from Central Government in order to make more rapid 
progress. The friction between the LTGDC and Central Government has intensified since the 
Conservative Party Mayor, Boris Johnson, was elected.  
 
When still in Government, the New Labour administration was wary that the devolution of more 
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powers to the LTGDC would confer too much influence on the new London Mayor (Branson and 
Walker, 2008) with the result that the Mayor would take over the control of Thames Gateway 
development. The argument against these current developments is that these stimuli are primarily 
contained within the London area of the Thames Gateway and that the momentum behind the 
remaining areas outside London is insufficient to meet local priority needs. Given the fact that the 
LTGDC has failed to meet its targets of housing development and the fact that the 2012 London 
Olympics has diverted resources from Stratford, there are accusations circulating that this has 
contributed to significant delays of development in other parts of the Thames Gateway and that the 
gains as presented by Government are not what they appear or as the rhetoric suggests. This was 
substantiated by both of the findings of the hypothesis-led and pre-hypothesis investigations 
undertaken in support of the research (see Appendix 4, under the topic “Impact of the 2012 Olympic 
Games on the Thames Gateway Development” and Appendix 5, HRQ #8). Here is one of the 
interviewees’ statement quoted from the pre-hypothesis investigations:  
 
“It [the 2012 Olympics] will have significant implications to the Thames Gateway because Thames 
Gateway is also a provider of lots of new housing over a period of time and clearly in the immediate 
time after 2012, they are not going to be in the position to bring on to the market further additional 
housing. The re-phasing of the delivery of Thames Gateway is also going to be significantly impacted 
by the 2012 Olympics.” (Pre-hypothesis interview, a private sector developer, 11/06/2008) 
 
Figure 6.7: Thames Gateway Development Area 
Source: Kosmograd website (2008) 【WWW】available at: 
http://newsfeed.kosmograd.com/kosmograd/disurbanism/【Accessed 04/04/2009】 
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The Developers 
The Stratford City Development Partners was a partnership (before July, 2006) consisting of 
Aldersgate, London & Continental Railways (LCR), Multiplex, Stanhope and Westfield, responsible 
for developing major plans to transform the Stratford Railway Lands into a new piece of city. Until 
2006, the owners of Stratford City site included Multiplex, Westfield, Stanhope and the Reuben 
brothers. In June 2006, the Westfield Group acquired from its co-owners a 75 per cent interest in 
Stratford City Development Partners and became the individual developer for the Stratford City 
Development scheme. This buy-out was caused by a dispute between the Westfield Group and the 
Reuben brothers. Before the dispute, the Multiplex Group was already minded to sell its interest in 
Stratford City site after it met huge losses building Wembley stadium (Waples, 2006). Westfield, 
which preferred to focus on retail-led development, then sought partners with experience in creating 
large-scale mixed-use developments. In March 2007, the ODA and LCR chose Lend Lease 
Corporation and partners First Base and East Thames as their preferred development partners for 
Stratford City. Since the outline planning permission for the site was granted in January 2007, the site 
has been split into seven development zones with Westfield being responsible for Zone 1 and the Lend 
Lease Group being responsible for Zones 2-7, including the Olympic Athletes’ Village (see Figure 6.3). 
This observation confirms one of the characteristics revealed in Chapter 2 which suggests that mega 
projects obtain complex stakeholder networks and they change over time.   
 
Opposition Groups 
By the time the announcement was made that London was to host the 2012 Olympic Games, the 
courses of action open to opposing groups were limited to monitoring the development process and 
campaigning against land and premises relocations as the pace of issuing compulsory purchase orders 
intensified (Evans, 2007: 308). Others, campaigning on issues of negative social and environmental 
impacts, spiralling costs, and general resistance to this kind of mega event, seemed to be confined to 
background ‘noise’ devoid of influence to change the course of the Olympics (see Gaus, 2007; Cheyne, 
2010)66. Much of this opposition is based on the argument that the investment of the Olympics is not 
sensible given the likely marginal benefits from the Games and the scale of expenditure on a single 
elite 17-day sporting event. This will not only divert public finances away from other important areas 
of public expenditure but also increase the national deficit for decades ahead. For Britain, which at the 
time of writing is enduring much more constrained economic circumstances, public support for the 
Games is more subdued with much greater concern about opportunity costs.  
 
In the view of several project stakeholders, individuals within the local community could exert greater 
                                                 
66 Many examples are addressed in the Games Monitor website: http://www.gamesmonitor.org.uk/ 
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influence during the negotiation process by lodging formal appeals against the mega project decisions. 
In doing so, these legal challenges could lead to costly time delays and even jeopardise the project 
(also see Chapter 5). This was apparent from the CTRL and the King’s Cross development case study 
material, and to a lesser degree for the 2012 Olympic Project. In the case of the Games, these 
objectors lacked genuine power and ultimately were obliged to adopt major compromises. In the 
CTRL and the King’s Cross development cases, the findings suggest that well-organised, local 
community groups can play a role in the choice of planning options and seek to ensure that the 
outcome is not excessively one-sided. As Lindblom (1988: 142) suggests: “Many will still look upon 
government as essentially corrupt and incompetent, but the voice of the mass of the people will 
demand with increasing insistence strong and effective government to cope with the problems of 
society”.    
 
The views of local community groups are also ostensibly important in the Olympic Games as the IOC 
awards the host city partly by judging the public support for the Olympics in the host city under 
question. At the time of the 2012 bidding process there was very little opposition to the proposal, with 
many inherent reservations hidden beneath a positive discourse and the ‘feel-good factor’ that was 
presumed would emanate from a successful bid. This is reinforced by evidence from the hypothesis-
led investigation which reveals that there was some feeling that the government employed a PR 
strategy to foster a close relationship with the media and use this to amplify the effect of their 
Olympic rhetoric (see Appendix 5, HRQ #9). It was not until the budget escalation became known in 
2007 – the estimated cost of £2.375 billion rose to £9.3 billion – did the media reverse their earlier 
favourable position and start to criticise the costly taxpayer-funded event. Thus the power of the local 
opposition to these projects was limited for several reasons despite the claims of several project 
stakeholders to the contrary.   
 
The Stratford Renaissance Partnership (SRP)67 
SRP was established in January 2007.  Its remit covers a broad zone within the borough of Newham, 
covering the Olympic Park, Stratford City, the Island Site, Stratford High Street, and the two 
conservation areas (see Figure 6.8). It is composed of a range of stakeholders. Its purpose is to 
promote the regeneration of the wider Stratford area through partnerships and to operate over a period 
of not less than ten years (2007-2017). SRP is a ‘not-for-profit company and has on its Board 
'subscribing' or grant-aiding member organisations with interests in the Town Centre and Stratford’s 
Cultural and Community Forums. SRP has published its own ‘Strategic Plan’ (see SRP, 2007)  which 
sets out its key objectives for the next ten years, together with a ‘Business Plan’ which sets out how 
                                                 
67 See Stratford Renaissance Partnership website: http://www.stratford-renaissance.co.uk/stratford-city 
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SRP will take forward the objectives identified in its Strategic Plan. The significance of SRP’s role is 
undermined by the London Development Agency, which is responsible of the Legacy Masterplan 
Framework (LMF) which began preparation in 2007 and will be a key driver for change and growth in 
the area.  
 
Figure 6.8: Stratford Renaissance Partnership Area of Interest 
Source: SRP (2007)  
6.2 History of the Stratford City Scheme Development and the 2012 London 
Olympic Games 
6.2.1 Background 
Stratford is located at the edge of London and also at the western end of the Thames Gateway 
development area (see Figure 6.9). The magnetic attraction of central London makes it very difficult 
for Stratford to compete both in terms of business investment and tourism development. Canary Wharf 
has, furthermore, emerged as a second Central Business District for London after the City itself and 
presents strong competition to Stratford should it wish to develop as a business centre. Under the 
Thames Gateway Development Framework, Stratford is defined as its new West Metropolitan Area. 
Notwithstanding this, the likelihood and extent of Stratford regeneration benefits being stretched to 
other areas of the Thames Gateway are worthy of debate. Another uncertainty is the extent to which 
the present economic downturn and the recent slump in the housing market (2007 to the present) will 
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impact on future public investments and the prioritisation of short-term, revenue generating, projects 
within Stratford. There is no doubt, however, that the London Olympics has injected a significant 
degree of certainty into this uncertain environment as well as an immutable timeframe for projects in 
Stratford, compared to the conditions for developments elsewhere.  
 
The planning of Stratford City is an outcome of a multiple-tiered set of policy and contexts directed 
from a number of levels ranging across central, regional, and local government guidance (see Table 
6.5). These policies all highlight Stratford as central to the regeneration of the Thames Gateway (see 
Figure 6.7), east London and the London Borough of Newham. The Stratford City scheme evolved 
from early initiatives including the City Challenge (see Chapter 4) and Single Regeneration Budget 
programmes (see Chapter 5) in the 1980s and 1990s, through to the current momentum generated by 
the CTRL and the imperative of the London 2012 Olympics. The plans for Stratford City seek to 
integrate Stratford Railway Land regeneration and the Stratford International Station development, as 
well as simultaneously redevelop the surrounding neighbourhood, with the wider ambition 
contributing to the development of London as an exemplary sustainable world city.  
 
Figure 6.9: Stratford as the West Metropolitan Edge of the Thames Gateway  
 
Source: DoE (1995) Thames Gateway Planning Framework (RPG 9A). London: DoE, p.32 
 
The third mega project under scrutiny is the 2012 London Olympic Games. The Games advocates 
claim that this particular kind of international mega event will have significant impact on sustainable 
development within the urban regeneration schemes of east London in general, and Stratford in 
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particular, including those underpinning the event or triggered by it. As the subsequent discussion will 
reveal, these developments have in turn led to the evolution of a dynamic institutional network that 
has greatly increased in complexity since this site was decided and included within the Olympic site 
for London.  
 
The London Games Act of 2006 addressed the responsibilities and obligations for the UK to deliver 
the 2012 Olympics. It established the ODA and defined its responsibilities, stipulated the requirements 
of the Olympic Transport Plan, and introduced regulations for advertising and for street trading. The 
theme of the London Games is ‘towards a one planet 2012’. This is intended to reflect the Games’ 
delivery partners’68 commitment to present an event which can maximise the sustainable economic, 
social, health, environmental, and sporting benefits and legacy for both London and the UK overall. 
The plans for the London 2012 Games comprise eight interrelated and interdependent aspects of 
delivery, including plans for the Olympic Park, transport, sustainability, ceremonies, technology, 
security, ticketing, and accommodation.  
 
Table 6.5: Stratford City Planning Policy Context 
The Sustainable Communities Plan 
 The then Deputy Prime Minister, John Prescott, launched the Sustainable Communities Plan in February 
2003. This plan sets out a long-term programme to address housing supply issues in the South East, low 
demand in other parts of the country, and the quality of the public spaces. It conforms to the Regions’ 
White Paper, ‘Your Region, Your Choice’, which set out the government’s plans to decentralise power and 
strengthen regional policy. 
 The Thames Gateway development is located in London and the South East region, two of the fourteen 
zones identified by the Sustainable Communities Plan, and presents a huge development opportunity.   
The London Plan (2004) 
 The London Plan represents the strategic planning framework for the integrated social, economic and 
environmental development of the city over the next 15–20 years. 
 The London Plan identified the Lower Lea Valley and Stratford as ‘Opportunity Areas’ in the ‘East 
London Sub-Region’. 
 The key strategic priorities include the housing, employment and mixed-use developments in the Thames 
Corridor with the vision that this sub-region can contribute to London’s world city role and the 2012 
Olympics bid. 
The Lower Lea Valley Opportunity Area Planning Framework (LLV OAPF) (2007) 
                                                 
68 These include the London Organising Committee of the Olympic Games and Paralympic Games (LOCOG) and the Olympic 
Delivery Authority (ODA), along with HM Government, Greater London Authority (GLA), British Olympic Association 
(BOA) and British Paralympic Association (BPA). 
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 The LLV OAPF outlines a vision for future development of the LLV area under thematic principles and 
needs to be incorporated into the Local Development Framework (LDF). 
 The LLV OAPF provides a planning policy context for the assessment of planning applications for non-
Olympic and legacy proposals as well as for the wider LLV regeneration area (Newham website and 
SRP, 2007: 38-39). 
Stratford and Lower Lea Valley Area Action Plan (AAP) (2010) 
 This has been commissioned jointly by the London Borough of Newham and the London Thames 
Gateway Development Corporation (Newham website and SRP, 2007: 38-39).  
Newham 2001 Unitary Development Plan (UDP) 
 The 2001 UDP provides a number of site-specific policies, including the ‘Arc of Opportunity’ within 
which Stratford sits (SRP, 2007: 38). 
Newham Local Development Framework (LDF) 
 The LDF is required since there are changes to the planning system. The LDF will replace the existing 
Unitary Development Plan and set the scene for the development and regeneration of the borough over the 
next 20 years. 
Sources: Newham Council Website (2009) Regeneration. 【WWW】available at: 
http://www.newham.gov.uk/regen/Regeneration. 【Accessed 21/07/2008】 
6.2.2 Project initiatives and obstacles 
Heavy lobbying over the Stratford International  
In the 1980’s the LB of Newham embarked upon a strategy of seeking to locate an international 
station for the CTRL in Stratford as it was convinced that the involvement of private sector was the 
only way to secure funding for development, which in turn would attract more investment to the area. 
This strategy was pursued, incidentally, at the same time that the LDDC’s docklands development 
became mired in the property market collapse at the end of the decade. In proposing Stratford 
International, the Newham Council saw the opportunity of linking Stratford to the CTRL as an 
initiative that would not only foster further development in the LDDC’s territory but also spawn more 
development in the wider area of the Thames Gateway scheme. Through shared interest, Newham 
Council, the LDDC, and several other public and private organisations formed the Stratford Promoter 
Group (SPG) in 1993 to lobby for the idea of Stratford International. The SPG vision for this CTRL 
hub, however, was undermined by the government’s concern about the troubled PFI arrangement for 
the CTRL project itself (see Chapter 4). This experience led government to opt for monopoly control 
over the Stratford Railway lands in order to use the potential profitability from going ahead with the 
Stratford International project to enhance the attractiveness of the entire PFI package of the CTRL 
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project to investors and developers.  In July 1992, the Stratford Promoter Group won the City 
Challenge Bid for the Stratford Railway lands regeneration, and it formed the Stratford Development 
Partnership (SDP)69 . As mentioned in Chapter 4, following sustained lobbying by the Stratford 
Promoter Group, in January 1994 the Secretary of State for Transport declared the choice of the east 
London route via Stratford in preference to the other options. The Government chose the more 
expensive option – the east London route – despite the £175m already expended by BR on the route 
through South East London. The east London route also meant an increase in travel time for 
passengers (by some 20 minutes) (See OMEGA Centre, 2008). A very insightful discussion of this and 
the urban regeneration movement overall in Stratford is given by Florio and Edwards (2001). 
 
The impacts of the Olympic Games on the Stratford City scheme 
The Games’ organisers claim that the Stratford City regeneration scheme is attributable to the “Games 
effect”. This scheme, however, was already enshrined in the CTRL Act 1996 as part of the “CTRL 
development package” with the result, it has been argued (see Blake, 2005; DCMS and PwC, 2005; 
Experian, 2006; Kornblatt, 2006; Collins and Jackson, 2006; UBS Investment Research, 2006; 
Atkinson et al, 2008), that the consequent housing construction and job creation cannot legitimately 
be attributed to the Games. The notion presented by the Games organisers is that this mega event 
functions as a catalyst to other important projects by prioritising and concentrating the financial, 
political, and institutional resources to the Olympic-related projects in which the Stratford City 
scheme is included. It is argued that this has led to the acceleration of the Stratford City programme 
which was originally phased over 15-20 years from 2007. This has brought benefits, especially for 
private sector developers seeking short-term returns from their developments.  
 
Three respondents from the interviews claimed that Ken Livingston and others in central and local 
government as well as in business at the time who promoted the Olympic Bid, in effect recycled the 
urban regeneration benefits of Stratford City scheme which preceded the Olympic project. They 
argued that the public are confused by the separate claims for these two projects where they have very 
different development paths and genesis; namely the Stratford City scheme emerged under the 
transformation of the planning context of east London throughout the 1980s and 1990s whilst the 
Olympic promoters started their preparation in 1997 and only officially announced London’s 
participation in the 2012 Olympic bid in 2003. This, however, contradicts one of the returns of the 
OMEGA Centre interviews where it is suggested that the idea to exploit the high-speed rail 
                                                 
69 Stratford City Development Partnership, composed of Aldersgate, London & Continental Railways (LCR), Multiplex, 
Stanhope and Westfield, is responsible for the Stratford Railway Lands regeneration. Source: Stratford City (2011) A New 
Metropolitan City for East London. 【 WWW 】 available at: http://wwp.greenwichmeantime.com/time-
zone/europe/uk/england/london/east/e15-stratford/stratford-city/【Accessed 19/05/2011】. 
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connections, airport connections, land availability and proximity to the populous of London in east 
London to host major sporting event was established in the outset of Thames Gateway or East Thames 
Corridor development. 
 
Housing development within the Stratford City scheme comprises approximately 7,000 dwellings, 
which includes 4,850 new homes for the Athletes Village. According to the pre-hypothesis and 
hypothesis-led investigations conducted for this research, the original promoters of the Stratford City 
scheme claim that the phasing of the Stratford City delivery programme was disrupted by the Games 
and thus forced its investors to put a large amount of housing on the market only after the Games (see 
Appendix 4, under the topic “Impact of the 2012 Olympic Games on the Thames Gateway 
Development”; Appendix 5, HRQ #7). Although it would be sensible for the developers to leave 
sufficient flexibility in order to properly accommodate the post 2012 housing market, the force of the 
Olympic project can be said to enhance the artificial pressures on the already uncertain and fragile 
property market and thereby distort it. The issue became more intricate when the developer for the 
Athletes Village revealed in 2009 that it needed a bailout from European Investment Bank and direct 
government fund due to the recession curtailing private sector interest in participation (see Webb, 
2009). The fact that the Government consequently nationalised the athlete village project in the end of 
2009 showed that the Games may guarantee the delivery of the Stratford City scheme but not without 
reconfiguring its programme and characteristics. This reflects to the findings of the pre-hypothesis 
investigations which suggest that, initially, the housing development of Stratford City made 
compromise for the Olympic Games by reprioritising its development resources, but after the collapse 
of the property market, the Government made financial compromise to sustain the project in order to 
deliver the Olympics. The pressure is then on to the UK taxpayers’ shoulder.  
 
Financing arrangements and the spiralling costs of the 2012 Olympic development 
The London 2012 project is delivered by the LDA and the LOCOG with respectively private and 
public funding. The former has a £2 billion budget raised from the private sector while the latter 
represents public sector interests in the mega event with a budget drawn entirely from public funds 
from the DCMS, the GLA, and the Olympic Lottery Distributor (see Table 6.6). Some of the £2.2 
billion National Lottery fund has already been diverted to help finance the Games. The Lottery will, 
however, share profits made from the land and property sales post-Games in an effort to repay some 
of this funding. The GLA is contributing £925 million (mainly drawn from Londoners’ Council Tax), 
while the LDA is providing £250 million toward the costs of the infrastructure and venues for the 
Games. It is also investing some £220 million in the clean-up of the land assigned to the Olympics 
Park.  
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In March 2007, Tessa Jowell (the then Minister for the Olympics) announced that the budget for the 
London Olympics had risen to £9.3 billion. The estimated gross cost at the time of the bid was just 
over £4 billion, to be met by £3.4 billion in public funding and an anticipated £700 million from the 
private sector (see BOA, 2004). The revised budget of £9.3 billion includes a number of higher costs 
in the ODA’s programme management budget – in the form of increased contingency funds, tax, and 
security costs. The £700 million anticipated from the private sector proved to be far too optimistic and 
only £165 million was generated. The shortfall had to be met by public funds (NAO, 2008). 
According to NAO sources (see NAO, 2008), the contingency funds had to be increased to £2.747 
billion because of uncertainties about final design specifications, the impact of construction price 
inflation, and the responses of potential suppliers to invitations to tender.  
 
Table 6.6: The Budget for the Games at March 2007  
   
Source:  NAO (2007a: 18) 
 
Kornablatt (2006) gave early warning of the problems with the budget estimate(s) by highlighting 
imprecise costings in the Olympic Bid.  He claimed that any subsequent discrepancies would 
undermine the goodwill behind the Games. The NAO report of February 2007 on risk assessment and 
management of the budget argued that the budget needed urgently to be clarified and effectively 
managed because the longer the delay in finalising the budget, the greater the risk of it having an 
adverse impact on the Olympic programme (NAO, 2007a: 16). The early highly-inaccurate cost 
estimates, at a later date, did much to discredit the accountability of the London Games’ delivery team 
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and as predicted eroded much of the  ‘feel-good factor’ that the promoters built up with the help of the 
media during and immediately following the bid.  
 
The cost estimates in the Candidate File were based on the review conducted by 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC), who were commissioned to identify the economic impacts related 
both to the Games and to the regeneration benefits of the Lower Lea Valley. PwC was also the 
consultant used to prepare the visitor forecasts and impact assessment for the Millennium Dome in 
1994 (see BOA, 2004: 103). Both the Games and the Millennium Dome forecasts did not ultimately 
materialise in that there were significant shortfalls, thereby illustrating the many tribulations and 
uncertainties involved in producing accurate forecasts for major projects.  
 
Financial responsibility for the Athletes’ Village, developed by the Bovis Lend Lease consortium, was 
taken over by the government after private investment dried up in May 2009 due to the recent 
property price downturn and bank lending problems (in 2008 and 2009). The prevailing financial 
conditions made it very difficult for any company to raise the £2 billion required for the Olympic 
Village, demonstrating that even a prestige project like the Olympics could not generate sufficient 
investor confidence. Bovis Lend Lease, has a sound reputation and a well respected track record. With 
the downturn of the housing market at the time of writing, however, the company faces further 
uncertainty about its ability to secure financing for the apartments after the Olympics under the profit-
sharing arrangements with the government (Helm, 2008a). The author suggests that the NAO’s 
warnings of the risks of private sector funding (see NAO 2007c: 16) have already been vindicated. 
This is reflected in the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations which indicate that neither the 
powerful decision-makers from the public sector nor the influential investors from the private sector 
are able to predict and control the outcomes of mega projects because they are ultimately at the mercy 
of volatility in the financial sector (see Appendix 5, HRQ #3; Appendix 8, Table A8.7). 
 
Evans (2007) explained that one of the reasons for the gulf between the bid estimates and the realities 
is that budgeting usually lacks transparency, with much investment and expenditure ‘off-the balance 
sheet’, resulting in understatement of the true costs and impacts. Evans presents a much less 
favourable picture of the 2012 London Games preparations than the government accepts in claiming 
that the London 2012 experience presents this same kind of credibility gap between promises and 
naïve assumptions, leading to negative impacts on the final costs of delivering the Games. Views of 
this kind have been fuelled by scepticism in the UK, evoked by evidence from many previous 
international mega projects and mega-event facilities which have invariably been characterised by cost 
overruns, contract disputes, and political controversy (see Flyvbjerg, et al., 2003; Altshuler and 
Luberoff, 2003; OMEGA, 2010). In the UK, there are parallels in the examples of the Channel Tunnel, 
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Pickett’s Lock, the Millennium Bridge, the Dome, the Scottish Parliament building, the Jubilee Line 
Extension, Wembley Stadium, and Heathrow Terminal Five (Evans, 2007; Financial Times, 2008).  
 
Overall, the origins of the large gap between the initial bid and the 2007 cost announcement may be 
attributed to a combination of the lack of transparency, optimistic, and biased estimates prior to the 
Games, and the complex impact study methods.  This argument is echoed by the responses to the 
Hypothesis-related Research Question #8 (see Appendix 5, HRQ #8; Appendix 8, Table A8.12), and 
illustrated by one interviewee’s statement: 
 
“If you want to spend public money in large amounts on any project, you talk about that project 
furiously because that’s what politics is about. It is actually about selling. So the aftermath is not 
going to be as exciting as the vision.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local authority, 
30/09/2008) 
6.3 Coordination between MUTP, Sustainable Urban Regeneration, and 
Mega Event 
Evans (2007: 303) suggests that the combination of a number of major transport projects, several 
regeneration schemes and the forces associated with a mega sporting event of the kind that the 
Olympics unleashes will inevitably multiply capital risks. This reflects to the theory of Lindblom and 
Hirschman (1962) who claim that projects are not necessarily fully coordinated, instead they will 
evolve into a “better imbalance” relationship to avoid excessive costs and irremediable damage. The 
following two sections reveal the insights into the prospects of the coordination between the three 
types of mega projects studied.  It also demonstrates the findings of this case study about the role of 
the 2012 Olympic Games in MUTP development (in response to Hypothesis #1).  
6.3.1 History of the coordination  
Ken Livingstone’s ambition for regenerating the East End of London increased the cost pressure on 
the Games, and this represents a misapplication of the ‘Games effect’ if it does not help promote urban 
regeneration. This viewpoint has been supported by the findings in the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-
led investigations. They reveal charges that unnecessary pressures were created on the regeneration 
projects already in the pipeline and that this in turn distorted the sustainability visions of the 
developments, including the democratic process of public engagement and a sensible rhythm for 
incremental developments (see Appendix 5, ORQ #1). Added to this is the claim that the mega-event 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
188 
 
 
 
strategy as an instrument for regeneration plans is not as effective as envisaged. The author argues that, 
in order to be effective integrated, a planning framework would need to be introduced which is led by 
regeneration projects instead of being dominated by the Olympics event. Evidence in support of this 
position is reflected in the findings of the pre-hypothesis investigations undertaken for this thesis (see 
Appendix 4, under the topic “discourse coalition”). The findings suggest that regeneration should have 
a separate rationale and a business case different from those of the Games. Wrapping up the promises 
of housing and employment into the Olympic discourse is likely to lead to disappointment and unmet 
expectations for the Games legacy. 
 
A further observation is that the London Olympic project violates the policy of the UK Government’s 
Communities Plan which aims to devolve powers to local authorities. It also contradicts any espoused 
vision to shift away from excessively commercially-oriented development. The forces behind the 
London Olympics’ highly state-controlled governance have offered little room for public participation. 
Poynter (2009) predicts that the London 2012 Games are likely to fail to provide sustainable urban 
regeneration that aspires to reduce any prevailing social disadvantage. These issues are reported to 
have been aggravated by the economic downturn at the time of writing, given that the business climate 
has become harsher and that sustaining profits has taken precedence over efforts at achieving 
sustainable urban regeneration.  
 
Burgeoning uncertainty surrounds many projects in the UK. It has the potential seriously to undermine 
the viability of many urban regeneration projects in the country, including that of Thames Gateway. 
Under these very difficult economic circumstances for developers and house builders in particular, it 
may be concluded that while the voices that have pressured governments and developers to 
incorporate sustainability measures will not disappear, the private sector players are increasingly 
concerned about their own survivability. This may be an opportune time for both government and the 
private sector to revisit the meaning of sustainability as it applies to business organisations in order to 
reach a consensus on an operational definition that goes beyond mere rhetoric. Evidence in support 
this position is reflected in the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations ORQ #2 for this thesis. As 
indicated in previous chapter, the term ‘sustainable’ is treated with cynicism. One of the responses 
relating to this issue is quoted below:  
 
“I think the problem with sustainable development is that it’s one of those hackneyed phrases now. 
Sort of dressed up, it means different things to different people.” (OMEGA Centre study, hypothesis-
led interview, a private sector developer, 30/06/2008) 
 
One of the principal issues of this thesis is the relationship between the Games and the Stratford City 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
189 
 
 
 
regeneration scheme which became much entangled. According to both sets of findings, the London 
Olympics created a powerful intrusion which reprioritised the allocation of political, financial, and 
planning resources. This argument is echoed by the findings of the pre-hypothesis investigations 
where it was revealed that the Games re-phased the Stratford City plan in order to confine it to the 
Games’ requirements. The evidence from the hypothesis-led investigation indicates that there are 
conflicts between the Stratford City scheme and the Olympic project in terms of project 
implementation since the construction sites are next to each other. 
 
To sum up, the question of whether Stratford International has stimulated sustainable urban 
regeneration in the hub’s area can be resolved from the both strands of the case study investigations.  
As indicated in Chapter 4, the case for the construction of Stratford International is less than 
convincing in terms of the high-speed railway operations alone. Stratford International has been 
criticised by many interviewees as a ‘white elephant’ and they have further contested its effectiveness 
on encouraging development in its surrounded area. The influence of Stratford International on the 
Stratford City urban regeneration scheme is similarly viewed as limited. However, its influence on the 
outcome of the 2012 London Olympic Bid is widely acknowledged. Of particular significance, it has 
been further argued, is that the Olympic Delivery Authority cannot afford for the joint programmes to 
fail, making it imperative that the joint projects should be fully completed on schedule and thus 
closely synchronised. Under these circumstances, although under stress due to the unforgiving 
deadline, the developers of the Stratford City enjoy the umbrella of the government’s support or 
guarantee which in turn reduces their risks. 
 
The following quotation from the interviews reveals how the CTRL project discourse on regeneration 
benefits has been treated with scepticism:  
 
“The catalyst effect in Stratford from the CTRL is very marginal. Westfield as a foreign developer is 
attracted by the available land and the good transport connections to other centres in London.” 
(Hypothesis-led interview, a person from the local community group, 10/07/2008) 
6.3.2 Role of the Games  
As stated at the outset of this thesis, one of the aims of this research is to establish whether or not the 
London Games have boosted the prospects of MUTPs in its vicinity as well as those of urban 
regeneration schemes, and whether these efforts are likely to contribute to sustainable urban 
regeneration outcomes. While the decision to construct a new £70m Thames-link overground rail 
station linked with the Eurostar terminal at St Pancras was pending in 2005, the announcement giving 
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the green light to London as the Olympic host city on 6th July 2005 seemed to boost the prospects of 
the Thameslink project, and, in retrospect, accelerate the decision. In February 2006, the government 
unveiled a £63 million cash boost to complete the new Thameslink station beneath St. Pancras station. 
This programme was considered part of the Olympic Transport Plan package (see O’Connell, 2007) 
together with an extension of (Phase 1 of) the East London Line from Canning Town to the new 
Stratford International Station intended to link the Docklands area with domestic and international 
high-speed services on High Speed 1 (see Figure 6.10).  
 
In addition to these two major transport projects, a 2.6 km extension of the Docklands Light Railway 
(DLR) is also seen an important component of the Games Transport package, together with the 
upgrade of Stratford Regional Station and the enhancement of West Ham Station capacity. These latter 
two stations together with the Stratford International Station are identified as the major ‘Olympic Park 
Gateway Stations’ by the ODA. The major influence of the Games here is associated with efforts 
towards accelerating the planned programmes to ensure they come online before 2012. The influential 
role of the CTRL in contributing to London winning the Olympic Games bid is well-known and 
widely accepted. The fact that the Games could not have become a reality without exploiting the 
available lands, the existing transport network, and political determination in east London is all too 
often taken for granted. 
 
From the evidence provide in the literature review, it would appear that the London Games did indeed 
trigger the re-allocation of resources and speed up some already announced programmes, but that the 
Games in themselves could not have generated enough thrust to influence the creation of a plan for a 
new MUTP; instead, it probably impacted on programmes of mega projects (including MUTPs and 
urban regeneration schemes) by prioritising and promoting them to meet the Olympic demands. 
Evidence in supporting this position is reflected in the findings of the hypothesis-led investigations 
ORQ #1 which asks whether mega events have significant impacts on MUTP development. Here is 
one of the responses to this question:  
 
“Mega events accelerate plans by concentrating political commitment and investments that will 
otherwise take much longer to materialise.” (Hypothesis-led interview, an advisor from the 
international organisation, 02/09/2008) 
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Figure 6.10: Public Transport Links to Main 2012 Olympic Games Venues 
Source: House of Commons Transport Committee (2006: 71) 
 
Five out of nine respondents expressed a strong positive support for ORQ #1. These respondents agree 
that mega events can be an important catalyst that accelerates projects and concentrates political, 
financial, and planning resources into particular areas. The remaining four respondents instead 
indicated that mega events can only have impacts on existing plans for MUTP programmes. Among 
these programmes, some are re-prioritised especially when they are designated to support and coincide 
with mega events, while other programmes are postponed or cancelled due to limited time and 
financial resources. These findings are reinforced by the results of the OMEGA Centre interviews, of 
which 20 out of 23 respondents indicate that there are strong relationships between MUTPs and mega 
events.  
 
Notwithstanding the discussion above, one of the interviewees from the OMEGA Study suggests that 
London won the host right of the 2012 Olympics based on a series of events which conform to the 
‘critical juncture’ phenomenon in Path Dependency Theory (Arthur, 1987 and Pierson, 2000; also see 
Chapter 2). Here is the quotation extracted from this response:  
 
“The London Dockland Development Corporation begat the Docklands Light Railway (DLR). The 
DLR begat the DLR extension London to the city, the extension begat Canary Wharf, Canary Wharf 
begat the Jubilee Line extension, the JLE begat the route for the CTRL. The combination of all those 
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begat Britain’s chance of having an Olympic Games.” (OMEGA Centre study, hypothesis-led 
interview, a person from academic group, 25/06/2008) 
6.4 Visions and Sustainability of the 2012 London Olympic Games 
Whilst the advocates of the Olympic Games’ promote them internationally as an opportunity for 
creating a unique occasion for a local economic bonanza, many studies (see Blake, 2005; DCMS and 
PwC, 2005; Experian, 2006; Kornblatt, 2006; Collins and Jackson, 2006; UBS Investment Research, 
2006; Atkinson et al, 2008) show that there are fewer and lower economic gains for the host cities 
than widely suggested. And while some studies share the sentiment of the Games’ promoters that 
long-term and intangible benefits are more beneficial than the direct economic gains, experiences 
from previous Games leave many doubts. The relevant issues are examined in the respectively 
following subsections. 
6.4.1 Regional economic growth  
For London, the role of the 2012 Olympic Games has been a powerful force for the concentration of 
public resources and project prioritising both for the capital and the UK as a whole. Given the 
prevailing economic circumstances, the businesses and contractors paid to be involved in the delivery 
of the Games are in the advantageous position where they can retain vital profit-share at a time when 
other companies are hit by a recession. However, complaints resulted from the introduction of a “no 
marketing rights” agreement which businesses involved in the Olympics must sign. The purpose for 
this protocol, devised by LOCOG and ODA, was intended to protect the rights of the event’s official 
sponsors, which generate £2 billion in commercial sponsorships70. Benefits to regional contractors of 
the Olympic Games have been constrained by this protocol. The Regional Development Agencies 
(RDAs) have found that this frustrates their efforts to encourage regional businesses to become 
involved in the Games and to try and win Olympic-related work. Countering this accusation, the ODA 
has claimed that they are pursuing good practice in adhering to competition and sustainability 
guidelines implemented through its contractors’ supply chains. Supporting this position, the NAO 
point out that both the “effective contract management” arrangements set up by the ODA and the 
“timely and accurate information” provided by contractors and their suppliers represent two successful 
implementation elements of these arrangements (ODA, 2008: 7). Notwithstanding these claims and 
observations, the intention of spreading the benefits of the ‘Games effect’ to support regional 
economic growth could be undermined if the scepticism about the business potential of the £9.3 
                                                 
70 There are three tiers of the sponsorship: tier one sponsors are contributing £40 million plus each; tier two sponsors is putting 
£20 million plus each and tier three is paying £10 million on average.  
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
193 
 
 
 
billion (the 2012 London Olympics budget announced in 2007) publicly-funded event was proven to 
be encouraged by protectionism practices – the ‘no marketing rights’ protocol – which restricts 
opportunities to vested-interest businesses.  
 
The Experian Report 2006 contained doubts about the direct benefits that could be generated by the 
Olympics as espoused by the Olympics’ champions (such as the Mayor of London, the ODA, and the 
LDA.). Kornblatt (2006) published a discussion paper in the same year expressing similar concerns. In 
his paper, Kornblatt concludes that the expectations of the Games in terms of its regional economic 
impacts should be ‘managed’ to avoid creating a big gap between perceived and actual gains in 
regional economic development. The same source has suggested that many jobs created by the 
Olympics will go to those living outside the host Boroughs. Benefits, however, to other regions 
outside London have been acknowledged to be far more marginal, with the result, some have argued, 
that it is more realistic to focus on ‘soft’ impacts such as the long-term legacy and fast-tracking 
function, to accelerate infrastructure investment and delivery, and to concentrate resources on east 
London (Kornblatt, 2006: 1).  
6.4.2 Job creation  
The Bid Document for the 2012 London Games refers to the regeneration prospects in the Lower Lea 
Valley area (BOA, 2004) and enhanced job prospects in the five host boroughs. The award of the 
Games to London was followed by several studies (see Blake, 2005; DCMS and PwC, 2005; Experian, 
2006; Kornblatt, 2006; Collins and Jackson, 2006; UBS Investment Research, 2006; Atkinson et al, 
2008) which explicitly or implicitly indicated that the direct economic benefits from hosting the 
Olympics were likely to be marginal, but pointed more towards indirect qualitative impacts, such as 
redevelopment opportunities, city image enhancement, civic pride, and investment confidence – all 
rather qualitative assessments.  
 
The 2006 Experian Study (see Experian, 2006) provided a rather euphemistic comment on the impacts 
of the 2012 Games. The report states: “One wonders if this was a strategy of anodyne evasiveness”. 
The report focuses on the criteria of job creation by the Games, looks into five other cases as 
comparative studies, and emphasises two key factors that were likely to generate different results 
when comparing the employment impacts of previous Games.  The first is the contextual differences, 
including economic conditions, political objectives, infrastructure needs, and funding arrangements. 
The second is how the impacts of the Games are defined, measured, and modelled, since each case is 
assessed against different criteria. Drawing from these other experiences, the study concluded that the 
number of London Games-related jobs is likely to be relatively small in east London. It further 
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contends that if there is disappointment about the number of new jobs created by the mega event, it 
should be blamed on the generation of unrealistically high expectations as a result of exaggerated and 
unsubstantiated claims based on job creation from previous Games.  
 
Also referring to other research, the Experian Study suggested that writers of mega event impact 
studies might be motivated to project favourable results before the Games because of the political 
biases and over-optimism towards the ‘Games effect’.  It implied that such studies were part of an 
orchestrated promotions exercise as they commonly presented excessive claims about the economic 
impacts of the mega event before they took place (Experian, 2006: 14; Kornblatt, 2006: 2). This 
observation fits to the work of Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) who claim that biased measurements are used to 
support political ambition which is the real factor underpins the mega project development (also see 
Chapter 2).  
 
Notwithstanding the reservations it expresses, the Experian Report suggests that past Games 
experiences indicate that they may well have a much larger transformational impact than that 
identified by the official modelling measures in that they have different impacts not captured by the 
modelling. To enhance these transformational impacts, the report suggests that targeted interventions 
are needed. It advocated a role for the Games as a lever or catalyst that can provide the initial 
momentum to an ongoing fostering strategy that is vital for a long-lasting legacy. This 
recommendation is echoed in an earlier UBS Study conducted in 2006 (see UBS Investment Research, 
2006) which predicts a net economic benefit of the 2012 London Games as being between £5.9 billion 
to £7.8 billion, but with the direct benefits to east London being relatively small. It further suggests 
that the beneficial impact of hosting the Olympics is largely in the legacy effects. These legacy effects, 
it is included, are more important for outlasting the Games than judgements about the short-term and 
tangible Olympic benefits to the east London. These conclusions were substantiated by the pre-
hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations undertaken for this thesis (see Appendix 5, HRQ #5; 
Appendix 8, Table A8.9). One of the interviewees gave the following statement that emphasises the 
importance of the Games’ legacy plan:  
 
“The government has not thought through the legacy plan yet. If they simply put some flats and 
apartments, it is not necessarily equal to regeneration. It [the legacy plan] forces some people to 
stand back for a bit and think more imaginatively toward what we can do here.” (Pre-hypothesis 
interview, a councillor from the local authority, 23/06/2008) 
 
Kornblatt (2006) suggests that local residents can expect only a limited number of jobs associated 
with the 2012 London Games since they are likely to be largely displaced by people from outside the 
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host boroughs, particularly by highly skilled employees. He suggests that even the low-skilled 
workers are likely to be replaced by labourers commuting from distant regions if they are 
insufficiently competitive. This has led Crookston (2006) and others to urge relevant authorities, when 
setting up training programmes, to recognise the complexity of these challenges. The objectives of the 
job training programmes prepared by the London 2012 Employment and Skills Taskforce (LEST) 
Pathfinder Partnership were criticised for their unrealistic job targets in light of the relatively few local 
residents who ultimately became involved in the Olympics (see Kornblatt, 2006; Evans, 2007).  
 
This section discussed the visions and political promises for regional economic growth and job 
creation generated by the Games. The following section explores the importance of negotiating power, 
and evaluates the transformation of political power and institutional arrangements of the three mega 
projects (the CTRL project, the Stratford City scheme, and the 2012 London Games) in this regard.  
6.5 Decision-Making Process and Negotiation Powers 
This section focuses on the Olympic Games’ decision-making process by closely examining the 
negotiation powers of the various stakeholders involved, what they advocated, and what the impacts 
are likely to be. It attempts to disentangle the interrelationship between the Games and the associated 
regeneration schemes, such as Stratford City regeneration, the Thames Gateway, and the Lower Lea 
Valley developments in order to draw conclusions about institutional arrangements and power 
relations based on the hypothesis and pre-hypothesis investigations.  
6.5.1 Political champions 
Finally, from the exploration in the Chapters 4, 5, and 6, particular focus was placed on the findings of 
the influence of political champions in mega-project decision-making process. Both general literature 
reviews on mega project developments and the case study material examined here revealed that in 
many cases certain individual political champions of mega projects are very important to their success.  
This observation is very apparent in the case of the urban regeneration strategy advocated by 
Conservative minister Michael Heseltine in his vision for the future of the Thames Gateway. His 
political position, personality, and sustained commitment are widely recognised to have heavily 
influenced decisions concerning the ultimately-adopted CTRL alignment and choice of locations of 
international stations during the 1980s. When New Labour came to power, John Prescott was similarly 
a very important political figure who acted as a champion for the sustained pursuit of the interwoven 
visions of both the CTRL and the Thames Gateway. He was convinced by the Newham lobby group to 
support the idea of having an international station at Stratford. This view was also supported by 
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Professor Sir Peter Hall, a respected academic and planner who supported the vision of regeneration in 
east London and the Thames Gateway (as in the latter case, previous advisor to Michael Heseltine). 
According to Faith (2007: 120-123), until 1991 Arup’s proposal had received the support of 331 MPs, 
including those not directly affected by the BR route, because of the strategic approach by Ove Arup. 
These political champions were pivotal in securing the necessary political support through a 
combination of lobbying and using of project discourses, facilitating mega-project developments and 
at the same time fulfilling their own agenda. This illustration of discourse power and bargaining 
power reflects on the kind of negotiating practices alluded to by Lindbom (1988) and Hajer (1995) 
and referred to by Altshuler and Luberoff (2003) in their works (also see Chapter 2).  
6.5.2 Political power and institutional arrangements 
The political power that accompanies the Olympics movement has developed by virtue of its global 
monopolisation and protectionism of the Olympic brand which as a result has the ability to reprioritise 
and relocate resources. As with previous Games (see Chapter 2), the many aspects of the 2012 
Olympic discourse, including predicted improvements in regeneration benefits, grass-root sports, 
employment, civic pride, city image, inward investment, and tourism, have almost all been overstated. 
Despite this, the recognition for hosting the Games remains very popular with government and city 
leaders world-wide. The prospect of acting as host to the Games also frequently appears to attract 
substantial public approval within bid cities. In other words, the experiences of previous Games do not 
seem to deter prospective host cities from aspiring to host the costly Olympics71. The 1976 Olympic 
debt from the Montreal Games took the city 30 years to pay off, yet the Vancouver 2010 Winter 
Games look to repeat this history72 (Gaus, 2009). Atkinson et al. (2008) suggests that the degree of 
public support for hosting the Games would be very different if the direct costs of these mega events 
were disclosed in advance. A similar argument was also mentioned in both strands of the 
investigations that criticise the conspiracy over the 2012 London Olympic budget scandal (see 
Appendix 8, Table A8.10 and A8.13). Findings identified from the pre-hypothesis investigations, for 
example, indicate that economic impact studies for mega events are prone to misrepresentations 
because of the double-counting of regeneration benefits. The same source argues that these studies 
also neglect ‘opportunity costs’ where funds are reallocated to a budget for the London Olympics, and 
are taken from the National Lottery funds earlier earmarked for the development of community sport 
projects. A respondent claimed that: 
 
                                                 
71 This is the case with the exception of Colorado, Toronto, Berlin and Nagoya. “In an anti-sprawl mood, Colorado voters 
rejected the 1976 Denver Winter Games after it was awarded them. Local opposition in Toronto, Berlin and Nagoya, Japan, 
is credited with preventing the Olympics from landing on those cities” (Gaus, 2007). 
72 The official figure for the final cost of these Games has yet to be formally announced at the time of writing and thus remain a 
mystery. 
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“In the Olympic public enquiry, we said we don’t believe this budget and it makes absolutely no 
difference. The inspector ignored the budget issue. In the beginning, the media and politicians formed 
a chain to market the Olympics. Their [the London Olympic agencies’] attitude is defensive from day 
one. To even suggest the Olympics might not be a good thing is considered as slightly baddy. The 
Olympics, conceived as a brand, manage to market itself effectively.  The fundamental argument that 
the Olympics is needed for the regeneration is still not being challenged. All these assumptions about 
the synergy which has been put forward here, the mutual benefits of the way things linking together, 
the public-private partnership argument are still up there running.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a 
person from the local community group, 10/07/2008) 
 
Given that a major interest of this study is how the forces of ‘mega-event discourse’ (more specifically, 
that of the ‘Olympic discourse’) (see Chapter 2) is formed, strengthens and collapses throughout the 
development of its project-led network. Of particular interest to this research is to discover what 
actually motivates national and local politicians desire to promote the Games. This case study has 
revealed that political gain is the determining factor. One of the responses from the hypothesis-led 
interviews highlighted that:  
 
“Political power is the gear of the decision to run for the Games. In the case of London, the Olympics 
have support from the Labour party and the Tories. With the power of rationality, probably Britain 
would not have the bid in the first place.” (Hypothesis-led interview, an advisor from the international 
organisation, 02/09/2008) 
 
For the previous Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, his intention was to use the Olympics to attract 
more public funds for the regeneration of east London on the premise that there was probably no 
alternative way to secure such a large sum of money and attention to one area. To some degree, this 
strategy has been used elsewhere in the UK when Manchester and Birmingham managed to attract 
substantially more central government funding (which in turn enticed greater investment from the 
private sector) in the case of the 2002 Commonwealth Games in Manchester, the Manchester Olympic 
bids in 2000 and 1996, and the Birmingham bid in 1992. 
 
It is widely believed that to be able to foresee the project outcomes, both positive and negative, and to 
gain support for the project from a majority of the stakeholders, a powerful negotiating position must 
be commanded as part of project-led network composed of well-organised groups who possess a 
strong commitment and sufficient resources. The negotiation process of the King’s Cross Central 
scheme displays a lack of consensus on sustainable urban regeneration, resulting in continuing 
tensions and conflicts in decision-making. The principal stakeholders (the developers and Camden 
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Council) all look to select planned major economic changes that will foster improvements to local 
welfare and economic growth. Local community groups look to a more democratic way of achieving 
this change and applaud the “wisdom of crowds” thesis (Surowiecki, 2004) which claims it is 
important to have public participation rather than just “managing public opinions”. However, in the 
case of the London Olympic Games development, the absolute power of the mega event excluded the 
voice of grassroots activists and the authorities.  
 
Overall, effective partnerships between project stakeholders have always been at the forefront of 
successful project delivery – particularly for mega projects. An effective partnership can only be 
arrived at through a process of negotiation, compromise, and professional performance that aims to 
meet the demands of every sector. Such partnership, in which high institutional barriers are the norm, 
appear to be an indispensable mechanism in mega-event development.  The synthesised findings of 
the two strands approach indicate that the streamlined planning power is one of the prerequisites in 
mega-project development. This observation reflects the literature review in Chapter 2 which reveals 
that power relations within a policy-making process will continuously change and evolve into a 
“better imbalance” (Lindblom and Hirschman, 1962). The embedded discourse power in the network 
is thus a force to heighten negotiating positions. In the cases of the King’s Cross and the Olympic 
development, the discourses of sustainable development and inclusive urban regeneration are 
perceived by every sector as important. These discourses reinforce the coalition within the partnership 
and achieve outputs in a more coordinated manner. This observation is echoed by the responses of 
HRQ #9 (see Appendix 4) which indicate that stakeholders can obtain their most advantageous 
position in project negotiation during times of crisis. This situation is further strengthened by 
politicians’ wariness of damaging political reputation and their need for popularity. Their attitudes put 
the government in a disadvantageous position in negotiation with private sectors and raise barriers for 
the treatment of risk. 
6.6 Hypothesis Testing and Theoretical Insights 
When multiple mega projects are instigated in the same timeframe and spatial context so that they 
overlap in their planning, appraisal, and delivery period, can they be integrated to produce synergistic 
outcomes that are greater than the sum of their parts? The exploration above, together with the 
investigations in Chapters 4 and 5, conclude that if visionary and decisive leadership exists, a 
streamlined planning power is assigned, and there is continuous political supports from high levels 
committed to these investments, such coordination between multiple mega projects can better 
overcome the issues of institutional barriers, fiscal difficulties, and pressures to generate short-term 
returns. This can further encourage the achievement of sustainability visions and meet the broader 
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range of stakeholders’ needs.  
 
The content of the next two subsections is as follows: the first describes the test of the four hypotheses 
postulated at the outset of this research in line with the case study conducted in this chapter; the 
second covers theoretical insights and emergent issues derived from the pre-hypothesis and 
hypothesis-led investigations. 
6.6.1 Testing findings against hypotheses 
HYPOTHESIS 1 – The Role of MUTPs 
Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of 
sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and 
sustainable urban regeneration developments. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive 
catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and ME developments associated with its transport 
hubs. 
 
The arrival of the high-speed rail link is regarded as an impetus to the Stratford City regeneration 
scheme where the proponents believe that the new international station at Stratford can boost 
confidence in inward investment. The CTRL project has been a strong vehicle to lead the Stratford 
City scheme despite less-than-ideal circumstances, including the conflict between the state-controlled 
development agency and the local authorities, the housing market slump and the desperate need for 
new economic stimuli for both the Thames Gateway development and the Newham’s regeneration 
strategy. However, the PFI package designated to deliver the CTRL project challenges the adaptability 
of the local agenda which eventually compromised in order to share benefits from the project. This 
shows that if a MUTP is to be the engine for urban regeneration schemes, a certain compromise of the 
local stakeholders’ interests needs to be made in order to achieve consensus. This argument was 
echoed in the case of the King’s Cross Central scheme (see Chapter 5) where the local authorities 
needed to comply with the MUTP general policies first in order to gain more room to influence the 
decision-making process once it integrated into the project network. 
 
The London 2012 Olympic Games Bid was driven by political determination to deliver urban 
regeneration in east London, with its available lands and well-connected transport network. The 
initiative to bring the Games to London was also determined by the British Olympics Association 
(BOA) after the failures of the Birmingham and Manchester bids for the 1992, 1996 and 2000 Games. 
The BOA was convinced that only a London-based bid was likely to be taken seriously by the IOC 
(Poytner, 2009: 140). This, in turn, reinforced polarisation of the position of London in relation to 
other regions in the UK, inevitably leading to further concentration of resources in the capital. The 
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existence of the CTRL project was a positive factor in the decision of the IOC to stage the 2012 
Games in London. It was integrated into the Bid documents along with other justifications, such as 
existing regeneration schemes, by the Games promoters to convince the IOC. Though in reality its 
role in the provision of transport services during the Games period may be limited, it nevertheless 
proved to be a powerful symbol in creating the climate for a positive outcome to the decision. As 
mentioned in Chapter 4, the impact of the CTRL project on the London Bid in 2005 was rather 
fortuitous, and created a ripple effect. According to the case study findings with regard to the 
regeneration benefits which were claimed by both the CTRL project and the 2012 Games, the causal 
relationship is not as apparent and direct as argued by the champions of the two projects.  
 
The importance of the relationship between urban regeneration and the Olympic Games was 
applauded in a House of Commons Report entitled London 2012 Olympic Games and Paralympic 
Games: funding and legacy (2007). Given that the Thames Gateway is recognised by the Government 
as a national regeneration priority, as indicated earlier, it had long been prioritised by the LDA for 
regeneration before the 2012 Olympic Bid. According to the ODA, change was already coming to the 
Thames Gateway area through its existing regeneration plan. The 2012 London Games project 
accelerated the delivery of higher quality infrastructure in a more systematic way. On this basis, 
Poynter (2009) further argues, the Olympics would not have become the dominant project in east 
London if it had not been part of an existing urban regeneration area with substantial political 
commitment. In these terms, the development of the Olympic Park and Lower Lea Valley are 
presented as an “once-in-a-lifetime opportunity” for significant infrastructure investment and policy 
attention. This exploration is reflected by the findings in both streams of the investigations which 
identified that mega-project development relies on a narrow ‘window of opportunity’ (Appendix 4, 
under the topic “Window of opportunity”) and the analogy of ‘planetary alignment’ (Appendix 5, 
ORQ #2).  
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 – Political decision 
Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the 
effective delivery and performance of mega urban transport projects (MUTPs), sustainable urban 
regeneration and mega event schemes.  
 
There is concern about the number of plans and planning agencies involved in the Stratford, Lower 
Lea Valley, Olympic Park and Thames Gateway regeneration projects in east London. The plethora of 
responsible bodies and the unclear role of each organisation makes progress of the Thames Gateway 
very difficult. This kind of institutional arrangement also creates confusion and obscures the interface 
for the prospective investors. The mega-event strategy seems an opportunity to coordinate the 
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fragmented institutional governance and thus deliver sustainable urban regeneration. However, the 
character of mega-event planning connects to tight temporal and spatial constraints which make it 
impossible to reconcile the ambitions of market-orientated interest groups with the aspirations of 
sustainable communities. The constraints brought by the London 2012 Games, including fiscal 
scarcity, eliminated the promise of the Games’ sustainable legacy. On the contrary, it reinforces a 
state-controlled institutional arrangement which bolsters a commercially-driven Games as well as the 
adjacent regeneration projects geared to market-led profits and short-term returns. The carefully 
established organisational structure for the Games delivery epitomises how power relations are 
deployed in order to gain control of political, financial and institutional resources. Under these 
conditions, the institutional arrangements and power relations designed for the Games are unlikely to 
deliver the promised sustainable legacy, let alone a sustainable urban regeneration project. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 3 - Synergy of network 
Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban 
regeneration and mega events can better foster integrated development and the achievement of 
sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects.  
 
If the synergy of these three elements aims to achieve the vision of sustainable development, in 
practice it has proved to be difficult because of the constraints brought about by the market-driven 
nature of the urban regeneration schemes and the consumer-orientated mega-event strategy. The 
potential for strength through synergistic relations via inter-agency co-operation was undermined by 
numerous difficulties. In the case of the regeneration in Stratford, it involved many agencies charged 
with responsibilities, including those connected to Thames Gateway Development and the Olympic 
projects. Some argue that strong leadership which can co-ordinate the multiple agencies is needed. 
The intervention by the Games, however, did not provide the expected solution – integration of 
interests from wider-scope stakeholders. Instead, it has formed a platform for the Games-led 
organisations to monopolise resources. There is certain inevitability about this situation given the 
global spotlight and the immovable deadline of the Games, and the imperative to eliminate any risk of 
failure to deliver. In Games-related policies, this serves as a deterrent towards taking into account a 
broad range of stakeholder needs in the streamlined decision-making process. The synergy generated 
by the three elements acting in concert may exist, but it establishes a market-driven and short-term 
profit imperative which is not compatible with the visions of sustainable development that aims to 
ameliorate social disadvantages.  
 
The HRQ #7 in the hypothesis-led investigations asked whether concentrating the resources to deliver 
the Olympic Games can help the progress of redevelopment in the South East Region or, on the 
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contrary, reinforce the development in an already crowded London. The government’s ambition is to 
use the investment leverage opportunity provided by the Games to meet house-building targets and to 
accelerate the development pace of urban regeneration in the wider Thames Gateway region. There 
are conflicting views on how well this is being achieved.  Evans (2007: 313-314) argues that what the 
Olympics are doing is still confined to the area inside the London segment of the Thames Gateway 
and that it is actually “casting a shadow over the outer Thames Gateway region”.  What critics have 
pointed out is that the Olympic Games needs to be hosted in an area which is conceived as part of 
London overall, determined by the availability of land, the accessibility, and regeneration strategies 
pursued by east London. The overall conclusion, such critics contend, is not only that the ambitions of 
using the Games to boost the progress of the Thames Gateway development as a whole seems to be 
overstated, but that prioritising the financial, political, and institutional resources to support the 
Games’ development in the manner executed is creating a negative impact on the Thames Gateway 
(Poynter, 2009).  
 
These conclusions were substantiated by the responses of HRQ #5 which asks will the completion of 
the 2012 London Olympics divert resources away from other development initiatives? If so, are the 
spin-off benefits of this re-prioritised justified? (see Appendix 5, HRQ #5; Appendix 8, Table A8.9). 
Seven out of nine interview respondents supported the notion that the 2012 London Olympics diverted 
resources away from other developments. Among these responses, three felt that there would be 
significant spin-off benefits from this resource prioritisation. The remaining two stressed that the 
success of the London Olympics will ultimately be judged by its legacy plan, which is regarded by 
some as a strongly competitive development project with its high profile and publicity. In the 
interviews conducted by the OMEGA Centre, some respondents (5 out of 23) used the example of 
previous mega events, such as 1964 Tokyo Summer Olympics, 1992 Barcelona Summer Olympic, 
2006 Turin Winter Olympics, etc. as evidence that mega events - under certain political and 
institutional contexts - were important catalysts for mega infrastructure investments.  
 
Findings from the pre-hypothesis investigations endorsed those found from the hypothesis-led 
investigations in relation to the long-term justification and wider benefits that the investment for the 
Olympics project could potentially bring. Some respondents suggested, however, that this conclusion 
is very much moulded by how economic benefits are quantified and how these values are then fed 
back into the economic appraisal equation. This viewpoint brought to the forefront the question of 
which measurements to use and how to interpret the appraisal and assessment data. One respondent 
claimed that the UK system enables politicians always to be able to take credit for these benefits. A 
respondent offered views on the role played by the Olympics as the catalyst for urban regeneration:  
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“It [The London Olympics] will take resources away but I am not sure in what form. The most obvious 
place to be influenced will be the Thames Gateway. The test is not the Olympics itself but the legacy. If 
it delivers the legacy then arguably it is worth it.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a planner from the local 
authority, 30/09/2008) 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4 - Discourse Power 
Key champions of Mega Urban Transport Projects, Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events 
typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the 
stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests 
above all else with a limited sense of social corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ 
their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe 
to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas. 
 
In the case of the Olympic Games, the agenda has become entangled with those of urban regeneration 
and sustainable legacy. The London 2012 authority claims that the Games effect contributes positively 
to the Stratford City scheme and Lower Lea Valley regeneration. Successfully marketing the Games 
brand with its established discourse demonstrated the partnership between LOCOG, the ODA, the 
Mayor of London, and the local host authorities. Without a coherent set of policies to realise 
sustainable development programmes, the mega-event strategy has resorted to slogans and empty 
rhetoric.  
 
The mega-event discourse power is usually then strengthened by the legitimisation process of 
conferring legal power and obligation at the same time. There is plentiful evidence from previous 
Games to show that the direct benefits from the Games effect are marginal and long-term and indirect 
benefits are also very limited. The mega-event discourse power is dominant in controlling limited 
resources of that region or nation to fulfil the demands of hosting the event. However, this power is 
also risky and costly at public expense. It can leave the host city with a legacy of debt for many years. 
The more rational reason for decision-makers to support cities staging the Games is political gain. 
Under this circumstance, mega-event discourse is exploited as a tool but not as a means for pursuing 
achievable goals as it suggests. Once a city decides to enter a bid for the Games, then its decision-
makers need to be aware that they are entering into a minefield of political and financial hazards that 
may be beyond their expectation. The extreme power of this discourse forces stakeholders to 
subscribe to it, to adjust their agenda and to adapt in order to share interests rather than being excluded 
from the network.          
 
The analysis and discussion thus far suggests that the stakeholders in the discourse network that 
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adhere to the same discourse are in some regards rivals to each other when their agendas are different, 
but mutually reinforcing where they share a common agenda. According to the findings of the 
investigations, some argue that much of the discourse employed by the dominant stakeholders is more 
rhetoric than reality, while others argue that it reflects a strategy for the promotion and marketing of 
the project that requires adjustment in line with changing audiences and circumstances. What is clear, 
however, is that the interpretation of stakeholder behaviour very much depends on the interests and 
agenda of the party making the judgements.    
 
The discourse employed by the project champions aims to strengthen their project delivery network in 
order to fulfil their agendas. In other words, they strategically impose a discourse on the network to 
enhance their negotiating power. This premise is disproved by the findings of hypothesis-led 
investigation which suggest that the claim of marginalising other stakeholders is overstated. One 
interviewee from the Olympic organisation suggested that any marginalisation probably occurred 
unintentionally. Another respondent implied that the mega project discourse is not as powerful as the 
premise suggests because there are always people who are impervious to the blandishments of the 
project advocates despite the tempting promises that partly constitute the discourses of mega projects 
to gain more support. However, an interviewee from the local community strongly supported 
Hypothesis #4 and argued that:  
 
“This premise does come down to the heart of how decisions have been made in Britain.” (Hypothesis-
led interview, a person from the local community, 10/07/2008) 
 
The conclusion of findings in HRQ #9 highlights that mega-project discourses work best when they 
are robust and there is substantive content rather than merely ‘froth’ and ‘public relations speak’. This 
is echoed by the response derived from the hypothesis-led investigations:  
 
“This contains a suggestion of “the Emperor's New Clothes” agreement. But of course everybody 
likes the boy in the Andersen fairy tale. The CTRL and the Olympics are so political in nature with no 
commercial profit; people are not all in wonder at the sight of the Emperor, there are always some 
people who, like that little boy, point out the truth.” (Hypothesis-led interview, a community planner, 
22/08/2008) 
6.6.2 Discussion 
The examination of the interrelationship between the CTRL hub development at Stratford and the 
2012 London Olympics oriented projects have revealed many insights into the research questions. 
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These comprise the role of Stratford International in the development of the locality, the impacts of 
the Olympic Games on the integration of the synchronised mega projects studied and the factors that 
determined decisions on these projects.  After the in-depth exploration via the case studies, the 
findings directly related to the research questions are demonstrated above. In addition to these 
findings, there are several theoretical insights and emergent issues as described in the following 
paragraphs.  
 
The initiative of hosting mega events is political 
As identified in Chapter 2 and the findings in this case study, a mega event is defined as a political 
production, which is adopted for given agendas across different levels of stakeholders. The question 
posed here is what is the initiative to host the Olympics for nations and cities in the modern era? The 
answer echoes the review of previous mega events, including expos and the sporting events 
highlighted in Chapter 2. Although each nation and city claims distinctive agendas and goals in their 
mega-event discourse when bidding to host an event, the underlying motive is criticised as political 
and macho leadership (Jenkins, 2004). The 2012 London Olympics shows the political ambition of the 
previous Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, who used the mega-event strategy to seize public 
funding and to coerce the government to reprioritise its development agenda towards east London. In 
addition, the Olympics offered the opportunity to strengthen the institutional arrangements and the 
power of the office of Mayor, newly established in 2000. The prospect of the Games attracted many 
other political advocates, some no doubt motivated to improve their popularity. This conclusion 
echoes the conclusion of Shoval (2002) that the motivations to host mega events are mostly politically 
driven (also see Chapter 2). 
 
The monopoly of global firms 
Those multinational corporations, highly driven to pursue areas with high investment potential and a 
lenient regulatory environment, typically manoeuvre the major urban development to form a pattern 
that is conducive of modernisation and consumerism. The success of these firms is fostered by the 
force of globalisation, mobilisation of capital and professionals and increasing coalition among 
international stakeholders who attempt to lower the competition in the shared market. For instance, the 
developers of Stratford City are the Westfield Group and Lend Lease. Both are based in Australia. The 
former is the world’s largest listed retail property company with over 100 shopping centres worldwide. 
The latter is one of the world’s largest property development companies. This phenomenon reflects the 
criticism documented by Janelle and Beuthe (1997) that these multinational corporations obtain 
superior negotiation position in mega project developments. As a result of these leading positions in 
the global market, there is a stereotypical city image emerging in many urban regeneration schemes. 
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The responsibility lies with the local authorities to safeguard local identity and to ensure the value of 
local contexts is not compromised by the momentum to imitate models from other cities. 
 
Is the mega-event effect amplified in less developed economics? 
As addressed in Chapter 2, Spain’s economic and political situation in the 1990s largely contributed to 
the success of 1992 Barcelona Olympics. London as a world city has very different contextual factors 
that will determine the impacts of the 2012 Olympic Games. While some mega-event promoters claim 
that the mega event drives the delivery of certain major projects which are important to economic 
growth, critics from the interviews conducted in this research argue that investment should also be 
made in social infrastructure rather than only on projects accessible only to high-income groups. For 
developing economies, where there are many aspects that require improvement, many infrastructure 
developments are urgently needed in order to improve the quality of life and help long-term economic 
growth. The mega-event strategy can be seen as a significant injection in terms of political and 
financial resources, with other interests inevitably being marginalised. If the mega-event strategy 
remains a means to encourage consumption-oriented economic activities, it remains to be seen 
whether this strategy will be more effectively and efficiently applied in decayed areas and less 
developed economics.  
6.7 Conclusions 
This chapter has explored the role of the 2012 London Olympics and its impacts on the urban 
regeneration scheme at Stratford. These two case studies have reinforced the findings in Chapters 4 
and 5 on the importance of political support from the central government for such mega projects. 
Especially in the UK, this dominant power is one of the prerequisites for efficient mega-project 
decision-making. Political determination and powerful intervention is also proved to be an essential 
facilitator in development investments in east London.  
 
A critical insight has been gained into the various roles and responsibilities of the key stakeholders, 
highlighting important interactions and their consequences. Following this critical review, a detailed 
evaluation of the nature and dynamics of the discourse that has taken place was provided, shedding 
some light on the function, accountability, and feasibility of the Olympic discourses. It revealed that, 
although it has exclusivity of public sector planning power, the ODA does not have a strong 
negotiation position when dealing with the private sector over the issues concerning the commercial 
arrangements. This is mainly because they are ultimately restrained by the force of the IOC and the 
urgency of delivering the Games on time. The ODA’s negotiation power was further eroded by the 
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Games’ budget issues. The gulf between the initial estimate for the 2012 London Games and the 2007 
cost announcement is the result of over optimistic and biased estimates, the complicated but 
inaccurate impact studies, and lack of transparency.  
 
Stratford City scheme is stimulated by the high-speed railway station and then complicated by the 
arrival of the 2012 Games-related projects in terms of reprioritising resources, rephrasing its 
programme, conflicts on the project implementation and the already competitive and unhealthy 
housing market in east London. Thus, in this case, the Olympics project has opportunistically been 
able to take advantage of available land and transport connections. There is limited connection 
between the catalyst effect of the Games and the Stratford City scheme although they are enmeshed in 
the presentation of the Olympic discourse.  
 
With reference to the characteristics of mega events reviewed in Chapter 2, the 2012 London 
Olympics fulfil the following criteria:  
 
 They are created, organised, and controlled by elite groups; 
 They are reinforced by ideological and propagandist discourses; 
 They have high adaptability toward the global political environment;  
 They benefit from a kind of ‘sacredness’ and protectionism that is inherent in the mega events; 
and 
 They play an important role in nation-building, national identity reinforcement, and national 
marketing. 
 
The Mayor of London and the Prime Minister shared the glory of the successful 2012 Olympic Games 
Bid and took the opportunity to reinforce their visions of urban governance and the agenda of urban 
regeneration in east London. Since the discourses about the co-ordination of regeneration benefits and 
the Games were well promoted, politicians favoured it until the upwardly revised budget was revealed.  
 
This chapter has again highlighted the effectiveness of lobbying. The efforts made by the Newham 
Council and the Stratford Promoter Group have created and accelerated development in the locality. 
These include the Stratford International, the Stratford City scheme, the 2012 Olympic Games and the 
recent decision on Crossrail.  
 
Finally, this chapter has revealed that the premise of the coordination between multiple mega projects 
is more likely to bring aggravation rather than multiplied benefits because such integration can 
dramatically amplify capital risks. This finding echoes Lindblom’s theory which contends that the 
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integration between several mega projects is more an ideology since the high levels of uncertainty can 
generate great barriers for this kind of coordination.   
 
Chapters 4, 5, and 6 have examined the CTRL project as a MUTP, the King’s Cross Central urban 
regeneration scheme, the Stratford City scheme, and the 2012 London Olympic Games. This thesis 
has revealed the answers to the primary research question on what role of MUTPs play in sustainable 
urban regeneration and mega events, and what are the relationships between these projects given the 
institutional contexts and power relations of the stakeholders as the backdrop to the decision-making 
process. The final chapter will conclude this thesis. It will summarise the answers to the research 
questions and the results of hypothesis testing, highlight the findings which add new knowledge to the 
understanding of mega-project investments. It will also review the strengths and limitations of the 
research methodology employed, and finally conclude with the lessons of potential value for 
application to future mega projects.  
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7 Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
The aim of this thesis is to identify and clarify the interrelationships among a cluster of three different 
types of mega projects, conceived and executed in the same timeframe and the same spatial context, 
with a view to establishing whether well-functioning cooperation between these projects can bring 
about more favourable synergistic outcomes that are greater than the sum of their parts for the key 
stakeholders involved. The research also sought to examine the extent to which institutional 
arrangements and power relationships are vital in understanding the nature and complexity of 
decision-making with regard to mega-project investments. It assesses the validity of a theoretical 
framework and a series of hypotheses which address the role of power relations and institutional 
arrangements in decision-making processes of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration projects and 
mega-event related development, using as case studies the Channel Tunnel Rail Link and its 
associated hub development. Rigorous examination of the case studies has identified which theoretical 
concepts are consistent with the research findings and helpful in their interpretation. These links are 
demonstrated throughout this concluding chapter.  
 
This final chapter is presented in three parts: 
 The first provides a synthesis of the findings from case studies and literature reviews regarding 
MUTPs, mega urban regeneration schemes, mega events, and their related decision-making. The 
synthesis contributes to a better understanding of the decisions taken as a basis for informing 
future mega project developments. 
 The second offers a summary of the synthesis of the case study findings derived from both 
primary and secondary sources framed against the thesis’ key research questions and hypotheses. 
It concludes with a review of the case study methodology and recommended improvements for 
future study.  
 Finally, the third part concludes with insights derived from the case studies that offer potentially 
valuable lessons for application to future mega projects. 
 
The cluster of mega project developments examined in this research demonstrates strong 
interrelationships in terms of the restricting and reinforcing influences on project planning, appraisal, 
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and delivery. Given the effective stakeholder collaboration observed, it is apparent that a number of 
opportunities have not only enhanced the business case for each of the three mega projects examined 
but also offer more attractive investment opportunities overall. The findings point to opportunities to 
contribute to goals of sustainable development, subject to the availability of an appropriate policy 
framework, suitable governance, and leadership. While it is clear that such collaboration inevitably 
involves higher risk and an extensive degree of compromise among stakeholders, it is an approach to 
be recommended, albeit with some reservations. As an example, it is a process likely to be dominated 
by elite groups, and this has the potential to marginalises disadvantaged groups if compensatory 
actions are not taken. Furthermore, under the current planning environment in the UK, both the public 
and private sectors are constrained by the movements of the market which can produce difficulties for 
project financing in certain economic conditions. These problems are sometimes accentuated by the 
government Treasury’s over-cautious desire to save money rather than time which can lead to delays 
in decision-making for mega projects. Invariably, neither is saved. 
7.2   Synthesis of the Findings from the Literature Reviews and Case Studies 
This section draws together the evidence presented in the literature reviews of the three types of mega 
projects (namely: MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega events) and theories of 
decision-making relating to the attributes, trends, challenges, and issues of mega-project investments 
as presented in Chapters 2. The common characteristics of these three types of mega urban 
development projects are identified and established, and issues drawn from the literature about mega 
projects are validated with the assistance of observations from the case studies. Context-sensitive 
cases are used where appropriate to highlight key points. The links between the decision-making 
theories and the three types of mega projects are elaborated in this section. 
7.2.1 Common features of mega projects 
Given the very nature of the mega projects, especially their characteristic high financial risk and 
longevity in the planning process, the cases investigated have the following common features that 
reflect the theories reviewed in Chapter 2 regarding the prevailing political, institutional, social, and 
financial environments. 
 
Mega-project decisions are dominated by elite groups  
According to the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, it was revealed that mega projects rely strongly 
upon vested interest partnerships and elite-dominated urban policy formation. The evidence gathered 
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from the case studies shows that problems arise from the close relationships between local authorities 
and developers. Because of the high institutional barriers associated with project-led networks, local 
authorities are likely to be in a disadvantageous position when negotiate with developers for 
commercial arrangements, resulting in diminished corporate social responsibility. This situation is 
more evident in the case of the Stratford City regeneration scheme, which is constrained by the 
timetable of the 2012 Olympics-oriented development. The network of the Games development, 
composed of specially-designed institutional structure and power distribution mechanism, has little 
space for local authorities and grassroots groups to participate in the decision-making process. This 
mirrors the theory of Path Dependency (Pierson, 2000). Pierson (2000) cites that ‘increasing returns’ 
in the political process as the dominant players reinforce their power in the network. This also 
confirms the initial premise that institutional arrangements and power relations are significant factors 
in mega-project decision-making. 
 
The powers which can manipulate mega-project investments are reinforced by project 
discourses, which tightly attach to political agendas   
The case studies reinforce the findings in the literature review that mega projects are empowered and 
governed by dedicated agency and streamlined planning powers which are strengthened by project 
discourse that is designed to promote the projects (see Hajer, 1995 and 2003). Such supreme power is 
legitimised by policies associated with mega-project development that are continually amended when 
new crises or major problems occur. Under this circumstance, mega projects are inevitably attached to 
prevailing agendas, often with privileged access to resources. According to the findings of the case 
studies, project discourses are regarded as a means to market projects. The process of using discourses 
to sell such mega projects is a very project-focused procedure, coordinated within the project delivery 
network. The discourse of mega projects can change over time and depends on prevailing issues such 
as cost efficiency, sustainability, and visions for urban regeneration. The research findings also point 
out that there is propensity of unmet promises resulting from mega-project discourses. For the purpose 
of gaining support from the public, and to further entice investments for projects, project discourses 
are likely to contain promises that provoke excessively high expectations from the delivery of these 
mega projects.   
 
On-going government commitment and significant public investments are prerequisites of 
mega-project development  
Mega project delivery needs the assurances of bi-partisan government in order to continue its 
development throughout changing political environments. Government commitments are responsible 
for enabling the necessary initiatives and concessionary contracts for attracting private sector 
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investment. In addition, a mega project on its own cannot be sufficient to fulfil the vision of 
sustainability to an area. Public investment in general infrastructure supporting the overall 
development is a prerequisite for the success of a MUTP project, sustainable urban regeneration 
scheme, and a mega-event legacy plan. Most importantly, any such mega project needs to be planned 
in the context of its city, region, and nation. The context includes political culture, planning systems, 
economic environment, and public perceptions. In the case of Stratford International and the 2012 
Olympic Games, the determination of the political champions to develop east London is one of the 
main factors for the delivery of the projects.  
 
Sustainable development as an element of mega-project discourses remains rhetoric  
The “sustainability vision”, although highlighted in the promises espoused in all the studied mega 
projects in this research, was found to remain in the realms of rhetoric rather than being a proven core 
driver for mega-project development. The findings of this research point to the view that disputes over 
sustainable development can undermine the viability of the projects and the value of what can be 
achieved or delivered together as a package of mega projects rather than a set of individual 
investments. The lack of consensus on what constitutes solid ground for the implementation of the 
sustainability approach leaves mega projects vulnerable and compromises economic growth over 
concerns about intra-city competition. The post-2008/2009 global financial crisis and the financial 
disarray across Europe at the time of writing amplified the barriers to sustainable development. It is 
concluded that the “sustainability vision” is nothing more substantial than part of the project discourse 
that is used to promote such mega projects. Many in local communities favour piecemeal development, 
an approach which they claim is more sustainable and compatible with the needs of local communities 
and businesses. They argue that comprehensive development projects, such as those reported in this 
research, do not appreciate the essence of organic growth of cities. These mega projects contribute to 
rises in land and property values, and in turn lead to gentrification and displacement, along with other 
negative impacts. 
7.2.2 Interrelated issues  
In accordance with the previous section, there are a number of interrelated issues that are consistent 
across the three types of mega-project-oriented urban development. The following is a summary of the 
findings from the literature which offer further reinforcement from the case studies.   
 
Urban regeneration benefits are packaged into MUTP and mega-event development  
The literature shows that, in recent years, urban regeneration projects, with the changes of priorities in 
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public initiatives and investments, political climate, and global trends over time, have become project-
led initiatives, packaged into MUTP and mega-event projects involving large mixed-use development 
and flagship projects. This observation is supported by the case studies, which indicate that 
regeneration benefits have become an important financial justification for high-speed rail projects as 
well as for the Olympic Games. However, the lack of concrete evidence to show positive economic 
impacts and the scepticism stemming from the conflicts between market- and community-led 
developments cast doubt on whether mega-project discourses relating to regeneration benefits can be 
meaningful. As seen in the case study findings, arguments were made that the London Olympic 
delivery team intertwined the Olympic project with the Stratford City scheme to the extent that it 
presented a misleading double-counting of benefits. This ‘double counting’ of regeneration benefits is 
seen by such critics as an overstatement of the Olympic effect and ignores the negative impacts 
brought to the Stratford City scheme. This argument reflects characteristics of the prestige urban 
regeneration projects reviewed in Chapter 2.   
 
The benefits and costs of project-led networking are perceived differently by different 
stakeholder groups  
Project-led networks inevitably involve a wide range of stakeholders, thus mega-project delivery 
requires strong leadership, proactive engagement from all actors, and an effective communication 
interface. This represents a challenge in terms of whether such networks can, with government 
intervention, ensure that project outcomes fulfil broader stakeholders’ needs. Although mega-project 
discourses often suggest that large-scale infrastructure investments can exhibit significant trickle-
down benefits to the local communities and to local businesses, this assertion has shown in this 
research to be overstated. This is mainly the result of over-optimistic claims and forecasts encouraged 
by political ambition and the use of inaccurate methods for project appraisal. This finding echoes the 
conclusions of Hall (1980) and Flyvbjerg et al. (2003) that the root cause of project cost overruns is 
over-optimistic attitudes towards project development. As demonstrated earlier, the power of project 
discourse, as a combination of political determination and the selective use of project study evidence 
by dominant decision-makers, is employed to promote mega projects. The synthesis of the findings 
from the review of Hajer’s (1995 and 2003) work and the case studies shows that project-led networks 
with streamlined planning power can produce optimal results that are closer to expectations of the 
members of the project networks. On the contrary, a fast-track and efficient style of development is 
not attractive to some parties who are in favour of organic and incremental growth.  
 
In addition, a fully integrated programme of the kind that comprises multiple mega projects and 
stakeholders is criticised by Lindblom and Hirschman (1962) because of the extensive difficulties for 
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network coordination presented by the scale and uncertainties inherent in these projects (also see 
Chapter 2). This view is substantiated by some stakeholders of the projects studied. It is indicated by 
the findings of the case studies that coordination between several mega projects can only be realised in 
an authoritarian regime. Two main objections arise regarding this proposed idea about mega-project 
coordination. One is that the oversize scale of coordinating multiple mega projects can lead to 
irreversible catastrophe that is beyond anyone’s control. The other is that the coordination between 
mega projects is in some way inevitable under the prevalent trends toward modernity – the pursuit, for 
example, of high-speed mobility, robust and attractive infrastructure, and advanced technology – 
which are not necessarily sustainable. As a result, disadvantaged groups are most vulnerable and stand 
to lose the most in the development process.  
 
Mega projects bring prestige to localities, leading some stakeholders to redirect resources away 
from much needed, though lower-profile, programmes  
Mega projects represent national or city symbols of economic virility and national unity which are 
traded-off by project stakeholders who are involved in different stages of the project lifecycle. These 
include decision-makers, developers, contractors, local authorities, and residents. Politicians are eager 
to be associated with project ‘success’ and with boosting their popularity, while local communities 
gain in civic pride and identity with the fame and reputation of such projects. The prioritisation of 
high profile mega projects inevitably has an impact on lower-profile investment programmes in public 
services and infrastructure in the form of delays and reduced specifications or cancellations, often to 
the detriment of minorities and other disadvantaged groups whose needs are more easily marginalised. 
The evidence of this claim is more apparent in the mega-event-related developments where the 
‘opportunity cost’ should be taken into account. The findings of the research argued that the Olympic 
project represents a large-scale opportunity cost for London that has diverted scarce resources from 
more pressing projects, and cited as an example the diversion of funds used for local social projects 
from the National Lottery. 
7.2.3 Context-sensitive features 
Following up on the summary of the general features and the consistent issues of the studied mega 
projects, this section focuses on the main context-sensitive features relating to mega project 
developments which are revealed in both the literature review and the case studies. The results 
highlighted here endorse the findings of the investigations conducted in this research. 
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MUTPs are involved in large and interdependent networks  
Based on the evidence from this research and the literature review, the project-led networks that drive 
MUTPs are increasingly likely to be part of larger national and international networks, resulting in 
increased interdependence and increased vulnerability to delays introduced by individual component 
parts. As to urban regeneration and mega-event related developments, they are essentially locally 
focused, particularly in terms of their catchment areas which are not as wide as the transport network 
which serves them. The impacts of these three types of projects differ in geographical scale and nature. 
Mega events, in particular, are dependent on MUTPs and urban regeneration schemes. They rely 
heavily on the existing infrastructure, especially the existing transport system, and on available land 
for redevelopment.  For this reason, mega events were characterised by many of those interviewed as 
opportunistic (perhaps even speculative), waiting for opportunities while at the same time opening 
windows of opportunity for other projects and triggering a spate of opportunistic behaviour from those 
seeking benefits out of the association with mega events. 
 
Both strands of the research enquiry endorse that MUTPs are seen as the prerequisite for successful 
urban regeneration and mega events, although they bring no guarantee of success. The CTRL, for 
example, enabled the delivery of other projects and provided a chain of events that no one individual 
mega project could deliver on its own. These findings suggest that whilst CTRL allows other projects 
to happen, the MUTP also has a dependency on these other projects, (e.g., urban regeneration schemes 
and other service transportation projects), to both sustain their momentum of development and justify 
the levels of investment made. 
 
Local authorities are responsible for securing local needs and interests  
Owing to the strong interrelationship between impacts of urban regeneration schemes and their 
localities, local authorities play a particularly important role in seeking to secure local interests. Strong 
partnerships between local authorities and private sector developers in urban regeneration schemes are 
essential because the private sector has access to a wider range of financial resources. The expectation, 
however, of a greater shouldering of financial risk by the private sector is compromised within Public 
Private Partnerships on account of project reliance on new funding from the private sector.  
 
The delivery of mega-event related development is driven by a time related imperative. This 
intensifies the pressure and tends to lead to higher risk and increases in overall costs. Furthermore, 
mega events involve stakeholders operating more prevalently at the national level. Local authorities 
are not sufficiently powerful to lead mega-event development, but they do significantly contribute 
their views and frequently exert influence on the ultimate decision-making that takes place. The 
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ultimate decision-making power, however, lies in the specially-designated agencies created by the 
government.  
 
In the UK, the decision-making powers related to MUTP development are highly centralised, and 
financial initiatives or approvals rely heavily on the HM Treasury. Under these circumstances, once a 
project receives the ‘green light’ by Government and is subsequently legitimised by central 
government agencies, there is little additional influence that local authorities can exert. 
 
Findings derived from both the pre-hypothesis and hypothesis-led investigations reveal that no matter 
who provides the leadership in the coordination of mega project developments, and irrespective of 
which type of project is the primary driver, ultimately, in the negotiation process, local authorities 
have the responsibility to shape the agenda and insist on attention to local needs. 
7.3 Synthesis of the Case Study Findings  
This section recaps the research questions and their findings. It is organised according to the sequence 
of results of the hypothesis testing. The comparison of the findings from the Narrative Pattern 
Analysis and the Content Analysis helped to integrate the outcomes of the research investigations in a 
manner that can either re-affirm or cast some additional new light on identified issues. The purpose of 
the comparative analysis is to see how these research outcomes from the different strands of enquiry 
respond to the questions posed at the outset of this PhD study in order to take a position on whether 
they are compatible or have major conflicts, with a view in both cases to allow the hypotheses to be 
tested and the principal conclusions to be drawn. 
 
The primary research question of this thesis is: 
When multiple mega projects are instigated in the same timeframe and same spatial context, can 
they be integrated to produce synergistic outcomes that are greater than the sum of their parts? 
 
Based on this research question, the primary hypothesis is as the follows: 
MUTPs can be an effective factor for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and 
international mega events; and, furthermore, mega events can positively catalyse both MUTP 
development and sustainable urban regeneration. Notwithstanding this, it is assumed that there 
are many other influencing factors which will lead to different outcomes for urban regeneration 
and mega events despite the use of MUTPs as a major strategic vehicle. 
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The case study findings have revealed that the coalition of interests that forms around these projects is 
a leading dimension of major development. This coalition is mostly constituted by politicians and 
developers. Moreover, given the combination of globalisation forces and concerns about city image in 
the context of competitiveness, MUTPs always go hand-in-hand with commercially-oriented urban 
regeneration. It also shows a general belief that the government or a well-equipped public agency 
should provide leadership with sufficient investment in such coalitions. Local authorities in this type 
of mega-project network need to be proactive and commit adequate resources at all levels in order to 
reach a position where they can shape the project design, manage the construction impacts and 
participate in the decision-making process.  
 
The use of regeneration benefits to finance the building of an MUTP is overstated because the 
regeneration benefits are difficult to monetise and revenues are generated far into the future.  As such, 
these benefits are only useful to help defray the transport infrastructure operation cost but not the 
project construction cost. Within this coordination of these three types of mega projects, mega events 
can provide a greater degree of certainty, in particular, for effective regeneration in times of an adverse 
economic climate. According to the case studies, uncertainties on project timeframe and investments 
surrounding the development programmes for King’s Cross area and the Stratford City scheme were 
significantly reduced because of the dependency of the Olympics on their services.  However, this 
certainty provided by mega events simultaneously generates enormous time pressures on some 
projects that result in cost escalation because of the ‘non-negotiable’ timeframes for completion.  
 
Notwithstanding the above, the research reveals that disputes over visions of sustainable development, 
especially its meaning and practical applications, cloud the issue of mega project viability. It shows 
that the general public and some mega project stakeholders have become cynical about the 
interpretation and utility of the concept. They claim that the coordination of these three types of mega 
projects does not help to achieve visions of sustainable development if sustainability is not owned by 
a wider range of stakeholders. The findings of this research reveal a concern that cynicism regarding 
‘convenient’ interpretations of ‘sustainable development’ can undermine the value of the concept and 
can even, for some, render the term meaningless. 
 
To better understand the answer of the primary research question, the findings of its sub-questions and 
associated hypotheses are elaborated below.  
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7.3.1 Research question #1 and hypothesis #1 
Research Question #1 
What is the role of MUTPs in sustainable urban regeneration and mega events; and what are their 
relationships given the institutional contexts and frameworks that they have been planned, appraised, 
and delivered within? 
 
Hypothesis #1 
MUTPs have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of sustainable urban regeneration and 
mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and sustainable urban regeneration 
development. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive catalyst for both sustainable urban 
regeneration and the Olympic development associated with its transport hubs. 
 
Findings  
Do MUTPs act as agents of sustainable urban regeneration and mega events? The research shows that, 
in the case of the King’s Cross Central scheme, the CTRL project did produce the thrust to overcome 
political conflicts and provided a compromising backdrop for negotiation and for reaching a 
consensus on the scheme. However, the CTRL also contributed to significant problems including: 
missed developing opportunities, increasing costs, and intensifying the complexity of the project. The 
Stratford City scheme would have gone ahead regardless of an international station because the area 
was seen as being important enough and sufficiently economically enticing in its own right to attract 
such development independently. However, the high-speed terminal provided certainty which allowed 
the regeneration project to go ahead much earlier than would otherwise have been the case.  
 
The assertion that MUTPs are a catalyst for mega events is overstated in the case of the CTRL project, 
although it did significantly facilitate the success of the Olympics bid; it was however only one of the 
significant factors. In this regard, that the CTRL project strengthened the London Bid was largely 
fortuitous and was ‘in the right place at the right time’ rather than strategically planned to help 
strengthen the Games proposal. The OMEGA Study interviews indicate that mega events have the 
power to convert planning into political imperatives for MUTPs that are already underway, or 
forcefully distort and modify existing projects to suit the temporary needs and the attendant political 
egos. 
 
A comparison of the findings of both streams of enquiry suggests that the CTRL project had the 
following effects: 
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 It brought certainty to the development of the derelict railway lands.  
 The St Pancras international railway terminal changed the image of the King’s Cross area, which 
has made the King’s Cross Central scheme assume a higher profile.  
 The local authority, contractors, and developers involved in the St Pancras station project trade off 
it and earn a good reputation.  
 The Stratford International Station project made a positive contribution to the London Olympics 
decision.  
 
Overall, CTRL is primarily a catalyst for the larger regenerative schemes which are taking place at 
King’s Cross and Stratford and further East through the Thames Gateway, but the vision of 
sustainability has been too weak and imprecise to be the driver of the project specifications. It was 
found merely to help the narrative around the business case for the high-speed rail development.  
7.3.2 Research question #2 and hypothesis #2 
Research Question #2 
How do institutional arrangements and decision-makers respond in order to manage changes of 
contexts and environments in the planning of MUTP, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega 
events? 
 
Hypothesis #2 
Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the 
effective delivery and performance of MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega-
event-related development.  
 
Findings  
Based on Path Dependency theory (North, 1993; Pierson, 2000), this research premises that 
institutional arrangements can erect high barriers that inhibit efficient decision-making. This 
constraint is further strengthened by the influence of the vested interest groups who constantly seek to 
protect their own particular benefits. The findings of the case studies reveal that the decision-making 
is influenced by political power and the power of technocratic rationality at different stages of a 
project life cycle. Also, based on the realisation that a project appraisal can never be all-encompassing 
and sufficiently accurate, visionary, and decisive politicians are often the main force behind such 
projects even though evidence generated by technocrats may show low viability potential as defined 
by traditional appraisal criteria. However, the findings conclude that the absolute decision-making 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
 
220 
 
power is not vested in any one individual stakeholder because major infrastructure investments are 
ultimately constrained by financial realities.  
 
Findings from the CTRL case study suggest that it is imperative to have a political decision-making 
structure in place in order to be able to implement any financial restructuring and to deliver new fiscal 
measures of the kind that were implemented for the CTRL. The research investigations suggest that 
much of the decision-making process of the CTRL appeared to be conducted on an ad hoc basis and 
that the process had little to do with planning but rather more with the need for a political outcome. 
From another perspective, the lengthy evolution of the CTRL project appeared to adjust itself over 
time to reflect the different political environments and changing emergent political agendas, a process 
which was considered by many respondents as a positive achievement. 
 
With regard to strategies employed to strengthen the negotiation powers of mega-project decision-
making, the findings have shown that the development process of power relations was complex, 
dynamic, and in some cases constrained over time by shifting political agendas and dynamic property 
markets. These power relations produced a conflict of aspirations between various stakeholders and a 
limited commitment to sustainability and inclusivity in urban regeneration participation. Under these 
circumstances, key mega-project stakeholders adhered to the discourses set out in the various 
changing agendas, with government commitments, and political support gaining a stronger negotiation 
position over time. In particular, a coalition of leading businesses, politicians, and local bureaucrats is 
likely to give the former the best negotiating position and to shape public policies to benefit 
businesses through their access to economic resources. 
 
Additionally, the findings derived from the case study investigations also indicate that good 
stakeholder-management skills are important, particularly in mega projects with a large number of 
actors in the project network. This includes the willingness to understand different styles of thinking, 
an effective mutual communication, proactive partnership, and commitment to provide resources. It 
was suggested that these elements in a stakeholder network can facilitate more joined-up solutions and 
enhance influence in negotiation where trust and consensus among stakeholders can be established. 
 
Tight time, fiscal, and spatial constraints brought by the London 2012 Games, in reality eliminated the 
promise of the Games’ sustainable legacy. On the contrary, it reinforces a state-controlled institutional 
arrangement which bolsters a commercially-driven Games and regeneration projects that are primarily 
geared to market-led profits and short-term returns. Opponents of the Games played a major 
‘watchdog’ role by pointing out many of the flaws in the mega-event discourses and highlighting 
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many negative shared experiences, including being displaced or having their lives disrupted. It is 
concluded, however, that the political determination that made the mega event happen and the realities 
of the execution of the project, plus the nature of the international contract the government has entered 
into with the international Olympic movement, dramatically curtailed the power of the opponents. 
Also, in both the CTRL project and the London 2012 Games, the case studies reveal that crises and 
problems can sometimes trigger new opportunities, especially where the risk for developers is largely 
underwritten by the government.  
7.3.3 Research question #3 and hypothesis #3 
Research Question #3 
Can several synchronised mega projects deliver a favourable outcome to stakeholders if they integrate 
and mutually reinforce each other, rather than compete with limited social, economic, political, and 
environmental resources? 
 
Hypothesis #3 
Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, sustainable urban 
regeneration, and mega events can effectively foster integrated development and the achievement of 
sustainable development visions that add value to the original individual projects. 
 
Findings  
It was found from this research that synergies may exist where the three types of projects act in 
concert. However, these constructs are likely to establish a market-driven and short-term profit 
imperative which is at odds with the visions of sustainable development that aim to ameliorate social 
disadvantages. The findings show that there is a degree of resource sharing between these three types 
of mega projects in terms of institutional arrangements and political commitment, while other aspects 
(such as manpower and suppliers in project implementation) are in competition. Critics point out that 
resources are shared in a way that especially generates a favourable outcome for the project promoters, 
organisers, and advocates. Moreover, MUTPs tend to lead this level of integration in terms of the scale 
of its impact. Other projects will adjust themselves to be compatible with the large-scale project in 
order to gain a better chance of reducing their own level of uncertainty of achieving their objectives 
by incorporating some elements of compromise and mutual reinforcement. Evidence from this 
research investigation suggests that many mega project decision-making processes in the UK are 
overly opportunistic, with key parties willing to enter into compromises. These processes are more 
likely to yield sub-optimal project outcomes than if they were planned in an integrated manner from 
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the outset.  
 
Another obstacle to such coordination revealed in this research is the dynamics of large numbers of 
stakeholders and their diverse interests within the context of democracy, where a good stakeholder 
management is one of the prerequisites for mega-project integration. This research has shown that the 
most effective form of mega-project governance is a partnership that embraces the qualities of trust, 
risk sharing, transparency, and proactive communication. Within this, in mega-project integration, it is 
vital to have strong leadership that provides both a clear vision and is properly accountable. Key 
actors may not be the most powerful in terms of the established hierarchy but are likely to be the most 
influential if they have strong and regular connections to all stakeholders within the network. The 
local authorities of King’s Cross Central scheme played the mediator role effectively and are widely 
considered as an essential driver for the regeneration project. The case of the King’s Cross Central 
regeneration project shows that achieving such synergistic qualities was undermined by over-reliance 
on commercial property and land value gains and the protraction of CTRL project decision-making, 
resulting in high degree of uncertainty. The CTRL stations and their associated regeneration efforts 
became more integrated as a result of premeditated intentions and justifications during the 
construction phase of the CTRL.  
 
Based on research question #3 and hypothesis #3, the research particularly looked at the 
interrelationship between the Stratford International Station, the Stratford City scheme, and the 
London Olympics. It revealed that the Stratford International Station was approved according to 
enthusiasts’ passionate belief in claims made by local authorities as to the catalytic effect of the 
international station on the Stratford development. There is a danger, however, for the Stratford station 
to become a ‘white elephant’ after the Games if the international high-speed train does not stop in 
Stratford. Despite the likelihood of the London Olympics changing the image of Stratford, the 
territory of Central London is in reality expanding, and though Crossrail will further improve the 
Stratford International Station’s passenger numbers, it is expected to take some time for Stratford to 
become more competitive. Government intervention and commitment is seen here to be critical to 
improve the attractiveness of investing in east London. This finding reflects the claims of Healey 
(1994) and Hollingsworth and Boyer (1999) that government intervention in mega projects is an 
important force for breaking development inertia and for setting up rules for effective resource 
allocation. Significant government financing is essential because without this form of government 
intervention in the market the timing and patterns of developments will be driven purely by the market, 
which may not be in the interest of public sector, in particular because this is likely to lead to a much 
longer timeframe of development and more fragmented development. To sum up, the synergistic 
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relationship between the Stratford International Station, Stratford City regeneration scheme, and the 
London Olympics was found not to be strong enough either to foster integrated development or to 
achieve sustainability.  
 
This research posed the questions about the extent to which these projects are mutually reinforcing, 
whether there is a credibility gap between the rhetoric and the reality of the discourse surrounding the 
London Olympics, and, if so, what impact this has had on the other two mega projects. This thesis 
concludes that the gap between initial expectations and final results is a process of rebalancing the 
equation with individual actors negotiating whilst seeking to limit their exposure to risk, which is the 
nature of business itself. This reflects what was emphasised by Lindblom, who believes that 
‘adjustments’ in decision making are continuously propelled towards an optimal degree of imbalance 
by the exertion of bargaining powers (Lindblom, 1954). Developers claim that failure to achieve 
anticipated benefits is mostly due to unforeseen circumstances and events rather than any sort of 
conspiracy. As for politicians, the political promises and many of their rhetorical visions are often the 
means of assembling wider support in order for the project to gain legitimacy. Under these 
circumstances, the UK public and political communities tend to be sceptical about project benefits that 
are promised by promoters and are well aware that many extravagant claims will inevitably disappoint. 
In addition, Games-related policies, because of the global spotlight and the immovable deadline of the 
Games, as well as the imperative to eliminate any risk of failure to deliver, serve as a significant 
deterrent to taking into account a broader range of stakeholder needs during the streamlined decision-
making process. As such, it is suggested that countries host the Olympics should solely for reasons of 
national celebration, since the economic rationale is too weak and the associated promises are almost 
always overstated.  
7.3.4 Research question #4 and hypothesis #4 
Research Question #4 
Have mega project discourses been used as a tool by key champions to convince others of the validity 
of the mega projects in the expectation that these discourses will be shared by a broader spectrum of 
stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the interests of these champions 
and empowering the project delivery network? 
 
Hypothesis #4 
Key champions of MUTP, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events typically establish their 
discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or 
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more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests above all else with limited sense of 
corporate social responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to strengthen their 
network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same discourse, even though they 
may have different agendas (see Hajer, 1995 and 2003; Roche, 2000). 
 
Findings  
Does mega-project discourse reinforce the power of key mega project champions in project 
development? The thesis’ research findings conclude that marginalisation by dominant actors of those 
who do not support their discourse may occur unintentionally as a result of the power of the 
expanding project-led network. This is to say that mega project discourses are not packaged in an 
overtly subversive way, but rather reflect the human factor and the contextualisation of the project. 
Undeniably, these discourses work better with robust dialog and substantive content rather than ‘froth’ 
and public relations ‘speak’.  
 
When considering mega-project coordination discussed above, the findings reveal that a coalition 
between these three types of mega-project discourses can result in a more attractive and persuasive 
business case. Also, an influential champion with the political leverage to streamline planning powers 
can add significant value by bringing about improved coordination. Collectively, they move towards a 
more powerful discourse to reduce the force of any objections. As the power dynamics of the 
discourse grow, especially throughout the institutionalisation phase, other discourses are likely to 
acknowledge their allegiance to it in order better to pursue their own agenda. 
 
Mega-event discourses are able to attract significant resources and redistribute them according to the 
demands of hosting the event. As mentioned earlier, mega-project discourses are often exploited as a 
tool aimed to market the projects, often leading to disappointing results. The findings show sympathy 
among the respondents to the gap between the Olympic promises and the emerging outcomes. It is 
suggested that the narratives surrounding the mega-event discourses or mega projects in general are 
for the purpose of helping to promote such projects, and consequently that the gap between the 
promises and final outcomes should not surprise the public. The components of the London 2012 
discourse were effectively communicated to the public. The successful marketing of the Games brand 
with its established discourse demonstrated the partnership between LOCOG, the ODA, the Mayor of 
London, and the local host authorities. Unfortunately, such mega-event discourse power can be risky 
and costly when financed by the public purse. This suggests that without a coherent set of policies to 
realise sustainable development programmes, the mega-event strategy has resorted to soothing words, 
slogans, and empty rhetoric. 
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This research concludes that the power of discourse is not as strong as that assumed in this study’s 
premise. Some players are impervious to the blandishments, tempting talk, and political promises. The 
democratic system provides a platform for different interests to join the discussion, though sometimes 
leading to stalemate and lengthening of the planning process. Although a certain degree of rhetoric can 
be attributed to the discourses used for mega project promotion, there will always be people, 
especially those directly affected, who closely scrutinise project policies.  
7.4 Review of the Case Study Methodology 
This section reviews the effectiveness of pre-hypothesis research methodologies and tools for the 
analysis of case studies alongside the more traditional hypothesis-led investigations. As presented in 
Chapter 6, this methodological approach entails an information-gathering and knowledge-building 
approach to mega project decision-making analysis that has proved to be highly fruitful as well as 
challenging throughout the empirical investigation of case study experiences.  
7.4.1 Strengths  
The results of employing the pre-hypothesis led investigations suggest that:  
 
 The pre-hypothesis approach has much in common with the general principles of Grounded 
Theory where hypotheses are built from the bottom up (data first). The methodology uses 
systematic detection techniques which allow the analyst to look for patterns of knowledge (and 
therefore build hypotheses) derived from large quantities of data, providing an approach not 
otherwise possible by more traditional hypothesis-led investigations.     
 
 The analytical tools employed for the pre-hypothesis research (i.e., SenseMaker Suite software 
developed by Cognitive Edge Pty.) successfully allowed the conversion of qualitative data 
derived from secondary data and interview transcripts to be displayed and interrogated from more 
perspectives and scales than would otherwise have been possible.   
 
 The methodology requirement for self-indexing by the respondents of the pre-hypothesis 
investigation was found to represent the most significant feature of the Narrative Pattern Analysis, 
as it facilitated a rich understanding of each interview’s data from the interviewees’ point of view.  
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7.4.2 Limitations 
Despite the considerable value added to this research by utilising this pre-hypothesis investigation, 
there were several issues which caused problems during the practical application of this method that 
merit consideration in future investigations. The following should be considered in any future research 
using this methodology:  
 
 The indexes need to be designed in a way which is more specific and concise because 
interviewees can be easily confused by lengthy indexes. The complication and the number of 
indexes employed appeared to undermine the effectiveness of the self-indexing exercise by, on 
the one hand, deterring the willingness of interviewees to complete the indexing process for all 
anecdotes, and, on the other, making the data analysis process longer and more complex.   
 
 The idea of employing Naïve Interview and Prompting Questions in order to disclose weak 
signals which can help to gain insights into the selected cases did not prove effective in this 
context. These general questions tended to attract loosely-focused responses which were not 
always sufficiently related to the underlying research questions.  
 
 The claim made by the advocates of pre-hypothesis analysis about avoiding its propensity to bias 
interviewees by masking hypotheses was found to be questionable since the indexes employed 
could give hints to respondents as to the underlying hypothesis as the interview progressed.   
 
Notwithstanding the above, the employment of the two stranded approach has, overall, helped provide 
a more balanced set of findings than an approach solely reliant upon a hypothesis-led investigation 
would have offered. 
7.5 Theoretical Insights and Lessons Learned  
After the summary of the synthesis of the findings from the literature reviews, the synthesis of the 
outcomes from the empirical studies and a review of the case study methodology, this section shifts 
attention to the theoretical insights and lessons that were identified by this research.  
7.5.1 Summary of theoretical insights 
There are several circumstances revealed in Chapters 4 through 6 that reflect the theoretical concepts 
reviewed in Chapter 2. This section highlights the key evidence in order to summarise the argument of 
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this thesis and highlight the theoretical concepts that are most compatible with the research findings 
and most helpful in their interpretation.  
 
Mega projects are realised through constant negotiation and compromise among stakeholders  
Related to the need for continuous negotiation and compromise is the principle of ‘inequality in 
bargaining’ as identified in the case study of the King’s Cross Central scheme. This finding mirrors the 
theory of Disjointed Incrementalism (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963; Lindblom and Hirschman, 
1962) which contends that policy-making decisions can be summarised as an ongoing process that is 
remedial, serial, and fragmented.  The research findings reveal that inequality in bargaining is a 
necessary element for achieving mega-project delivery. The bargaining power is not equally 
distributed in the project-led network. Also, a dominant power or government intervention in this 
network is critical to mega-project development. The issue analysis in Chapter 1 raised the question 
which can be answered by this theory. The question is whether the equilibrium of stakeholders or 
dominant players can form the most appropriate leadership model in mega-project decision-making. It 
has proved that a streamlined planning power and government intervention are essential to effective 
mega-project development.  
 
Mega-project discourse is used as an instrument but not an achievable goal  
In terms of the related observation about the project-led networking and bargaining power, mega-
project discourse is the main component which holds the network together as well as an instrument 
that enforces bargaining positions. The marginalisation effect caused by mega-project discourses in 
such networks has been proved to be inevitable and unintentional as a result of strengthening the 
network. However well-intentioned the project promoters may be towards a wider agenda, according 
to the case study findings, their ultimate decisions are determined by narrow profit-sustaining and 
cost-reducing concerns. Under these circumstances, mega-project discourse is exploited as a tool but 
not as an achievable goal as it might suggest. These findings echo the attributes of discourse power 
identified by Hajer (1995 and 2003) as discussed in Chapter 2.   
 
The planetary alignment analogy  
The ‘planetary alignment’ analogy and the ‘window of opportunity’ principle were identified by the 
hypothesis-led and the pre-hypothesis investigations respectively, and also confirmed by the findings 
of the OMEGA Centre research. As illustrated in Chapter 4, the CTRL project provided a window of 
opportunity which triggered many existing proposals to align themselves with this limited opportunity. 
Within this, all the stakeholders made a lot of political noise in order to position themselves for a 
better share of interests. This research concluded that the planetary alignment analogy, which signifies 
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that all elements, including serendipity and planning, of mega projects should be correctly positioned, 
is one of the main factors for mega-project development. This is a multi-dimensional phenomenon. 
That is to say, a sufficient range of conditions should simultaneously converge to form a favourable 
arrangement to facilitate the project.  
 
Diverse measurements of economic benefits and their accountability  
Measurements of projected economic impacts for major infrastructure investments and mega-event 
developments have been challenged by Hall (1980) and Flyvbjerg et al. (2003). Findings of the 
investigations in this research also show that stakeholders do not have sufficient confidence in these 
measurements. Economic impact studies are often filled with misapplications of economic theory that 
virtually guarantee that their projections will be favourable. Large-scale projects have relatively long 
planning timeframes, which increase the difficulty of project appraisal. The high degree of uncertainty 
involved in these projects often results significant gaps between the estimates in the initial planning 
period and the project cost at the end. These gaps attract criticism for over-optimistic forecasting, as 
noted by Flyvbjerg et al.(2003). They claim that excessive optimism and over-promising with regard 
to project costs nd benefits is the result of decision-makers intentionally ignoring risks and using 
biased measures in order to promote their political agenda. Some respondents argued that the selection 
of modelling traffic capacity or measurements of transport demand as a means of evaluating a project 
has automatically excluded certain other concerns. There was a general sense in the interview 
responses that mega projects of the kind discussed can never be fully comprehensive nor fully 
accurate, partly because these projects are complex by nature and partly because they evolve over long 
timeframes where contexts change over time. The research findings also assert the diminishing returns 
from more and more preliminary studies and forecasts, which are sometimes used as an excuse for 
decision-makers to prevaricate, resulting in more wasted resources. Given these circumstances, the 
role of visionary and decisive politicians, often seen as the main force in pushing these projects 
through, becomes increasingly pivotal. 
 
Opportunism in mega-project development  
Opportunistic behaviour has been cited several times in the interview responses in the case studies. 
Some respondents have argued that the Olympic Games is a significant platform for opportunistic 
behaviour. It relies on available land and existing or planned transportation systems. Many of the 
conditions contributing to the genesis of the CTRL and the 2012 Games were generated by chance and 
not by long term strategic planning. In the current planning environment, many major projects come 
to fruition by a process of ‘muddling through’ amidst changes in urban politics, evolving public issues, 
and the increasing force of globalisation. Some may criticise this as a process lacking planning and 
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encouraging opportunistic behaviour, whilst others believe this to be the true nature of large-scale 
project evolution given the longevity of project development. 
7.5.2 Lessons learned 
The mega-project decision-making process is characterised by a number of accumulated forces vying 
for political power, seeking different outcomes, and relying on considerable lobbying, negotiation, and 
compromise. The research process presented in this thesis highlights the importance of assembling a 
sufficient number of narratives from different sources in order to clearly identify critical decisions and 
the factors at play behind them. To what degree are the factors influencing the proliferation of prestige 
developments, including MUTPs, large-scale sustainable urban regeneration schemes, and mega-event 
oriented projects interrelated? This research shows that the adoption of important infrastructure 
investments is typically encouraged or stimulated by four main sets of forces:  
 the restructuring and the increasing interdependency of the global economy;  
 the intensification of inter-city competition for international and domestic capital flow;  
 the increasing magnitude of city-region economic activities; and 
 the high mobility of the workforce and capital.  
 
Against the backdrop of these conclusions, there are generic lessons for policy makers and investors in 
future mega-project development: 
 
Mega projects are magnetic to political agenda and varied objectives  
Mega projects may attract ‘big ideas’ and ‘gambles’, and these ideas may change throughout a 
project’s development cycle. An important feature of mega projects is the ‘stickiness’ or ‘gravitational 
pull’ they generate, which means that other projects will adjust themselves to be compatible with these 
large projects in order to gain a better chance to achieve their own agenda. This is how the project-led 
network is built and reinforced. Based on the conclusions from this research, however, the visionary 
political champion is one of the prerequisites for mega-project development. The decisions made by 
these political champions are essential. 
 
Concerning the rhetoric surrounding CTRL’s propensity to facilitate property development and urban 
regeneration surrounding the hubs, the only benefit the CTRL can conceivably provide the station 
areas is an accessibility advantage that in turn increases its surrounding land values. The growing 
doubt about the decisions on the CTRL stations revealed two facts. On the one hand, it showed that 
there was a lack of an integrated decision-making framework between the construction and operation 
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sectors, resulting in inefficiencies. On the other hand, returning to the research question about the 
power of technocrats, it reinforces the view that political outcome is the ultimate determinant of 
project decision-making.   
 
Mega project delivery relies on imperfect information and good political decisions  
Closely relates to the above, from the experience of the CTRL project, this research reveals that 
project information will never be perfect. In a complex and dynamic environment it is not prudent to 
spend vast amounts of time and money on exhaustive studies in vain attempts to resolve uncertainty. 
Studies are frequently commissioned in order to legitimise political decisions, so that politicians are 
often told what they want to hear. This results from a built-in bias in the political system that people 
tend to produce information that is politically acceptable. Decision-makers must make time-sensitive 
judgements based on imperfect information. Within this, the government often uses the information-
assembling process as a delaying tactic to avoid politically difficult decisions. Information gathering 
can be a prop for those who are reluctant to make decisions, and the associated bureaucracy wastes 
resources. In this sense, whilst a resolute political decision may seem impulsive and ill-considered, it 
may ultimately be the most rational approach.  
 
If project promoters are determined to push a project through, the use of information may involve 
manipulation, communication, or other persuasive activities. While some may perceive deception or 
sins of omission, others see dialog based on imperfect or incomplete information, understanding that 
perfectly correct data do not exist. The premise here is that there can never be perfect information on 
which to make judgements. Evidence-based research is often used selectively and translated into 
political pressure.  
 
Challenges in public engagement  
Although local needs and considerations are always at the forefront of the mega project discourse, 
local needs and community benefits are, in reality, often resistant to clear definition. This contributes 
to accusations that such promises are likely to become tokenistic and possibly even very costly and 
hard to retrofit in light of the damage to the credibility of such claims. Project promoters have, as a 
result, found it is difficult to move up the ladder from ‘consultation’ to the ‘engagement’ stage, 
exhibiting so called ‘consultation fatigue’. This phenomenon is related to the lack of trust in 
emasculated local authorities, which is seen by some parties to impede the engagement of the public. 
These circumstances have in turn created an adversarial culture surrounding mega projects.  
 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
 
231 
 
The research findings reveal (see Chapter 5) that in this climate of distrust, public inquiries, and 
judicial review are employed by opponents of mega projects as delaying tactics, as in the case of the 
King’s Cross Central scheme. The analysis in Chapter 4 has shown that fast-tracking a project has an 
element of fait accompli which minimises consultation and discussion and speeds up project 
developments, but also runs the risk of being challenged by more public appeals that costing time and 
money, especially in the UK context. The challenge to the developers and project proponents is how to 
break-down the mistrust and suspicion surrounding such projects. 
 
Another related issue is that of the ‘vocal minority and silent majority’. The local stakeholders 
who ’shout loudest’ tend to be those who oppose development, and tend dominate local community 
responses. In reality, there is a broader spread of community opinions that goes beyond those voluble 
views and interests. Others in the more transient population are indifferent because these projects are 
so far in the future that they are irrelevant to their current day-to-day lives.  Nonetheless, there may be 
benefits to those who have not yet moved into the area and who therefore have no voice at present. 
There is then an issue about representativeness and accountability in local community response to 
these mega project developments and whether the groups involved have sufficient legitimacy to 
represent the general view of current local communities.  
 
The treatment of risks and uncertainties in mega project development  
In the UK, project implementation is complicated by regulatory and enabling legislations, which add 
to uncertainty and ultimately to costs. As indicated in Chapter 5, a simple and well-focused 
institutional arrangement is one of the components of achieving a better outcome for the delivery of 
mega projects. Such an institutional arrangement is not necessarily equivalent to a fully authoritarian 
decision-making structure, but rather a network with well-defined responsibilities. The combination of 
streamlined planning powers and an inclusive stakeholder engagement process has proved to be 
optimal for mega project delivery by the research findings.   
 
This research also reveals that another strategy to reduce mega projects’ exposure to risks is to 
‘institutionalise knowledge’. The continuity of staffing is critically important in mega project planning, 
appraisal, and implementation. The reality is that few if any individuals can remain with a mega 
project team throughout all its stages because these projects, by definition have a protracted timeframe. 
To safeguard against the loss of this institutional knowledge, the research concludes that it is essential 
to institutionalise the knowledge accumulated in such projects in order to pass it on to others in later 
stages of the project lifecycle and other similar mega projects. Also, under the contexts of 
globalisation and high mobility of capital and professionals, transnational corporations can transfer 
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this knowledge to other projects and teams rather than discounting it and risking ‘reinventing the 
wheel’. This process can influence how experiences and knowledge are carried forward from one 
project stage to another, how relationships are carried forward through time and how the stakeholder 
management strategies need to evolve.  
 
Flexibility is a prerequisite for mega projects  
The findings derived from the CTRL case study show that flexibility is a prerequisite for mega 
projects to adapt to the changing political agenda. That is to say that mega-project-related policies are 
unceasingly adjusted according to prevailing priorities of public investments and initiatives 
throughout a projects’ life cycle. This is confirmed by the conclusion in Chapter 5, which suggests that 
mega-project decision-making is achieved by a continuously changing combination of negotiation and 
compromises among stakeholders. Flexibility is one of the important qualities in mega projects and it 
is crucial when confronting problems and crises. Both the hypothesis and pre-hypothesis 
investigations concur that, overall, there is constant strategic allocation of resources among projects, 
which varies in scale and level depending on the project in question. As decisions are made and are 
transmitted from national to local levels, the assigned resources tend to become diluted if these 
projects are not at the core of the dominant political agenda of the time. Through a combination of 
strategic and political alterations, the resource allocation changes over time. 
 
The research findings suggest that mega events featuring immovable timescales create immense 
tension among associated development projects, and generate higher costs. The Olympics project is 
extremely time sensitive, which is not conducive to good planning. Also, to have a mega event rely 
too heavily on the completion of MUTPs carries a high level of risk and uncertainty, since mega 
projects need a certain level of flexibility in order to adapt to the changing contexts, whereas time-
sensitive projects do not provide this.  
 
New meaning of sustainability  
There is no doubt that modern society is highly dependent on major infrastructure systems, and that 
these systems are subjected to the risks and uncertainties of the environments and societies they serve. 
There are many unknowns with which any approach to sustainable development may have to contend. 
It needs to be robust, constantly monitored, and adjusted to adapt to changing environments. Our 
growing understanding of the impacts of climate change and how it might impact or threaten our daily 
life suggests that the retrofitting of existing mega infrastructure to address these concerns is critical to 
ensure a better future quality of life. Planners, designers, engineers, and policy-makers should broaden 
the consideration of the burden on our environment when planning, appraising, and delivering mega 
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infrastructure investments and their associated developments, including the means to retrofit existing 
mega projects to meet the requirements of sustainability.  
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Pre-Hypothesis Interviews 
Richard Brown, CEO, Eurostar UK  
Robert Holden, Chief Executive, London and Continental Railways 
Phil Jeffries, Founder, King’s Cross Railway Lands Group  
Michael Johnson, Planning Obligations Manager, Transport for London 
Keith Lindblom QC, Francis Taylor Building 
Conor McAuley, Councillor, Cabinet Member for Regeneration, LB Newham 
Richard McGreevy, Principal Policy Officer – Transport, Greater London Authority 
Martin Slavin, Researcher, Games Monitor 
Hugh Sumner, Director of Transport, Olympic Delivery Authority 
Anonymity, Camden Council 
 
Hypothesis-Led Interviews 
Philippe Bovy, Professor emeritus of Transportation at the Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology in Lausanne (EPFL) Switzerland, Transport advisor, International 
Olympic Committee 
Robin Buckle, Urban Renaissance Design Manager, London Development Agency 
Julian Cheyne, Local resident, Olympic host borough 
Debbie McMullen, Principal Planner & Policy Advisor (Planning and Housing), 
Greater London Authority 
Niall McNevin, Head of Town Planning, Olympic Delivery Authority 
Michael Parkes, Planner, Planning Aid for London 
Tim Urquhart, Project Director, Bovis Lend Lease 
Bob West, Head of Urban Design & Renewal, Camden Council 
Anonymity, Transport for London 
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THE BARTLETT SCHOOL OF PLANNING 
 
 
 
Centre for Mega Projects in Transport and Development 
A global Centre of Excellence in Future Urban Transport sponsored by Volvo Research and Educational 
Foundations (VREF) 
 
        
 
         Date 
 
 
  
Dear … 
 
Investigation of Relationships Between Mega Urban Transport Project Planning and Delivery, Sustainable 
Urban Regeneration and Mega Events 
 
I have been given your name as a key contact by Mr. Michael Edwards and am hoping that you will be 
able to help me with my research by agreeing to a short interview.   
 
I am a PhD student at the Bartlett School of Planning, UCL. My research focuses on investigating the 
relationship between the aims and investments of Mega Urban Transport Projects (MUTPs), Sustainable 
Urban Regeneration (SUR) and Mega Events (MEs) in the planning and appraising of MUTPs, and the 
extent to which these are/ can be made mutually reinforcing.   
 
The study focuses on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) and its contribution(s) to the regeneration of 
Kings Cross/St. Pancras and Stratford in East London, plus the 2012 London Olympic Games.  It intends 
to draw from these case studies generic and context-specific lessons for future projects in the UK and 
elsewhere. I propose to conduct a series of interviews with persons such as yourself who in the past have 
acted/ are currently acting on behalf of stakeholders of the CTRL, KX Central, Stratford City or 2012 
London Olympics and their affiliated developments, to elicit narratives (stories /anecdotes) based on your 
experiences.  
 
A particular aim of my research is to ascertain what kind of institutional networks and power relations 
among key stakeholder organisations can be deemed a ‘pre-requisite’ to the delivery of desirable 
outcomes. 
  
I would be most grateful if you could spare some time to be interviewed - either at your premises or here 
at the OMEGA Centre at UCL, whichever suits you best. I would be especially grateful if you would allow 
me to record the interview on the understanding that you will not be quoted without your permission in 
any publications and/or findings that emanate from my work.  I will provide you with a transcript of the 
interview for your checking and approval.   
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Please find attached the questionnaire that I propose to use for the interview.   
 
If you feel able to accept my invitation, I would be most grateful if you could please contact me by email 
(yen-ning.tseng@ucl.ac.uk, 020 7679 4877) to arrange a mutually convenient time/date for the interview.  
In the meantime, if you have any questions please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
 
 
Yen-Ning Tseng 
PhD Research Student & VREF Scholarship Holder 
Enc. 
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PRE-HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH QUESTIONS, INDEXES AND FILTERS 
 
 
A. Opening Question (to be asked in all interviews) 
Interviewees’ relationship to the project 
- “What is your relationship to the [CTRL/ KX Central/ Stratford City/ 2012 London Olympics] 
project. Please explain which aspect of the project you were responsible for, involved in or 
affected by.”   
B. Prompting Questions 
 
QUESTION 1 (to be asked in all interviews) 
Looking back, what in your mind were the most pivotal events that shaped the [CTRL/ KX 
Central/ Stratford City/ 2012 London Olympics] project? (Turning points or triggers of significance, 
not necessarily project milestones) Please consider: 
 Which of these were most surprising? Most predictable? 
 Which of these were planned? Which were unexpected? 
 Specify the date the event occurred, who were the main people involved, where it  
                   took place and why it took place. 
 
QUESTION 2 (to be asked in all interviews) 
Tell me about a time when someone changed the course of the project for better or for worse? 
 
QUESTION 3 - Tell me about a time when this project was rescued or sabotaged? 
  
QUESTION 4 - When were the moments of stagnation or breakthrough? What happened? 
 
QUESTION 5 - When have you or members of your community suffered or been inspired as a result 
of this project? What happened and why? 
 
QUESTION 6 - Imagine this project, 10 years ahead, is perceived as: 
 a total disaster or 
 a resounding success 
 What stories would you share with others to convince or dissuade those who felt that 
way? 
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C. Indexes & Filters- to be completed for each anecdote / story 
 
1. Project (please tick which project your story most relates to:) 
 
 UK 
 Channel Tunnel Rail Link 
 Urban regeneration of King’s Cross Central 
 Urban regeneration of Stratford City 
 2012 London Olympics 
 
2.  Is this? (please tick appropriate box): 
 
Your personal experience?  A newspaper, magazine article, or other 
document? 
 
3. How does this story make you feel? (please tick appropriate box): 
 
 Elated  Don’t Care 
 Proud  Disappointed/Sad 
 Hopeful  Angry 
 
 
4. Roughly when did the events in this story happen? (please place mark on the timeline below) 
 
 
 
             
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
 
 
5. What roles are represented in this story? (you may tick as many boxes as you think appropriate) 
 
 
 Advisor - Finance, Legal, Design, 
Technical, Business etc. 
 Entrepreneur/Business Person 
 Planner  Financier 
 Other Design Professional  Scientist/Researcher 
 Advocate/Representative  Media/Journalist 
 Politician  Contractor/Constructor 
 Bureaucrat  Consultant  
 Lobbyist/Stakeholder Advocate  Ecologist/Environmentalist 
 Engineer  Developer 
 Community or social worker  Local Resident 
 Commuter  Other 
 
6. How relevant do you think your story is to the outcome of the project in index 1? 
(please tick appropriate box) 
 
 Very Relevant 
 Relevant 
 Not Relevant 
 Don’t know 
 
7. What key words or phrases would you associate with this story? 
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8. Which of the following themes are relevant to this story? (Please select relevance on a scale of 1 to 10. 
1 being less relevant, 10 being extremely relevant - for all boxes):- 
 
Public sector power       1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Private sector power 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Political intervention in the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Political will 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Leadership 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bureaucracy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Technical solutions to unforeseen problems/issues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Visions and ideas 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Scale of impact of the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Public participation or consultation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Use of public money 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Use of private sector money 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Tensions between economic-social-environmental values 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Degree to which project centrally controlled/driven versus ad hoc 
decision making 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Sustainability concerns/environmental impact 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Treatment of risk, uncertainty, complexity in decision making 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Globalisation forces 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Roles and responsibilities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Financing projects/development 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Co-operation amongst those involved in the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Real estate development associated with/triggered by the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Institutional arrangements 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Path dependency 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Bargaining power 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Other (please specify) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
9. The following situations are represented in this story (Please select relevance on a scale of 1 to 10. 1 
being less relevant, 10 being extremely relevant – for all boxes): 
 
Reaching agreement on project financing/funding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Experiencing financial failure/under performance  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Forming the vision/objectives for the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Project start-up/mobilisation 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Agreement about project specifications 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Public outcry about the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Programme slippage/advancement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Major change in project scope 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Political intervention into the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Alleviating project impacts 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Implementing the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Deciding on developments associated with the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Implementing developments associated with the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Performance of organizations responsible for the project 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Changing partners 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
 
257 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
The OMEGA Centre, rm 429b 
Bartlett School of Planning, UCL, 22 Gordon Street, London WC1H 0QB, UK 
t: +44 (0)20 7679 4887 (internal extn: 24887) 
e: yen-ning.tseng@ucl.ac.uk  
w: www.omegacentre.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk  |  www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/planning 
 
Forming partnerships 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Other (specify) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 
 
10. ‘About Your Role on the Project’ (please tick the box that best describes your influence on the 
project) 
 
 I influenced decision-makers 
 I influenced project stakeholders 
 I helped to build relationships/consensus 
 I helped to implement the project 
 I supported/advocated the project  
 I observed/reported on the project 
 I opposed the project 
 Other 
 
 
11. ‘What You Do’ (please tick the box that best describes what you do) 
 
Private Sector 
 Entrepreneur/Business Person  Consultant/Advisor 
 Business/Financial Adviser  Financial Consortium/Funding Agency 
 Contractor/Constructor  Other 
Public Sector 
 Central Government Employee  Politician 
 Local / Regional Government Employee  Other 
Non-Government Organisation/Other 
 Work for Regional or Metropolitan Agency  Lobby Group 
 Local Community Member  Member of Community Action Group 
 Academic  Other 
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THE BARTLETT SCHOOL OF PLANNING 
 
 
 
Centre for Mega Projects in Transport and Development 
A global Centre of Excellence in Future Urban Transport sponsored by Volvo Research and Educational 
Foundations (VREF) 
 
      Date 
 
  
Dear, 
 
Hypothesis-led Questionnaire on Relationships Between Mega Urban Transport Project 
Planning and Delivery, Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events 
  
 
I have been given your name as a key contact by my primary supervisor Prof. Harry 
Dimitriou and am hoping that you will be able to help me with my research by agreeing 
to a short interview.   
 
I am a PhD student at the Bartlett School of Planning, UCL. My research focuses on 
investigating the relationship between the aims and investments of Mega Urban 
Transport Projects (MUTPs), Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events in the 
planning and appraising of MUTPs, and the extent to which these are/ can be made 
mutually reinforcing.   
 
The study focuses on the Channel Tunnel Rail Link (CTRL) and its contribution(s) to the 
regeneration of Kings Cross/St. Pancras and Stratford in East London, plus the 2012 
London Olympic Games. It intends to draw from these case studies generic and 
context-specific lessons for future projects in the UK and elsewhere. I propose to 
conduct a series of interviews with persons such as yourself who in the past have acted/ 
are currently acting on behalf of stakeholders of the CTRL, KX Central, Stratford City or 
2012 London Olympics and their affiliated developments.  
 
A particular aim of my research is to ascertain what kind of institutional networks and 
power relations among key stakeholder organisations can be deemed a ‘pre-requisite’ 
to the delivery of desirable outcomes. 
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I would be most grateful if you could spare some time to be interviewed - either at your 
premises or here at the OMEGA Centre at UCL, whichever suits you best. I would be 
especially grateful if you would allow me to record the interview on the understanding 
that you will not be quoted without your permission in any publications and/or findings 
that emanate from my work.  I will provide you with a transcript of the interview for your 
checking and approval.   
 
Please find attached the questionnaire that I propose to employ for the interviews.  It 
contains: 
 
 Part 1 - A series of core questions (Overarching Research Questions) which we 
would like all of our interviewees to address;  
 Part 2 - A list of questions relating to a series of hypotheses about the CTRL / KX 
Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics, from which we would like you to 
please select those which you feel best able to answer. You may choose as many 
as you like.   
 
If you feel able to accept my invitation, I would be most grateful if you could please 
contact me by email (yen-ning.tseng@ucl.ac.uk) or telephone (020 7679 4877) to 
arrange a mutually convenient time/date for the interview.  In the meantime, if you have 
any questions please do not hesitate to contact me. 
 
Yours Sincerely, 
Yen-Ning, Tseng 
PhD Research Student & VREF Scholarship Holder 
Enc. 
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PART 1:  Overarching Research Questions derived from the CTRL 
experience 
 
The questions in Part 1 are posed to help ascertain the extent to which the 
synergy of mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) 1, sustainable urban 
regeneration (SUR)2 and mega events (MEs) 3 could effectively maximise benefits 
and minimise costs even though at some stage these projects will be 
implemented in a competing environment.  
 
Question 1:  
Do you agree that MUTPs are impacted significantly by mega events, if so, why and 
how? 
Question 2:  
In your view, under which circumstances can one coordinate the delivery of MUTPs, 
SUR and MEs and simultaneously achieve visions of sustainable development4? 
Question 3:  
Where this trilogy of development exists, which agency/institution provides leadership 
and which of the three types of developments (MUTPs, SUR and MEs) become the 
locomotive of change that drives the others to achieve favourable (integrated?) 
outcomes for the principal stakeholders? 
Question 4: 
Do MUTPs, SUR and MEs share resources5 at the local, regional and national scale, or 
is one promoted at the expense of the others? If so, please provide an illustration of this. 
                                                 
1 MUTP: Transport projects involve high investment expenditures (i.e., over US $500 million); long life time of 50 years and more; and are land-
based transport infrastructure investments within and connecting ‘urban areas’ in the form of bridge, tunnel, road and rail links, or combinations 
of these. They usually involve considerable uncertainty with respect to demand forecasts and cost estimations; considerable share of indirect 
benefits which cannot be captured by the operator (e.g., urban regeneration benefits) (Bruzelius et al. 2002: 144).  
2 SUR: Definition employed in these questions is derived from the visions of King’s Cross Central and Stratford City regeneration schemes 
which are provided by the developers. To summarise, they should be able to facilitate economic development and contribute to the 
capital’s continued economic growth; deliver benefits to existing local communities; adopt wider sustainability principles, for 
example in terms of energy efficiency, the use of water and the recycling of materials. 
3 MEs: For the purposes of this research, mega events focus on cultural and sporting events, for instance, Universal Exposition (EXPO) and 
Olympic Games.  
4 Interviewees should have their own perception of Sustainable Development. If not, we can use Brundtland Report which is well known and 
often cited: "Sustainable development is development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations 
to meet their own needs." 
5 Resources: It includes financial, political, institutional and planning resources. 
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PART 2:  The Channel Tunnel Rail Link and its Transport Hubs (at 
King’s Cross and Stratford) and 2012 London Olympics: Some 
hypotheses and questions about their development 
 
A number of hypotheses are forwarded here to help explain how the CTRL and its 
transport hubs at King’s Cross and Stratford were developed and what 
relationships (if any) were established with the 2012 London Olympics project? 
The following questions invite interviewees to respond to the plausibility of each 
of these hypotheses.  
HYPOTHESIS 1 – The Role of MUTPs 
 
Mega Urban Transport Projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the 
delivery of Sustainable Urban Regeneration (SUR) and Mega Events (MEs), while MEs 
in turn can speed-up MUTP and SUR developments. On this basis CTRL constitutes an 
important positive catalyst for both SUR and ME developments associated with its 
transport hubs.  
 
Question 1: MUTP is a positive catalyst 
Do you agree with this hypothesis in general terms and as it relates more specifically to 
the CTRL? 
Question 2: CTRL – A driver of change? 
What are the distinct roles of the CTRL in terms of the urban regeneration process of 
KX Central and Stratford City, and what role (if any) has the CTRL played in the 
Olympic Games Project? 
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HYPOTHESIS 2 – Political decision 
 
Institutional arrangements6 and power relations are the most significant factors 
influencing the effective delivery and performance of Mega Urban Transport Projects 
(MUTPs), Sustainable Urban Regeneration (SUR) and Mega Event (ME) scheme.  
 
Question 3: Politics in time (after Paul Pierson, 2004) 
Is the ultimate determining factor of the decision-making process in MUTP planning, 
appraisal, evaluation and delivery that of political power - not the power of the rationality 
of technocrats?   
 
 
Question 4: Bargaining power (after Charles Lindblom, 1988) 
What factors can enhance stakeholders’ ‘negotiation power’ in the delivery of:  
▪  CTRL as a whole  
▪  the KX Central / Stratford City transport hubs or   
▪  2012 London Olympics  
and why?  
 
 
                                                 
6 For the purposes of this study the discussion of institutional arrangements is more emphasised on the planning aspect. 
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HYPOTHESIS 3 - Synergy of network 
 
Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergetic relations between MUTPs, SUR and 
MEs can better foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable 
development visions that add value to the original individual projects.  
 
Question 5: Robbing Peter to pay Paul 
Will the completion of the 2012 London Olympics project significantly divert resources 
away from other major development initiatives?   
If so, is the spin-off benefits of this re-prioritisation justified?    
 
Question 6: ‘Win-win’ strategies? 
Do you agree that some important aims of the CTRL project, the 2012 London Olympics 
project and the urban regeneration schemes for Stratford City and King’s Cross are in 
reality mutually reinforcing, or are the product of important compromises? 
 
Question 7: Concentration or de-centralisation 
How effective will the new CTRL Stratford Station be as a catalyst for new 
development?   
Will it attract new public and private sector development in East London or merely 
encourage the further concentration of such development in Central London? 
 
Question 8: Reality or Rhetoric 
How would you respond to the claim that there is a gap between the rhetoric and reality 
in the vision that mega events, such as the 2012 London Olympics, can significantly 
stimulate sustainable urban regeneration?   
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HYPOTHESIS 4 - Discourse7 Power 
 
Key champions of Mega Urban Transport Projects, Sustainable Urban Regeneration 
and Mega Events typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become 
influential players in the stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to 
promote their agendas and interests above all else with limited sense of social 
corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ their discourse powers to 
strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe to the same 
discourse, even though they may have different agendas. 
 
Question 9: Networked Polity (after Chris Ansell, 2000) 
Do you agree that discourses7 of MUTPs, SUR and MEs have been used as tools by 
key champions to convince others of the validity of their position(s) in the hope that this 
will be shared by a broader spectrum of stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising 
those who do not share the same interests and empowering the project delivery 
network?  
 
Question 10:  
Who are the primary champions and decision-makers that supported and opposed: 
 the CTRL project?   
 KX Central   
 Stratford City or 
 2012 London Olympics?  
And what were their major intentions? 
 
Thank you  
 
                                                 
7 Discourse is widely defined as storylines, actions, policies, and visions that are used to persuade, convince, attract or even point people to 
certain dimensions. 
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INDEX 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
About You 
 
1. What You Do (please tick the box(es) that best describes what you do) 
(  You can copy and paste this symbol to the box) 
Private Sector 
 Entrepreneur/Business Person  Consultant/Advisor 
 Business/Financial Adviser  Financial Consortium/Funding Agency 
 Contractor/Constructor  Other 
Public Sector 
 Central Government Employee  Politician 
 Local / Regional Government 
Employee 
 Other 
Non-Government Organisation/Other 
 Work for Regional or Metropolitan 
Agency 
 Lobby Group 
 Local Community Member  Member of Community Action Group 
 Academic  Other 
 
2.  Your Role on CTRL/ KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics (please tick the 
box that best describes your influence on the project) 
(  You can copy and paste this symbol to the box) 
 I influenced decision-makers 
 I influenced project stakeholders 
 I helped to build relationships/consensus 
 I helped to implement the project 
 I supported/advocated the project  
 I observed/reported on the project 
 I opposed the project 
 Other 
 
By completing the following indexes you will be greatly helping us to analyse 
the data collected in your interview.  The indexes are divided into two parts: 
 About You - questions about you and your involvement in the CTRL / KX 
Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics and/or its associated  
developments (Questions 1-3 below); 
 Your Views on CTRL / KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics 
(Questions 4-6 below); 
 Please specify which project(s) that your indexes apply to. 
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3. Your period of involvement in CTRL/ KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London 
Olympics (please place mark on the timeline below -  you may show more than one 
period; please specify which project(s) that your indexes apply to) 
(  You can copy and paste this symbol to the box) 
 
 
             
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 
 
 
 
Your Views on CTRL/ KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics 
 
 
4.  Which of the following types of context do you consider most important in the 
planning of CTRL/ KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics? (please 
rank each one out of ten in terms of importance, where one represents the highest 
priority and ten the lowest; please specify which project(s) that your indexes apply 
to): 
(  You can copy and paste this symbol to the box) 
Types of context 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
National background, policy, planning and funding 
frameworks? 
          
Sustainability visions to be serviced?           
Geographical, spatial and location considerations?           
Cultural contexts?           
Temporal contexts? (They could be project time frame,  
history of project development, and timing for key-
decisions) 
          
Others? (please specify) 
 
          
 
5.  How successfully do you consider the CTRL/ KX Central / Stratford City / 2012 
London Olympics project has coped with the Sustainable Development 
Challenges below? (please assign a value of one to ten to each, where one 
represents the highest weighting and ten the lowest; please specify which project(s) 
that your indexes apply to):   
(  You can copy and paste this symbol to the box) 
 
Sustainable development challenges  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Ensuring accountability in decision-making           
Providing transparency in decision-making           
Ensuring institutional capacity building & public 
consultation 
          
Addressing concerns of biodiversity           
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Addressing concerns of ecology           
Promoting health           
Sustainable development challenges 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Addressing concerns of safety           
Promoting energy saving           
Contributing to social cohesion           
Contributing to goals of equity           
Promoting economic competitiveness           
Successfully involving the private sector             
Addressing forces of globalisation           
Enhancing operations efficiency           
Guaranteeing affordability of project           
Ensuring economic viability of project           
Promoting enhanced accessibility           
Contributing to planned spatial & territorial re-
structuring 
          
Addressing concerns of subsidiarity           
Others (please specify)           
 
 
6.  Which of the following attributes do you consider most important for an 
efficient and effective stakeholder network to deliver CTRL/ KX Central / 
Stratford City / 2012 London Olympics?  (please assign a value of one to ten to 
each, where one represents the highest weighting and ten the lowest; please specify 
which project(s) that your indexes apply to):   
(  You can copy and paste this symbol to the box) 
Attributes of Stakeholder Networks 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Power: distribution or concentration / negotiation           
Interests: project incentives / business environment           
Strategic leadership: bring actors together           
Attitudes: stakeholder’s agenda / visions           
Relationship: trust / transparency / communication           
Capacity to contribute: professions / financing           
Institutional arrangements: network structure / 
policies 
          
Level of involvement: decision-making / consult / 
keep informed 
          
Others (please specify) 
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APPENDIX 4: 
Pre-Hypothesis Interview Responses 
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For the purpose of this research, the issues and themes presented below are by no means exhaustive, 
but instead focus on those aspects that have strong relevance to the main aim of this research: to 
identify interrelationships between mega urban transport projects, sustainable urban regeneration 
and mega events. Moreover, it appears that the correlations between issues are numerous, hence the 
summary below compresses the main areas of interests of this study.   
 
Summary of Interview Responses 
From the narrative patterns identified by the analytical tools described in Chapter 3, the predominant 
issues and their interrelationships can be ascertained. The interrelationships of these issues are crucial 
linkages for shaping a more comprehensive understanding of the studied mega-project decision-
making process. In this section, the summary of these relations is illustrated and accompanied by brief 
extracts from the data. Moreover, issues are characterised into six areas of interests: decision-making, 
institutional arrangements, discourse power, uncertainty, interrelationships between these three types 
of mega projects and the related issues. 
 
 Determining factors and features of mega project decision-making  
– Difficulty in quantifying benefits from the CTRL project development 
A prevailing argument is about how to appraise a business case like the CTRL project. The 
measurement of regeneration benefits is difficult, partly because it requires a long-term view and 
partly because the value can be different depending on whether it was judged from an optimistic 
or pessimistic perspective. It is argued that the externalities derived from the development of the 
CTRL project need to be taken into account. Additionally, wider benefits that are expected to 
trickle down to the communities are not certain and can easily be compromised. For example, the 
financial contributions from the developers of the station areas (St Pancras and Stratford in this 
case) were negotiated and legitimised as Section 106 agreements; however, the 2008/2009 world-
wide credit crunch and scarcity of bank lending provided an excuse for the private sector to re-
negotiate the deal. The negotiation for the Section 106 agreements involves elements of 
developers’ social responsibility and flexibility required by mega projects. The agreement set up 
an overarching, long-term, planning framework and enabled a market-driven development logic. 
The challenge for the public sector, including the Central Government and the local authorities, is 
to keep the project alive without loosing control. At the same time, the project might be slowed 
down or re-phased and the distortion or degradation of sustainability objectives by financial 
difficulties is expected.      
 
– Diverse measurements of economic benefits and their accountability 
The accountability of the measurements for major infrastructure investments and mega event 
developments has been challenged. Economic impact studies are often filled with misapplications 
of economic theory that virtually guarantee that their projections will be large. Large-scale 
projects have relatively long planning timeframes, which increase the difficulty of project 
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appraisal. The high degree of uncertainty involved in these projects results in big gaps between 
the estimates in the initial planning period and the project cost at the end. These gaps attract the 
criticism of over-optimistic forecasting.  
  
– Government indecisiveness and ‘least cost logic’ 
Mega projects inevitably involve a large sum of capital investment and when the Government 
needs to face decisions relating to project financing, they tend to be very indecisive or reluctant to 
face confrontations. The decisions at the early stage of the CTRL were made by British Rail and 
were mostly based on relatively narrow and safe aspects of their organisational interest. Thus, the 
profits from the property development linked to the station areas were a major incentive for their 
decisions. In addition, their decisions were greatly constrained by the Treasury’s predominant 
“least cost logic” when investing in public services.   
 
– Endeavour by the partnerships between business groups and the local authorities  
Ove Arup played a creative and proactive role in the private sector and did their utmost to lobby 
for the CTRL easterly route. Kent County Council at the early stages endeavoured to push the 
CTRL project through. Newham Council, development agencies and local businesses jointly 
lobbied furiously for the easterly route and Stratford International Station. The combination of 
professionals, institutional capacity, lobbying skill, intensive communication and consensus 
building was the critical impetus which drove and shaped the CTRL project. According to the 
narrative provided by the interviewees, Newham Council argued vehemently with a lot of the 
other people vote at least it needs to be a station in Stratford. That proposal was resisted very 
strongly by the Government and by Union Railways. They thought it would simply slow the 
journey times down. Initially, they thought their development profit would come from the 
Ebbsfleet and King’s Cross areas. Newham Council and the Stratford promoter groups did not see 
the loss that it would make by having extended service times because of Stratford and thought 
that the cost of building the station there will be offset by the development potential at Stratford. 
Consequently, the decision in favour of Stratford International was supported by John Prescott 
who was persuaded and lobbied by Newham Council. Interestingly, the development profits of 
the Stratford railway lands emerged as one of the critical elements for the CTRL concessional 
contract / commercial arrangements to attract the private sector. 
 
– Political power and determination  
Apart from the united effort made by the local authorities, developers and business groups, 
political power was a strong thrust that is crucial to the CTRL project proposal approval. The 
most-mentioned politician is Michael Heseltine who used his concept of the creation of London 
Dockland Development Corporation (LDDC) to promote the idea of integrating the CTRL project 
and the Thames Gateway development (see Section 9.4.2). Many interviewee responses 
(including people from the local authorities, the developers and the community groups) indicated 
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that the political determination and cross-party support is the essence of the force that drove the 
CTRL project through. Once the project obtained a certain level of political determination from 
powerful advocates and prevalent approval within the government, the project has built up 
enough momentum to proceed and has become too costly to abandon. Political determination was 
also a critical driving force for the 2012 Olympic Games. The three main political parties (Labour, 
Conservative and Liberal Democrats) committed to the Games during the Bid phase. The 
Olympics have achieved the degree of political commitment presented to the IOC, which has 
given the Games a reasonable chance of attracting very high levels of local and institutional 
support.  
 
– Government intervention  
It is argued that the private sector expected that the government could not afford to abandon the 
CTRL project or run through the tendering process again, and therefore they offered an over-
optimistic business case in their bid offer. The project then ran into financial difficulties in 1996 
and was secured by the 1998 financial restructuring which obtained strong government backing. 
Without John Prescott’s support for the project, this government intervention would have been 
unlikely. Although the advocates’ effort to lobby and brief John Prescott was a critical dynamic to 
persuade him to support the CTRL project when the Labour government took office in 1997; 
there are some suggestions that the new government held an attitude that “no projects died on my 
watch”. Therefore, a unique government backing mechanism was forthcoming something which 
previously had not existed and has not been replicated in other projects since. Another relatively 
subtle instance of the government’s intervention in the CTRL project is the elements of its Private 
Finance Initiative (PFI) mechanism. The government’s no-public-funding ideology contradicts 
the financing mechanism in the CTRL project. The lucrative development rights of the railway 
lands at King’s Cross and Stratford were given to the LCR as part of the concessionary contract. 
It is seen as a necessary initiative from the government when seeking private sector resources to 
build the CTRL. Under this circumstance, the commercial agreements between the government 
and the developers could represent a different form of public subsidy.   
 
– Window of opportunity  
The CTRL project per se can be seen as a window of opportunity. Once this window opened, 
many existing proposals flocked into this limited opportunity, including station area 
developments at Stratford, Ebbsfleet and Thames Gateway. These proposals have long been 
planned but they linked themselves to the CTRL project and became part of the agenda. This 
mutual aggrandisement between the CTRL project and its associated developments formed a 
better business case to justify the project as a whole package. With all the stakeholders eager to 
share the window of opportunity, they made a lot of political noises as they began positioning 
themselves. The 2012 London Olympics appeared to take advantage of the introduction of the 
high-speed rail link to Stratford. It is suggested by many interviewees that the existence of the 
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CTRL project was a determining factor for London to become the host city of the 2012 Olympic 
Games. Mega events are often seen as opportunistic. Here the Olympics were created based on an 
available site and major transport link and they rode on the back of this foundation. Within this 
context, the mega event triggers the opening of another, but much smaller, window of opportunity. 
It is widely agreed in the case of the 2012 London Olympics, given the nature of the mega event 
with its relatively shorter timeframe for planning, that projects catalysed by this mega event are 
on a smaller scale or are existing ones with only their programmes changed. Further discussion of 
the impacts of mega events is presented below. In this case study, Newham seems to be the 
biggest winner. The interviewee described the arrival of Stratford International, the 2012 
Olympics and the Crossrail project as being like a Christmas present to the locality. If there is any 
lost momentum in terms of building on the development platform left behind by the Games, the 
Crossrail project will act as further impetus. In their position, they are happy to see the Olympic-
related money being spent on them although it costs a lot.  
  
– Path-dependent behaviour  
Path-dependent behaviour may be pervasive in many situations and organisations. Partnerships in 
delivering the CTRL project were easily frustrated by the silo thinking which is characterised by 
path dependency. However, the co-operation within the CTRL project network had overcome the 
barrier to some extent. The most-criticised path-dependent behaviour was from British Rail. Their 
inexperience and silo thinking caused them to become locked into the approaches that they are 
familiar with but which were incapable of dealing with a crisis. Another notorious path-dependent 
behaviour is the legacy of the Thatcher government: privatisation. The ideology of privatisation 
appears to be a feature of the UK government’s culture and reinforced by its institutional 
arrangements. Although there are doubts about the principle of no public funding for the CTRL 
project, the new Labour government did not modify its predecessor’s policy. It is suggested that 
the concern was that there would be further delay if it were to be re-negotiate and re-tender the 
contract. Notwithstanding, the financial restructuring could be an opportunity to adjust the roles 
of the government and the developer.  
 
 Institutional arrangements  
– Negotiation powers are controlled by senior decision-makers  
It has long been argued that the current planning system and consultation framework favours the 
core decision-makers and excludes oppositions (see Section 9.4 and 9.5). According to the local 
campaigners, their negotiating power was constrained by the key decision-makers. Opinions 
which did not subscribe to the same vision as the project advocates are likely to be marginalised 
within the decision-making network. On the contrary, the actors from local government and 
developers argued that the consultation process gave a fair opportunity for people to comment on 
the proposal, except for the early stage of BR’s plan where they neglected the importance of 
public consultation, which they lacked the capacity to undertake. The long campaign of the 
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opposition group is also criticised for its loss of focus and unclear demands.   
 
– Streamlined planning power  
Camden Council as a planning authority aimed to push the King’s Cross redevelopment project 
through. They were the drivers for the King’s Cross Central scheme along with the developers. 
There were various attempts to derail projects and there were various attempts by others to take 
over the King’s Cross Central project. The local authority was a key decision-maker until the 
planning system was changed in 2001. The Mayor of London is now the planning authority for 
King’s Cross. The GLA in the early days were very keen to take control of the King’s Cross 
Central project. They did not succeed then but the law has now changed. Camden Council played 
a crucial role in the King’s Cross Central scheme. The International Olympic Committee (IOC) is 
now one of the world’s iconic institutions. It deployed the Olympic Games to dominate the 
business world and maintain its identity without compromising its core values. Moreover, it 
established many of the ground rules of today’s sports marketing industry. The force of having to 
guarantee things to the IOC forces the decision-making to become institutional. The contract 
signed between the host country and the IOC is very powerful. The Olympic Delivery Authority 
is bespoke and has streamlined planning powers in the Olympic Park area.   
 
– Organisational performance  
Opponents of the 2012 Olympics criticised the Government and the Games organisations’ poor 
performance. One of the examples stemmed from the delay of the compensation payment by the 
London Development Agency (LDA). They claimed that the LDA is a chaotic organisation and 
very difficult to deal with. Another example was quoted from the report published on 23rd April 
2008 by the House of Commons Select Committee which is responsible for reviewing the 
performance of the Department for Culture, Media and Sport: “such a radical revision of cost 
estimates has been damaging to confidence in the management of the overall programme. It has 
also exposed the Government and Games organisers to the charge that the initial bid was kept 
artificially low in order to win public support.”  
 
– Political decision  
The role of the high-speed railway network can probably encourage cluster cities / 
agglomerations since it connects major cities as a centre for each cluster. Other subsidiary 
transport networks link up all the smaller cities within each agglomeration, which forms a self-
sustaining cluster that might, for example, specialise in a particular industry. The campaign for 
the High Speed 2 has long argued that the high-speed railway network can facilitate economic 
growth and stimulate regeneration. The advocates of the high-speed railway also claimed that in 
the future, if we are looking towards a lower carbon economy, then there is a demand for their 
services. However, the planning process in the UK is long and complicated and the infrastructure 
cost is so high that it would take a long time for this to be realised. According to the sense making 
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item, the idea of high-speed railway networks in the UK is supported by the three main political 
parties. The Tories and Liberal Democrats have spoken in favour of a high-speed line north of 
London, in part to avoid the expansion of Heathrow Airport by offering an alternative to domestic 
air travel. It noted that while there are 5,570km of high-speed line in operation in Europe and 
almost 12,000km under construction or planned; the UK boasts a mere 110km. This indicates that 
national pride is partly responsible for politicians’ urge to support the high-speed railway network 
development. As a political consensus is emerging, the remaining issue is the cost. Building high-
speed railway networks in the UK is evidence of the competitiveness of the nation as well as its 
political output. 
 
– Trust is the key element in partnership  
Many interviewees claimed that mutual trust is the key to delivering the project and trust is 
developed over time and after more understanding obtained by each actor in the network. The 
notion is of a ‘trust circle’, the local community group is excluded because the opposition groups 
distrust the developers and the local authorities. As to the development process of major projects, 
the public tends to hold a certain level of scepticism and believes that there will always be gaps 
between the project outcome and the political promises. This also signifies the lack of trust in the 
government and the project’s promoters.  
  
 Discourse power  
– Rhetoric and political promises  
The interviewees from the local communities indicated that, in the case of the mega project 
developments in the UK, the mature institutional system allowed the people who deliver them to 
claim them as a great victory providing all they ever intended. However, there is little relationship 
between the outcome and the original aims because they always rely on people forgetting them. 
Some bits of the outcomes will be better and some will be worse than those originally promised. 
It depends on who gets the bits that are worse. A related issue mentioned by most of the 
interviewees is the promise of extending the CTRL services north of London. At the time, there 
was much opposition from the North of England, Scotland and Wales against the high-speed 
railway construction unless it provided services for the whole of the country.  So British Rail were 
required to produce a proposal for through services, which they were not prepared to do. This was 
largely seen as nothing more than a tantalising gesture and a means of gaining support. The 
hypocrisy of pretending that there would be high-speed services for the rest of the country locked-
in the decision to have the station at King’s Cross/St Pancras. This is a sub-optimal solution, and 
it provides an example of path dependency. The intention behind this promise is derived from the 
property development potential of the King’s Cross derelict railway lands.  
 
– Changing the discourse  
The development of mega projects in the UK takes a relatively long time. In the case of the CTRL, 
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it took two decades from the inception of the debate to the project completion. The initiatives for 
building this project changed throughout the development process. When this project was 
conceived, the objective was less focused on transatlantic economic linkage. At that time, the 
concern of London’s position as a world city probably was a more dominant rationale because the 
British high-speed railway infrastructure is far behind those of other countries. However, the 
various points of this development journey, such as the objective of European trading, the UK’s 
position in Europe and the regeneration in Thames Gateway all exerted an important influence 
over time. The Games are often attached to certain themes and messages, which are part of the 
marketing strategy. Hence the discourse can change over time depending on the prevailing issues, 
such as cost efficiency and sustainability. One common attribute of the 2016 Olympics bid cities 
is low cost and using existing facilities. The interviewee asserted that the Olympics are moving 
away from the Olympic Park concept. Host cities are realising that concentrating enormously 
large numbers of people in a particular area creates a huge number of transportation issues. It also 
means that cities end up spending a lot of money on building venues that are only temporary or 
later need to be downsized. Sustainability will mean that, for mega events like the Olympic 
Games, it will be a case of using existing facilities much more widely or upgrading existing 
systems, such as using existing accommodation and transportation systems. Otherwise it will be 
financially and environmentally unsustainable. 
 
– Stratford International Station is a white elephant  
The elected politician of Newham claimed that three factors constituted a strong case for Stratford 
International: First, Stratford can provide a necessary safety case for the Eurostar train between 
Barking and St Pancras when it needs to dispatch trains at night in an emergency. Second, there is 
a railway yard north of Stratford - Temple Mill - which provides suitable conditions for the 
construction of a railway depot. Third, Stratford provides better operational conditions for future 
high-speed train expansion to the cities to the north of London by connecting to the West Coast 
Main Line. However, other interviewees’ narratives collide with the latter two points. According 
to one interviewee, the demand for a railway depot was recognised at a very late stage of the 
CTRL development. Eurostar presented the case to the Government in 2004 and lobbied seriously, 
but the Government was reluctant to make a decision that involved more expenditure. The 
decision of giving approval to the Temple Mill depot was eventually made after two years. The 
decision on Stratford International was made much earlier (in 1998) than that on the depot. 
Additionally, the argument about the railway connection with the West Coast Main Line was in 
opposition to the suggestion that the future connection is likely to be from King’s Cross (The 
2010 published High Speed 2 proposal1 demonstrates that the connection from London will be 
from Euston Station which is close to the St Pancras International Station).  Some interviewees 
suggested that Stratford International is a white elephant given the relatively short distance 
                                                 
1 High Speed Two Ltd. (2010) High Speed Rail London to the West Midlands and Beyond: A Report to Government by High 
Speed Two Limited, DfT, 11 March. 
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between the St Pancras terminal and Stratford International.  
 
– Property-oriented development  
In 1984, the Thatcher Government started instructing nationalised industries to make up their 
expenses by selling their assets. British Rail in particular was instructed as a former Tory Prime 
Minister said in the House of Lords “to sell the family silver and to make their books balance.” 
The British Rail Property Board was looking at all the lands that they could probably sell. From 
the perspective of the developer and railway manager, the integration of railway and land 
development is a win-win solution. However, this mechanism would inevitably cause 
gentrification and displacement. The disadvantaged groups would be the losers to be sacrificed on 
the alter of a capitalist society. This is a protracted debate between market-driven and community-
friendly development. Furthermore, the vision of sustainable development which was emphasised 
by the regeneration projects in King’s Cross and Stratford seems to be easily derailed by the 
commercially-focused development. Developments at the CTRL station areas, i.e. King’s Cross 
Central and Stratford City schemes, are under significant pressure because profits generated from 
the developments are designated to pay back the construction cost. This has stressed the need for 
developers to maintain their profit level by raising the development density and therefore leading 
to over-development. Even worse, it is suggested that the profits generated from the regeneration 
benefits are highly uncertain and can merely keep the operation cost in balance if the regeneration 
schemes successfully attract more patronage. 
 
– Strategies to win support  
In order to win support for the Channel Tunnel in the 1980s, the government made various 
concessions. There was an argument about that it would undermine the very companies who carry 
most rail and road traffic over to the Continent at that time if there was any government subsidy. 
So the Channel Tunnel was debarred from receiving any public subsidy and this has become a 
legacy which impacted on the CTRL project. The then domestic public service was used to 
validate putting public funding into the CTRL project financing. The ‘no public funding’ policy is 
a political ideology. As mentioned earlier, the promise of a high-speed railway link to the north of 
London was merely a political gesture which aimed to win the support of the MPs in the northern 
constituencies. The LCR’s bidding was criticised because it was felt that they deliberately kept 
the requirement on Government’s direct grants low in order to win the bid. A similar criticism was 
levelled at the cost estimation for the 2012 Olympics where it was argued that the initial Olympic 
bid was kept artificially low in order to win public support. One sense making item alleged that 
key evidence from the Olympic impact research was suppressed or ignored by the Olympic 
organisers. This revelation about Olympic impacts and actual costs raised the question of why 
ministers endorsed a bid citing a justification dismissed by their own experts.  
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 Uncertainties  
– Opportunistic behaviour  
In the period of financial restructuring, Railtrack was regarded as opportunistic. When they were 
invited to participate in the arrangement to buy the CTRL, they clearly saw that they were in a 
very advantageous position to negotiate the terms. They exploited the financial crisis of the CTRL 
project. Again, when it came to the point of setting in place the arrangements to proceed with 
section 2, Railtrack were reluctant to concede that they would not be able to exercise their option 
and attempted to extract from the Government a revised better deal. At the same time, the 
Department for Transport was also reluctant to acknowledge that Railtrack would not exercise 
that option. Therefore the CTRL developers (i.e. LCR) were working very much by themselves 
making sure that they were ready for to go forward as quickly as possible once people accepted 
and acknowledged that Railtrack would not exercise their option. The LCR were working in the 
background on alternative plans. This also reveals that sometimes a government can be the source 
of uncertainties. 
 
Another instance of opportunistic behaviour is the transport project associated with the St Pancras 
International terminal. The interviewee claimed that the Thameslink Station is a typical example 
of opportunism. When that plan had gone wrong, it was abandoned leaving a sub-optimal 
transport system as a result. Thameslink Station was initially designed to be built underneath 
King’s Cross Station. However, the Government subsequently realised that it was too expensive 
and risky – the same logic as with the high-speed terminal underneath King’s Cross Station. 
Thameslink now has its 12 carriage platform at St Pancras but at the cost of an immense battle to 
sort out problems in Borough Market and London Bridge stations to get longer platforms. 
Thameslink is running today but with shorter trains. It has become very costly to build longer 
platforms. Hence its capacity is currently restricted by this circumstance. The benefits of 
Thameslink, as originally designed, are missing.          
 
– Planning blight caused by uncertainties  
Related to the factor of “indecisiveness and least-cost logic”, the long drawn out CTRL planning 
process contributed to uncertainties and planning blight. It is blamed on the uncertainties about 
the delivery of the CTRL project, which delayed the King’s Cross regeneration programme for 
many years. Given the conditions in the King’s Cross area, the impetus of urban regeneration was 
not heavily dependent on whether there is a high-speed rail terminal or not. Instead, without the 
intrusion of the CTRL project, King’s Cross regeneration would have started sooner and cost less. 
The same reason also caused the planning blight along the potential routes before the actual route 
was determined.  
 
– Mega events provide certainty  
In the current uncertain climate, particularly during the world economic recession, the threat of 
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delays to some projects due to funding constraints is a real concern. However, the connection of 
some schemes to the 2012 London Olympics will serve to ensure a strong infrastructure growth in 
demand over the next couple of years. The Athlete Village is one of the examples. Apparently, the 
Olympic Games placed immense pressure to the surrounding development area, and when the 
economic tsunami arrived, the developers grabbed the window of opportunity created by the 
crisis. As a result of government intervention, the housing project in the Village was secured and 
is progressing.  
 
 Interrelationships between mega urban transport projects, sustainable urban 
regeneration and mega events 
 
– Discourse coalition  
Ken Livingstone, the then Mayor of London, pushed for London to have an Olympic Bid and the 
only place that the Olympic stadium could really be developed in terms of space and regeneration 
potential was in Stratford. Stratford became very attractive to the Olympics because they could 
add the regeneration of the area onto that bid, which is something required by the International 
Olympic Committee. A lot of the developments, particularly the housing developments that are 
now taking place around the Olympic site, are developments that are facilitated by the local 
authority. The local authority will give them planning permission very readily because local 
authorities, particularly the London boroughs in the area surrounding the Olympic park, now no 
longer have access to significant sums of money to initiate their own public developments. 
However, some argued that regeneration benefit was a dangerous rationale for supporting the 
Olympic project. Regeneration is something that should have a separate rationale and a business 
case from those of the Games. Wrapping up the promises of housing and employment on the back 
of the Olympic project is a recipe for failure and disappointed expectations for the Games legacy.  
 
– The Olympic Games and the Stratford City scheme  
The government needed to merge the Stratford City scheme to justify its decision on hosting the 
Games and site selection. They recycled the benefits of urban regeneration and people became 
confused about these two projects. The Stratford City scheme was already planned when the 
Olympic Games site decided. Newham Council claimed that these two have different initiatives 
and different resources. There is competition when these two mega projects happened at the same 
time on adjacent construction sites. In order to present a good image of the Olympic park, the 
Government did not kill the Stratford City scheme when conflicts arose. Apparently, the 
developers are under significant pressure caused by the Games. As a result of the global economic 
recession, the developer of the athlete village (i.e., Lend Lease) cannot access sufficient bank 
lending. The Government consequently nationalised the athlete village project in 2009. In this 
sense, the Games may guarantee the delivery of the Stratford City scheme but not without 
reconfiguring its programme and characteristics. 
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– Impact of the 2012 Olympic Games on the Thames Gateway development  
In terms of housing development, the 2012 Olympic Games will have a significant influence on 
the Thames Gateway because the Thames Gateway is also a provider of lots of new housing over 
a period of time and especially in the years immediately after 2012. They are not going to be in a 
position to bring onto the market further additional housing. The re-phasing of the delivery of the 
Thames Gateway is also going to be significantly impacted by the 2012 Olympics. The mega 
event in this sense is competing for resources with other mega projects. If projects are not 
associated with the mega event, they are likely to be impacted negatively since mega events tend 
to have overriding power. 
 
– The impact of the CTRL project on urban regeneration  
Some claimed that the CTRL’s prolonged planning process and decision-making caused planning 
blight for the King’s Cross area rather than bringing forward the King’s Cross redevelopment 
scheme. As time was wasted, higher costs occurred when the high-speed railway terminal was 
finally decided. Conversely, some interviewees believe that the CTRL project is primarily a 
catalyst for the regeneration which is taking place in King’s Cross and Stratford and further east 
through the Thames Gateway. The CTRL developer defined three objectives for this project: 
providing international train travel, to improve commuting train travel from Kent and to provide a 
catalyst for regeneration. The new St Pancras station did improve the image of the locality. Local 
campaigners and community developers criticised the way in which the privilege and reputation 
of the local authority seemed to form an important part of the incentives for local authorities 
working in partnership with the developers. 
 
One interviewee argued that “today, and in 10 years time, the far more important issue would be 
the catalyst project for the regeneration. Back in 1998 / 1999, government was only allowed to 
include half a billion pounds worth of further regeneration from this railway, whilst today, with 
King’s Cross and Stratford, there would be over £10 billion worth of regeneration - effectively 20 
times higher and with the potential to become even greater on completion of the project.” 
Regeneration benefits have become an important financial justification for the high-speed railway 
project. The lack of concrete evidence to show the economic impacts and scepticism stemming 
from the collisions between market- and community-led developments posed questions about 
whether this mega-project discourse can materialise. 
 
Newham Council believes that having an international station at Stratford with links to Europe 
will be a real catalyst for redevelopment/regeneration in the east of London. Although Newham is 
one of the most deprived areas of the UK, the local authority thought the international station was 
the project that could really unlock the potential of the area. Hence, from 1988 to 1998 they 
consistently worked to promote the idea that the international station would become the catalyst 
for change at Stratford.    
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In addition to the high-speed domestic services connecting north Kent to central London via 
Stratford, Crossrail would appear in 2016. Transport infrastructure will make Stratford a very 
attractive and fast business gateway. This was always the ambition of the Newham lobbying 
group’s backing 20 years ago making Newham a place where investors would come to build their 
businesses. One sense-making item shows that, regarding the Thames Gateway development, the 
area inside London makes a strong case for developing housing rather than in Kent and Essex. 
Although the Government often quoted the Crossrail project and the Eurostar domestic services, 
they cannot properly serve the Thames Gateway areas that are outside London. The transport 
expenditure in the Thames Gateway areas outside London is heavily weighted towards roads. 
Conversely, in the London Thames Gateway, most transport expenditure went on public transport. 
Transport infrastructure improvement has been a perennial challenge for 25 years in the South 
East. Additionally, major infrastructure is a prerequisite for successful regeneration.   
 
 Mega-event-related issues 
– Entrepreneurialism in urban politics and the promotion of mega events  
Entrepreneurialism emerged from the transformation of both the character and the content of 
urban politics since the mid 1970s. Mega events are one of the instruments to realise the idea of 
public-private partnership formation. However, some suggested that the close relationship 
between business leaders and local politicians lead to too much focus on commercially-oriented 
development. In this research, opponents remonstrate against the approach of the developments 
both in the high-speed rail station areas and Olympic-related programmes. The notion is that the 
opponent groups generally agreed that developments are necessary and inevitable, but they are 
dissatisfied with the patterns of development that are predominant in the partnership between 
politicians and developers. The expected bottom-up development approach, which is also 
propagandised by the government, is derailed when developers seek profits to pay off the bills of 
mega project development. This situation is worse in the case of the 2012 London Olympics in 
which the developers face significant pressure and time constraints.  
 
Although the Government advocates public-private partnerships (PPPs) when deliver mega 
projects, the PPP does not necessarily seem to be a peaceful process. The interviewees from the 
public agencies and the government expressed their frustration when dealing with the private 
sector and described the partnership is an application of Game Theory. This was partly caused by 
the stakeholders’ different aspirations but mainly because the public sector is in a 
disadvantageous position when there are rigorous time constraints.  
 
The identified theme of ‘entrepreneurialism’ in the OMEGA study suggests a different aspect of 
this concept. Some stakeholders consider that major infrastructure investments need to be led by 
those with an entrepreneurial approach, and are thus able to see the wider potential gains and 
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losses of key decisions.  
 
– Timeframe 
According to ODA, the Olympic project has never gone stagnant because it is always driven by 
deadlines. There is huge pressure to deliver results at every stage. The Olympics accelerate the 
focus on time, which concentrates the mind. The Games’ organisers stated that the Olympics 
brought forward investment and regeneration within a certain timeframe which is a significant 
feature of the Olympic Games. On the one hand, it draws financial, political and planning 
resources to one place; on the other hand, the Olympic timeframe reveals that the associated 
projects are mostly planned long before the Games development. This echoes its opportunistic 
characteristic whereby the Olympic Games rely on existing infrastructure projects and planned 
development.    
 
– The 2012 Olympic Legacy Plan  
The local boroughs think that the Games organisers and developers do not understand the local 
needs. They presume that the stadium is likely to become a white elephant after the event. 
Connectivity is also a concern to the Olympic boroughs. The current thinking of the Olympic 
Park is as an island not really merged with its neighbourhoods. However, the Olympic Games 
created a new shopping list for the locality and lead to more money coming in from the 
government contingency funds. It is suggested that many investments have followed the Olympic 
decision, for example, the rolling stock of the High Speed One, the East London Line, some of 
the DLR extensions, the re-fit of the Stratford Regional Station, the underground power cables, 
land assembly which would have taken 20 years otherwise and West Ham’s has received £35 
million project to make over its entrances and ramps.  
 
 Other issues 
– Stakeholder management is the key to mega project delivery  
The interviewees from local authorities, public agencies and the Olympic organisations all 
stressed the importance of stakeholder management in large-project development, which they 
believe to be the key to success for mega projects and mega events. Ultimately, the rest of it is 
just noise as people try to position themselves for commercial advantages. Everything else is 
about money, which you can always work through. The difficulty is about managing stakeholders 
in that particular environment: how to bring all these stakeholders into roughly the right 
alignments and how to carry the relationships forward through time.  
 
– Institutionalise knowledge  
Mega projects have the pattern of going through a lot of chopping and changing, for example, 
different partners have been in and out of the Stratford City project. This further complicated the 
project and increased costs in terms of knowledge transfer and commercial arrangement 
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renegotiations. The continuity of personnel and partnership are identified as an important element 
in mega-project delivery. However, this remains ideology given the longevity of this kind of 
project. Therefore, one interviewee indicates that the solution should be to institutionalise 
knowledge in order to cope with changing personnel and partners.  
 
– Accumulating momentum for the 2012 London Olympics  
Contradicting the argument about the Olympic timeframe, one interviewee indicated that actually 
the process of assembling a bid for the Olympics is a long process. There were a series of failures 
where other UK cities had been involved in Olympic bids before the 2012 London Olympics. 
Although these bids failed, they exhibited the process of the accumulation of momentum for 
building the project. The interviewee suggested this is known in some literature as a ‘growth 
coalition’. The theory of growth coalition reflects the affiliation of project champions. Regarding 
the issue of the Olympic timeframe, the level of risk should be taken into account. Whether a city 
can win the hosting rights for the Olympics is highly uncertain, major project developments, such 
as transport and regeneration, cannot only rely on the Games to bring them about. From the 
announcement of a host city to the opening ceremony, there are only 7 years, which is too short a 
timeframe for major transport and regeneration schemes. Hence, the author would support the 
argument that the Olympics relied on existing infrastructure or already-planned facility 
programmes.  
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APPENDIX 5: 
Hypothesis-Led Interview Responses 
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Question 1:  
Do you agree that MUTPs are impacted significantly by mega events, if so, why and how? 
 
Around half of the respondents (5 out of 9) to this question expressed strongly positive support for this 
premise regarding the impacts of mega events on MUTPs. There appears to be general agreement that 
mega events can be a catalyst that accelerates projects and concentrates political, financial and 
planning resources. Conversely, another half of the respondents expressed strong disagreement with 
this question. They indicated that mega events can only have impacts on existing plans for MUTP 
programmes some of which are then prioritised and some left out.  
 
 Respondents from government agencies, Olympic organisations and local authorities support 
this premise for the reasons summarised below: 
– It is about national pride as a world contest to provide the best transport system for a 
world event; 
– Mega events tend to have immediacy, funding, political reputation and political 
prioritisation attached to them; 
– Without the 2012 London Olympics’ role as a driver establishing an end date, you 
would not have had the CTRL project completed in its entirety, including the associated 
underground infrastructure; 
– Mega events prioritise the way the government and others are going to spend the 
resources; 
– Mega events have effects on transport capacity and demand; 
– Mega events accelerate plans by concentrating political commitment and investments 
that will otherwise take much longer to materialise; 
– Mega events create a long-term infrastructure legacy; 
– In the case of the Olympics, they act effectively as a catalyst. 
  
 Respondents from both public and private sectors and local communities indicated their 
argument as follows: 
– Mega events can only push those projects which are already on the drawing board, but 
to which the political will or the necessary funds have not been allocated; 
– In the case of Crossrail, which has long been planed, the excitement around the 
Olympics probably gave that a boost; 
– The London Olympics is relying on the existing transport infrastructure programme to 
accommodate them; 
– Given the lengthy planning period for MUTPs, the relatively-short planning time of 
mega events cannot have a significant impact on them; 
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– In parallel, mega events complicate the already-complex MUTPs. They cause immense 
pressure on the transport projects and really make the cost escalate because of their 
different timeframe. 
  
Question 2:  
In your view, under which circumstances can one coordinate the delivery of MUTPs, SUR and MEs, 
and simultaneously achieve visions of sustainable development? 
Most of the interviewees (6 out of 9) responding to this question agree that coordination between 
these three things can provide a better outcome. Two of these responses suggested that a mega-event 
organiser with overriding planning powers could coordinate these projects and lead to sustainable 
development. One response emphasised that an influential champion with streamlined planning 
powers can bring the coordination. Three comments indicated that the planning authority for urban 
regeneration could better coordinate the other two types of project. One interview transcript pointed 
out that the coordination between these three is inevitable under the prevalent fashion for modernity, 
i.e. pursuing high-speed transport, sumptuous infrastructure and advanced technology, but it is not 
sustainable. Some of the responses from both the public and private sectors expressed a degree of 
cynicism toward sustainable development in terms of its essence, manoeuvring and ownership.  
 
 Below is a summary of the respondents’ perceptions which supported the idea of 
coordination of mega urban transport projects, urban regeneration and mega events: 
– A strong champion who is in charge of a powerful regional development agency can 
make project delivery easier than purely relying on the market. 
– Once the political support, funding strategy and fundamental programmes are all in 
place, an event can tie these three things (i.e., MUTPs, SUR and MEs) together and 
potentially deliver a broader and faster outcome. 
– Mega events consist of a series, a group and a package of projects; therefore, mega 
events per se create the environment to coordinate other associated elements of 
development. 
– The context of Stratford shows coordination within the symbiotic relationship between 
the transport hub, urban regeneration and the Olympic project, which has helped 
achieve the vision of sustainable development. 
– Only by means of a highly undemocratic and strongly authoritarian process could this 
kind of coordination otherwise be achieved. 
– Continuous commitment from all stakeholders and co-operation between public and 
private sectors are the key factors to realise the vision of sustainable development. A 
planning authority could coordinate these three things. Local authorities and 
government each have significant roles to play in providing a framework. 
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– The leader of the local planning authority plays an important role as a broker. In the 
case of King’s Cross, Bob West, who played a crucial mediator role in the 
redevelopment, had constructive communication and proactive engagement in the 
decision-making process of the King’s Cross regeneration scheme with the continuity 
of strategic planning and technical professions. The coordination between diverse 
stakeholders from different projects was a key factor in realising the projects and 
minimising risks. 
– The coordination of all these three things provides a much stronger case; none of them 
exists on its own. This highlights the interdependence of projects, which helps them 
sustain each other, delivering savings and synergies for a better overall outcome. 
 
 Below is a summary of the respondents’ perceptions with different ideas about the 
coordination of mega urban transport projects, urban regeneration and mega events, which 
further addresses some issues related to sustainable development:  
 
– There is a fundamental issue concerning the features of major projects and about their 
nature that can actually prevent or hinder the realisation of sustainable development. 
Hence, there is no necessity to co-ordinate these three. It does not help to achieve 
visions of sustainable development if sustainability is not owned by the local 
population. 
– Under the force of globalisation, city competitiveness and the desire for modern and 
large-scale infrastructure projects, these high-speed infrastructure projects will 
inevitably accompany modern regeneration. Replacement will subsequently happen to 
existing communities and businesses. This is not sustainable development; instead, it is 
about the image that a city wants to present. 
– Sustainable development is over-used and has become a ‘buzz term’, despite never 
being properly defined. 
– The vision of sustainability was not a strong driver, although it did help the narrative 
around the business case for the high-speed rail link. 
– The challenge and risks that Stratford City faces are higher than King’s Cross, because 
it is not prime development land. Within the current market, there are more 
uncertainties. Certainly designating that site for the Olympics helped to give the extra 
push that was needed to get that project through. 
– Similar to the concept of the ‘window of opportunity’, interviewees indicated that the 
major project development relies heavily on the planetary alignment analogy which 
requires that all the components of the project are correctly positioned. It implies that 
the major project developments also need the elements of serendipity and planning. 
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– In the case of the CTRL project, the timing occurred twice over about 14 years. 
However, some opportunities were missed as decisions were made to save money 
rather than time. Ultimately, neither was saved. 
 
 
Question 3:  
Where this trilogy of development exists, which agency/institution provides/should provide 
leadership?  
Which of the three types of developments (MUTPs, SUR and MEs) becomes the locomotive of 
change that drives the others to achieve favourable outcomes for the principal stakeholders? 
 
Concerning the question about the source of leadership, three (37.5% from private developer, 
government agency and local authority) out of eight responses suggested that the Central Government 
should play the lead role and coordinate this trilogy of development. The other three (from a 
government agency, an international organisation and the local community) indicated that a powerful 
public agency is the leader if multiple development projects exist in one area. Two interviewees (from 
a government agency and the local community) stated that a coalition between interest groups would 
be dominant in the project delivery process.  
 
As to which of the three types of developments could be the locomotive and achieve the predominant 
agenda, there were two respondents who claimed that the integration of mega urban transport projects 
and sustainable urban regeneration schemes is the key locomotive. Two suggested that mega urban 
transport projects or a similar grand project with a major injection of public funding are the most 
powerful driver. Two responses from the mega-event organisations believes that a mega event is the 
ultimate locomotive which can drive other associated projects forward to reach their goals at a quicker 
pace with certainty. 
 
A few emerging issues extracted from the responses to question 3 are highlighted below: 
 Initial commitment from the Central Government level should provide the leadership. The bi-
partisan political support is needed to ensure the long-term view. 
 In the case of London, the Mayor and the London Development Agency (LDA) are the strong 
champions and well-equipped public agencies that can provide leadership in this trilogy of 
development. 
 It requires a specially-designated, supra-national body to be in control. 
 Leadership comes from the championship and governance of sponsorship.  
 Leadership is where initiative, drive and backing for the projects lies.  
 The British are notorious bad at grand projects. The only time this trilogy of development has 
ever been managed, although not at all successfully, was the London Docklands 
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Development Corporation. The current Olympic Delivery Authority, as an undemocratic 
authoritarian body, may be able to successfully manage the Olympic projects. 
 The coalition of interests that comes together around these projects, especially the coalition 
between politicians and developers, is the means to control these major projects. Policy-
makers provide the ground rules and the developers have to find a way of fitting their 
projects into that framework in order to manipulate that situation. However, these major 
projects are always out of anyone’s control. 
 The time scales of these projects determine the characteristics of this trilogy. Fundamentally, 
mega events cannot be the strategic driver because mega urban transport projects and major 
sustainable urban regeneration schemes take a long time to plan. 
 Transport projects and sustainable urban regeneration schemes should be closely integrated. 
This integration is the locomotive to drive other associated developments. 
 Mega events are often opportunistic. They rely heavily on the opportunity created by having 
the site and the large transport link.  
 This trilogy of development is likely to exist when there are brownfield sites and they are the 
locomotive.   
 Stakeholders need to be sensitive to the wider political context.  
 A strong and effective personality heading up the project itself would turn out to be the main 
driver. Someone who is fully empowered to make decisions for the project and who can 
persuade and manoeuvre stakeholders into position. 
 Seeking for political reputation and political benefits will be the main motives for the local 
level. 
 Major infrastructure investment or large injections of public funding to some projects is a 
strong catalyst; otherwise the market would see to it and take control of the timing and 
patterns of that area’s regeneration.  
 How effectively local authorities shape the agenda and insist on attention to sustainability-
related issues determines the sustainability of a regeneration scheme. After all, the 
regeneration scheme is more a local-scale project. 
 
 
Question 4: 
Do MUTPs, sustainable urban regeneration, and mega events share resources1 at the local, regional, 
and national scale, or is one promoted at the expense of the others?  
 
Within the nine interviews, two responses (22.2% from the Olympic organisation and the community 
planner) believed that resources are shared between these three main elements (MUTPs, SUR and 
MEs). Further, the community planner emphasised that they share resources in a way that brings a 
                                                 
1 It includes financial, political, institutional and planning resources. 
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favourable outcome for the project organisers and advocates. There were three stakeholders (33.3% 
from the private developer, local community and government agency) who agreed that, to some extent, 
there is a degree of resource sharing, but with certain other aspects are in competition. Two responses, 
both from the government agencies, indicated that these developments do not share resources but in a 
competitive situation. The interviewee from the local authority commented that these developments 
are rather independent in terms of resources.  
 
Brief illustrations of stakeholders’ views on question 4 are presented below:  
 Political resources are shared but financial resources are separate. Institutional planning 
resources are streamlined in order to improve efficiency.  
 It requires a strong figure to reprioritise the resources in the environment where these 
projects compete for resources. 
 Long-term legacy and urban regeneration benefits are justifications for the Olympics taking a 
large share of the resources in London.  
 In the case of the 2012 Olympics, the stakeholder noted that Britain is a democratic country 
and the government knew how far they could go to make the Bid attractive whilst not ruining 
the country.  
 If these developments can be combined and in a communist society, they can share resources.  
 This issue depends on project scale. Mega urban transport projects are often at a national 
level. They cause the greatest impacts and may provide the greatest benefit. Sustainable 
urban regeneration investments impact on relatively smaller areas. In the case of the CTRL 
and Crossrail, they do share resources with the Stratford City project. As to the Olympics, it 
further reinforces the imbalance between developments in London and other regions. 
 There are elements for sharing in planning resources and planning constitution, but 
competing in respect of implementation, i.e., labour. 
 The costs to local authorities are generally underestimated. The local authority claimed that 
they pour in resources at all levels in order to be in a position to shape the project design, 
manage the construction impacts, negotiate, cajole and consult. 
 Many Councils would baulk at paying millions of pounds or more to be part of the project, 
but the benefits to Camden of having an international terminus there are huge and well worth 
it.  
 Strategic allocation of resources is constantly going on. However, as the decision of the 
project goes down the line from national level to local level, the assigned resources are 
already diluted. If the project is sabotaged, it is the resulted of a combination of strategic and 
political changes. Because there is a long timeframe for project delivery, it is possible for a 
project to stop and start several times.  
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HYPOTHESIS 1 – The Role of MUTPs 
Mega urban transport projects (MUTPs) have the potential to act as an agent for the delivery of 
sustainable urban regeneration and mega events, while mega events in turn can speed-up MUTP and 
sustainable urban regeneration developments. On this basis, CTRL constitutes an important positive 
catalyst for both sustainable urban regeneration and the Olympic developments associated with its 
transport hubs. 
 
Question 1: MUTP is a positive catalyst 
Do you agree with this hypothesis in general terms and as it relates more specifically to the Channel 
Tunnel Rail Link project? 
 
The majority (eight out of nine) of the respondents supported this hypothesis and agreed that the 
CTRL project is an agent for urban regeneration. However, two of them disagreed that it is a catalyst 
for the Olympics. They suggested that the CTRL did facilitate the success of the Olympics bid, but it 
was only one of the factors. This assertion about the MUTP being a catalyst for mega events is 
overstated. One response indicated that the impact of the CTRL on urban regeneration and the 
Olympics is marginal. The CTRL could merely justify the rationale for choosing that Olympic site but 
the majority of transportation will depend on domestic services. Furthermore, the Stratford City and 
King’s Cross Central will be delivered anyway no matter whether there is an international station or 
not because those lands are big enough and economically enticing.  
 
The respondents’ pros and cons to question 5 are summarised below: 
 In the London context, the Dockland Light Railway and Jubilee Line Extension for the 
Canary Wharf are good evidence for Hypothesis 1. 
 Mega urban transport projects are not necessarily the catalyst for mega events, but they allow 
the events to happen.  
 In the case of the planning process, the CTRL has no direct relationship with the London 
Olympics because they happened at different times. 
 The Olympics will benefit from the Stratford International Station and the internal transport 
network that the CTRL provided. The high-speed link is the determining factor for London to 
convince the IOC visitors. 
 The high-speed railway station at Stratford triggered a chain reaction. The Stratford 
International Station helped the decision made about the Games. Then the Olympics helped 
to speed up other projects and give certainty to the Stratford City development.  
 Major transport projects are planned deliberately to catch every possible regeneration 
opportunity, which is part of the rationale for their planning.  
 The land development of Stratford City is going to recoup the CTRL construction debt but 
there is no benefit contributing to sustainable urban regeneration.  
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 Mega events require a variety of conditions and mega urban transport projects are probably 
one of those necessary elements.  
 Mega urban transport projects are usually a positive catalyst because they improve 
accessibility and the image of that site. The case of King’s Cross / St Pancras is certainly 
changing the whole image of that area of London.  
 
Question 2:  CTRL – A driver of change? 
What are the distinct roles of the CTRL in terms of the urban regeneration process of King’s Cross 
Central and Stratford City, and what role (if any) has the CTRL played in the Olympic Games Project? 
 
Question 2 is closely related to question 1. All (nine) of the respondents agreed that the CTRL is a 
driver of change, but there were different outcomes of these changes, i.e. for better or for worse. 
Seven stakeholders expressed their agreement that the CTRL project had positive impacts on urban 
regeneration and the Olympic project. Two of the respondents commented that the sheer lengthy of the 
CTRL project planning process caused planning blight which brought uncertainty to the King’s Cross 
area development. One respondent argued that the CTRL brought unsustainable patterns of 
development to the hub areas because the concessionary contract imposes great pressure on their 
development, which results in a commercially-focus and over-dense development. In addition, six 
responses stressed the determining role of the CTRL in the Olympic Bid decision. 
 
Below is a summary of the views of the stakeholders:  
 CTRL has significant impact in terms of the public and private investment in King’s Cross 
Central and Stratford City regeneration schemes. 
 The Railway is an old and faithful transport system and the impact on the cities is 
tremendous. 
 CTRL provided a window of opportunity for King’s Cross and Stratford to develop good 
commercial regeneration schemes. 
 Accessibility is a major determiner for London land and rental values because these land and 
rental values in turn are major determiners of land use. There will be many large-scale 
enterprises located in King’s Cross. The impacts of the ripple effect of the gentrification have 
already happened in St Pancras.  
 CTRL is an unsustainable project in terms of encouraging those property-led developments 
along its stations. They all follow the modern model of development and create 
disadvantages for existing local communities. 
 The uncertainty of the blight created by the CTRL delayed the King’s Cross Central project 
and other developments along the proposed corridors for decades. The Stratford City 
regeneration scheme, although it has the international station, is not as competitive as King’s 
Cross Central in terms of its geographical conditions. Furthermore, the projected number of 
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patrons expected for the international station there is risky because of competition from St 
Pancras Station. 
  As to the 2012 Olympics, the CTRL is like the icing on the cake. The importance for people 
to get to the Olympic site by the link provided by the CTRL will not register in the public 
perception. 
 The railway facilitates the delivery of better and bigger regenerative development along with 
the international stations. There is an argument about the gentrification problems that may 
result from the King’s Cross Central plan, but it is controlled by the market and it was the 
railway that made the change initially, not the property development. 
 The effect of the CTRL terminal is more dramatic and obvious at Stratford as the land value 
there is relatively low and with little prospect of economic success. The CTRL project is a 
strong injection to that area. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 2 – Political decision 
Institutional arrangements and power relations are the most significant factors influencing the 
effective delivery and performance of Mega Urban Transport Projects (MUTPs), Sustainable Urban 
Regeneration (SUR) and Mega Event (ME) schemes.  
 
Question 3: Political power 
Is the ultimate determining factor of the decision-making process in MUTP planning, appraisal, 
evaluation, and delivery that of political power and not the power of the rationality of technocrats?   
 
Two thirds of the stakeholders (6 out of 9 comments) responding to this question expressed strongly 
positive support for this premise regarding the influence of political power in the decision-making 
process for major projects. The other one third of the respondents held an opposing opinion suggested 
that there is a fundamental flaw in this premise. Both of these two sides provided illustrations for their 
arguments, which highlight emergent issues. 
  
 The statements which support this premise: 
- Political output is a dominant concern and far more influential than the cost it takes 
to deliver that outcome. 
- Politics are about priority and it comes from government level. Without political 
support, major projects are not going to happen irrespective of the merits of the idea 
or technical requirements.  
- In the case of London, political power at the heart of the decision to bid for the 
Games. Without cross-party support and based on the power of rationality, Britain 
would probably not have bid in  the first place.  
- Political decisions are vulnerable to global economic forces and the perception of a 
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city’s image. Therefore these high-profile major projects are inter-connected with 
the highest level of strategic politics and political decisions where things like 
financial viability are secondary.  
- It is difficult to have a fully rational technical case because even the results of 
thorough evidence-based research may change over time. The political decision 
might be based on something that is not provable in a rational manner, but is a good 
idea politically.  
 
 The views of the stakeholders who disagreed with this premise: 
- The power of the rational technocrats is not divorced from political power in the 
MUTP decision-making. 
- Neither the technocrats nor the politicians have that much power in decision-making 
for major infrastructure investments. Decision makers and politicians are often 
constrained by the financial realities unless they perceive strong willingness from 
people to pay more tax or they have a strong ideology in favour of public provision 
driven either by an authoritarian or a democratic state. The private market ideology 
will limit the capacity as a politician to push the project through. Political and 
financial contexts of the time need to be taken into account if one wants to devise a 
programme. There is no difference between political power and technocratic 
rationality concerning the development and delivery of major projects. 
- Politicians make decisions but these are not overriding decisions. Decisions for 
major infrastructure investment also involve elements of lobbying. Appraisal and 
evaluation reflect the benefits of that project in the real world. This evidence is 
translated into political pressure and political interest.   
 
 
Question 4: Bargaining power (after Charles Lindblom, 1988) 
What factors can enhance stakeholders’ ‘negotiation power’ in the delivery of:  
▪  CTRL as a whole  
▪  the KX Central / Stratford City transport hubs or   
▪  2012 London Olympics  
and why?  
 
 
Nine stakeholders all have their own views on this question as summarised below.   
 Concerning stakeholders’ negotiation power in the delivery of a wider range of major 
projects:  
- Good stakeholder management and wide-ranging stakeholder support are important 
when negotiating terms. 
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- Good communication skills for letting all stakeholders fully understand the benefits 
that the project can deliver are an important strategy to gain more negotiating power. 
- Being sensitive to the political climate enables the programme to be adjusted to gain 
a better position in negotiation. 
- Some designated agencies are empowered to override other stakeholders’ concern to 
some extent in order to deliver the key agenda. Wherever these agencies can bring 
into play something that the principal stakeholder wants to achieve, they will be 
well advised to do so. They obtain significant negotiating power because of their 
strong support from all other principal stakeholders.  
- In terms of the CTRL project, the power of the government or the agency which is 
buying the project is much greater. This is down to political will and ideology. 
- Government investment is a key factor for the project delivery. Particularly in an 
economic downturn, it is the right timing for the Government to step in and 
stimulate investment.  
- Once the certainty of the major projects has been built into legislation, the 
negotiating power of the local authority lies in the ability to slow a programme 
down and sometimes generate negative publicity. But a proactive role of the local 
authority in supporting the project or in providing an arena for consensus-building, 
is evidence of valuable, and hopefully appreciated, good will. This helps to build 
trust among the stakeholders. If there can be an input of resources, this can further 
help to gain influence. Although this does not provide absolute power, the local 
authority can participate in decision-making for the project specification and secure 
local needs by proactive involvement.  
 
 In the case of the 2012 London Olympics, the stakeholders’ negotiating power is determined 
by the following factors: 
- London has provided one of the best transport plans and accompanied it with 3000 
consultation entities. This is very convincing, especially since transport in London is 
always a difficult issue.  
- Urban regeneration and legacy benefits put the Games in a strong bargaining 
position.  
- National pride and a public perception of the UK’s world image is one of the 
significant factors to enhance the power of the Games. 
- The government and Mayoral commitment is the key factor in the delivery of the 
Olympic project. The stakeholder negotiations almost achieve a conclude 
transaction of interest-sharing before the Bid. It could be seen as a political 
movement. At the time, all decision makers from the central government, the Mayor 
of London and the four Olympic local boroughs were in the Labour party. The 
negotiation represents sharing benefits between these principal stakeholders. It is a 
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win-win situation for them if everyone obtains certain benefits that they desire in 
their area.  
- Crisis can trigger the opening of an opportunity window. Sometimes, problems or 
failure would enhance certain stakeholders’ negotiating power. For example, the 
credit crunch provided a better position for developers to re-negotiate their 
obligations under the Section 106 agreements. 
- The champions of the Olympics are very good at lobbying. It is a very good 
example of how to use negotiating power.  
 
HYPOTHESIS 3 - Synergy of network 
Inter-agency co-operation that brings synergistic relations between MUTPs, SUR and MEs can better 
foster integrated development and the achievement of sustainable development visions that add value 
to the original individual projects.  
 
Question 5: Robbing Peter to pay Paul 
Will the completion of the 2012 London Olympics project significantly divert resources away from 
other major development initiatives?  If so, are the spin-off benefits of this re-prioritisation justified? 
 
There was almost overwhelming support by all sectors for the notion that the 2012 London Olympics 
diverted resources away from other developments. There was only one (out of nine) respondent from 
the Olympic organisation who did not agree with this premise. Among these responses, four 
stakeholders (from the developer, government agency, Olympic organisation and local authority) 
indicated that there would be significant spin-off benefits from this resource prioritising. Two of the 
stakeholders stressed that the success of the London Olympics will be judged by its legacy plan, 
which was regarded by another respondent as a competitive project if compared to other lower profile 
developments.  
 Summaries from the responses to this question:  
- The justification is that a mega event condenses the timeframe, which will produce a 
more efficient outcome than piecemeal developments. 
- It is not really robbing Peter as such; it is only diverting financial resources, 
delaying expenditure on one area. The investment for the Olympic project is 
justifiable if looked at long-term and for its wider benefits. It also depends on how 
you quantify economic benefits and how they then feed back into the economic 
equation. 
- The spin-off benefits are big considerations for the Olympics decisions. Legacy, 
such as capturing the imagination of the nation and driving improvements in sport 
awareness, and urban regeneration benefits are considerations. 
- Although the infrastructure budget is more problematic, it is justifiable. The 
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investment is more concentrated in space and time. 
- We have to look at the long-term regeneration benefits. There has been an absolute 
quantitative and qualitative improvement in Barcelona’s global and European 
position, tourism and jobs because of the ’92 Games. London will also have the 
same reaction to that catalyst. 
- These big projects actually help to stimulate the local economies because they are 
very useful for making sure that there are new suppliers and new markets. 
- The test is not the Olympics itself but the legacy. If it delivers the legacy then 
arguably it is worth it. 
 
 Some relevant issues were emerging as follows:  
- The planning resources of King’s Cross, Stratford and Ebbsfleet will not be diverted 
by the Olympics, but other, regional, sport-related developments will lose their share 
to the Olympics. 
- Having several major projects going on at the same time may inflate the cost. 
- Highly-specialised engineering skills can be used for one project and then moved on 
to the next.  
- The most obvious area to be influenced by the Olympics will be the Thames 
Gateway development. 
 
Question 6: ‘Win-win’ strategies? 
Do you agree that some important aims of the CTRL project, the 2012 London Olympics project and 
the urban regeneration schemes for Stratford City and King’s Cross are in reality mutually reinforcing, 
or are the product of important compromises? 
 
All the respondents (eight) agreed that there are elements that are mutually reinforcing. Among these 
eight responses, half of them (from community planner, local community, government agency and 
local authority) suggested that to some extent there are also compromises within these developments.  
 
 Summaries extracted from the interview transcripts are presented below:  
- There is a win-win situation in terms of transport mode shift. The CTRL is a 
transport-oriented development and the Games heavily rely on public transport 
services. Both of them encourage urban regeneration.  
- In terms of the viability of all the projects, there is a need for compromises and it is 
just more like reality. However, in the process of deciding which interests are to be 
compromised, the private developers usually have a better negotiating position.  
- The synergy between these elements is there, but the CTRL project alone is not the 
decisive factor for the King’s Cross redevelopment or the Stratford City scheme. 
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The urban regeneration schemes came because the CTRL project was made 
available to a commercial organisation prepared to take the risk and develop it. The 
overall transport network to those sites is more crucial and then the Olympics have 
provided the impetus to take Stratford City forward. However, there are 
compromises between Stratford City and the transport design. The way Stratford 
City was designed held back the quality of some of the transport infrastructure 
interchange. 
- The two regeneration schemes make the rail project a strong business case. King’s 
Cross could have been redeveloped without the CTRL; it only needed certainty. 
Stratford City probably could have been developed without the CTRL but it would 
have taken much longer because Stratford had a lower economic viability. 
- The CTRL ties into the King’s Cross Central scheme.  They are mutually re-
enforcing, but they do not produce sufficient benefits to claim a win-win strategy.  
The Stratford City and the Olympics entangle together so there is compromise going 
on there that is completely unnecessary. Therefore, there is no win-win consequence. 
 
 
Question 7: Concentration or de-centralisation 
How effective will the new CTRL Stratford Station be as a catalyst for new development?  Will it 
attract new public and private sector development in East London or merely encourage the further 
concentration of such development in Central London? 
 
Eight stakeholders responded to question 7. Three of them (from the government agency, the 
Olympics organisation, and the local community planner) strongly supported the claim that Stratford 
International Station is the main catalyst for the development in that area. One of the stakeholders 
(from the local authority) supported the premise that the International Station at Stratford is the 
impetus for the development but suggested that the impact is not immediate. It is believed that it will 
takes longer than they expected for the effect of the Stratford International Station to be realised, but 
the Station allows London to host the Games, which has instant results in attracting investments. 
There were three responses (from the local authorities and the government agency) that said that the 
real catalyst for the Stratford development is the Olympics rather than the CTRL station because the 
majority of transport to Stratford relies on tubes, buses and cars. As regards the issue of competition 
between east and west London, there were three stakeholders (from the local community, the 
international organisation and the local authority) who pointed out that the concept of central London 
is changing, the territory of central London is expanding, the geographic centre of London is shifting 
eastwards.  
 
 Apart from the summary of the responses above, there are several emergent issues addressed 
by the stakeholders:  
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- The Stratford International Station has been designed around the development of the 
Chelsfield (original) regeneration scheme. It is a natural place for the development 
to grow. 
- The quality of the Olympic Bid was to attract investment and development to east 
London. However, in the Bid, Stratford was presented/regarded as part of central 
London. 
- Stratford is hardly able to compete effectively with central London at the moment. 
The Olympics diverted resources away from the Thames Gateway area. The Thames 
Gateway needs governmental intervention and a fully-empowered body to deliver 
the development because if the market is to be depended on to develop in a 
commercially sensitive environment, the investors are likely to go to the west. 
- The catalyst effect in Stratford from the CTRL is very marginal. Westfield as a 
foreign developer is attracted by the available land and the good transport 
connections to other centres in London.  
- The Olympics may change the public perception of the Stratford area and show how 
easily it can be reached from the Jubilee Line or the high-speed domestic services. 
- People need to take a long-term view because, over time, the geographic centre of 
London is shifting eastwards. The wave of movement further east will continue. 
- Crossrail is very important to Stratford International. It should increase the number 
of passengers of the CTRL and generate new investment in east London rather than 
concentrate on an overheated central London.  
 
Question 8: Reality or Rhetoric 
How would you respond to the claim that there is a gap between the rhetoric and reality in the vision 
that mega events, such as the 2012 London Olympics, can significantly stimulate sustainable urban 
regeneration?   
 
Three out of eight interviewees (from the government agency, the international organisation and the 
local authority) believed that people should hold a long-term view and look at the regeneration 
benefits that have already happened and will happen in the future. In their opinion, the 2012 London 
Olympics is probably the only mechanism to boost investment in east London and develop derelict 
lands efficiently and effectively. The respondent from the local community planning organisation 
criticised the claim that the Games can stimulate regeneration in that area because it was felt that this 
would not be sustainable. Three other interviewees (from the Olympic organisation, the local 
community and the local authority) indicated implicitly that there were gaps between the reality and 
the political promises and they are as a result of political determination and the consideration of 
political outputs. Also, two of the responses (from the government agency and the local authority) 
suggested that this phenomenon is in the nature of the major projects; hence there are always gaps. 
One of them highlighted that the promoters of major projects need to use rhetoric that is over and 
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above the real value of the project in order to sell such mega projects as an attractive idea.     
 
 Interviewees’ responses are summarised at some length below:  
- The politics in the Olympics output is always constant political motivation.  
- There is no connection between the rhetoric and the realities. It is more about 
political determination for regenerating East London, not the mega event. The mega 
event is a false strategy to encourage a streamlined planning body to develop 
Stratford at a much faster pace because the piecemeal development is more 
compatible with the needs of local communities and businesses. Furthermore, the 
piecemeal development might achieve housing creation targets at lower cost. 
- We do need our visionaries and leaders to improve the prospects of London and 
Britain. Ken Livingston was one of these people. 
- If you want to spend public money in large amounts on any project, you talk about 
that project furiously because that’s what politics is about. It is actually about selling. 
So the aftermath is not going to be as exciting as the vision. 
- CTRL has failed so far as something that is going to serve the regions in this 
country and yet it is all designed that you can just go straight from Stratford up to 
the North East, and to the North West without even stopping at St Pancras. There is 
no train service, however, but the train paths on the track are still there for Eurostar 
to go all the way from Manchester to Paris without stopping at St Pancras - which is 
the reason why Stratford is important; Eurostar will stop in Stratford. The promise 
of those regional connections to Europe has not yet been delivered. In the long term, 
it may well happen. David Cameron (Leader of the Tory Party) said he wants High 
Speed 2 and this is about selling the political vision. It hits a lot of buttons, quite 
clever. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 4 - Discourse Power 
Key champions of Mega Urban Transport Projects, Sustainable Urban Regeneration and Mega Events 
typically establish their discourses with the expressed aim to become influential players in the 
stakeholder networks of one or more of these three domains to promote their agendas and interests 
above all else with a limited sense of social corporate responsibility. Such champions also employ 
their discourse powers to strengthen their network in support of their aims with parties that subscribe 
to the same discourse, even though they may have different agendas. 
 
Question 9: Networked Polity (after Chris Ansell, 2000) 
Do you agree that mega project discourses have been used as tools by key champions to convince 
others of the validity of the mega projects in the expectation that these discourses will be shared by a 
broader spectrum of stakeholders, simultaneously marginalising those who do not share the interests 
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of these champions and empowering the project delivery network?  
 
There were only five interviewees who responded to this question and all of them agreed that 
advocates of major projects used discourses as a tool to promote those projects. But there were three 
(from the local community planning organisation, the government agency and the local authority) who 
suggested that the claim about marginalising other stakeholders was overstated. One interviewee from 
the Olympic organisation thought the marginalising behaviour probably occurred unintentionally. One 
response implied that there are always people who are impervious to the blandishments despite the 
tempting promises that partly constitute the discourses of major projects to gain more support. The 
interviewee from the local community argued that this premise does come down to the heart of how 
decisions have been made in Britain. The media and politicians formed a chain to market the 
Olympics from their inception. The Olympics is conceived as a brand that manages to market itself 
effectively. The stakeholder from the local authority regarded this process as very project-focused 
with nobody losing in the project delivery network. 
 
 Some statements and issues worth noting are listed below:  
- Ken Livingston had the power to tell people what a great idea it would be to bid for 
the Olympics so he persuaded the government and ensured that a bid was made. He 
had no money, only personality, charisma, connections and energy. Moreover, Ken 
Livingston, Gordon Brown, Tony Blair and Sebastian Coe were all simultaneously 
in agreement. Their political commitment and determination pushed the Olympic 
project through. In this process, the discourse might prove effective and other 
concerns might be neglected unintentionally.  
- As regards the premise that major project discourses are a tool for the key 
champions, this contains a suggestion of “the Emperor's New Clothes” agreement. 
But of course everybody likes the boy in the Andersen fairy tale who said: “but the 
King is in the all-together, the all-together … naked as the day that he was born”. 
The CTRL and the Olympics are so political in nature with no commercial profit; 
people are not all in wonder at the sight of the Emperor, there are always some 
people who, like that little boy, point out the truth.  
- The statement about marginalising the others is a bit too black and white. In modern 
society, especially in London, people cannot ignore the power of the community 
networks and the media. 
- In the Olympic public enquiry, the Olympic budget was challenged and it made no 
difference. The inspector ignored the budget issue. 
- The Olympic project delivery network showed a defensive attitude from day one. To 
even suggest the Olympics might not be a good thing was considered as slightly 
baddy. 
- Everybody has an interest in that land, arguably all those interests are all aligned. 
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The actual companies involved in doing things are people like Bechtel, Arup and 
some others. The commercial companies worked out that they want to put King’s 
Cross and St Pancras into their portfolio and they want to maintain their networks 
and positions because they have good contacts in government, good contacts with 
banking and good contacts with everything else. They traded off the success story of 
King’s Cross. 
 
 
Question 10:  
Who are the primary champions and decision-makers that supported and opposed: 
- the CTRL project?   
- KX Central   
- Stratford City andf 
- 2012 London Olympics?  
And what were their major intentions? 
 
 Statements concerning the champions and opponents of the CTRL project: 
- The LCR championed the CTRL because of the benefit from the land. Other champions 
include Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Blair. Also, the Northern and Scottish MPs and the local 
and regional authorities were championing it because they thought it would bring them 
direct services to London and Europe. 
- Most of the landowners and community groups up and down the line opposed the project 
because they suffered from the construction blight.  The Treasury opposed the original 
proposal until it added in the regeneration benefits. 
- The CTRL project did not have strong opposition. Some small local community groups 
were concerned about the impact and the way it would be built. They were not against 
the railway itself. 
 
 Statements concerning champions and opponents of the King’s Cross Central scheme: 
- The primary champions for the King’s Cross Central were the LCR and Camden Council 
who enjoyed the reputation and prestige brought by St. Pancras station. 
- This project does not have strong opposition. Certain local communities were opposed, 
fairly small community groups who, although small, were competent and quite effective 
about what their communities were opposed to.  
. 
 Statements concerning champions and opponents of the Stratford City scheme and the 2012 
London Olympics: 
- The organisations include the Mayor, the British Olympic Association, the London 
Development Agency, Greater London Authority, Transport for London and Sport 
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England as the main champions. 
- The Games is guaranteed by the nation not the government. Once the bid document was 
signed, the commitment of the country was assured. The conditions for decision-makers 
are unlike other projects that have become technical. 
- The individual figures like Lord Sebastian Coe, Ken Livingston, Tony Blair and Tessa 
Jowell are the key champions. 
- The five London boroughs which benefit from the Olympic-related investments support 
the Olympics. 
- The Ministers for Sport needed to support the Bid, although they didn’t expect to win but 
they did so eventually. 
- Ken Livingston, the London Mayor at that time, was regarded as the key person who 
promoted the idea for London to participate in the Olympic Bid.  
 
 Emergent issues derived from the responses to this question: 
- Politicians want to be associated with successful sports for the sake of their reputation 
and identification. They are seeking the ‘feel good’ factor. 
- A nation, like China, which supports sports because they see them bringing benefits and 
economic power, can use military power or sporting power to justify their system and 
claim their success.  
- The pressure of competing with other cities for the World City status is also one of the 
reasons to encourage the championship either for the major projects or the mega events. 
- The IOC markets the Olympic strategy, but it is just a big publicity blur. It is like The 
Emperor's New Clothes. It is noted that the expression of “The Emperor’s New Clothes” 
was mentioned by different stakeholders in the issue of discourses of major projects. 
This signifies that the opposition groups, who do not agree with the development mode 
of major projects, fundamentally disagree with the ideology of championships involved 
in these major projects. 
- Opponents from the local communities do not want too much commercial development 
and high-rise on their doorstep, but they are not against the idea of regeneration.  
- Mega transport projects start with the advantage of usually being desirable in the first 
place as long as they are public transport ones. The special things like trains and trams 
have some romance about them. There have been no railway projects that people have 
regretted after seeing them built. 
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APPENDIX 6: 
Statistics of Hypothesis-Led Investigation Index  
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Which of the following types of context do you consider most important in the planning of 
CTRL/KX Central/Stratford City/2012 London Olympics 
(For the importance of each index, one represents the highest weighting and ten the lowest) 
 
Types of Context Indexing number Importance 
National background, policy, planning and funding frameworks 13 1 
Sustainability visions to be serviced 28 2 
Geographical, spatial and location considerations 33 3 
Cultural contexts 42 5 
Temporal contexts (such as project time frame, history of project 
development and timing for key decisions) 41 4 
Others   
 
How successfully do you consider the CTRL/KX Central/Stratford City/2012 London Olympics 
project has coped with the Sustainable Development Challenges below? 
(For the importance of each index, one represents the highest weighting and ten the lowest) 
 
Sustainable development challenges Indexing Number Importance 
Ensuring accountability in decision-making 38 9 
Providing transparency in decision-making 45 12 
Ensuring institutional capacity building & public consultation 36 8 
Addressing concerns of biodiversity 26 2 
Addressing concerns of ecology 27 3 
Promoting health 29 5 
Addressing concerns of safety 23 1 
Promoting energy saving 28 4 
Contributing to social cohesion 39 9 
Contributing to goals of equity 47 13 
Promoting economic competitiveness 30 6 
Successfully involving the private sector 26 2 
Addressing forces of globalisation 29 4 
Enhancing efficiency of operations 45 12 
Guaranteeing affordability of project 40 10 
Ensuring economic viability of project 43 11 
Promoting enhanced accessibility 30 6 
Contributing to planned spatial & territorial restructuring 31 7 
Addressing concerns of subsidiarity 52 14 
Others 38 9 
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Which of the following attributes do you consider most important for an efficient and effective 
stakeholder network to deliver CTRL/KX Central/Stratford City/2012 London Olympics 
(For the importance of each index, one represents the highest weighting and ten the lowest) 
 
Attributes of Stakeholder Networks Indexing Number Importance 
Power: distribution or concentration / negotiation 32 5 
Interests: project incentives / business environment 32 5 
Strategic leadership: bring actors together 26 3 
Attitudes: stakeholder's agenda / visions 33 6 
Relationship: trust / transparency / communication 25 2 
Capacity to contribute: professions / financing 33 6 
Institutional arrangements: network structure / policies 29 4 
Level of involvement: decision-making / consult / keep informed 23 1 
Others   
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APPENDIX 7: 
The Use of NVivo 8 and SenseMaker Suite Analytical 
Tools, Some Results, and Systematic Manual Data 
Analysis 
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Appendix 7 continues from Chapter 3 with more details of the analysis by SenseMaker and Nvivo 
applied to for the data collected by the pre-hypothesis investigations. The concept of Content Analysis 
and its application to the hypothesis-led research is explained here too.  
Steps of Using NVivo 8 Software 
The NVivo software application was used to analyse the pre-hypothesis data to complement the use of 
SenseMaker. This process involves systematically categorising and coding data collected by 
pre-hypothesis investigations. This forms the basis for a comparison and synthesis of data from the 
two research approaches at a later stage (see Appendix 8).  
 
Step 1: Open coding  
The process of transforming raw data by labelling them according to meaningful criteria is known as 
coding. Open coding is identifying, naming and describing phenomena found in the data by reading 
through each line of the text (in this case interview transcripts, newspaper cuttings, journal articles). 
There is no preset coding scheme in this process which is different from the approach introduced by 
Cognitive Edge. Issues, roles, events or concepts are identified through the open coding. This exercise 
is to identify all possible clues for the research questions.  
 
Figure A7.1: The most-coded nodes in the pre-hypothesis interview data 
 
Source: Author, with the aid of Nvivo 8 software application 
 
Step 2: Identifying the most-coded nodes 
The outcomes of this step present a series of the most mentioned issues that helps to streamline the 
analytic process. Contents associated with these most-coded nodes were recalled with the aid of the 
software in order to see other nodes which have also been coded in the same contents. Further, the 
Selective Coding (Borgatti, 1996) technique was used to compare a core node with other nodes. This 
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is to develop storylines of this node around all other themes, issues, concepts and players.  
 
With the aid of the NVivo 8 software application, the list of the most-coded nodes was identified 
(Figure A7.1). The chart below displays that the most-coded nodes are “financing and cost”, “decision 
making”, “benefits”, “negotiation power”, “partnership”, “timeframe”, etc.  
 
Step 3: Identifying correlations between nodes 
This step is to discover the properties of nodes in a way that helps to relate the nodes to each other. 
The types of the properties of the interrelationships between the nodes are borrowed from (Borgatti, 
1996) discussion drawn from Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Strauss and Corbin (1998). They are: 
– Concepts that hold these nodes together;  
– Events or variables that lead to the occurrence or development of the phenomenon;  
– Context that is considered as background variables;  
– Intervening conditions that are also regarded as mediating variables;  
– Actions that agents perform in response to the phenomenon and intervening conditions; and  
– Consequences of the action strategies.   
 
Following the identification of the most-coded nodes, the node “decision making” was chose as the 
core node for comparison since it is most relevant to the major research questions. With the software 
aid, the contents coded by “decision making” were recalled in order to examine what other nodes were 
also coded to the contents. This represents certain relationships existing between these nodes and 
decision-making. Through this process, the characteristics and contexts of decisions were revealed. It 
helped to identify the actors involved, the events related and time and spatial elements. 
 
Step 4: Identifying emergent issues, themes, and hypotheses 
Prevailing issues, themes and hypotheses will emerge through progressively refining the attributes of 
each node, systematically organising raw data and meaningfully comparing the filtered information. 
Some of these issues and themes are compatible with the theoretical framework established in this 
research (see Chapter 2); however, some are newly developed through this exploratory analysis 
approach. An iterative process of coding was adopted in order to better incorporate new elements 
emerging from data with those previously identified. This provides an integrated debate on the 
agglomeration of issues attached to relevant themes.  
 
There are three methods used for identifying emergent issues, themes and hypotheses. First, revisiting 
the data coded by the most-coded nodes. By looking at the data and the corresponding nodes, the 
preliminary findings can be drawn (Figure A7.2). The second way to explore the data is to re-read the 
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data organised by the nodes selected according to the research questions. These nodes were decided 
by core issues derived from decomposing each hypothesis-led question. In accordance with the key 
elements of these questions, the text-rich data collected by the pre-hypothesis investigation approach 
is better structured. The third method to identify key contents from the data for further analysis is to 
review the data coded by multiple nodes selected in the previous step. 
 
Figure A7.2: Identifying interrelationships, emergent issues, themes and hypotheses 
 
Source: Author, with the aid of Nvivo 8 software application 
Steps of Using SenseMaker Suite Software 
Each of the ten naïve interviews was transcribed verbatim from the digital recordings made during the 
interviews. Each interview transcript was divided into a series of anecdotes which, in the researcher’s 
view, comprise stories about the same event, topic, time period, decision, etc., or any combination 
thereof.  
 
The SenseMaker software provided many ways of presenting identified interrelationship between 
indices (see Appendix 2 for the indexing sheet of the pre-hypothesis investigation). There are three 
functions involved in the application of this software that assist the selection of stories (sense-making 
items) for further study. These functions include:  
 Identifying strong bi-variate correlations which are presented in scatter graphs. 
 Mapping patterns with strong multivariate correlations which are presented in sense-making 
item clusters. 
 Identifying high indexing-frequency variables which are presented in sense-making item 
browser.  
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To illustrate the interrelationships between the indexes, visualisations were presented of identified 
correlations using scatter graphs (see A7.3), sense-making item clusters (see A7.5) and sense-making 
item browser (see Table A7.1) to facilitate the exploration of narrative patterns. The selection of 
indexes used for discovering narrative patterns in SenseMaker software is dependant on the strength 
of the correlation coefficient value R and the frequency of indexing of observations. 
 
Step 1: identifying strong bi-variate correlations (which are presented in scatter graphs)  
The strong bi-variate correlations were presented in the form of a juxtaposed scatter graph and a 
supporting report of significant correlations, which shows correlation coefficient R (see Appendix 9). 
It represents the strength of correlations between each pair of indexes with the strong bi-variate 
correlations representing connections between two indexes.  
 
Figure A7.3: Juxtaposed Scatter Graph 
 
Source: Author, based on the OMEGA study and with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software 
application 
 
Step 2: mapping patterns with strong multivariate correlations (which are presented in 
sense-making item clusters) 
From the report of correlation coefficient R (Appendix 9), we can see the significance of correlations 
with each selected index. In order to effectively select sense-making items from the case study data 
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mass1, we only choose the seven2 most significant correlators of each index to compose the 
‘sense-making cluster graph’ (see Figure A7.3). For instance, in Figure A7.5, if chosen the index 
‘treatment of risk, uncertainly and complexity in decision making’ as the core index, together with 
another seven indexes which reveal the most significant correlation R, they form the sense-making 
item cluster graph where each dot in the middle of the figure represents each anecdote.  
 
Unlike NVivo, the indexes (or nodes in NVivo) were pre-designated, and hence this analytical 
approach focuses on finding correlations between the indexes (i.e. issues, themes and topics). Multiple 
correlations can be identified by detecting “strong bi-variate correlations” (Figure A7.4), “multivariate 
correlations” (Figure A7.4), and “high indexing-frequency variables” (Table A7.1).  
 
Figure A7.4: Bi-variate correlations  
 
Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application 
 
The variables with the highest number of significant correlations with other variables are (in 
descending order): 
- Theme- Financing projects/development (39) 
                                                 
1 120 sense-making items collected by the research plus 270 sense-making items collected by the OMEGA Centre. In the 
application of SenseMaker software, data collected from this PhD research and the OMEGA Centre are analysed separately.  
2 The choice of the seven most significant correlators is not an absolute way to form the sense-making cluster graph, but in 
terms of a technical approach an octagon helps the researcher to identify key sense-making items from the cluster graph. The 
angles of the octagon are formed by eight indexes, including the selected one and its seven most significant correlators.  
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- Theme- Use of public money (37) 
- Theme- Public sector power (36) 
- Situation- Experiencing financial failure/under performance (34) 
- Situation- Political intervention into the project (34) 
- Theme- Technical solutions to problems (33) 
- Theme- Tensions between values (33) 
- Theme- Private sector power (33) 
- Theme- Political intervention (33) 
- Situation- Public outcry about project (33) 
- Situation- Performance of organisations responsible for the project (32) 
- Theme- Globalisation forces (31) 
Figure A7.5: Sense-making item cluster  
 
Source: Author, based on the OMEGA study and with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software 
application 
 
Following the identification of the seven most significant correlations, a process of further filtering 
the strength and value of these correlations were undertaken together with efforts to ascertain 
‘connection density’ are used to further filter the anecdotes which aims to find out most related 
anecdotes. Where these two sets of criteria are prevalent, they exhibit those sense-making items which 
obtain higher values to certain indexes. It means these sense-making items have relatively stronger 
relationships to some issues (which are represented by the indexes) (See Figure A7.6). 
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Other examples of visualisations that show multivariate correlations are presented as Figures A7.7 – 
A7.10: 
 
Figure A7.6: Key Sense-making items cluster with filter strength value 50-100%3 and 
connection density of filters 
 
Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Filter strength value: this is the correlation value between two indexes. 
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Figure A7.7: Cluster of filters of strength value 0-100 % with legend of ‘occupations of the 
interviewees’ 
 
Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application 
 
Figure A7.8: Sense-making items filtered by cluster of filters led by ‘Path-dependency’ 
 
Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application 
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Figure A7.9: Sense-making items filtered by cluster of filters led by ‘Globalisation forces’ 
 
Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application 
 
Figure A7.10: Sense-making items filtered by cluster of filters led by ‘Experiencing financial 
failure’ 
 
Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application 
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Step 3: identifying high indexing-frequency variables (which are presented in sense-making item 
browser).  
 
The identification of high indexing-frequency variables in SenseMaker software is an exercise similar 
to the step of ‘identifying most-coded nodes’ in NVivo where it sought to discover which issues were 
of most concern to the interviewees in the studied case. Here the anecdotes indexed by the variables 
with the highest indexing-frequencies were recalled for further analysis in order to identify important 
themes and emergent hypotheses associated with these issues. Example can be seen in Table A7.1 
below where the data was extracted from the OMEGA Study and it shows that the highest 
indexing-frequency is located in ‘roles and responsibilities’.  
 
Table A7.1: Number of Sense-making items indexed by each filter 
 
The list of the 10 most indexed filters 
in descending order is: 
 
1. Roles and responsibilities  
2. Public sector power 
3. Performance of organizations 
responsible for the project 
4. Visions and ideas 
5. Scale of impact of the project 
6. Co-operation amongst those 
involved in the project 
7. Private sector power 
8. Leadership 
9. Forming the vision/objectives for 
the project 
10. Use of private sector money 
 
 
Source: Author, based on the OMEGA study and with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software 
application 
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Table A7.2: Number of SMIs indexed by each filter  
 
 
The list of the 10 most 
indexed filters in 
descending order is: 
1. Roles and 
responsibilities 
2. Visions and ideas 
3. Bargaining power 
4. Scale of project impact  
5. Technical solutions to 
problems 
6. Treatment of risk in 
decision making 
7. Performance of 
organisations 
8. Degree of central/ad hoc 
decision making 
9. Financing 
projects/development 
10. Use of public money 
Source: Author, with the aid of SenseMaker Suite software application 
 
The above three different applications for mapping narrative patterns facilitated not only the 
identification of correlations between indexes, but also assisted the identification of key sense-making 
items. There is no rigid way to proceed with this, ideally, practitioners using this analytic software 
program are encouraged to try as many of the functions provided as possible until the patterns appear 
and the key data can stand out. As this exercise proceeds, the issues and themes become more refined 
in order to address the research questions. The research questions are considered as the lens for 
analysis at one stage accompanied by an exploration of new issues or hypotheses during the analytical 
process.  
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Data analysis for hypothesis-led investigation: Systematic Manual Data Analysis 
The data collected from the hypothesis-led investigations is analysed systematically by manual 
categorisation and critical reviews (see Appendix 8). It involves three steps:  
 
Step 1: Cluster the responses according to each hypothesis and research question 
This process is to summarise the responses of the interviewees against each question according to the 
hypotheses and the associated research questions. It facilitates the identification of the relationship 
between the different points of view from varied project stakeholders. 
 
Step 2: Give rankings to the degrees of agreement toward each hypothesis and research question 
This step aims to build up statistical evidence which presents the strength of acceptance or rejection 
for the statements in hypotheses and research questions. This is seen as a supporting the qualitative 
data in previous step.  
 
Step 3: Identify pre-hypothesis data coded by indexes that are associated with the established 
hypotheses and research questions. 
Using certain indexes in SenseMaker software to find anecdotes in the pre-hypothesis investigations 
that pertain to hypotheses and research questions addressed in the hypothesis-led investigations. For 
example, anecdotes indexed by ‘political intervention in the project’ are have relatively high 
connection with Hypothesis 2 (see Section 1.3). These identified sense-making items are analysed to 
see whether there is substantiated or rejected evidence against hypotheses or research questions. 
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APPENDIX 8: 
Comparison of Data Derived from Pre-Hypothesis and Hypothesis-Led Interviews 
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Table A8.1: Synthesis of Responses to ORQ #1 
 
APPROACH 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH  
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement 
PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
PART 1:  Overarching 
Research Questions 
derived from the CTRL 
experience 
 
The question in Part 1 are 
posed to help ascertain the 
extent to which the 
synergy of mega urban 
transport projects 
(MUTPs), sustainable 
urban regeneration (SUR) 
and mega events (MEs) 
could effectively maximise 
benefits and minimise 
costs even though at some 
stage these projects will be 
implemented in a 
competing environment. 
Q1: Do you agree that 
MUTPs are impacted 
significantly by mega 
events, if so, why and how? 
 
Yes, but only modestly (TU)        x    PHR Datasety /Kws(x) 
(y=interviewees; Kws(x)= Key words and themes  in Qx; 
x=1‐14) 
 
Kws(1)=Interrelationship (between MUTPs and MEs) 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(1)=  
Using the key words identified from the HLR questions to 
detect PHR dataset. This aims to select responses of PHR 
that are relevant to HLR questions. In this way, the most 
codings (namely most mentioned issues) in these related 
responses can be identified. It helps to compare the data 
of the two different research approaches. In the 
overarching research question 1, the identified keyword ‐ 
Kws(1) ‐  is interrelationship between MUTPs and MEs 
and the most mentioned issues are listed below, i.e., 
urban regeneration (8 SMIs), timeframe (6 SMIs), etc. 
* SMIs‐ Sense‐Making Items 
* The table below shows two sets of data that extracted 
from PHR interviews and together with other SMIs 
collected from newspaper, online articles, documents, 
etc.  
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
Yes, in terms of transport capacity and demand. In 
terms of workforce that requires delivering the projects 
will compete for that labour resources. (RB) 
        x 
Yes, in terms of transport capacity. It is also a world 
contest to provide the best transport for a world event. 
Each city competing is in fact developing a special 
transport plan or even projects normally would take 10 
years or 20 years in the pipeline to be produced are 
accelerated.  The political commitment and 
investments are results of building a long‐term legacy. 
(This implies to globalisation and accelerating project 
delivery.) (PB) 
        x 
Yes, the Olympics act effectively as a catalyst. (NM)          x 
No, it should be the other way round.  The presence of 
the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, particularly the Stratford 
International Station let the success of the Olympics bid 
for London. (MP) 
x         
In the case of Crossrail, the excitement around the 
Olympics probably gave that a boost. MEs can only 
push those projects which are already on the drawing 
board, but the political will or the necessary funds not 
being allocated. The same thing applies to the East 
London Line. In Stratford, the main transport 
infrastructure is already present, so rather than the 
MEs creating transport links in this case, it is another 
way around; the transport links have facilitated the 
MEs. (JC) 
x         
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Mega events will have significant impact on many 
things, but in the case of CTRL, it is planned and built 
prior to the Olympics. The London Olympics is relying 
on the existing transport infrastructure programme to 
accommodate it. (HB) 
x         
urban regeneration (6) 
timeframe (6) 
benefits (5) 
decision makers (5) 
financing / cost (5) 
urban regeneration (8) 
timeframe (6) 
benefits (5) 
decision makers (5) 
financing / cost (5) 
 
Summary:  
The most important thing is the way the Games 
accelerates the focus on time. It concentrates the mind. 
July 27, 2012, 7.30pm, the Games are going to start and 
that has brought forward infrastructure investment, it 
has brought forward regeneration in East London. It is 
how to use it as a reasonable way to change the world. 
The key question is can you change the world around the 
Games. That is where we are going to succeed in Legacy 
because we are going to create a very difference place 
consequently. (HS) 
 
The key to success for mega projects and mega events is 
stakeholder management. Ultimately the rest of it is just 
noise. Everything else is about money which you can 
always work through. The difficulty is about managing 
stakeholders in that particular environment with a big P 
and a small p. (HS) 
 
I don’t agree that’s necessarily the case because MUTPs 
are very long term in the planning. They are very 
complex and involve a lot of money. Quite often a mega 
event has short time scale. Mega event actually 
impacted negatively on the project because it has to be 
completed at certain time. It put terrible pressure on 
the transport projects and really makes the cost 
escalate. (DM) 
x         
They are because the mega events tend to have 
immediacy attached to them, which means your 
transport project has a different deadline that it might 
otherwise have. They have funding attach to them. 
They have political reputation attached to them and 
political prioritising. Without the Olympics as a driver 
setting up an end date you wouldn’t have had the CTRL 
project completed in its entirety; it would probably 
have CTRL into St Pancras but you wouldn’t have the 
associated underground infrastructure built. Mega 
events setting up the priority for the way the 
government and others are going to spend the 
resources. (BW) 
        x 
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The Arup report relied too much on bus and coach travel 
for Olympic visitors and it really under estimated the cost 
of some of the heavy infrastructure; relied quite a lot on 
the temporary measures which we thought it would be 
under estimated and the costs were too low. (RM) 
 
Although those transport projects were at good business 
cases, there were still uncertainties about their funding. 
The Olympics gave them the certainties of that funding 
but also probably prioritise them and make them happen 
3 or 4 years earlier than they would happen otherwise. 
(RM) (The example here is the Docklands Light Railway 
extensions.) 
 
Potentially after the Games, Stratford International would 
be white elephant if it is not effectively utilised. If the 
plan for Stratford City fully realised with the office and 
residential development will take place there, then it 
could be a destination on its own right for the high speed 
services. We must look beyond the usual 5 or 10 years 
horizon and look towards 20 or 25 years to see how it will 
be realised. (RM) 
 
The Olympic decision set the timeframe which didn’t exist 
before. Now King’s Cross is tied in to delivering not only 
Eurostar, national rail, regeneration but also transport 
infrastructure for the Olympics 2012. (RK) 
 
What Olympic does is imposing the timetable on 
delivering the key elements in the area. The opening of 
Eurostar station itself was a timetable to pre‐exist but the 
Olympics set another level. (RK) 
 
When London won the Olympics, the decision came out 
the day before the London bombings, the developers 
said, I am sure it is just a piece of rhetoric, but it’s a ring 
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true that the bombings cancel out the benefits of the 
Olympics. So it is neutral. The Olympics had 10% to the 
investment, but the bombings wound that 10% up 
because the uncertainty. (RK) 
 
CTRL owned the important components for wining the 
Olympics for London. Olympics will kick start lots of 
investments in regeneration around Stratford. (RB) 
 
Debate over the pursuit of a mega‐event tends to focus 
on its economic impact—the cost of the stadium, the 
value of a new hotel, or the tax revenues generated—but 
rarely on the broader political and social ramifications. 
We believe that the study of urban mega‐events can 
illuminate questions of enduring importance in urban 
politics such as what strategies do cities use to pursue 
economic growth, what role does local government play, 
and who benefits? (MS quoted from  Burbank, 
Andranovich and Heying, 2001) 
 
These mega projects are usually consortiums of 
businessmen and politicians in these cities, who form a 
'growth coalition' which appeals for public grants to help 
finance these projects. (MS quoted from Jeffery Owen, 
2005) 
 
The potential for long term economic benefits from the 
Beijing Games will depend critically on how well Olympics 
related investments in venues and infrastructure can be 
incorporated into the overall economy in the years 
following the Games. (MS quoted from Jeffery Owen, 
2005) 
 
What they were looking for was a subsidy from the city 
within which they wanted to build their projects, so they 
approached city administrations, with a business plan. 
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Low land prices and changes in the industrial economy of 
those cities meant that those areas were in economic 
decline and needed investments. (MS) (This is the 
initiative of mega‐event strategy) 
 
A great construction pressure is in the King’s Cross area, 
they may need to rush the planning permission of the 
Western Concourse finished ahead of the Olympics. (JF) 
 
LCR initially did not want to have station in Stratford. The 
wining of the Olympics host right was credited to the 
CTRL services. It is good commercial opportunism but it 
wasn’t on their agenda. (JF) 
 
The cost and benefit analysis on this massive expensive 
station (Stratford International) falls pieces. It has low 
economic viability since it will compete with St Pancras 
for passenger numbers. It would be more sensible when 
the Kent Commuter services start. (JF) 
 
We do know in these projects as projects have 
manifested the success of partnership working and that is 
a success story and that is not going to go away. (KL) 
 
"Most of the infrastructure growth will come from public 
spending and in the current uncertain climate the threat 
of delays to some projects due to funding constraints is a 
real concern," finds BCIS. "However, the size of the 
current commitments and the connection of some 
schemes to the 2012 Olympics should ensure a strong 
growth in demand over the next three years."  (SMI 20) 
 
In response to the threat of rising unemployment, 
Brown's new deal is beginning to sound like Franklin D 
Roosevelt's public works solution from 1930s America. 
Big planning projects such as the Olympics, the Thames 
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Table A8.2: Synthesis of Responses to ORQ #2 
Gateway and eco‐towns should benefit, but so should 
power stations, investment in energy alternatives and 
energy‐saving technologies. (SMI 45) 
 
Regeneration is something which should have a rationale 
and a business case all of its own. Wrapping up the 
promises of housing and jobs on the back of the Olympic 
project is a recipe for failure and disappointed 
expectations. (SMI 47) 
 
London 2012 represents a major opportunity for the new 
Mayor. It also has the potential for huge distraction and 
political aggravation. There are some who argue that the 
whole enterprise represents a large scale ‘opportunity 
cost’ for London diverting resources from other critical 
projects (perhaps delaying the start of Crossrail and 
placing emphasis on upgrading the parts of the transport 
system on which the Olympic project depends rather 
than on the urgent need to improve the whole). Hence 
the need for rigorous focus on delivering to budget and 
being clear eyed and realistic about what the Olympics 
project is really about. (SMI 47) 
 
APPROACH 
 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo 
Negative  Impartial  Positive 
Q2: In your view, under 
which circumstances can 
one coordinate the delivery 
of MUTPs, SUR and MEs 
and simultaneously achieve 
Concerning the project nature of long timeframe, 
political support, funding strategy, and fundamental 
programmes have to be in place, and an event can 
actually tie these three things together and potentially 
deliver that broader and faster outcome. (TU) 
      x   
Kws(2)=Coordination, Vision, Sustainability 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(2)=  
No direct correlation between these three 
keywords 
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visions of sustainable 
development? 
 
 
A strong champion and who is in charge of a powerful 
regional development agency can make things easier 
than purely rely on the market. ( RB) (This implies to 
the political power and streamlines the development 
process.)  
      x   
other most codings: 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
partnership (11) 
mega event (8) 
benefits (7) 
opportunity (7) 
catalyst(6) 
urban regeneration (6) 
negotiation power (5) 
local government (5) 
partnership (11) 
opportunity (8) 
catalyst (7) 
urban regeneration (7) 
major infrastructure (6) 
negotiation power (6) 
decision making (5) 
 
 
Summary: 
The vision of the Olympic Games is changing much more 
to be the themes of sustainability and cost effectiveness. 
(HS) 
 
The construction of the Olympic projects is opening a 
suggestion to burn money. It is important to blend mega 
events into existing fabrics, existing facilities so you can 
make it more sustainable. (HS) 
 
It is like Game Theory when you deal with all those 
different stakeholders with different agenda. You just try 
to work the overlaps. Those areas of commonality which 
goes even though you might have to bury your own 
particular aspiration for everything you get most of what 
you want by actually cooperating. How do you create 
enough of a win‐win or in this case win‐win‐win‐win 
when people are prepared to shut up and just to get on 
The Olympics is the strongest catalyst for 
developments, not only for mega urban transport, but 
also for sustainable urban regeneration. Mega events 
have totally different timeframe and it enforces the 
government to deliver it on time. They consist of a 
series, a group, a package of projects.  (PB) 
        x 
CTRL is public transport oriented and the Olympics 
heavily rely on the public transport. They both aim to 
deliver urban regeneration. The context of Stratford is 
coordination as a symbiosis of the two things and that 
achieved sustainable development vision. (NM) 
        x 
Under highly undemocratic and strongly authoritarian 
process could you achieve that. There is no necessary 
to co‐ordinate these three. It does not help to achieve 
visions of sustainable development if sustainability is 
not owned by local population. (MP) 
x         
There is growing demand on faster travel. Air transport 
will compete with high‐speed rail to build bigger and 
faster planes which require bigger airport. This is also 
as a result of the image of London that London wants 
to stay in the world city position. These modern and 
high‐speed infrastructure projects will inevitably go 
along with modern regeneration and replacement will 
happen to existing communities and businesses. This is 
not sustainable. It is about the image that a city wants 
to present. (JC) 
x         
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I have a degree of cynicism about sustainable 
development, it is over hyped and it’s not clear what it 
means.  Obviously the planning authority can 
coordinate regeneration around both mega events and 
transport projects. Local authorities have role to play, 
as well as government in providing a framework. (HB) 
  x       
with their jobs? That’s what you can do. It is looking for 
‘good enough’ not ‘perfection’. You will never get 
perfection. Good enough for everyone. (HS) (Stakeholder 
management is the key condition to collaborate different 
mega projects.) 
 
The reason that John Prescott supported the CTRL 
project, probably the most important thing, however, 
was the ability of the new railway to support 
regeneration. In that, he was continuing a policy which 
his predecessor Deputy Prime Minister Michael Heseltine 
supported in the previous Tory government what gave 
rise to the current route of the railway through east 
London as opposed to the original BR route which 
brought the route via south London. Regeneration, at 
King’s Cross Central, Stratford City and 2012 Olympics, all 
those things being possible because of the project we are 
talking about today. (RH) (Visionary politician is vital to 
the delivery of mega projects. The CTRL provided 
locomotive for other projects.) 
 
King’s Cross and Stratford have the old railway lands 
which were delegated for many years waiting for a kick 
start as the railway provided. The 2012 Olympics closely 
Leadership is one of the key elements for the KXC 
project. There are strong commitments from the local 
council, the Mayor and the developer.  They did have 
had that coordinated group of interests working 
together in order to realise that the project and 
basically minimise the risk that they were facing.  Bob 
West had that continuity of strategic planning and 
technical employee. He was able to be there to 
coordinate thinking of other stakeholders. The 
coordination between public sector and private sector 
was a very key factor. Bob was instrumental in that.  
 
The challenge and risks that Stratford City faces is 
higher than KX, because it is not a prime development 
land. With the current market, there are more 
uncertainties. Certainly designating that site for the 
Olympics help to give that extra push they needed to 
get that project through. (DM) 
      x   
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You can call this planetary alignment, where all the 
main ingredients all line up. They all have a cyclical 
nature, with good and less good periods. If you are 
lucky, they can come into alignment at a good moment 
for the mega project, but it is luck and very hard to 
organise. Having an overarching vision of sustainability 
can help this coming together, because it is a theme 
that applies to all projects and stakeholders and might 
be strong enough to help stakeholders focus or re‐
prioritise around a common project, but it is a gentle 
push rather than decisive.  
 
In the case of CTRL, the planetary alignment of 
stakeholders, funding, political will and project timing 
occurred maybe twice over about 14 years, and some 
opportunities were missed as decisions were made to 
save money rather than time – ultimately neither was 
saved. Sustainability wasn’t a strong driver, although it 
did help the narrative around the business case for high 
speed rail. If you do coordinate all of these things, you 
have much stronger case; none of them exists on its 
own. That’s possibly another lesson to learn, about the 
interdependence of projects which helps sustain each 
one, delivering savings and synergies for a better 
overall outcome. (BW) (Sustainability itself as a 
discourse is not strong enough to push the project 
through. Sustainability is one of the components of the 
discourse attached to MUTPs. The MUTP discourse is a 
tool to strengthen the project‐led network. Political 
power might eventually be the key to bring all the 
elements together. However, political power could be 
defeated by the macro economy. Hence the new 
discourse is (re)emerging to reinforce the MUTPs’ 
position, such as recent ‘Green Infrastructure’ which 
claims it can tackle both problems of economic 
downturn and climate change.) 
      x   
now integrate with the development of Stratford City 
and arguably the 2012 Olympics re‐phased Stratford City 
in a way which made the delivery of Stratford City more 
difficult longer term, but arguably some would say brings 
forward some aspect of the Stratford City development 
sooner than would otherwise be the case. (RH) 
 
CTRL, KX Central, and Stratford City, are inter‐related. 
The justification for the investment for the CTRL today is 
predicated on what is happening in King’s Cross Central 
and Stratford City. CTRL is not primarily a transport 
project. CTRL is, in my view, primarily a catalyst for the 
regeneration which is taking place here in King’s Cross 
and Stratford and further east through the Thames 
Gateway. (RH) 
 
There has been difficulty between Stratford City 
developers, now is Westfield, and the Olympic Delivery 
Authority because there are competing demands. The 
hearts of two sites next to each other really don’t work 
together in transport terms and even in terms of building 
work in the two sides of the site, delivering the materials 
to the work and workers on the site. It is quite difficult 
that two extremely large building projects taking place 
next door to each other simultaneously. The negotiation 
between Westfield and the ODA has been difficult 
sometimes because they have different priority. (CM) 
 
We represent the people in this area and we do 
understand what people needs. The boroughs 
surrounding the Olympic site come together with five 
borough organisations. We try to promote different 
approach to see how the legacy is dealt with and working 
through the boroughs not separate from the boroughs. 
(CM) (Understanding local needs and collaborate with 
other local authorities will make sure the delivery of the 
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Olympic legacy.) 
 
The government has not thought through the legacy plan 
yet. If simply put some flats and apartments, it does not 
necessary equal to regeneration. It forces some people 
to stand back for a bit and think more imaginatively 
toward what we can do here. (CM) (Vision is important 
to integrate mega events and regeneration in order to 
achieve sustainability.) 
 
I think at the time it was collective. There was general 
willingness from all the parties involved. It is an attitude 
of what can we do to help rather than this is going to be 
a problem. (RM) 
 
We make sure both parties were making the same 
assumptions. If one party had a concern or an issue that 
affect the other party we raised it and sorted out. In 
order to ensure that our planning was coordinated and 
the risks were managed together rather than push on to 
the other. (RB) 
 
This is the advent of the Neo‐liberal economy. “Clarke 
and Gaile identify the period after 1984 as the 
“postfederal” era of local economic development. This 
period is characterized by greater willingness of local 
governments to take risks, increased cooperation among 
governments on a metropolitan or regional level, and 
greater reliance on public‐private partnerships or quasi‐
public agencies to implement development projects. 
Thus, just as American voters elected a president 
committed to ending the flow of federal money to U.S 
cities, Los Angeles was showing how to attract money 
and attention to a city through a high‐profile sporting 
event.” (MS quoted from Burbank, Andranovich and 
Heying, 2001) 
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I think the developers clearly led the process in co‐
operation with the London Borough of Newham Council. 
In my impression, that was challenging but ultimately 
very successful relationship. (KL) 
 
Politician had to make commitments. Sometimes 
commitments where difficult perhaps all challenging to 
make against the background of local opposition to 
particular aspect of projects. None of these could 
happen, however, without active partnership and co‐
operation between public and private sectors. (KL) 
 
The granted permission by the London Borough of 
Newham Council as culmination over a very long period 
co‐operation between developers, officers and members 
of that authority and the commitment was last made to a 
hugely important regeneration project to East London. 
(KL) (Political commitment. Co‐operation and partnership 
with senior stakeholders are vital to deliver the project.) 
 
Essentially local authorities have the co‐operative role, a 
questioning and challenging role when it is necessary, a 
scrutiny role, a partnership role, and a role that properly 
reflected both the local interest and also the wider public 
interest in these projects coming successfully through 
their processes. Without that commitment, without that 
bridge position these projects would not have made it to 
the successful outcome that we are beginning to see. (KL) 
 
The Coe vision sees the Olympics as a catalyst to 
transform sporting participation in London and across 
the UK, providing inspiration for a whole new generation 
of young people who will experience London 2012. The 
vision was compelling. The reality has proved to be a lot 
more prosaic. (SMI 47) 
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Table A8.3: Synthesis of Responses to ORQ #3 
 
APPROACH 
 
QUESTION  HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement 
PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial 
Po
siti
ve
Q3: Where this trilogy of 
development exists, which 
agency/institution provides 
leadership and which of the 
three types of 
developments (MUTPs, SUR 
and MEs) become the 
locomotive of change that 
drives the others to achieve 
favourable (integrated?) 
outcomes for the principal 
stakeholders? 
 
Yes, there are a lot of examples. The existing 
brownfield sites are the locomotive. Some initial 
commitment from the central government level should 
provide the leadership. The bi‐part political support is 
needed to ensure the long‐term view. (TU)          x 
Kws(3)=Leadership, Locomotive, Driver 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(3)= 
The most codings in the data which coded by one of the 
Kws(3) need to exclude codes “major infrastructure”, 
“urban regeneration”, “mega event” and “successful 
projects” in order to identify a meaningful list of most 
codings. These four nodes are themes of the PHR 
questionnaire; hence they are likely to be repeated when 
interviewees responded to the questions. However, 
when summarising PHR dataset, these materials were 
included because the relevant signals could be found in 
them. The most codings are as follows:  
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
A strong champion and a well equipped public agency 
are important; in the case of London is the Mayor and 
the LDA. (RB) 
        x 
It requires a special body specially designated which 
will organise the Games. This body is beyond national 
level. In the case of the 2012 London Olympics, the 
LOCOG is the body established by IOC laws. (PB) 
        x 
Leadership comes from championship and governance 
of sponsorship. Mega event is the catalyst for change. 
The Games has made it all happen at very quick pace 
        x 
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with certainty. (NM)   catalyst (7) 
 justification (5) 
 
 catalyst (5) 
 decision making (5) 
 politicians 
/champions (5) 
 
Summary:  
They are doing it because they were retired or they want 
to change the world or that used to be their old area 
where they grew up in and they want to change that. 
Most people are here because they want to do 
something different, not because they just like big 
projects. (HS) (People feel that participation of the 
Olympic projects is a prestige. The feel‐good effect is the 
key driver for people working on the project. Mega‐event 
provides the opportunity for change.) 
 
Political champions, John Prescott and Michael Heseltine 
supported the current route of the CTRL through east 
London. Regeneration, at King’s Cross Central, Stratford 
City and 2012 Olympics, all those things being possible 
because of the project we are talking about today. (RH) 
(This complies with one of the HLR responses that 
leadership comes from political champion. In this case, 
MUTP is the locomotive of other major projects.) 
 
The decision to bring the CTRL into St Pancras removed 
the uncertainty about the routes of rail over those lands 
and the additional factor bringing the UK’s only 
international railway terminus into St Pancras provided a 
further catalyst for the regeneration of those lands in 
providing better transport links, particularly important to 
business. (RH)  
 
The CTRL project was used to prove to the IOC evaluation 
British are notorious bad for grand projects. The only 
time we ever managed to achieve this is where, not at 
all successfully but the best example I can think of is 
London Docklands Development Corporation or 
Olympic Delivery agency, these undemocratic 
authoritarian bodies. Within these three elements, 
transport project is the most important. (MP) 
x         
Coalition of interests that conforms themselves around 
mega events, especially the coalition between 
politicians and developers, is the means to control 
these major projects. In the case of the Stratford City, 
policy‐makers provide the ground rules and the 
developers have to find a way of fitting their project 
into that framework and manipulate that situation. 
Transport projects, obtained clear cut, are about 
controlling the contract and the SUR to the 
government is about standing back from the project. 
Mega event is you stuck with it. These major projects 
are always out of anyone’s control. (JC) 
x         
The government usually funds for the transport 
projects and mega events. SUR schemes respond to 
transport projects. MEs build on MUTPs and SUR and 
need to be integrated by both the planning and 
practical activities. (HB) 
        x 
This depends on time scales on these projects. There 
desirably should be close integration between the 
transport projects and the sustainable urban 
regeneration projects. That is where the strategic 
planning comes in. As far as the mega events, they are 
quite often opportunistic. They see an opportunity has 
been created by having the site, by having the big 
transport link and they ride on the back of that. Mega 
events cannot be the strategic driver because the 
      x   
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MUTPs and major SUR do take long time in planning. 
(DM) 
committee that transport arrangements were not an 
issue and that the UK could deliver major infrastructure. 
(RH) (The role of the CTRL project represents the capacity 
of project delivery of the UK.)  
 
CTRL is not merely a transport project, but an important 
driver of regeneration in King’s Cross, Stratford and 
further east through the Thames Gateway. (RH) (A 
different aspect to look at the project as a regeneration 
package shifts the characteristic of the MUTPs which can 
be good business cases.) 
 
The first was the speech by Malcolm Rifkind, when he 
was the Conservative Transport Secretary, announcing 
the High Speed line coming from the east. Just change 
the route that made all the difference. The second one 
would be John Prescott insisted that there should be a 
station at Stratford when he rescued the project in 
1997/98. Although they didn’t put the details in the 
nature of the Channel Tunnel Bill, they made a 
requirement about there should be a station at Stratford. 
Merely making that requirement, everything flows from 
that. There would be an Olympic Games above the 
International Station at Stratford. They are able to 
convince the IOC that they can get people from central 
London. (CM) (The decisions made by the Government 
and the support from John Prescott put the project 
through and the project has proved to be the driver of 
other major projects in Stratford.) 
 
A lot of projects because they already have very good 
business cases, such as Docklands Light Railway 
extension from Canning Town to Stratford, the three car 
upgrade East London line. Olympics just give that surety 
and certainty that they will be delivered. So they won’t 
be any white elephant left after the Games in terms of 
Generally speaking the government has the big funding 
contribution and the ability to delay/withdraw it and it 
has a strategic political overview. It was always 
surprising to me how easily decision‐making rises to 
ministerial level, so that stakeholders do need to grasp 
the wider political scene.  I think a strong and effective 
personality heading up the project itself would turn out 
to be the main driver: someone who is fully 
empowered to make decisions for the project and who 
can persuade and manoeuvre other stakeholders into 
position. When you are talking about all three major 
elements, which at King's Cross are the Olympics, the 
regeneration and the railway, you can’t avoid 
government being seriously instrumental. The bigger 
the scale, the more the government gets involved. The 
leadership is where initiative lies, where the drive lies, 
wherever the backer of the project lies.  Local motives 
will be much more towards looking for political 
reputation, political benefits they would want to take 
for themselves. 
 
In terms of which project can provide locomotive, I 
would say sustainable urban regeneration is not 
enough on its own. There’s usually a catalyst like an 
MUTP or some other piece of infrastructure or some 
major injection of public funding. Otherwise the market 
would see to it that the area would be regenerated. 
What makes regeneration sustainable is, however, very 
        X 
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much around how effectively local authorities in 
particular shape the agenda and insist on attention to 
climate change.  The 2012 Olympics are an ME and 
clearly provide a new imperative to complete CTRL and 
LUL works at King's Cross and Stratford. (BW) 
transport. (RM) (Mega events play a role as an agent for 
existing transport plans to give them certainty and 
delivering timetable.) 
 
King’s Cross tied into regeneration scheme, transport 
projects and the Olympics. The Olympic decision set up a 
different level of timeframe for these associated 
projects. (RK) 
 
The leader’s charisma and well connected to both the 
political and professional networks are two key elements 
of project delivery, such as the Director of planning who 
came to Camden very much to handle King’s Cross and 
my primer boss, Bob West. (RK) 
 
What we did as a planning authority was pushed project 
through. We were the drivers for the project along with 
the developer. There were various attempts to derail 
project and there were various attempts by others to if 
not this derail but to take this project over.  The local 
authority was key decision‐maker but I don’t think it is 
anymore. It wouldn’t be now because the planning 
system has changed since 2001. Camden was the 
planning authority for King’s Cross where is now the 
Mayor. The new planning rules changed everything. The 
Mayor or the GLA in the early days were very keen to 
take control of the project. We needed the agreement 
that of GLA and support the GLA. GLA often will try to 
control the key things. They didn’t succeed but the law 
has now changed. If we were starting now, the Camden 
would have much less role in King’s Cross. (RK) (This 
statement shows that the importance of the local 
authority in the KXC project and the institutional 
arrangements which gives planning power to the Mayor.) 
 
It is CTRL which enables Eurostar, which facilitate others. 
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It is a chain and no one component on its own would 
work, but together, it works. (RB) (MUPTs can be the 
locomotive but they need other projects to justify their 
value.)  
 
Stratford International decision was tied in with changes 
for train depot arrangements which originally intended 
to be at the North Port Depot and they moved to Temple 
Mills near Stratford instead. The idea of building a proper 
railway link from Stratford runs to the Temple Mills 
would enable the West Coast Main Line started creating 
a proper High Speed network. The possibility of building 
a proper link which would mean to interfere the 
development potential. Also, it was required the 
commitment to build proper high speed line north of 
London and that was something they did not prepare to 
do. (PJ) 
 
Regional Shopping Centres (RSCs) have much to offer in 
the future planning of their areas. They are huge wealth 
generators in their local and regional economies. They 
are served by excellent public transport infrastructure 
and provide a wide range of shops, services and facilities. 
Most have development land available nearby. They are 
ideally suited to drive a new wave of regeneration and 
meet the housing delivery agenda. If planned properly, 
they will become focal points for sustainable mixed‐use 
communities, knitting into the existing urban fabric. (SMI 
36) (Can the retail‐oriented development Stratford City 
be the lead for regeneration? It seems existing transport 
network and available lands are prerequisites for the RSC 
development.) 
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Table A8.4: Synthesis of Responses to ORQ #4 
 
APPROACH 
 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
Q4: Do MUTPs, SUR and 
MEs share resources at the 
local, regional and national 
scale, or is one promoted 
at the expense of the 
others? If so, please 
provide an illustration of 
this. 
 
They do share political resources. Financial resources 
are separate. Institutional planning resources are 
streamlined in order to improve efficiency. (TU) 
      x   
Kws(4)=Resources 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(4)=  
Although there are two sets of the most codings identified 
below, the contents of identified data do not relate to the 
theme of HLR question 4. The summary can assist to 
distinguish the reliability of the‐most‐coding‐nodes list. In 
this case, financing and cost is the most mentioned issue 
when talk about resources. The summary also shows 
some sharing resources contain intangible elements. 
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 financing / cost (8) 
 
 financing / cost (10) 
 mega event (7) 
 competition (5) 
Summary:  
The KX Central and Stratford City, that government 
currently own the land but as part of the arrangements 
for the CTRL that land gets transferred to London & 
Continental Railways. So as well as being responsible for 
the delivery of the CTRL, my company is also working in 
partnership with Argent, the developers for King’s Cross 
Central, and we are working in partnership with the 
Olympic Development Authority and with Westfield, 
They compete for resources. It requires a strong figure 
to reprioritise the resources. (RB)    x       
It depends on the scale of the city in terms of 
population. If it is a small country then the Olympics 
can take a large share of the resources. What spent in 
London is justifiable because it is for long‐term legacy 
and urban regeneration benefits. Britain is a democratic 
country and the government knows how far they can go 
to make the Bid attractive but not ruin the country. (PB) 
    x     
In the case of Stratford, the CTRL and Stratford City 
development share resources.  There is a debate about 
the IOC wouldn’t grant us the privilege of the host city 
contract without almost being seduced by large brand 
new railway station. The Games has hugely accelerated 
the interests and increased the certainty of the 
development. (NM) 
        x 
If they can be combined and in communist scale, they 
can share resources. The case of the CTRL caused the 
rise of land value and that generates regeneration and 
mega events. In the case of London, the CTRL helped 
London Bid. The Olympics are far from taking resources 
away from the urban regeneration; they are actually 
bringing in or helping to stimulate resources to the 
urban regeneration (MP) 
        x 
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It depends on project scale. MUTPs provide the most 
impacts and may provide the most benefits. They are 
national level. As to the SUR projects, they relatively 
impact on small areas. In terms of the CTRL and the 
Crossrail, they do share resources with Stratford City 
project. The Olympics further reinforces imbalance 
between London and other regions. (JC) 
  x       
developers for Stratford City.  These three, CTRL, KX 
Central, and Stratford City, are inter‐related. (RH) (From 
this statement, MUTPs, SUR schemes and MEs can share 
resources in terms of planning resources and financial 
viability) 
 
It will have significant implications to the Thames 
Gateway because Thames Gateway is also a provider of 
lots of new housing over a period of time and clearly in 
the immediate year of time after 2012, they are not going 
to be in the position to bring on to the market further 
additional housing. The re‐phasing of the delivery of 
Thames Gateway is also going to be significantly impacted 
by the 2012 Olympics. (RH) (The mega event in this sense 
is competing with other major projects for resources. If 
projects are not associated with the mega event, they are 
likely to be impacted negatively since mega events tend 
to have overriding power.) 
You need selling point for the Games in London. There is 
no way for London we can all assemble all those 
components close to each other and that’s why it has to 
be Stratford. (CM) (The available land in Stratford 
provided the London Olympics a selling point to win the 
Bid.) 
Most of the infrastructure growth will come from public 
spending and in the current uncertain climate the threat 
of delays to some projects due to funding constraints is a 
real concern. However, the connection of some schemes 
to the 2012 Olympics will facilitate to ensure a strong 
growth in demand over the next three years. (SMI 20) 
(Event‐related projects share the economic viability with 
the mega event. The sharing element is intangible.) 
 
 
Yes, there is element for sharing. There are shared 
planning resources, shared planning constitution, but 
obviously in terms of implementation, the building, the 
labours, they are to some extent competing. (HB) 
      x   
In the case of KXC project, a willing council who 
dedicated planning resources to the project and the 
developer who were prepared to play the lead role are 
two key factors. In KXC, it was absolutely essential to 
have that private sector commitment and their 
willingness to make that long term investment. But 
what work there may not be replicated on another site. 
(DM)  
    x     
I am not sure about sharing resources, but we pour in 
resources at all these levels. I don’t think there’s much 
sharing of resources as such; we each have roles and 
fund them accordingly.  
Your first level of political activity is to decide whether 
you are going to spend time and money in this way. 
Secondly, how resources go in depends also on how the 
stakeholders are getting on. Third, the MUTP costs on 
local authorities are generally underestimated. We 
have a duty of care to local communities. So we have to 
put in resources of our own to shape the project design, 
manage the construction impacts, negotiate, cajole, 
consult, etc.  
 
Many councils would baulk at paying a million pounds 
or more to be part of the project, but the benefits to 
  x       
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Camden of having an international terminus here are 
huge and well worth it.  
 
There is a lot strategic allocation of resources going on. 
As the decision of the project goes down the line from 
national level to local level, it is already diluted.  If the 
project dies or stops, it is combination of strategic and 
political change and, because it is a long timeframe for 
project delivery for railways, it is possible for a project 
to stop/start several times. (BW) 
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Table A8.5: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #1 
 
APPROACH 
 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
PART 2:  The Channel 
Tunnel Rail Link and its 
Transport Hubs (at King’s 
Cross and Stratford) and 
2012 London Olympics: 
Some hypotheses and 
questions about their 
development 
 
A number of hypotheses 
are forwarded here to help 
explain how the CTRL and 
its transport hubs at King’s 
Cross and Stratford were 
developed and what 
relationships (if any) were 
established with the 2012 
London Olympics project. 
The following questions 
invite interviewees to 
respond to the plausibility 
of each of these 
hypotheses.  
H1: The role of MUTPs 
Mega Urban Transport 
Projects (MUTPs) have the 
Yes, I do agree with all of that. (TU)          x  Kws(5)=Catalyst 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(5)=  
According to the data identified here, people who 
champion MUTPs or HSR believe that they are catalyst for 
economic growth and regeneration. In return, these 
regeneration benefits are justification for building the 
MUTPs. During the period of global economic slump, 
MUTPs are expected to stimulate domestic spending. 
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 driver (7) 
 justification (6) 
 urban regeneration 
(5) 
 mega event (5) 
 opportunity (5) 
 politicians / 
champions (5) 
 
 urban regeneration 
(9) 
 benefits (8) 
 major infrastructure 
(8) 
 justification (7) 
 driver (7) 
 mega event (6) 
 opportunity (5) 
 politicians / 
champions (5) 
 economic rationale 
(5) 
Summary:  
Regeneration, at King’s Cross Central, Stratford City and 
Certainly in the London context. 
Dockland Light Railway and Jubilee Line Extension for 
the Canary Wharf is a good example.  
MUTPs are the catalyst for urban regeneration. They 
are not necessarily the catalyst for mega events but 
they allow the events to happen. (RB) 
      x   
In the case of the CTRL, it has no direct relationship 
with the Olympics. They happened at different timing. 
The Olympics is benefited from the Stratford 
International and the internal transport network that 
the CTRL provided. The high speed link is the 
determining factor for London to convince the IOC 
visitors. (PB) 
      x   
The case of the Stratford International helped the 
decision made about the Games. The Olympics helped 
to speed up other projects and it gives certainty to the 
Stratford City development. Another example is the 
Öresund Bridge which facilitated economic 
development. (NM) 
      x   
Major transport projects are planned deliberately to 
catch every possible regeneration opportunity which is 
part of the rationale for their planning.  The CTRL 
constituted some important catalyst for both urban 
regeneration and the Olympics. (MP) 
        x 
The impact of the CTRL is very marginal. It could justify 
the reason to choose that Olympic site but the majority 
transport will depend on domestic services. 
x         
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potential to act as an agent 
for the delivery of 
Sustainable Urban 
Regeneration (SUR) and 
Mega Events (MEs), while 
MEs in turn can speed‐up 
MUTP and SUR 
developments. On this 
basis CTRL constitutes an 
important positive catalyst 
for both SUR and ME 
developments associated 
with its transport hubs. 
 
HRQ1:  MUTP is a positive 
catalyst  
Do you agree with this 
hypothesis in general terms 
and as it relates more 
specifically to the CTRL? 
Furthermore, the SC will be delivered anyway no 
matter whether there is an international station or not 
because that land is too big and very enticing. The land 
of SC is going to recoup the CTRL construction debt but 
there is no benefit contributing to sustainable urban 
regeneration. (JC) 
2012 Olympics, all those things being possible because of 
the CTRL project we are talking about today. (RH) 
 
The decision to bring the CTRL into St Pancras removed 
the uncertainty about the routes of rail over those lands 
and the additional factor bringing the UK’s only 
international railway terminus into St Pancras provided a 
further catalyst for the regeneration of those lands in 
providing better transport links, particularly important to 
business.  What it effectively becomes is a transport hub 
because a number of underground lines, as well as a 
number of overground UK railway lines which come to 
King’s Cross / St Pancras or indeed Euston which is very 
short walk away. Similarly, Stratford City, the catalyst for 
Stratford City again is railway land, and the connection 
between the new international station and the Continent, 
and the improved connections from Kent through 
Stratford into central London. (RH) 
 
CTRL is primarily a catalyst for the regeneration which is 
taking place here in King’s Cross and Stratford and further 
east through the Thames Gateway. This is a catalyst 
project with 3 objectives: providing international train 
travel, to improve commuting train travel from Kent, and 
to provide catalyst for regeneration.  (RH) 
 
This is a catalyst project with 3 objectives: providing 
international train travel, to improve commuting train 
travel from Kent, and to provide catalyst for regeneration. 
Initially they were in that order. International train travel 
was by far the most important. Today and in 10 years 
time, the far most important issue would be the catalyst 
project for the regeneration. Back in 1998 / 1999, 
government was only allowed to include half billion 
pounds worth of further regeneration from this railway 
whilst today with King’s Cross and Stratford, there would 
Yes, MUTPs can act as an agent for delivery of SUR or 
UR but not catalyst for mega events. The word, 
catalyst, is too strong. Mega events require a variety of 
conditions and MUTP probably one of those necessary 
elements. (HB)  
      x   
MUTPs are usually a positive catalyst because they 
improve accessibility and image of that site. KX / St 
Pancras is certainly changing the whole image of this 
quarter in London. MEs can in some circumstances to 
help MUTPs speed up but MEs also created 
unnecessary construction pressure and increase 
projects’ costs. (DM) 
      x   
Yes, H1 is fine by me and CTRL is a good example. (BW) 
        x 
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be over 10 billion pounds worth of regeneration 
effectively 20 times higher and could be even greater than 
by that time it’s finished. (RH)  
 
To set upon as a project we ought to support amongst 
part of number of reasons: we believed having a station at 
Stratford, an international station that links to Europe will 
be real catalyst for redevelopment / regeneration in this 
part of London. Because we are one of the most deprived 
authority areas of this country. We want something that 
brought jobs as well as opportunism, training, education 
and new commercial ideas as well as new housing. We 
thought this is the project can really unlock that area. We 
consistently work from 1988 through out to 1997/8 to 
promote the idea that it would bring the engine, the 
catalyst for changing at Stratford. (CM) 
 
CTRL will deliver potential commuter from north Kent to 
Stratford. Crossrail will come through in 2016/2017. 
Transport infrastructure will make Stratford a very fast 
business gateway. That was always our original ambition 
we always talk about backing 20 years ago making this 
place where investors will come to build their businesses. 
(CM) 
 
The CTRL route and station are most significant decisions 
from Rifkind and Prescott. For us, those were two key 
things and everything flows from that. (CM) 
 
That’s the catalyst. That was put this area of London on 
the map. Without Eurostar, I think it would be much 
harder. That will just be another area that London to 
regenerate. It puts it on the media spotlight worldwide 
and therefore on the radar of a lot of property developers 
and companies think about locations. (RB) 
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I think where very important decisions to be made not 
only about land use and disposition of land uses within 
that a huge scheme of regeneration on railway land, but 
also infrastructure. One of the greatest challenges in East 
London has been to improve the public transport 
infrastructure. That has been a perennial challenge for at 
least 25 years since the regeneration in London Docklands 
began and through the work of the London Docklands 
Development Corporation in the early 1980s. The 
introduction of the Docklands Light Railway has been an 
extremely important influence and stimulus to 
regeneration. That network continues to be expanded. It 
too will have function, specifically serving not only on the 
Stratford City, but also the London Olympics. The 
improvement of major infrastructure in East London is a 
prerequisite for a successful regeneration. (KL) (The 
domestic transport network is more influential than the 
international railway services.) 
 
Following the success of the CTRL project, further impetus 
has been given to the debate for a High Speed rail 
network in the United Kingdom. A High Speed corridor has 
been identified by Greengauge 21 between London and 
Birmingham/ Manchester, including a spur to Heathrow. 
This scale of this improvement in connectivity would 
result in significant productivity gains to the national and 
regional economy, with overall GDP gains of over £5bn 
(2002 prices) forecast over a 60 year period, calculated in 
line with the Government`s `Wider Economic Benefits` 
(WEBs) Guidance.  A significant proportion of these 
benefits would accrue to Birmingham and the West 
Midlands, and in particular would support the expansion 
of the high value financial and business service sectors, 
with related spin off benefits to the property and retail 
sectors. This provides further strong evidence of the 
potential role high speed rail can play in supporting 
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Table A8.6: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #2 
 
economic growth in the UK, and in stimulating 
regeneration in our major cities. (SMI 16) (The role of HSR 
network can probably encourage cluster cities / 
agglomeration since it connects major cities as a centre of 
each cluster. Other sub transport network is to link up all 
smaller cities within each agglomeration which forms a 
self‐sustain or certain industry specialty cluster.)  
 
China is trying to boost domestic consumer spending 
by injecting money into the economy in hopes of 
insulating it from a sharp drop in global demand for its 
exports. Following Beijing's launch of a massive 
stimulus plan to revive slowing economic growth, the 
China's provincial governments have proposed more 
than 10 trillion yuan ($1.4 trillion) in infrastructure 
spending. The provinces' planned spending is mainly 
focused on projects involving rail, road, port and low‐
income housing construction. (SMI 21) (The role of 
MUTPs is a stimulus in economic downturn.) 
APPROACH 
 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
HRQ 2: CTRL – A driver of 
change? 
What are the distinct roles 
of the CTRL in terms of the 
CTRL is the determining factor for London won the Bid. 
(TU)           x 
Kws(6)= Driver 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(6)=  
This set of data is overlapping with the previous one. The 
extra information identified will supplement HLR question 
CTRL has significant impact in terms of the public and 
private investment in KX Central and Stratford City 
regeneration schemes. (RB) 
        x 
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urban regeneration 
process of KX Central and 
Stratford City, and what 
role (if any) has the CTRL 
played in the Olympic 
Games Project? 
 
It does steer enormous activities around those railway 
stations. The example in Japan and Hong Kong is the 
case. Those lands surround railway or subway stations 
became very high value.  Railway is an old and faithful 
transport system but the impact even for the future of 
the cities is tremendous. The CTRL service is the 
determining factor to convince the IOC visitors (PB).  
        x 
5 and 6.  
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 mega event (11) 
 major infrastructure 
(9) 
 urban regeneration 
(7) 
 catalyst (7) 
 successful project (5) 
 justification (5) 
 
 major infrastructure 
(14) 
 mega event (13) 
 urban regeneration 
(10) 
 catalyst (7) 
 decision making (5) 
 successful project (5) 
 justification (5) 
Summary:  
CTRL makes the Olympic site more accessible, accessible 
enough to compete with Paris. (PJ) 
 
As regeneration project on the back of the transport, it is 
already successful. CTRL is also an important component 
to win the Olympic Bid for London. (RB) 
 
It is CTRL which enables Eurostar, which facilitate others. 
It is a chain and no one component on its own would 
work, but together, it works. (RB) 
 
HSR could have very important future and the existing 
CTRL is a great example of what we can build and 
obviously quite well patronised. There is demand. I think 
in the future if we are looking towards lower carbon 
economy then definitely there is need for it. But the 
planning process in this country is so long and 
complicated. Also infrastructure cost is so high that it 
would take long time to realise it. (RM) 
 
CTRL is an important factor on the Games decision. It 
also plays a significant role in urban regeneration. (NM)          x 
Access is a major determine for London land and rental 
values because land and rental values in turn are major 
determine of land use. There will be many large scale 
enterprises locate in King’s Cross and the impacts of 
the ripple effect of the gentrification already in St 
Pancras.  
Without the Stratford International Station, we 
couldn’t have a) found the land and b) claimed that the 
Olympics will lead to regeneration in that whole part of 
London. The CTRL played a major part in the London 
Bid. (MP) 
        x 
CTRL is an unsustainable project in terms of 
encouraging the development along its stations. They 
all follow the modern model and create disadvantages 
to local communities. (JC)  
x         
CTRL provided window opportunity for King’s Cross and 
Stratford to develop good commercial regeneration 
schemes. CTRL is a necessary aspect providing access 
capacity to the Olympics. (HB) 
      x   
The uncertainty of the CTRL delayed the KXC project for 
many years. The CTRL is helping the SC, but SC is not as 
competitive as KXC. There is also risk of the station 
there because it makes it easier for people to travel 
away rather than travel to it. In terms of the Olympics, 
CTRL is like the frosting on the cake. I don’t think the 
importance for people to get the Olympic site registers 
  x       
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(will ever register) in the public perception. (DM)  CTRL was used to convince IOC that the capacity of 
building major infrastructure in the UK. They can see what 
promise has been made and they can see the rail link has 
been built. (CM & RH) 
 
The idea of HSR networks in the UK might have remained 
mere speculation, particularly as Sir Rod Eddington's 
review of transport infrastructure in 2006 was notably 
lukewarm. "High‐speed rail networks in the UK would not 
significantly change the level of economic connectivity 
between most parts of the UK, given existing aviation and 
rail links," he concluded. But three years is a long time in 
politics. Both the Tories and Liberal Democrats have 
voiced support for a high‐speed line, in part to avoid 
expansion of Heathrow Airport by offering an alternative 
to domestic air travel. In January, the government got 
behind the idea too. The paper noted that while there are 
5,570km of high‐speed line in operation in Europe and 
almost 12,000km under construction or planned, the UK 
boasts a mere 110km. A political consensus is thus 
emerging. The question is where the line would run and 
consequently what it would cost. (SMI 48) (Building HSR 
networks in the UK is also showing the competitiveness of 
the nation and also as political output.) 
 
 
CTRL is a driver of change, but it also brings uncertainty 
because of the blight it has created.  It delayed the KX 
redevelopment for 20 years. The railway is a driver of 
change because it means you can deliver better and 
bigger regenerative development, along with the 
international dimension, etc. People were arguing 
about the gentrification problems will be brought by 
the Argent’s plan, but you can’t do much about it then 
because it is the market, and it was the railway that 
made the change initially, not the development. 
 
The effect is more dramatic at Stratford, probably, as 
there is a lot of land there with low values and little 
prospect of economic success without something 
dramatic like CTRL happening. 
 
As for the Olympics, the capacity for a high speed link 
between central London (St Pancras) and the Olympic 
village at Stratford on the CTRL line probably won the 
bid for London. (BW) 
        x 
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Table A8.7: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #3 
 
APPROACH 
 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
H2: Political Decision 
Institutional arrangements 
and power relations are 
the most significant factors 
influencing the effective 
delivery and performance 
of Mega Urban Transport 
Projects (MUTPs), 
Sustainable Urban 
Regeneration (SUR) and 
Mega Event (ME) scheme. 
 
HRQ 3: Politics in time 
(after Paul Pierson, 2004) 
Is the ultimate determining 
factor of the decision‐
making process in MUTP 
planning, appraisal, 
evaluation and delivery 
that of political power ‐ not 
the power of the rationality 
of technocrats? 
 
 
I agree.  
Political output is a dominant concern and far more 
influential than the cost that takes to deliver that 
outcome. (TU) 
        x 
Kws(7)= Political power, Political output, decision‐
making, technocracy 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(7)=  
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 major infrastructure 
(27) 
 mega event (20) 
 decision makers (19) 
 financing / cost (12) 
 transport service 
(11) 
 justification (10) 
 promote / convince 
(10) 
 negotiation power 
(9) 
 urban regeneration 
(9) 
 lobby (7) 
 major infrastructure 
(33) 
 decision makers (23) 
 mega event (22) 
 financing / cost (15) 
 lobby (11) 
 justification (10) 
 economic rationale 
(10) 
 politician / 
champion (9) 
 approval mechanism 
(9) 
 uncertainty / 
certainty (9)  
Summary: 
The search for a single critical path is very difficult. If you 
look at the planning of a project like the Olympics, the first 
thing you become aware of is the sheer scale of it, the 
large number of people who are involved and the fact that 
the process of assembling a bid for the Olympics is a long 
Political decisions are fundamental. Politics is about 
priority and it comes from government level. Without 
political buying and delivery of that project, it is not 
going to happen irrespectively whether it is a fantastic 
idea or technical requirements. (RB) 
        x 
Political power is the gear of the decision to run for the 
Games. In the case of London, the Olympics have 
support from the Labour party and the Tories. With the 
power of rationality, probably Britain would not have 
the bid in the first place. (PB) 
        x 
The power of the rationalitative technocrats is not 
divorced from political power. This is a fault premise. 
(NM) 
x         
This kind of project is inter‐connected with the highest 
of all strategically politics and high political decisions 
where things like commercial viability are secondary.  
We have to have it because ultimately a country is 
competing in an ever smaller global economy.  It 
depends on the perception of city image. (MP)  
        x 
Decision‐makers and politicians are stuck with the 
financial realities; hence they actually do not have that 
much power. Unless you get strong willingness from 
people to pay more tax or you have strong ideology of 
public provision either driven by an authoritarian or a 
democratic state. The private market ideology will limit 
  x       
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the capacity as a politician to push the project through. 
People who want to devise a programme they have to 
take into account the political and financial realities of 
the time. There is no difference between political 
power and technocrats concerning development and 
delivery of mega projects. (JC) (This can be referred to 
path‐dependency. The agenda has already been set 
before the politicians even get involved. The planning 
structure once established, it is not easy to change. 
There are many factors of this framework, including 
macroeconomic environment, global trends, political 
conditions, local challenges, institutional 
arrangements, etc.) 
process. Before London 2012 there were a series of 
failures where people have been involved in other bids 
from England for the Olympics. Those bids failed but 
although they failed, they exhibited the process of the 
accumulation of a coalition for building the project.  In 
some of the literature this is described as a 'growth 
coalition'. You won't know what the critical decisions are 
until you’ve gone through a very long process of 
assembling some narratives of this process from a great 
deal of different sources. I think that these events are on 
such a large scale that you first of all have to establish a 
narrative of how they take place. You could not put your 
finger on a single critical decision. (MS) (This statement 
signifies three important aspects: first is the importance of 
using narratives to understand the decision‐making 
process. Second is the theory of growth coalition which 
reflects to affiliation of project champions. Final is the 
impact of previous failures on the London 2012 Olympics.) 
 
Economic impact studies confirm these expectations by 
forecasting economic benefits in the billions of dollars. 
Unfortunately these studies are filled with misapplications 
of economic theory that virtually guarantee their 
projections will be large. Ex‐post studies have consistently 
found no evidence of positive economic impacts from 
mega‐sporting events even remotely approaching the 
estimates in economic impact studies. (MS quoted from 
Owen, 2005) (Forecasts are likely to have optimistic bias.) 
 
These mega projects are usually consortiums of 
businessmen and politicians in these cities, who form a 
'growth coalition' which appeals for public grants to help 
finance these projects.  They produce something called an 
'economic impact study'. These impact studies are always 
a study shows that mega event will be both good for 
urban finances and good for business. (MS) (Consortiums 
of businessmen and politicians form a certain 
Politicians make decisions but they are not overriding 
decisions. There are also elements of lobbying.  
Appraisal and evaluation reflect benefits out of that 
project in the real world. They get translated into 
political pressure and political interest. (HB) 
x         
Yes, entirely. These are incredible expensive projects 
unless the government is prepared to provide 
commitment to that long range funding. (DM) 
        x 
Yes, indeed.  Some case like the nuclear power, 
technically the case is absolutely clear, but politically it 
is not all clear because the political risks are really hard 
ones. 
 
To get to a fully rational technical case, you have to do 
an awful lot of evidence‐based research and your 
evidence may change over time which means whatever 
you say today may not be the same next year. That 
means you have to make a political decision on the 
bulk of the evidence rather than on the fully rational 
case. And it is not always negative. The political 
decision might be based on something that isn’t proven 
in that kind of rational way, but politically it is a good 
        x 
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idea. 
Choices between mega projects and their significance 
are going to be political ones. 
 
The government did not want to win the Olympics, 
because they knew it would cost them billions one way 
or the other. So they are forced to make political 
choices as a result of winning the Olympics. That’s 
pretty half‐hearted government support. The 
reputational damage of not running the Olympics, and 
not supporting sports through out the country around 
such catalyst, is far too high. They cannot afford not to 
be very much involved. (BW) 
development model which criticised as artificially rise the 
land value and lead to over development.) 
 
One of the critical economic changes happened as part of 
the political process. The critical change that took place 
was the overturning of the predominant theory of 
Keynesian economics or welfare capitalism, which was 
developed in 1930s and was a product of the Great 
Depression. It said, among other economic policy 
prescriptions, that the state should spend money during a 
recession in order to stimulate the economy and get it 
going again. This is the birth of Neo‐liberalism.  (MS) (Is 
this the similar situation happening today? Nations are 
spending money to stimulate the economy and bail out 
banks and car industries. This also caused restructuring of 
financial regulation internationally and nationally.) 
 
“The essential features of regime theory stipulate[s] that 
business leaders have a privileged position in local politics 
because of their command of economic resources. 
Because business leaders are affected by local political 
decisions, not just at the level of property taxes but by the 
business climate of the city as well, they attempt to shape 
public policies to benefit business. In order to shape an 
agenda and bring results, business leaders need the 
cooperation of elected officials. Local elected officials and 
local bureaucrats seize the opportunities afforded by 
cooperation with business leaders.” 
 (MS quoted from  Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 
2001) 
 
Decisions of the CTRL project were taken by chance not 
with intention and planning has very little to do with that. 
(PJ) (Ad‐hocery decision‐making.) 
 
Because Ken Livingstone pushed for London to have 
Olympic Bid and the only place that the Olympic stadium 
could really be developed in terms of big development 
space and regeneration potential is Stratford. Certainly 
Stratford became very attractive to the Olympics because 
they can tag the regeneration of the area onto that Bid 
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and makes it on the Bid because the International Olympic 
Committee require about such things. (PJ) 
 
The Government resisted the idea of having station in 
Stratford but later they changed their mind. It was mostly 
because the Newham council fought for it and also we had 
changed our government finally. Then Labour comes to 
power. Transport Secretary, John Prescott, forced for the 
project when the developer had financial crisis. You end 
up with the Government backing the private sector 
partners who are taking the risk building a profitable 
development and agreeing that the single project will be 
built in 2 phases. (PJ)  
 
There was no down side for the private sector side. They 
shouldn’t be allowed to go bankrupt; the Government 
should take it in, should have done itself and got the 
profits. But instead, they decided to get this money back 
through the development agreement which tied up with 
the lands at King’s Cross / St Pancras and Ebbsfleet. That 
meant it put artificially high valuations of on what the 
lands worth. This has forced the developers to up how 
much they build to maintain their profit level leading to 
over development. Of course that’s pushed through 
because it is central to the Channel Tunnel project. But 
the whole thing all the way along has been tailored 
accident happenstance. There is no mega transport 
project. That is a collection of bits and pieces that 
happened to be fashionable at the time. Just as the 
Crossrail Bills, now almost finished going through the 
Parliament making all the same mistakes. (PJ) (The 
interviewee opposed over development which caused by 
the PPP delivery mechanism.) 
 
Stratford has good connections that would make sense for 
Kent Commuter to get off Stratford but the Stratford 
station will slow down the journey times and massively 
reduce the number of passengers who do come through 
the St Pancras because they get off the Stratford station 
which is more useful. The cost and benefit analysis on the 
massive expensive St Pancras station falls pieces. (PJ) 
(Technocrat evidence cannot justify the Stratford 
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International station.)
 
What happened was in reality that they pretended that 
would be high speed services and the rest of the country 
locked in the decision to have the station at King’s 
Cross/St Pancras. It’s not the best solution. It’s a sub‐
optimal solution but I think it is a very good example of 
what economist called mode‐locking (path dependency). 
So the second rate solution became the market dominant 
one. All these chopping and changing that we have been 
talking about all because of the decision of property 
development. The Thameslink, the Kent Commuters, the 
Olympics, all the rest of it are example after example of 
generating sub‐optimal solutions which themselves fix as 
in what can happen next and set it up for next sub‐optimal 
solutions. (PJ) (Sub‐optimal solutions are locked in by the 
desire of profit‐making out of the railway lands 
development.  Is it really a bad approach to employ the 
sub‐optimal solution when it can better meet the 
demands of all parties? This is back to the debate that 
whose agenda needs to be prioritised.) 
 
Governments have different set of priorities and 
perspectives. Basically the Governments they don’t want 
any bad news. They don’t like difficult decisions and 
dilemmas. They have slightly negative influence on all of 
these things because they want to put bad news under 
the table and not let it happen. If you confront them with 
difficult decision, like the decision on the depot in east 
London. When they have to spend some more money, 
they didn’t like it. It took them two years to make that 
decision. They delayed it by two years because it was the 
decision that they didn’t like. They have different set of 
objectives and perspectives. They have no sense of 
urgency either because they haven’t got to open up train 
services 5.30 every morning. I mean they just go to work 
and they operate completely different time scale. (RB) 
(This sounds more like a issue of bureaucracy.) 
 
Behind the scenes we had build a new maintenance depot 
which is actually in Stratford, east London, because old 
maintenance depot was in west London and not 
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accessible from new line. That was a big strategic decision 
because it was not included in the original project. No 
body really thought how they are going to maintain the 
trains. Because it was variation to the project, the 
Government had to pay and the Government didn’t want 
to pay. So that was really quite a big strategic decision to 
make it work. (RB) (What RB suggests here that the reason 
of moving the maintenance depot to Temple Mills is 
operational and it confirms that once the project is 
underway, technocrats have power to modify the project. 
However, lobbying is an indispensable element in 
decision‐making process.) 
 
What was critical for different stakeholders was their 
influence. The Islington west area sub committee refused 
planning permission for the Triangle. I think it was purely 
political because all the reports of west are sub committee 
has received said the planning permission should be 
granted. It is very a perverse committee because it is a 
committee of opposition. It doesn’t really represent 
Islington Council that opposition because it is a peculiar 
way that Islington set itself up. The opposition party 
controls the west area sub committee. The west area sub 
committee can’t constantly play to the popular vote 
without taking the consequences. I think the west area 
sub committee refused the planning permission for 
Triangle was purely political and purely opportunist. (RK) 
(Political outputs and political opportunism: using a 
situation to get power or an advantage) 
 
The decision of having International Stratford Station in 
transport terms was slightly odd decision. I think it was 
based on the fact that regional Eurostar services which are 
going to serve the rest of the United Kingdom. When the 
regional Eurostar were cancelled, because of both the 
forecast show lack of patronage, Stratford International 
becomes white elephant. Why has an international station 
so close to St Pancras? Eurostar, I don’t think they are 
going to start many international services at Stratford. 
That’s obviously that a need was demonstrated once for 
the domestic Eurostar services to come from Manchester 
and stop in Stratford and then go into Paris, but then in 
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the process somewhere someone has demonstrated that 
business case was flawed so those services have been 
withdrawn but they still went ahead to build the station. 
(RM) (This is evidence showing that technocracy is not the 
central factor of key decisions.) 
 
Again we worked with partners, we lobbied and we 
realised in the end that Stratford can do two things for the 
route that couldn’t be done anywhere else. One was there 
was a safety case for station in Stratford. If there is 
problem of the Tunnel Link in Barking and King’s Cross, 
the safety case we built that you need somewhere in the 
middle. Similarly, if they want to stable both of the trains, 
these are very long trains that used for the Eurostar 
services, there was a railway yard at north Stratford, 
Temple Mills, which is long enough. The other issue was 
making connection to the West Coast Main Line. At the 
moment the High Speed line just stops at St Pancras and 
doesn’t bring to the north. If it goes further north, it needs 
to access West Coast Main Lines. It is easier to access 
West Coast Main Lines from Stratford than from St 
Pancras. Those are the three factors that we believe 
ultimately made the case for building the Station at 
Stratford. (CM) (According to RB, the depot at Temple 
Mills was decided in 2006 but the decision of Stratford 
International was in 1996 (OMEGA, 2008) or 1998 (CM). 
CM used the safety case, maintenance depot and HSR 
service to the north to justify the benefits of Stratford 
International.) 
 
What is very difficult in anything this big is how you weld 
local government, at its various levels, at a borough level, 
at a city level, with the national government agenda, with 
the private sector agenda where you have, I am not saying 
mutually opposed agentives, but you all have different set 
of objectives. So the private sector is there fundamentally 
to make profit and ideally to generate a bit good will 
about the individual.  Central government is there to 
consider can they achieve short‐term expedience in 
political outputs ideally with no costs itself. Also think how 
you get creditability and points with the electorate for 
spending nothing. City‐wide is how you insure that you 
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convince everyone else insight to do your own political 
agenda at no cost to yourself.  At the local borough level, 
it is how I get as much into the borough as I can ideally 
with no disbenefits and with my own electorate thinking 
I’m wonderful. (HS) 
 
That’s why the S106 agreement is so thick and complex 
because it’s assuming that certain events may happen in 
the future, but if they don’t happen then there is a 
fallback position. (MJ) (Flexibility and uncertainty) 
 
The Olympics can't change the world or China, but the 
power and the magic of the Olympics has always 
transcended political issues. (SMI 10) 
 
This scale of this improvement in connectivity for HSR 
networks would result in significant productivity gains to 
the national and regional economy, with overall GDP gains 
of over £5bn (2002 prices) forecast over a 60 year period, 
calculated in line with the Government`s `Wider Economic 
Benefits` (WEBs) Guidance. (SMI 16) 
 
Opposing a third runway at Heathrow Airport and a 
second at Stansted will certainly boost Tory leader David 
Cameron's green credentials, drawing a clear line between 
his party and the Labour government on the issue of 
airport expansion. (SMI 26) 
 
New income streams for local authorities to tackle 
pollution and congestion have been a great success in 
London but you need to have the political decision‐making 
structure in place to deliver new fiscal measures. Progress 
outside London has been slower, fuelled by nimbyism. 
Council members are under pressure to support the local 
electorate, even if the transport proposal is not the most 
logical or pragmatic solution. (SMI 29) 
 
Further work by Michael Parkinson for the Core Cities has 
argued that differences in organisational and financial 
structures lie at the heart of differences in the 
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performance of cities (Parkinson et al., 2004). However, 
many of the changes required are highly controversial. 
They affect the fundamental distribution of power 
between different levels of government, and how 
different communities are empowered. Even the smallest 
changes, such as those put forward in the Local 
Government White Paper, seem very hard to implement 
as they require a climate of trust, not rivalry. (SMI 43) 
 
Instead it was quietly forgotten when it did not present a 
strong case for a bid. Civil servants watered down the 
findings but the final draft was still unhelpful to bid 
champions within the Government. “The justification for 
bidding should have been based on evidence placed in the 
public domain. Instead key evidence was suppressed or 
ignored.” The revelations raise the question of why 
ministers backed a bid citing reasons dismissed by their 
own experts. (SMI 44) 
 
The successful delivery of the games will be critical to the 
success or failure of Boris Johnson’s first term in City Hall 
and may determine whether Londoners’ entrust him with 
a second. Despite broad support for the games from 
voters during and immediately after the successful bid, 
skepticism has steadily grown as to whether the games 
will bring the benefits promised by politicians. (SMI 47) 
 
The bottom line is, though, that it is the Mayor, as the 
dominant and most powerful political figure in London, 
who will be seen as responsible for the games the success 
or failure of which will rebound significantly on his 
political reputation. It is encouraging that the new Mayor 
has taken immediate steps to exert his influence on the 
games by appointing David Ross, a successful 
entrepreneur with the Carphone Warehouse to be his 
representative for London 2012. The management of the 
games is crying out for a more business like approach. 
(SMI 47) (The irony is David Ross was resigned later on 
because of financial scandal.)  
 
The previous Mayor was not exactly surrounded by people 
with a great deal of commercial acumen. It is no surprise, 
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therefore, that the £1.8 billion of land sales projection is 
at the most optimistic end of the spectrum. Given the 
radically changed economic conditions that now prevail 
and which are likely to set the financial and economic 
context for the next 3 to 4 years, these optimistic 
assumptions need to be ripped up. Mayor Johnson owes it 
to London taxpayers to ensure that all aspects of the 
finances of the games are on a realistic footing and are 
not the product of political fantasy. (SMI 47) (Optimism 
bias) 
 
The reality is, though, that these benefits are pretty 
intangible. When the original cost/benefit analysis was 
presented to the government prior to the decision to bid 
for the games there was very little evidence that the 
Olympics would bring any direct economic benefits to 
London. Yet, there is no point in re‐opening old wounds. 
London 2012 needs to be a success and enhancing 
London’s reputation is the single most important 
objective. That is fine. The debate about the so called 
legacy of the games is much more contentious. (SMI 47)  
 
The idea of extending the UK's high‐speed rail network is 
making headway on the political front but a welter of 
financial and procedural issues need resolving, A political 
consensus is thus emerging. The question is where the line 
would run and consequently what it would cost.(SMI 48) 
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Table A8.8: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #4 
 
APPROACH 
 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
HRQ 4: What factors can 
enhance stakeholders’ 
‘negotiation power’ in the 
delivery of:  
▪  CTRL as a whole  
▪  the KX Central / Stratford 
City transport hubs or   
▪  2012 London Olympics  
and why? 
 
One is to have all range of stakeholders support and 
the other one is the benefits of the project can deliver 
are fully understood by the stakeholders. (Here it 
implies stakeholder management and well equipped 
communication skill.) The stakeholder’s scale of the 
Olympics is global level. (TU) 
    N/A     
Kws(8)= Negotiation power 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(8)=  
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 Partnership (15) 
 Developer (13) 
 Agenda (10) 
 Stakeholder (10) 
 Urban regeneration 
(8) 
 Financing / Cost (8) 
 Benefits (8) 
 Mega event (6) 
 Decision making (5) 
 
 Partnership (15) 
 Developer (13) 
 Agenda (10) 
 Decision maker (10) 
  Stakeholder (10) 
 Urban regeneration 
(9) 
 Financing / Cost (9) 
 Major Infrastructure 
(8) 
 Stakeholder 
management (7) 
 Project delay (6) 
 
Summary: 
“The essential features of regime theory stipulate[s] that 
business leaders have a privileged position in local politics 
because of their command of economic resources. Because 
business leaders are affected by local political decisions, 
not just at the level of property taxes but by the business 
climate of the city as well, they attempt to shape public 
policies to benefit business. In order to shape an agenda 
and bring results, business leaders need the cooperation of 
elected officials. Local elected officials and local 
Political climate would be an important factor. 
Whether is the funding available? What priority and 
promises have been made by politicians? (RB) 
    N/A     
In the case of the 2012 London Olympics, London has 
provided one of the best transport plans and 
accompanied with it were 3000 consultation entities. 
This is very convincing especially transport in London is 
always a difficult issue. Urban regeneration and legacy 
put the Games in a strong bargaining position. The 
world image is another factor to enhance the power of 
the Games. Beijing has used Olympics to extreme to 
present itself to the world. (PB)   
    N/A     
In the case of 2012 London Olympics, the government 
and Mayoral commitment is the key factor to deliver 
the project. The stakeholder negotiation almost put 
before the Bid and submitting the candidate files. The 
power of Ken Livingston as the Mayor played an 
important role. It could be seen as a political 
movement and at the time, all decision makers are in 
the right colour. From the central government, the 
Mayor to the four local boroughs, they are all Labour 
party. If everyone gets certain things that they want in 
their area, it is a win‐win situation. (This opinion 
    N/A     
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complies to the answer below.) (NM)  bureaucrats seize the opportunities afforded by 
cooperation with business leaders.” (MS quoted from  
Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 2001) 
 
There was a lot opposition from North England, from 
Scotland, and from Wales that Channel Tunnel shouldn’t 
be built unless it provides services for whole of the 
country. So the requirement was put on British Rail to 
cover with proposal for through services. (PJ) (In order to 
get support, the promise of the CTRL proposal contained 
to provide HSR network service to the north England.) 
 
The changes we want would have to put the whole thing 
properly underground and only came up on the Railway 
Lands. They wouldn’t admit that and one of the reasons is 
that would reduce the property development potential. 
But the reason they really apposed that was because of 
the consortium that had won included Virgin Trains. Virgin 
wants to run trains from Kent up to Manchester and 
Birmingham because they had West Line concession. 
Virgin was part of London & Continental Railways at that 
time. That meant Virgin wanted easy connection from the 
Rail Link there. (PJ) (Property development is the main 
agenda for the CTRL project. The interest of Virgin Trains 
had influenced the decision‐making on double‐track 
escape route, but it is not clear the influence was on 
Stratford or St Pancras station or whether it is the same 
thing in Temple Mills.)  
 
It was there as a possible station and Newham Council 
argued vehemently as a lot of the other people vote at 
least it needs to be a station there. That proposal was 
resisted very strongly by the Government and by Union 
Railways. Later, the Government changed their mind. 
Mostly because the Newham council fought for it and also 
We are already at this mega level whether it is LCR or 
TfL or the ODA, these agencies in the sense have to 
override any other stakeholder’s concern to some 
extent.  Wherever a stakeholder can bring to play 
something that the key stakeholder wants to achieve, 
and then he or she will be well advised to do so. (This 
argument is the same with NM’s opinion) (MP)  
    N/A     
Sometimes problems or failure would enhance certain 
stakeholders’ negotiating power regarding the London 
Olympics. (This also implies to CSR to business. Bob 
West also mentioned that the current financial climate 
gives excuse to private sector to renegotiate the 
Section 106 deals.)  In the case of the CTRL, the power 
of the government or the agency which is buying the 
project, buying the goods, is much greater. In terms of 
hub development, developers have the most power. It 
is down to political will and ideology. (JC) 
    N/A     
To meet planning requirements is vital so the planning 
permission is important. Political support is also 
important. (HB) 
    N/A     
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Government should believe in investment because it is 
so important to make the country more competitive. 
Particularly in the time of economic down turn, it is the 
right time for the Government to step in and stimulate 
investment.  
 
Some have very short‐sighted view of the funding of 
the Olympics. That is going to be a fantastic asset. The 
branding of that will be so much more valuable.  The 
champions of the Olympics are very good at lobbying. It 
is a very good example of how to use negotiation 
power. (DM) 
    N/A     
we had changed our government finally. (PJ) (Lobby and 
change of political climate are two of the factors of 
building the Stratford International) 
 
There was no down side for the private sector side. They 
shouldn’t be allowed to go bankrupt; the Government 
should take it in, should have done itself and got the 
profits. But instead, they decided to get this money back 
through the development agreement which tied up with 
the lands at King’s Cross / St Pancras and Ebbsfleet. That 
meant it put artificially, we don’t know how much because 
the number is secret, high valuations of on what the lands 
worth. This has forced the developers to up how much 
they build to maintain their profit level leading to over 
development. (PJ) (This is the issue of PPP mechanism. If 
the CTRL project is public funded, will it has more 
community friendly design is still a question. Inevitably, 
the government needs to find money and pay back since it 
is taxpayers’ money.) 
 
All they getting are the things they got in Section 106 
which because they thought that was their job to agree 
what the developer proposed more or less. The Camden 
Council negotiated very poorly because the developers 
knew they will push and open the door. (PJ) 
 
They probably try to get more big players, like Sainsbury’s 
and tie down so they can be sure they won’t fall over. (PJ) 
 
You have different style of thinking. You need to allow for 
that and work on each side of understanding the others 
thinking and constrains better, if you are going to get the 
right jointed decision. It doesn’t just happen; you have to 
work on it. That’s why I said it is difficult but that’s natural 
and it is state of humanity. We are all different and we all 
got different perspectives. You have to build bridges 
understanding the other organisation’s or the other 
person’s point of view; explain your point of view clearly 
in order to get a better jointed solution. (RB) 
 
That’s whole nature of development industry. It’s 
negotiation. Yes, there are endless issues between all of 
The certainty of the CTRL project has been built into 
legislation so the negotiation power of the local 
authority lies in the ability to slow a programme down, 
and sometimes generate negative publicity. But if the 
local authority takes a pro‐active role in supporting the 
project, or in providing an arena for consensus to be 
reached, then the goodwill is valuable.  We chose to be 
very proactive in helping the railway because we 
wanted certainty about King’s Cross but also we 
wanted to protect local residents. The proactive 
involvement increased the negotiating power. There is 
a saying: If you are not sitting at the table then you are 
on the menu. Our role became master ring, mediation. 
We got quite a good reputation for that, for mediation, 
being sensible and we traded off that. This helped us to 
gain trust of the stakeholders. This is not absolute 
power but influence. We also gained influence because 
we put in resources. Moreover, we showed our ability 
to collaborate other local authorities down the CTRL 
route as a unity. We convinced the Treasury to look at 
the business case in a different way. (BW) 
    N/A     
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these among different aspects. Because it is expensive and 
because you are asking financial contribution from the 
developer, then that’s always an issue. That applies to all 
of them. This is where the Network Rail said “we are 
public sector body, we don’t have to commit any 
contribution at all to the wider regeneration or engaging 
wider regeneration”. But we said they did, they accepted 
that. All the discussions with Network Rail on going took 3 
or 4 years for Argent to get planning permission. That was 
because we are in negotiation through out that period. 
We negotiated, we discussed, we argued about the form 
of the application, the elements within the application and 
106 agreement. (RK) 
 
The process of setting up the public inquiry and especially 
one involves local authorities, the developer and the local 
residents takes great deal of time and that’s the delay. JR 
potentially delayed and that’s part of the motivation for 
people who did JR because of the delay. Delay can kill the 
scheme. That’s where you sabotage even you are not 
successful in Judicial Review, the fact you delay things. It 
can mean the confidence has lost or it is down turn or 
banks stop calling the lets. It is the delay that causes 
problems. (RK) 
 
In the run up to put in the Bid, we had to have financial 
certainties with all those projects and that was 
negotiation between central government and the GLA to 
underwrite the funding for the transport projects. There 
was potential if that agreement wasn’t in place. The 
Olympic Committee could think that bid wasn’t serious. 
(RM) 
 
When Railtrack was invited to participate in the 
arrangement to buy the railway, they clearly saw that they 
were in a very advantageous position in negotiating the 
terms. They certainly exploited that situation. Again when 
it came to putting in place arrangements to proceed with 
section 2, Railtrack were reluctant to concede that they 
were not able to exercise their option and again 
attempted to extract from the government a revised 
better deal which government assessed to be completely 
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unacceptable to them. (RH)
 
Because of what is giving rise to that is property market 
issues we have a combination of the recession in the 
property market and a shortage in the supply of debt 
financing which is clearly having impact on how we and 
Argent take forward King’s Cross. Companies find it is 
more difficult to raise money to support property 
developments. This is likely to have some impact on the 
timing of the delivery of the King’s Cross Central. Stratford 
City is part immune from the stage because of the need to 
deliver the infrastructure for the 2012. (RH) 
 
You just have to manage what I might call political noise 
as people try to position themselves for commercial 
advantage, and maintain a straight bat. You just try to 
work the overlaps. Those areas of commonality which 
goes even though you might have to bury your own 
particular aspiration for everything you get most of what 
you want by actually cooperating. (RH) 
 
I would say whether the Stratford City or any other major 
development from what I’ve seen in the past when 
negotiating with developers, some of the most difficult 
things to agree on are very much the existing situation in 
terms of the transport network in the existing patterns of 
train frequencies or buses numbers. Once you agree that 
position, you then go through probably a fairly protracted 
debate with developer to establish the modeling that they 
will need to do to look at and how their proposed 
development may or may not be accommodated on the 
transport network. (MJ) 
 
The reason I used “debate” not “negotiate” because my 
experience of modeling is the ‘best guess’, and so the 
debate is ‘whose guessing is better’. That’s why I said 
there is a debate; because I think having established that 
you are in an agreement with the modeling, and then you 
move into the negotiation bit. (MJ) 
 
With the big schemes where we are looking at the future 
mitigation, there needs to be a degree of flexibility written 
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into any agreement to allow those improvements to 
happen when they are needed. But you often find the 
developers still want to have been the party to agreeing 
how that money will be spent even ten years in the future. 
Because I can understand they just don’t want to hand 
money over. They have got responsibilities to their 
shareholders and investors. That then means you’ve got 
to have some thought about the S106 money and what 
they deliver are going to be for sometime in the future, 
you then argue about, debate or negotiate as to what 
triggers are going to be the legal agreement which then 
trigger those payments. (MJ) 
 
Gordon Brown is expected this month to approve a new 
third runway at Heathrow, but ministers will try to limit 
the environmental and political fallout of the decision by 
proposing improved high speed rail links to the airport. 
(SMI 04) 
 
Madelin has little time for the arguments. He said: “They 
can’t be more passionate than me about retaining the 
heritage here and they can’t dismiss the views of English 
Heritage and the Victorian Society, who we have been 
working with. (Those organisations) have dismissed out of 
hand the proposals the KCCAAC have put forward in a 
detailed and articulate way. It’s not an option that works.”  
“We comply with local and national planning policy. And 
we have the backing of the likes of English Heritage. It 
would mean a two to three‐year delay and would cost us 
several million in lawyers’ fees. We would get there — not 
because I’m arrogant but because we meet all the policy 
objectives.” (SMI 05) (To collaborate with other influential 
organisations can strengthen negotiating position.) 
 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
 
363 
 
Table A8.9: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #5 
 
 
APPROACH 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
H3: Synergy of Network 
Inter‐agency co‐operation 
that brings synergetic 
relations between MUTPs, 
SUR and MEs can better 
foster integrated 
development and the 
achievement of sustainable 
development visions that 
add value to the original 
individual projects. 
 
HRQ 5: Robbing Peter to 
pay Paul 
Will the completion of the 
2012 London Olympics 
project significantly divert 
resources away from other 
major development 
initiatives?   
If so, are the spin‐off 
benefits of this re‐
prioritisation justified? 
Yes, I agree with the Hypothesis. (TU) 
It is not really robbing Peter as such. It is only diverting 
financial resources, delaying expenditure on one area. 
(The interviewee believes it is justifiable if look at long‐
term and wider benefits.) It also depends on how you 
quantify economic benefits and how does that then 
feed back into economic equation.  
Another justification is that mega event condenses the 
timeframe which will produce a more efficient 
outcome than piecemeal developments. (TU) 
        x 
Kws(9)= Co‐ordination, Integration, Co‐operate 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(9)=  
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 partnership (10) 
 negotiation power 
(5) 
 local government (5) 
 
 partnership (10) 
 negotiation power 
(6) 
 urban regeneration 
(5) 
 local government (5) 
 stakeholder (5) 
 
Summary: 
“Clarke and Gaile identify the period after 1984 as the 
“postfederal” era of local economic development. This 
period is characterized by greater willingness of local 
governments to take risks, increased cooperation among 
governments on a metropolitan or regional level, and 
greater reliance on public‐private partnerships or quasi‐
public agencies to implement development projects. Thus, 
just as American voters elected a president committed to 
ending the flow of federal money to U.S cities, Los Angeles 
was showing how to attract money and attention to a city 
through a high‐profile sporting event.” (MS quoted from 
Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 2001) (This highlights 
the close relationship between politicians and 
  x       
Yes, the Olympics will divert resources.  
The spin‐off benefits are big considerations for the 
Olympics decisions. Legacy, such as capturing the 
imagination of the nation and driving improving sport 
awareness and urban regeneration benefits are 
considerations. (RB) (Interviewee seemed to avoid 
using “justification” and stressed the measurement of 
the Olympics outcome will be judged after the event.) 
      x   
      x   
There are two separate budgets: one is the operating 
budget and another one is the long‐term infrastructure 
budget. The operating budget is paid by the selling 
broadcasting rights and tickets, as well as sponsorships. 
Although the infrastructure budget is more 
problematic, it is justifiable. The investment is more 
concentrated on space and time. (PB) 
x         
      x   
I don’t think so. We have to look at the long‐term 
regeneration benefits. There is absolute quantitative  x         
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and qualitative improvement in Barcelona’s global and 
European position, tourism and jobs because of the ’92 
Games. London will have the same reaction of that 
catalyst as well. (NM) 
        x 
businessmen.)
 
Think in all sorts of levels, it already got all the ingredients 
of being very successful. It is CTRL which enables Eurostar, 
which facilitate others. It is a chain and no one component 
on its own would work, but together, it works. (RB) 
 
They realise that the Olympic site next to the Stratford 
City site, but they wanted/needed to almost merge the 
two projects. A lot of development in Stratford City has 
nothing to do with the Olympic Games but people will not 
understand that it has nothing to do with the Games. 
(CM) 
 
The 2012 Olympics closely now integrate with the 
development of Stratford City and arguably the 2012 
Olympics re‐phased Stratford City in a way which made 
the delivery of Stratford City more difficult longer term, 
but arguably some would say brings forward some aspect 
of the Stratford City development sooner than would 
otherwise be the case. (RH) 
 
Railfuture agrees with critics who view Eurostar as "an 
airline on wheels" which refuses to co‐operate with 
ordinary train operators. Eurostar does not co‐operate 
with Southeastern to promote Ashford as an interchange 
station. (SMI 17) 
 
One result of this rapid influx of development was a lack 
of integration of land uses around some centres. This 
presents an opportunity to bring about greater integration 
of land uses and better use of public transport facilities. 
(SMI 36) (Integration between Retail‐oriented 
development and public transport planning) 
 
If concerning the planning resources between King’s 
Cross, Stratford and Ebbsfleet, these three are 
geographically so different in terms of their location 
and characteristics. They will locate different markets. 
The Olympics could not divert their resources away. It 
might divert resources away from other regional 
sporting type developments. The Olympic legacy will be 
very competitive compared to other less high profile 
development opportunities. (MP) 
x         
    x     
Yes, the Olympics diverted resources from the 
grassroots’ sports and art development. The Olympics 
has no spin‐off benefits. (JC) 
        x 
x         
It is obvious there is only one pot for tax payers’ 
money, but so far TfL hasn’t seen any major diversion 
as such. (HB) 
    x     
  x       
There is concern about having several major projects 
going on at the same time will make the cost go up, but 
the very specialised engineering skill can then be used 
for one project and moved on to next project. Probably 
these big projects actually help to stimulate the local 
economies because they are very useful for making 
sure that there are new suppliers and new markets. 
(DM) 
    x     
      x   
I agree with the hypothesis.  It is kind of self‐obvious. 
It will take resources away but I am not sure in what 
form. The most obvious place to be influenced will be 
the Thames Gateway. The test is not the Olympics itself 
but the legacy. If it delivers the legacy then arguably it 
is worth it. (BW) 
        x 
      x   
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Table A8.10: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #6 
 
 
APPROACH 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
HRQ 6: ‘Win‐win’
strategies? 
Do you agree that some 
important aims of the CTRL 
project, the 2012 London 
Olympics project and the 
urban regeneration 
schemes for Stratford City 
and King’s Cross are in 
reality mutually reinforcing, 
or are the product of 
important compromises? 
 
(Skip) (TU)      x      Kws(10)= Co‐ordination, Integration, Co‐operate 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(10)=  
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 mega event (6) 
 
 mega event (7) 
 economic rationale 
(5) 
 
Summary: 
What Jeffery Owen did was demonstrate that when you 
look at these economic impact studies they contain basic 
misrepresentations. They do double counting. Another 
thing they don’t count is called the ‘opportunity cost’. An 
'opportunity cost'  occurs where money which is put into 
a budget for the London Olympic Games project, for 
example, is taken in this case from the National Lottery 
funding of community sport projects. The opportunity to 
use that money for grass roots sport is lost to the benefit 
of elite sport. (MS) 
 
In the Lea Valley before the Olympic project came along 
if you wanted to buy some land in order to set up a 
business it would have cost you about £1million per acre. 
Once it has been Compulsorily Purchased by the London 
Development Agency and that land is then rezoned  for 
housing that land is then overnight worth £8million per 
acre. It is a classic way of doing business, buy cheap and 
sell dear. You use public money to do it. You use legal 
power to force people to sell their land and move their 
Some of them, I suppose they do. (RB)        x   
They are mutually reinforcing. (PB)          x 
Yes, I agree. There is win‐win in terms of transport 
mode shift. The CTRL is a transport oriented 
development and the Games heavily rely on public 
transport. Both of them encourage urban regeneration. 
(NM) 
        x 
I would think to some extent those three elements are 
mutually reinforcing. The need to make to up the 
viability of the whole project is compromise or just 
more like reality. For those private developers, they can 
have a better negotiation position. (MP) 
      x   
There is no win‐win consequence. The CTRL ties into the 
KXC project.  They are mutually re‐enforcing, but they 
do not produce benefits used as a win‐win strategy.  
The SC and the Olympics entangle together so there is 
compromise going on there which is completely 
unnecessary. (JC) 
x         
CTRL alone is not the decisive factor for KXC or SC.  The 
urban regeneration scheme for Stratford and King’s 
Cross come because that line was made available to a 
commercial organisation prepare to take the risk and 
develop it. The overall transport network to those sites 
is more crucial.  The Olympics has provided the impetus 
to take Stratford City forward. So the synergy there. 
There are compromises, the way Stratford City was 
designed leads back the quality of some of the 
transport infrastructure interchange. (HB) 
      x   
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
 
366 
 
It’s probably more that they are more mutually 
reinforcing.  I am not aware of compromising being 
made in these projects. (DM) 
      x   
businesses. In the case of the London Olympic Games, 
there is huge displacement of economic activity which is 
again not properly counted as part of the costs. I think 
there were something like 350 businesses that has have 
been displaced. Most of the businesses had competitive 
edge because of their location, close to the centre of 
London. Many have lost their competitive advantage as a 
result of being displaced. There are significant 
displacement costs to those businesses which is not 
included in the the disbenefits of the Games. (MS) 
 
Olympic Turnaround tells for the first time how the future 
of one of the world's iconic institutions was secured. It is 
the story of a fine balancing as an amatuer organization 
struggled with and eventually embraced the business 
world. But it did so on its own terms maintaining its 
identity, not compromising its core values and in the 
process establishing many of the ground rules of today’s 
sports marketing industry. (MS quoted from the blurb of 
Michael Payne’s book, 2006) 
 
But the whole idea of putting station under King’s Cross 
was so risky and therefore financially unjustifiable. The 
decided putting Thameslink Station underneath St 
Pancras where the existing terminal is. The model for 
everything will come after it. The model down of it needs 
specially build trains with shorter carriages than standard 
in order to run it all because any other trains will bang 
into the side of the tunnel and couldn’t get around 
safely. This is just one that alone the way of the main 
story. That is a typical case of if opportunism gone wrong 
compromise out and left the third rate transport system 
as a result. Of course Thameslink now has its 12 carriage 
platform at St Pancras but they had immense battle to 
sort out what are they going to do at the Borough 
Markets and London Bridge to get longer platforms. It 
becomes immensely expensive. It is running today but 
with shorter trains. It is providing links to Luton Airport 
and Gatwick Airport. It’s providing those commuter 
connections. Until the South of the River stuff and sort 
out the Borough Market area, they can’t start running 
longer trains. Its capacity is restricted by that. That 
Yes, they are mutually reinforcing and there are 
important compromises. The two regeneration schemes 
make the rail project a strong business case. King’s 
Cross could have redeveloped without the CTRL; it only 
needs certainty. Stratford City probably could be 
developed without the CTRL but it will take much longer 
because Stratford has lower economic viability. (BW) 
        x 
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becomes important in relation to St Pancras. (PJ) (A story 
about the solution of integrating Thameslink in St 
Pancras International. It suggests that Stratford could be 
a better solution without the HSR running into King’s 
Cross area.) 
 
So much of this is decisions taken by chance not with 
intention and planning has very little to do with that. 
When it came to that West Coast Main Line connection, 
it was because that was what Virgin wanted. Virgin was 
known as part of the consortium then they are no longer 
part of the consortium. Now the connection is there, but 
nobody is talking about running trains from Ashford or 
Ebbsfleet to Manchester or Birmingham. It is all clear 
what mistake they did. (PJ) (One of the CTRL promises is 
to provide HSR network for the UK. This has been used to 
win supports from other regions outside south east. 
Although the HS 2 is not yet coming, the opportunity to 
realise the connection is there. The argument raised by 
champions from Newham suggested that the Stratford 
International station can be better used to connect to 
the north of the UK in the future is not true. From my 
source (RH) suggested the Stratford International is a 
white elephant and Eurostar will not loose the journey 
time by stopping there. The future extension of the HSR 
to the north will be around St Pancras / King’s Cross.) 
 
What happened was in reality that they pretends that 
would be high speed services the rest of the country and 
it locked in the decision to have the station at King’s 
Cross/St Pancras. It’s not the best solution. It’s a sub‐
optimal solution but I think it is a very good example of 
what economist called mode‐locking. (PJ) (The intention 
behind this compromise is derived from property 
development potential. From the perspective of the 
developer and railway manager, the integration of 
railway and land development is a win‐win solution. 
However, this mechanism is inevitably cause 
gentrification and displacement. The disadvantage 
groups are the losers who have been sacrificed from the 
capitalism society. This is a protracted debate between 
market‐driven and community‐friendly development.) 
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The 2012 Olympics closely now integrate with the 
development of Stratford City and arguably the 2012 
Olympics re‐phased Stratford City in a way which made 
the delivery of Stratford City more difficult longer term, 
but arguably some would say brings forward some aspect 
of the Stratford City development sooner than would 
otherwise be the case. (RH) (For the housing market, the 
Olympics created artificial pressure to the Stratford City 
and to the Thames Gateway. There will be problems in 
property market post Games in terms of demand and 
paying off Olympic debt. As to the developer, Lend Lease, 
since the athlete village has been nationalised resulted 
from current credit crunch. The pressure is entirely on 
the UK taxpayers’ shoulder. In the beginning, it seems 
housing development of Stratford City made compromise 
for the Olympics. After the collapse of the property 
market, the government made compromise to sustain 
the project in order to deliver the Olympic event.) 
 
There was the whole of Stratford City going into 
receivership and the change of the land ownerships. It 
changes in terms commercial requirement. I think what it 
means  a learning point from that is how to 
institutionalize the knowledge; how you carry people 
forward from bid into exit works; how do you carry the 
relationships forward through time; how do you need to 
change the stakeholder management process every time. 
This all sort of things you need to do if you were starting 
all over again. (RH) (The way to cope with uncertainties is 
to institutionalise knowledge.) 
 
Eurostar chiefs had been weighing up keeping open two 
London terminals, but decided Waterloo was too 
expensive to keep as a standby. Eurostar Waterloo 
International station ‐ which cost £130million and 
opened only 10 years ago ‐ is to close. The closure will 
prove a major boost for more than 200,000 beleaguered 
South West Trains commuters who suffer regular delays 
as services wait to use the busy Waterloo terminal. When 
the International section opened SWT was forced to 
surrender two of its platforms. (SMI 09) (The initial 
Mega urban transport projects as a catalyst for sustainable urban regeneration and the role of mega events 
 
 
369 
 
decision of Waterloo International was considered under 
the need of a terminus in the southern London and 
Waterloo was the only one having sufficient space and 
cheap land price. The aim of encouraging property 
development at the surrounding area is not the primary 
reason. Currently, the Waterloo International station is 
not used mainly because the issue between SWT 
franchise.) 
 
"Officials admit that building a park is essential for 
increasing the value of neighbouring development." This 
is no bad thing if both the park and surrounding 
development bring major benefits to existing 
communities. However, the current idea of ringing the 
park with apartment buildings ‐ should the market for 
them still exist after 2012 ‐ and a media‐based complex 
will create a wall between the "new East End" and the 
old communities. Already the Clays Lane residents are 
being moved out to make way for the athletes village. 
(SMI12) 
 
Eurostar travellers in Kent are protesting the axing of 
most of the Eurostar calls at Ashford International 
station, in favour of Ebbsfleet in north Kent. The changes 
were prompted by the closure in November 2007 of 
Waterloo International and the opening of St Pancras 
International. (SMI 17) (Decisions between Ashford and 
Ebbsfleet; St Pancras and Stratford all challenge the 
rationale of locating those stations at the first place. How 
was the decision of Ashford made? CTRL Domestic 
services will also be a key driver in the development of 
Ashford, one of the four growth areas identified in the 
Sustainable Communities Plan. Ashford's strategic 
location and role as a gateway to Europe will be 
strengthened with the completion of CTRL Domestic 
services. In August 1987 Government approved £550m 
expenditure for Phase 1 (excluding the international 
station at Ashford which government felt could not be 
justified commercially) but said it could not commit to 
Phase2.  (quoted from OMEGA, 2008) RH argues that the 
decision of shifting Eurostar service from Ashford to 
Ebbsfleet is a bad decision. The transport network and 
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Table A8.11: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #7 
 
development potential are better in Ashford than 
Ebbsfleet.) 
 
The DfT said the responsibility lies with local authorities 
and it has no plans for a blanket approach to 
safeguarding all potential alignments or disused lines. 
"We need to balance the public interest in releasing land 
for development with safeguarding land for future 
transport," it maintained. Campaign for Better Transport 
public transport spokeswoman Cat Hobbs said: "The 
government's lack of interest in expanding the rail 
network is disappointing. It does not come from an 
honest assessment of passenger need but from a desire 
to keep costs low." (SMI 22) (This relates to the issue of 
Treasury’s culture in the UK.) 
 
 
 
APPROACH 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
HRQ 7: Concentration or 
de‐centralisation 
How effective will the new 
CTRL Stratford Station be 
as a catalyst for new 
development?   
Will it attract new public 
and private sector 
development in East 
London or merely 
encourage the further 
(Skip) (TU) 
 
    x      Kws(11)= Competition, Competitiveness 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(11)=  
 
    x     
Yes, it has already. The CTRL Station at Stratford has 
been designed around the development of the 
Chelsfield scheme. It is sort of natural place for the 
development to grow. (RB) 
        x 
    x     
No, this is the quality of the bid. You don’t give it to 
central London which is already extremely developed.  
Stratford is regarded as a part of central London. (PB) 
    x     
        x 
Stratford International has played an important role in 
the Stratford City development. (NM) 
        x 
        x 
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concentration of such 
development in Central 
London? 
 
Apparently it is very effective. My own suspicion is that 
those nodes of high public transport accessibility that 
are within a certain distance from Stratford might 
benefit from the ripple effects of Stratford. I just at the 
moment find it is hard to believe that Stratford would 
compete effectively with central London.  Thames 
Gateway needs a streamlined body to deliver 
regeneration if it depends on market to develop in the 
commercially fragile environment; investors are likely 
to go to the west. (MP) 
        x 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 transport service (5) 
 mega event (5) 
 
 major infrastructure 
(8) 
 transport service (6) 
 mega event (6) 
 resources (6) 
 market (5) 
 
Summary: 
‘Urban entrepreneurship, corporate interests and sports 
mega‐events: the thin policies of competitiveness within 
the hard outcomes of neoliberalism.’ Mega‐events are 
therefore one of the means by which places seek to 
become ‘sticky’ (Markusen, 1996) – that is attract and 
retain mobile capital and people – through place 
enhancement and regeneration and the promotion of 
selective place information (Hall, C.M., 2005a, b). (MS 
quoted from Hall, C.M., 2005) 
 
How can we explain this mega‐event obsession? First of 
all, we must realize that this kind of competition is 
nothing more than the most conspicuous form of global 
competitiveness. This competition between cities and 
regions is a consequence of the political and economical 
changes that have occurred in approximately the last 
thirty years. The concentration of urban environment 
transformation and devotes itself to the construction of 
infrastructures of whatever kind that are highly valuable 
for corporations and quality customers. In this frame of 
competitiveness and in this process of converting a city 
into a spectacle is where we must set the recent obsession 
with mega‐events. The strategy has only worked with the 
help of a continuous and huge public investment in 
private business. In the case of Spain, the leftwing political 
parties usually carry the burden of an uncritical believe in 
the idea that good macroeconomic figures entail benefits 
for the people. As John Logan and Harvey Molotch said, 
“a skilled politician delivers growth while giving a good 
x         
The catalyst effect in Stratford from the CTRL is very 
marginal. Westfield as a foreign developer is attracted 
by the available land, well‐connected transport to other 
centre in London. The concept of Central London is 
changing and the territory is expanding. It is difficult to 
distinguish central London and East London. (JC) 
x         
  x       
The major catalyst for the SC was the Olympics rather 
than the International station. The majority of transport 
to Stratford relies on tubes, buses and cars. Having 
good retail in Stratford potentially will create a good 
centre. (HB) 
x         
  x       
The catalyst effect of the station to Stratford will take 
longer than we hope. Hopefully the Olympics will 
change the public perception of that area and see how 
easily you can get there through Jubilee Line or the 
CTRL. We need to take a long‐term view because over 
time the geographic centre of London is shifting 
eastwards. The wave of movement further east will 
continue. (DM) 
      x   
      x   
The Stratford International allows you to host the 
Olympics for start but probably the real catalyst is the 
Olympics. Crossrail is very important to Stratford. It 
increases the number of ridership of the CTRL and if 
you have a business address or a home address which is 
on the international railway line, that’s also worth that 
      x   
x         
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a little bit more. It will generate new investment in east 
London. It won’t concentrate on an overheated central 
London. (BW) 
circus”. (MS recommended reference of Carolina del 
Olmo: The role of mega events in urban competitiveness 
and its consequences on people) 
 
If I remembered correctly, the Lord who chaired the 
House of Lords, the Select Committee of the Bill 
described it as a non‐runner. But in order to win support 
for the Channel Tunnel, the Government made various 
concessions. In particular, there was eventually that it 
would undermine the very companies who carry most rail 
track and road traffic over the Continent at that time, if 
there was any Government subsidy. (PJ) 
  
We’re currently involving another around of legacy 
planning. I mentioned earlier at the initial stages,  we 
ensure the site is going to have excellent accessibility so 
there is an argument said that those regeneration sites in 
East London got to have accessibility which is as good as, 
probably better than the West London or part of Central 
London. Ultimately, it’s all about creating conditions for 
private development to take off there. You can create 
those conditions but you also depend on the general 
economy. (RM) (The general economy is more 
important.) 
 
Livingston and people who promoted the Olympic Bid did 
so telling people that is to regenerate this part of east 
London. They chose to ignore the fact that there already 
was a large programme for regeneration around 
Stratford, the Stratford City project. Even today, people 
confuse two projects. Stratford City was a quite separate 
project with quite separate route and quite separate 
genesis. It is coming from different source and when the 
Olympic Bid was proved and they had cycled work for 
this. (CM) 
 
Hyde Park is and will remain a great metropolitan open 
space in the heart of one of the richest and most visited 
cities in the world. East London, meanwhile, has always 
been the poorest part of the city, and is likely to remain 
so for the foreseeable future, despite the Olympics. The 
London Development Agency is intent on retaining the 
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media complex as studio facilities. The mayor has been 
trying to sell it to Bollywood. But west London, with its 
dynamic Asian business community and proximity to 
Heathrow, would seem much more attractive.  (SMI 12) 
 
The business lobby agrees. London First chief executive 
Baroness Valentine, whose group represents 250 firms in 
the capital, says: "London could lose its crown to New 
York or to the increasingly influential Dubai or Shanghai. 
Ruling out making Heathrow bigger is a bad decision for a 
global city and the UK economy." Heathrow operator BAA 
says HSR will only form one part of the solution to the 
UK's long‐term airport capacity needs. "Our overseas 
competitors are investing in airports and rail," it notes. 
(SMI 29) 
 
The head of one of the world's fastest growing airlines 
has backed plans for an airport in the Thames Estuary so 
the UK can compete with foreign rivals threatening to 
eclipse Heathrow, according to The Sunday Times. Tim 
Clark who is president of Dubai's national airline 
Emirates, claimed that building the hub would allow 
Heathrow and Gatwick to close, free up land for 
development and bring environmental benefits across the 
South East. (SMI 35) 
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Table A8.12: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #8 
APPROACH 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
HRQ 8: Reality or Rhetoric 
How would you respond to 
the claim that there is a 
gap between the rhetoric 
and reality in the vision 
that mega events, such as 
the 2012 London Olympics, 
can significantly stimulate 
sustainable urban 
regeneration?   
 
(Skip) (TU)      x      Kws(12)= Rhetoric / Reality 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(12)= There is only 20 references coded by 
rhetoric/reality; hence numbers of other also coding 
nodes are relatively small.   
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 vision (2)   legacy (4) 
 vision (4) 
 mega event (3) 
 technocracy (2) 
 
Summary: 
They promote themselves as looking after the interests of 
those who have been displaced but what they actually 
deliver is far short of their rhetoric. They perform even 
worse if you dispute your outcomes with them. They are 
also quite chaotic in operation. They are an organisation 
which functions rather chaotically. They can be appalling 
to deal with. (MS) 
 
“On 23 April 2008 the House of Commons Select 
Committee responsible for reviewing the performance of 
the Department for Culture, Media and Sport published 
its report London 2012 Games: The next lap. This report 
contains the following judgments.” "such a radical 
revision of cost estimates has been damaging to 
confidence in the management of the overall 
Probably it hasn’t been as successful as it might have 
been, but certainly I think the London Olympics will see 
significant regeneration in the area. (RB) 
      x   
Regeneration of derelict land is the justification of the 
2012 London Olympics. (PB)          x 
I feel confident that they will be successful outcomes. 
What has been showing around the area is beginning to 
be interesting which is related to the Olympics. The 
politics in that output is always constant political 
motivation. (NM) 
        x 
It can stimulate urban regeneration but not sustainable 
urban regeneration. (MP)     x       
It is impossible to see any connection between the 
rhetoric and realities. They argued it needs a 
streamlined body to develop Thames Gateway or the 
four boroughs in East London. They already exist but 
not very effective. It is more about political 
determination, not the mega event. Furthermore, there 
is nothing wrong with piecemeal development. It might 
achieve housing creation targets with less cost. (JC) 
x         
The Olympics has already encouraged or sped up the 
retail centre in Stratford. It is too early to answer this 
question but there will always be gaps between 
rhetoric and reality. It depends on what legacy they 
deliver and one what cost. (HB)  
      x   
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I would probably disagree with that claim. I think that 
we do need our visionaries and we do need leadership 
and I think the Olympics will be fantastic for East 
London. I cannot think of any other way that East 
London would receive this amount of injection of 
investment without the Olympics. A lot of that was 
down to Ken Livingston. (DM) 
        x 
programme. It has also exposed the Government and 
Games organisers to the charge that the initial bid was 
kept artificially low in order to win public support." “The 
effect is to introduce an element of uncertainty into a 
long‐term funding programme, hobbling financial 
planning. We believe that it will turn out to be a 
misjudgment and an unwelcome diversion of effort.” 
(MS) 
 
If you listen to the LCR, the CTRL was built in order to 
service the Olympics. It is always part of their shining 
visions to serve the Olympic site Stratford, the place they 
didn’t even want the station. (PJ) (Stratford station was 
decided according to enthusiasts’ belief in the catalyst 
effect of the international station on the Stratford 
development. However, in terms of HSR operational 
rationale, the station is not welcome and likely to be 
white elephant.) 
 
Whatever we have got then we got a more matured 
system will valid the people who deliver it declaim it to 
be a great victory and what they always intended. 
However little relationship it has got with the original 
aims because they always rely on people forgetting them. 
Some bits of it will be better and some will be worse. It 
depends on who gets the bits that worse. (PJ) 
 
The 2016 Games are being marketed as an opportunity to 
bring the West and East closer together. 'These could be 
a landmark Games ‐ helping leading to better 
understanding of Arab culture,' said Hassan. 'Bringing the 
flame to the Arabic‐speaking world for the first time, 
extending the Olympics ideals to millions of new hearts 
and minds, will engage and inspire the Arab youth and 
help them understand the wider world and help the rest 
of the world gain a true picture of Arab culture and 
hospitality.' (SMI 37) (Olympics are marketed as a 
medium which bring together the West and the East 
nations. This is an issue of geopolitics. It is can be seen a 
rhetoric under the force of globalisation.) 
 
Ministers ignored evidence from their own experts who 
Yes, there is gap between rhetoric and reality. That’s 
partly because mega events tend to attract a rhetoric 
which is over and above of the real value of the project: 
arguably it needs to be so that the mega project sells 
well as an idea. 
If you want to spend public money in large amounts on 
any project, you talk about that project furiously 
because that’s what politics about. It is actually about 
selling. So the aftermath is not going to be as exciting as 
the vision. But CTRL has failed so far as something that 
is going to serve the regions in this country and yet it is 
all designed that you can just go straight from Stratford 
up to the North East, and to the North West without 
even stopping at St Pancras. You should have Leeds, 
Manchester or Glasgow to Paris directly, and this was a 
big selling point in the vision. There is no train service, 
however, but the train paths on the track are still there 
for Eurostar to go all the way from Manchester to Paris 
without stopping in St Pancras ‐ which is the reason 
why Stratford is important; it will stop in Stratford. The 
promise of those regional connections to Europe is not 
delivered. In the long term, it may well happen. David 
Cameron said he wants High Speed 2 and this is about 
selling the political vision. It hits a lot of buttons, quite 
clever. There is always going to be a gap but I think the 
gap is around what is needed to sell the projects, to 
make sure that they happen. I don’t argue about that 
gap too much because I know you need to sell the 
project to make it happen. (BW) 
      x   
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found scant social or economic justification for bidding 
for the 2012 Olympics, The Times has learnt. A 250‐page 
strategy document, signed off in December 2002 by Tony 
Blair as Prime Minister but selectively distributed, found 
little support for the claim that the Games would produce 
significant economic returns or more people playing 
sport. John Clark, the report’s chief author, told The 
Times: “We concluded that countries should host the 
Olympics only for reasons of national celebration because 
the economic rationale is weak.” Yet just a few months 
later, the Cabinet backed a bid on the ground that it 
would increase sports participation and regenerate East 
London, and Lord Coe sold the message to the 
International Olympic Committee in 2005. (SMI 44) (This 
reflects to the Giddens’ theory of power that power is 
equivalent to the capability of human beings to intervene 
in a series of events so as to alter their course1 (Allen, 
p.43)) 
 
The previous Mayor was not exactly surrounded by 
people with a great deal of commercial acumen. It is no 
surprise, therefore, that the £1.8 billion of land sales 
projection is at the most optimistic end of the spectrum. 
Given the radically changed economic conditions that 
now prevail and which are likely to set the financial and 
economic context for the next 3 to 4 years, these 
optimistic assumptions need to be ripped up. Mayor 
Johnson owes it to London taxpayers to ensure that all 
aspects of the finances of the games are on a realistic 
footing and are not the product of political fantasy. (SMI 
47) 
 
The successful delivery of the Games will demonstrate a 
high level of practical competency which will show that 
he is on the side of London’s taxpayers and is prepared to 
be honest and straightforward with them about what this 
huge project is all about. Londoners do not want 
extravagant promises that will inevitably disappoint. (SMI 
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Table A8.13: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #9 
47)  
APPROACH 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo 
Negative  Impartial  Positive 
H4: Discourse power 
Key champions of Mega 
Urban Transport Projects, 
Sustainable Urban 
Regeneration and Mega 
Events typically establish 
their discourses with the 
expressed aim to become 
influential players in the 
stakeholder networks of 
one or more of these three 
domains to promote their 
agendas and interests 
above all else with limited 
sense of social corporate 
responsibility. Such 
champions also employ 
their discourse powers to 
strengthen their network in 
support of their aims with 
parties that subscribe to 
the same discourse, even 
(Skip) (TU)      x      Kws(13)= Agenda, Discourse, Promote/Convince, Vision 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(13)=  
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 benefits (14) 
 mega event (14) 
 negotiation power 
(12) 
 decision making (12) 
 decision makers (11) 
 financing / cost (8) 
 lobby (7) 
 major infrastructure 
(7) 
 developer (6) 
 project delay (5) 
 benefits (15) 
 mega event (14) 
 decision making (13) 
 negotiation power 
(12) 
 decision maker (11) 
 major infrastructure 
(10) 
 lobby (8) 
 politician / 
champion (8) 
 financing / cost (8) 
 urban regeneration 
(6) 
 
Summary: 
I learnt that the Olympic Games were but one version of a 
(Skip) (RB)      x     
Olympics is a brand of 4000 years old and has been 
carefully protected. It is a commercial business which 
requires sponsorship (PB).  
      x   
Perhaps unintentionally, the example would be Ken 
Livingston. His power of telling people what a great 
idea would be to bid so he tried to persuade and 
ensure the government did bid and they did.  He has no 
money and all he had was personality, charisma, his 
connections and energy. We had Gordon Brown, Ken 
Livingston, Tony Blair and Sebastian Coe. All of them at 
the same page at the same time. (NM) 
        x 
This is a bit the sort of “the Emperor's New Clothes”, 
but of course, anybody likes the boy in the Andersen’s 
fairy tale who said: “but the King is in the all together, 
the all together is naked as the day he was born.” The 
CTRL and the Olympics are so politically nature, no 
commercial profit; people are not in all wonder in the 
sight of the Emperor, there are always some people 
who like that little boy point out the truth. The 
statement about marginalising the others is a bit too 
black and white. In modern society, especially in 
      x   
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though they may have 
different agendas. 
HRQ 9:  Networked Polity 
(after Chris Ansell, 2000) 
Do you agree that 
discourses of MUTPs, SUR 
and MEs have been used as 
tools by key champions to 
convince others of the 
validity of their position(s) 
in the hope that this will be 
shared by a broader 
spectrum of stakeholders, 
simultaneously 
marginalising those who do 
not share the same 
interests and empowering 
the project delivery 
network? 
London, people cannot ignore the power of the 
community networks and the media. (MP) 
range of so‐called mega‐events which coalitions of leading 
local businessmen and politicians in various cities have 
been promoting to profitably reconstruct decaying 
districts.  These spectacular redevelopment projects are 
marketed on the theory that what is good for business is 
good for all. But unfortunately for the poor of these areas 
these entrepreneurs have not properly followed up the 
social outcomes of the projects to see if their theories are 
validated. (MS) 
 
The theme we will develop in this book is that efforts by 
U.S. cities to attract events such as the Olympics are the 
product of a deliberate strategy for promoting local 
economic growth—the mega‐event strategy.(MS quoted 
from Burbank, Andranovich and Heying, 2001) 
 
Mega‐events are therefore one of the means by which 
places seek to become ‘sticky’ (Markusen, 1996) – that is 
attract and retain mobile capital and people – through 
place enhancement and regeneration and the promotion 
of selective place information (MS quoted from Hall, C.M., 
2005). 
 
Manchester is very often held up as the very epitome of 
entrepreneurialism and dynamism in urban governance, 
as one of the proving grounds of what has been labelled 
the ‘new urban politics’. Indeed, the city has been the site 
of frenzied public‐private partnership formation in recent 
years, while, as the previous chapter demonstrated, both 
the character and the content of local‐government 
strategies have in many ways been transformed since the 
1980s. To be sure, this has been a complex process, and 
one in which there have been notable continuities as well 
as marked breaks with the past, but it is difficult to escape 
the conclusions that over the last two decades Manchester 
has witnessed a dramatic shift in the means and ends of 
urban politics. More than any single episode in this long 
This does really come down to the heart of how 
decision has been made in a country like Britain. In the 
Olympic public enquiry we said we don’t believe this 
budget and it makes absolutely no difference. The 
inspector ignored the budget issue. In the beginning, 
the media and politicians formed a chain to market the 
Olympics. Their attitude is defensive from day one. To 
even suggest the Olympics might not be a good thing is 
considered as slightly baddy. The Olympics, conceived 
as a brand, manage to market itself effectively.  The 
fundamental argument that the Olympics is needed for 
the regeneration is still not being challenged. All these 
assumptions about the synergy which has been put 
forward here, the mutual benefits of the way things 
linking together, the public‐private partnership 
argument are still up there running. (JC) 
        x 
They have been promoting themselves. I don’t 
particularly think they marginalise those don’t agree 
with them. (HB) 
      x   
(Skip) (DM)      x     
I don’t feel as one stakeholder that I’ve been used as a 
means for other stakeholders to improve their position 
in the rest of the world. It is very project focused.  
Everybody has an interest in that land, arguably all 
those interests all aligned. The actual companies 
involved in doing things are people like Bechtel, Arup 
      x   
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and others, commercial companies working out that 
they want to put King’s Cross and St Pancras into their 
portfolio and they want to maintain their networks, 
positions because they have good contacts in 
government, good contacts with banking and good 
contacts with everything else. They traded off the 
success story of King’s Cross. Generally speaking, I 
don’t think anybody loses after this process. (BW) 
process of transformation, perhaps, the city’s bids for the 
Olympic Games stand out as crucial moments. The second 
Olympic bid in particular – the focus of this chapter – 
came to symbolise and to crystallise many of the new 
urban‐political forms in an especially vivid fashion. And 
political change was not a mere side‐effect of the Olympic 
bidding process in the city. On the contrary, the 
transformation of decision‐making structures and 
governance systems was very much part and parcel of 
what key ‘players’ in the city would refer to as the Olympic 
process. (MS quoted2) 
 
It was there as a possible station and Newham Council 
argued vehemently as a lot of the other people vote at 
least it needs to be a station there. That proposal was 
resisted very strongly by the Government and by Union 
Railways. They thought it would simply slow the journey 
times down. They thought their development profit is 
coming from the Ebbsfleet area and from King’s Cross; 
they didn’t see the lost that they thought they would 
make on having extended service time because of 
Stratford and the cost of building the station there will be 
offset by the development potential at Stratford. (PJ) (The 
decision of Stratford International was supported by John 
Prescott who lobbied by Newham Council. However, the 
development profits of the Stratford railway lands 
emerged as one of the critical elements for the CTRL 
concessional contract / commercial arrangements to 
attract private sector.)  
 
Today and in 10 years time, the far most important issue 
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would be the catalyst project for the regeneration. Back in 
1998 / 1999, government was only allowed to include half 
billion pounds worth of further regeneration from this 
railway whilst today with King’s Cross and Stratford, there 
would be over 10 billion pounds worth of regeneration 
effectively 20 times higher and could be even greater than 
by that time it’s finished. (RH) (Regeneration benefits 
become an important financial justification for the HSR 
project. The lack of concrete evidence to show the 
economic impacts and scepticism stemmed from the 
conflicts between market‐ and community‐led 
developments posed questions to whether this mega‐
project discourse can be materialised.) 
 
The 2016 Games are being marketed as an opportunity to 
bring the West and East closer together. (SMI 37) (The 
Games are often attached to certain themes and message 
which is part of the marketing strategy. Hence its 
discourse can change over time and depends on prevailing 
issues, such as cost efficiency and sustainability.) 
 
The legacy promise for London 2012 is predicated on two 
assumptions. The first is that the building of significant 
infrastructure in some of East London’s most deprived 
areas will leave lasting social and economic regeneration 
over the next half century.   
Mayor Livingstone, who was no sports fan, said that he 
only supported the games because of its potential as a 
catalyst for regeneration. This was a dangerous rationale 
for supporting the Olympic project. Regeneration is 
something which should have a rationale and a business 
case all of its own. Wrapping up the promises of housing 
and jobs on the back of the Olympic project is a recipe for 
failure and disappointed expectations. The second is that 
the games will provide a specific sporting legacy in terms 
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Table A8.14: Synthesis of Responses to HRQ #10 
of infrastructure and participation. (SMI 47) (Ken 
Livingstone said his intention to host the 2012 Olympics is 
to get more money from the central government to invest 
in London.) 
APPROACH 
 
QUESTION 
HYPOTHESIS LED RESEARCH 
INTERVIEWEES’ RESPONSES 
Degree of agreement  PRE HYPOTHESIS RESEARCH 
Data detected by NVivo Negative  Impartial  Positive 
HRQ 10: Who are the 
primary champions and 
decision‐makers that 
supported and opposed: 
 the CTRL project?   
 KX Central   
 Stratford City or 
 2012 London 
Olympics?  
And what were their major 
intentions? 
 
(Skip) (TU)      x      Kws(14)= Champioins, Decision‐makers 
 
PHR Datasety/Kws(14)=  
 
Interview dataset 
Interview dataset + 
Secondary dataset 
 financing / cost (23) 
 mega event (21) 
 major infrastructure 
(20) 
 benefits (18) 
 decision making (17) 
 developer (13) 
 promote / convince 
(11) 
 negotiation power 
(10) 
 lobby (9) 
 
 financing / cost (25) 
 major infrastructure 
(24) 
 decision making (23) 
 mega event (23) 
 benefits (18) 
 lobby (14) 
 developer (14) 
 political power (10) 
 agenda (5) 
 
 
Summary: 
The Olympic Games were but one version of a range of 
For 2012, British Olympic Association is the major 
champion, the Mayor, the London Development 
Agency, GLA, TfL, and Sport England. People have 
different intentions for their support of it. For LDA, it 
was about regeneration. (RB) 
        x 
The Games is guaranteed by the nation not the 
government. Once you signed the Bid document, the 
commitment of the country has been dedicated. The 
condition for decision‐makers is not anymore like 
other projects that have become technical. The Games 
provide chance to realise major projects in short time 
by dedicating political will. The world competition 
between host cities is another pressure. The Games 
also can provide innovation possibilities such as special 
traffic management concept which can be applied in 
the future. (PB) 
        x 
Lord Sebastian Coe, Ken Livingston, Tony Blair and 
Tessa Jowell who was the Secretary of the State and 
now the Olympic minister, and the five local boroughs, 
they are champions. The idea is to develop this piece 
of land. (NM) 
 
        x 
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The LCR championed the CTRL because of the benefit 
from the land. Mrs. Thatcher and Mr. Blair, who was 
the firmament indicated by his predecessor, Mr. Major 
initially. The Northern and Scottish MPs and local and 
regional authorities were championing it because they 
thought it will go there.  Most of the landowners and 
community groups up and down the line opposed the 
project because they suffered from the construction 
blight.  The Treasury opposed the original proposal 
until it added in the regeneration benefits.  
 
The primary champions for the King’s Cross Central are 
the LCR and the Camden Council who enjoy the 
reputation and prestige brought by the St. Pancras 
station.  
  
Mr. Ken Livingston and the five London boroughs 
support the Olympics. I image the Ministers of sports 
although they didn’t expect to get it but they did get it. 
For the available land and regeneration claim, they 
could not put the Olympic site at King’s Cross but 
Stratford which is still within London area. (MP)  
  x       
so‐called mega‐events which coalitions of leading local 
businessmen and politicians in various cities have been 
promoting to profitably reconstruct decaying districts. … 
What they were looking for was a subsidy from the city 
within which they wanted to build their projects, so they 
approached city administrations, with a business plan. 
Low land prices and changes in the industrial economy of 
those cities meant that those areas were in economic 
decline and needed investments.  (MS) 
 
Hosting a premier event such as the Olympics or a world’s 
fair is central to this strategy because city leaders are 
seeking not just short‐term tourist revenues but to change 
their city’s image and perhaps even the city’s physical 
structure. (MS quoted from Burbank, Andranovich and 
Heying, 2001) 
 
Olympic Turnaround tells for the first time how the future 
of one of the world's iconic institutions was secured. It is 
the story of a fine balancing as an amateur organization 
struggled with and eventually embraced the business 
world. But it did so on its own terms maintaining its 
identity, not compromising its core values and in the 
process establishing many of the ground rules of today’s 
sports marketing industry.(MS quoted Payne, 2006) 
 
A lot of the developments, particularly the housing 
developments which are now taking place around the 
Olympic site, are developments which are facilitated by 
the local authority. The local authority will give them 
planning permission very readily because local 
authorities, particularly the London boroughs in the area 
which surrounds the area of Olympic park, now no longer 
have access to significant sums of money to initiate their 
own public developments. (MS) 
 
London mayor Ken Livingstone has said he “ensnared” 
ministers over the bid to host the 2012 Olympics in an 
effort to get money for East End redevelopment. (MS) 
 
Politicians want to be associated with successful sports 
for their reputation and identification.  They are eyeing 
for ‘feel good’ factor. For a nation who supports sports 
because they see they have muscles of economic 
power, military power or sporting power which is to 
justify their system. The pressure of competing with 
other cities for the World City status is also one of the 
reasons. The IOC markets the Olympic strategy, but it 
is just a big publicity blur. It is like The Emperor's New 
Clothes. (JC) 
         
(Skip) (HB)      x     
(Skip) (DM)      x     
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CTRL and King’s Cross Central, they do not have strong 
opposition. Certain local communities were 
oppositional, fairly small community groups, small but 
competent and quite effective about what 
communities were opposed to. They were concerned 
about the impacts and the way would be built. I don’t 
think they were against the railway itself or the 
regeneration. They do not want to see high‐rise and 
too much commercial development on their doorstep.  
 
I think mega transport projects start with the 
advantage of being desirable usually in the first place 
as long as they are public transport ones.  The special 
things like trains and trams, they have some romance 
about them. Show me a railway project that people 
regret after it has been built.  
 (BW) 
        x 
In 1984, the Thatcher Government started instructing 
nationalising industry to make up their expense by selling 
their assets. British Rail in particular was instructed as 
former Tory Prime Minister said in the House of Lords to 
sale the family sofa and to make their books balance. The 
British Rail Property Board was looking all the lands that 
they can probably sale anywhere. There was a useless 
land in King’s Cross. It decided to have a development 
competition to decide who should develop for it with the 
view to maximise the profit. (PJ) (This encouraged railway 
lands development and as the inception of integration 
between railway and property development.) 
 
Ove Arup who had been part of the consortium that 
might have taken the private sector risk pulled out 
themselves came up with an alternative line, still came to 
King’s Cross but via Stratford. They kept lobbying the 
Government to stop there instead of what was called the 
Southerly Approach which caused a big problem through 
King’s Cross using the Snow Hill Tunnel which needs to go 
through the South London and that will cause massive 
demolitions in lots of contingency, mostly Tory. There 
was opposition from bits of all political parties even 
though the majority of MPs … the principle were 
concerned about the local impacts. (PJ) (Local political 
impacts?) 
 
Ken Livingstone pushed for London to have Olympic Bid 
and the only place that the Olympic stadium could really 
be developed in terms of big development space and 
regeneration potential is Stratford. Certainly Stratford 
became very attractive to the Olympics because they can 
tag the regeneration of the area onto that Bid and makes 
it on the Bid because the International Olympic 
Committee require about such things. (PJ) 
 
It appears to be unique piece of government backing 
which without John Prescott’s support for the project was 
unlikely to be forthcoming. Probably the most important 
thing, however, was the ability of the new railway to 
support regeneration. Regeneration of the King’s Cross 
land behind me, regeneration of the land out at Stratford 
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and regeneration of lands in the Thames Gateway. (RH) 
 
Newham are desperately keen for the Games. They will 
do whatever it takes and they will take whatever it takes. 
(HS) 
 
The important thing is ‐ I mean what’s really driven this 
thing ‐ is you have this situation in which 3 political 
parties, Conservative, Liberal Democrats and Labour ‐ 
have committed to the Games. They committed to the 
Games during the bid phase. Once you’ve got that degree 
of political commitment and it is on video being played to 
the IOC, you stand a reasonable chance of everyone else 
coming to the party. (RH) (Reinforcing network) 
 
A recently completed study, undertaken by Steer Davies 
Gleave on behalf of Birmingham City Council and 
Greengauge 21, shows that High Speed Rail has the 
potential to deliver significant benefits to the national 
economy, and to contribute to the regeneration of 
Birmingham and the West Midlands. (SMI 16) 
 
“The justification for bidding should have been based on 
evidence placed in the public domain. Instead key 
evidence was suppressed or ignored.” 
The revelations raise the question of why ministers 
backed a bid citing reasons dismissed by their own 
experts. Tessa Jowell, the Olympics Minister who 
sponsored Game Plan, admitted this month that a bid 
would probably not have been pursued if a recession had 
been foreseen. (SMI 44) 
 
Both the Tories and Liberal Democrats have voiced 
support for a high‐speed line, in part to avoid expansion 
of Heathrow Airport by offering an alternative to 
domestic air travel. In January, the government got 
behind the idea too. (SMI 48) 
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APPENDIX 9: 
Pre-Hypothesis Investigation Data 
Analysis Correlation Coefficient R 
Report 
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Each significant correlation is shown here with its correlation coefficient R. Positive 
values are shown first; order is from strongest to weakest. 
 
(NP) Indicates a non-parametric Spearman ranked correlation test was used. 
 
1 Theme - Financing projects/development 
 
1) 0.840 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
2) 0.830 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
3) 0.758 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
4) 0.719 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
5) 0.707 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
6) 0.697 Theme - Technical solutions to problems  (NP) 
7) 0.693 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
8) 0.686 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
9) 0.667 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
10) 0.610 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
11) 0.609 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
12) 0.599 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
13) 0.584 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
14) 0.581 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
15) 0.580 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
16) 0.578 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
17) 0.531 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
18) 0.521 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
19) 0.510 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
20) 0.506 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
21) 0.503 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
22) 0.485 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision makin) 
23) 0.482 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
24) 0.479 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
25) 0.455 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
26) 0.397 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
27) 0.385 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
28) 0.384 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
29) 0.351 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
30) 0.345 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
31) 0.344 Theme - Political will NP) 
32) 0.332 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
33) 0.331 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
34) 0.324 Implementing the project (NP) 
35) 0.322 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
36) 0.282 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
37) 0.279 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
38) 0.255 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) 
39) 0.232 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
 
2 Theme - Use of public money 
 
1) 0.838 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
2) 0.825 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
3) 0.813 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
4) 0.779 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
5) 0.736 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
6) 0.701 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
7) 0.692 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
8) 0.688 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
9) 0.664 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
10) 0.647 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
11) 0.640 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
12) 0.635 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
13) 0.635 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
14) 0.630 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
15) 0.624 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
16) 0.618 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
17) 0.616 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
18) 0.606 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
19) 0.585 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
20) 0.554 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
21) 0.536 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
22) 0.513 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
23) 0.501 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
24) 0.471 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
25) 0.459 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
26) 0.397 Implementing the project (NP) 
27) 0.395 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
28) 0.384 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
29) 0.381 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
30) 0.371 Situation - Forming partnerships - Forming partnerships 1 (NP) 
31) 0.363 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
32) 0.353 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
33) 0.347 Theme - Political will - Political will 1 (NP) 
34) 0.313 Theme - Visions and ideas - Visions and ideas 1 (NP) 
35) 0.306 Theme - Co-operation - Co-operation 1 (NP) 
36) 0.301 Theme - Leadership - Leadership 1 (NP) 
37) 0.223 Theme - Bargaining power - Bargaining power 1 (NP) 
 
3 Theme - Public sector power 
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1) 0.941 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
2) 0.622 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
3) 0.615 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
4) 0.613 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
5) 0.610 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
6) 0.569 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
7) 0.565 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
8) 0.536 Theme - Political will (NP) 
9) 0.533 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
10) 0.531 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
11) 0.528 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
12) 0.526 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
13) 0.519 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
14) 0.516 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
15) 0.490 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
16) 0.486 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
17) 0.485 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
18) 0.483 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
19) 0.477 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
20) 0.475 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
21) 0.464 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
22) 0.424 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
23) 0.420 Implementing the project (NP) 
24) 0.417 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
25) 0.414 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
26) 0.403 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
27) 0.393 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
28) 0.378 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
29) 0.365 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
30) 0.364 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
31) 0.362 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
32) 0.351 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
33) 0.319 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
34) 0.301 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
35) 0.285 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
36) 0.277 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
 
4 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance  
 
1) 0.846 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
2) 0.825 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
3) 0.818 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
4) 0.790 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
5) 0.782 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
6) 0.780 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
7) 0.778 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
8) 0.759 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
9) 0.751 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
10) 0.707 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
11) 0.695 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
12) 0.660 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
13) 0.629 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
14) 0.615 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
15) 0.591 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
16) 0.583 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
17) 0.574 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
18) 0.565 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
19) 0.544 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
20) 0.519 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
21) 0.518 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
22) 0.504 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
23) 0.476 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
24) 0.468 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
25) 0.461 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
26) 0.453 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
27) 0.432 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
28) 0.392 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
29) 0.390 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
30) 0.385 Implementing the project (NP) 
31) 0.348 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
32) 0.347 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
33) 0.301 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
34) 0.274 Theme - Political will (NP) 
 
4 Situation - Political intervention into the project 
 
1) 0.914 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
2) 0.825 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
3) 0.745 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
4) 0.726 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
5) 0.710 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
6) 0.707 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
7) 0.703 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
8) 0.702 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
9) 0.664 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
10) 0.631 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
11) 0.627 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
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12) 0.620 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
13) 0.620 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
14) 0.613 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
15) 0.612 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
16) 0.573 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
17) 0.572 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
18) 0.545 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
19) 0.534 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
20) 0.531 Theme - Political will (NP) 
21) 0.521 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
22) 0.491 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
23) 0.480 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
24) 0.477 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
25) 0.409 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
26) 0.407 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
27) 0.398 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
28) 0.384 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
29) 0.368 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
30) 0.338 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
31) 0.296 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
32) 0.282 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
33) 0.278 Implementing the project (NP) 
34) 0.268 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
 
5 Theme - Technical solutions to problems 
 
1) 0.776 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
2) 0.733 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
3) 0.723 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
4) 0.701 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
5) 0.691 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
6) 0.660 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
7) 0.658 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
8) 0.637 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement(NP) 
9) 0.602 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
10) 0.584 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
11) 0.583 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
12) 0.561 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
13) 0.519 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
14) 0.518 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
15) 0.508 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
16) 0.495 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
17) 0.484 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
18) 0.480 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
19) 0.452 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
20) 0.432 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
21) 0.428 Situation - Performance of organisations  (NP) 
22) 0.421 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
23) 0.416 Implementing the project (NP) 
24) 0.353 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
25) 0.353 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation  (NP) 
26) 0.338 Situation - Major change in project scope  (NP) 
27) 0.328 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
28) 0.323 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) 
29) 0.322 Theme - Bureaucracy  (NP) 
30) 0.322 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
31) 0.313 Theme - Political will (NP) 
32) 0.284 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
33) 0.272 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
 
5 Theme - Tensions between values  
 
1) 0.845 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
2) 0.802 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
3) 0.789 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
4) 0.784 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
5) 0.750 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
6) 0.740 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
7) 0.734 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
8) 0.722 Situation - Major change in project scope  (NP) 
9) 0.681 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
10) 0.676 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
11) 0.665 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
12) 0.628 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
13) 0.616 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
14) 0.601 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
15) 0.594 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
16) 0.594 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
17) 0.562 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
18) 0.553 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
19) 0.511 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
20) 0.476 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
21) 0.460 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
22) 0.434 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
23) 0.425 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
24) 0.419 Theme - Political will (NP) 
25) 0.403 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
26) 0.364 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
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27) 0.341 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
28) 0.335 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
29) 0.330 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
30) 0.302 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
31) 0.298 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
32) 0.296 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
33) 0.254 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
 
5 Theme - Private sector power  
 
1) 0.943 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
2) 0.626 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
3) 0.619 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
4) 0.614 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
5) 0.608 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
6) 0.599 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
7) 0.576 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
8) 0.573 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
9) 0.569 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
10) 0.554 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
11) 0.544 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
12) 0.542 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
13) 0.531 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
14) 0.531 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
15) 0.520 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
16) 0.502 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
17) 0.501 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
18) 0.500 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
19) 0.478 Implementing the project (NP) 
20) 0.477 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
21) 0.472 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
22) 0.452 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
23) 0.443 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
24) 0.442 Theme - Political will (NP) 
25) 0.429 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
26) 0.428 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
27) 0.422 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
28) 0.384 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
29) 0.383 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
30) 0.366 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
31) 0.362 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
32) 0.347 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
33) 0.304 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
 
5 Theme - Political intervention  
 
1) 0.920 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
2) 0.759 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
3) 0.728 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
4) 0.724 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
5) 0.696 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
6) 0.642 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
7) 0.639 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
8) 0.633 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
9) 0.629 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
10) 0.624 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
11) 0.618 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
12) 0.607 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
13) 0.605 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
14) 0.583 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
15) 0.578 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
16) 0.568 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
17) 0.564 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
18) 0.536 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
19) 0.527 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
20) 0.524 Theme - Political will (NP) 
21) 0.514 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
22) 0.497 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
23) 0.468 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
24) 0.462 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
25) 0.397 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
26) 0.397 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
27) 0.363 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
28) 0.349 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
29) 0.306 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
30) 0.269 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
31) 0.265 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
32) 0.256 Implementing the project (NP) 
33) 0.235 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
 
5 Situation - Public outcry about project  
 
1) 0.834 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
2) 0.805 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
3) 0.782 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
4) 0.726 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
5) 0.718 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
6) 0.645 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
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7) 0.642 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
8) 0.633 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
9) 0.625 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
10) 0.604 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
11) 0.604 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
12) 0.598 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
13) 0.597 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
14) 0.587 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
15) 0.580 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
16) 0.562 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
17) 0.545 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
18) 0.522 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
19) 0.517 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
20) 0.487 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
21) 0.485 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
22) 0.483 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
23) 0.476 Theme - Political will (NP) 
24) 0.463 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
25) 0.448 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
26) 0.432 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
27) 0.332 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
28) 0.324 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
29) 0.308 Implementing the project (NP) 
30) 0.299 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
31) 0.290 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
32) 0.285 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
33) 0.275 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
 
6 Situation - Performance of organisations responsible for the project 
 
1) 0.687 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
2) 0.654 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
3) 0.615 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
4) 0.574 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
5) 0.537 Implementing the project (NP) 
6) 0.533 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
7) 0.529 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
8) 0.527 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
9) 0.516 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
10) 0.510 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
11) 0.488 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
12) 0.488 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
13) 0.477 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
14) 0.454 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
15) 0.442 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
16) 0.427 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) 
17) 0.414 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
18) 0.405 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
19) 0.380 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
20) 0.377 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
21) 0.372 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
22) 0.367 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
23) 0.364 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
24) 0.358 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
25) 0.350 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
26) 0.335 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
27) 0.331 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
28) 0.326 Theme - Political will (NP) 
29) 0.323 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
30) 0.314 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
31) 0.285 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
32) 0.279 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
 
7 Theme - Globalisation forces  
 
1) 0.860 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
2) 0.844 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
3) 0.817 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
4) 0.804 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
5) 0.773 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
6) 0.769 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
7) 0.747 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
8) 0.716 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
9) 0.710 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
10) 0.695 Situation - Public outcry about project  (NP) 
11) 0.687 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
12) 0.685 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
13) 0.683 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
14) 0.674 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
15) 0.667 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
16) 0.659 Theme - Political intervention - Political intervention 1 (NP) 
17) 0.571 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
18) 0.524 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
19) 0.512 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
20) 0.475 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
21) 0.466 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
22) 0.453 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
23) 0.452 Theme - Political will (NP) 
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24) 0.446 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
25) 0.414 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
26) 0.370 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
27) 0.369 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
28) 0.364 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
29) 0.348 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
30) 0.319 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
31) 0.317 Implementing the project (NP) 
 
7 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement 
 
1) 0.743 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
2) 0.726 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
3) 0.691 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
4) 0.674 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
5) 0.659 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
6) 0.652 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
7) 0.651 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
8) 0.644 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
9) 0.631 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
10) 0.626 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
11) 0.605 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
12) 0.593 Implementing the project (NP) 
13) 0.543 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
14) 0.542 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
15) 0.538 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
16) 0.530 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
17) 0.522 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
18) 0.483 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
19) 0.466 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
20) 0.409 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
21) 0.395 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
22) 0.376 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
23) 0.375 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
24) 0.375 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
25) 0.344 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
26) 0.316 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
27) 0.302 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
28) 0.287 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
29) 0.281 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
30) 0.277 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
31) 0.246 Theme - Political will (NP) 
 
8 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making 
 
1) 0.673 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
2) 0.645 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
3) 0.569 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
4) 0.565 Implementing the project (NP) 
5) 0.551 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
6) 0.522 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
7) 0.514 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
8) 0.501 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
9) 0.499 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
10) 0.495 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
11) 0.489 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
12) 0.483 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
13) 0.463 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
14) 0.461 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
15) 0.410 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
16) 0.380 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
17) 0.365 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
18) 0.361 Theme - Political will (NP) 
19) 0.351 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
20) 0.340 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
21) 0.339 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
22) 0.336 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
23) 0.331 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
24) 0.327 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
25) 0.310 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
26) 0.308 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
27) 0.304 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
28) 0.275 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
29) 0.261 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
30) 0.230 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
 
8 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making  
 
1) 0.779 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
2) 0.663 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
3) 0.603 Implementing the project (NP) 
4) 0.601 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
5) 0.597 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
6) 0.575 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
7) 0.562 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
8) 0.558 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
9) 0.529 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
10) 0.528 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
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11) 0.523 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
12) 0.513 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
13) 0.507 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
14) 0.505 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
15) 0.503 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
16) 0.492 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
17) 0.480 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
18) 0.471 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
19) 0.465 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
20) 0.454 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
21) 0.447 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
22) 0.430 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
23) 0.427 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
24) 0.380 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
25) 0.344 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
26) 0.317 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
27) 0.290 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
28) 0.285 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
29) 0.280 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
30) 0.217 Theme - Political will (NP) 
 
8 Theme - Roles and responsibilities 
 
1) 0.651 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
2) 0.603 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
3) 0.591 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
4) 0.552 Implementing the project (NP) 
5) 0.542 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
6) 0.537 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
7) 0.535 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
8) 0.524 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
9) 0.522 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
10) 0.513 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
11) 0.492 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
12) 0.472 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
13) 0.470 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
14) 0.459 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
15) 0.431 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
16) 0.409 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
17) 0.409 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
18) 0.392 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
19) 0.389 Theme - Bargaining power 
20) 0.368 Situation - Alleviating project impacts 
21) 0.359 Theme - Institutional arrangements  
22) 0.341 Theme - Use of private sector money  
23) 0.340 Deciding on developments associated with the projects 
24) 0.316 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues 
25) 0.309 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance 
26) 0.305 Situation - Political intervention into the project 
27) 0.303 Theme - Political will  
28) 0.298 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
29) 0.296 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
30) 0.241 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
 
8 Theme - Real estate development 
 
1) 0.701 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
2) 0.620 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
3) 0.619 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
4) 0.606 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
5) 0.591 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
6) 0.570 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
7) 0.561 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
8) 0.505 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
9) 0.500 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
10) 0.498 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
11) 0.488 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
12) 0.482 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
13) 0.471 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
14) 0.469 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
15) 0.465 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
16) 0.424 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
17) 0.400 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
18) 0.386 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
19) 0.375 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
20) 0.370 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
21) 0.355 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
22) 0.340 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
23) 0.332 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
24) 0.304 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
25) 0.290 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
26) 0.285 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
27) 0.279 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
28) 0.262 Theme - Political will (NP) 
 
8 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding  
 
1) 0.718 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
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2) 0.697 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
3) 0.683 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
4) 0.622 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
5) 0.590 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
6) 0.578 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
7) 0.569 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
8) 0.546 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
9) 0.529 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
10) 0.508 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
11) 0.507 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
12) 0.505 Implementing the project (NP) 
13) 0.499 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
14) 0.494 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
15) 0.458 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
16) 0.419 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
17) 0.416 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
18) 0.406 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
19) 0.377 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
20) 0.364 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) 
21) 0.337 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
22) 0.333 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
23) 0.328 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
24) 0.289 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
25) 0.263 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
26) 0.245 Theme - Political will (NP) 
27) 0.245 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
28) -0.280Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
 
9 Situation - Changing partners  
 
1) 0.806 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
2) 0.766 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
3) 0.733 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
4) 0.700 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
5) 0.678 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
6) 0.652 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
7) 0.649 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
8) 0.624 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
9) 0.614 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
10) 0.613 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
11) 0.546 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
12) 0.525 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
13) 0.508 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
14) 0.507 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
15) 0.497 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
16) 0.492 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
17) 0.490 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
18) 0.484 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
19) 0.452 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
20) 0.450 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
21) 0.449 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
22) 0.447 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
23) 0.415 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
24) 0.404 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
25) 0.399 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
26) 0.376 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
27) 0.350 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
28) 0.350 Theme - Bargaining power(NP) 
29) 0.323 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
 
10 Theme - Institutional arrangements 
 
1) 0.607 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
2) 0.585 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
3) 0.556 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
4) 0.554 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
5) 0.521 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
6) 0.516 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
7) 0.470 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
8) 0.465 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
9) 0.456 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
10) 0.429 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
11) 0.420 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
12) 0.416 Implementing the project (NP) 
13) 0.414 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
14) 0.405 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
15) 0.396 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
16) 0.382 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
17) 0.377 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
18) 0.371 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
19) 0.366 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
20) 0.356 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
21) 0.353 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
22) 0.352 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
23) 0.349 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
24) 0.338 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
25) 0.334 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
26) 0.324 Theme - Co-operation  (NP) 
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27) 0.297 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
 
11 Situation - Implementing the project  
 
1) 0.606 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
2) 0.590 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
3) 0.589 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
4) 0.559 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
5) 0.548 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
6) 0.539 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
7) 0.534 Situation - Performance of organisations  (NP) 
8) 0.525 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
9) 0.519 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
10) 0.508 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
11) 0.464 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
12) 0.415 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
13) 0.414 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
14) 0.413 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
15) 0.410 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
16) 0.386 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
17) 0.378 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
18) 0.362 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
19) 0.344 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
20) 0.338 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) 
21) 0.333 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
22) 0.326 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
23) 0.289 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
24) 0.269 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
25) 0.263 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
26) 0.255 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
 
10 Situation - Alleviating project impacts  
 
1) 0.866 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
2) 0.770 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
3) 0.748 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
4) 0.693 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
5) 0.663 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
6) 0.651 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
7) 0.650 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
8) 0.615 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
9) 0.611 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
10) 0.589 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
11) 0.562 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
12) 0.536 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
13) 0.504 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
14) 0.500 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
15) 0.500 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
16) 0.500 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
17) 0.491 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
18) 0.414 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
19) 0.354 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
20) 0.350 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
21) 0.348 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
22) 0.315 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
23) 0.304 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
24) 0.302 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
25) 0.291 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
26) 0.287 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
27) 0.281 Theme - Political will (NP) 
 
11 Theme – Bureaucracy 
 
1) 0.827 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
2) 0.812 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
3) 0.780 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
4) 0.716 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
5) 0.708 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
6) 0.704 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
7) 0.692 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
8) 0.681 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
9) 0.671 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
10) 0.637 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
11) 0.628 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
12) 0.616 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
13) 0.606 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
14) 0.551 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
15) 0.541 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
16) 0.517 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
17) 0.509 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
18) 0.483 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
19) 0.439 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
20) 0.432 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
21) 0.412 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
22) 0.378 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
23) 0.364 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
24) 0.363 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
25) 0.298 Theme - Political will (NP) 
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26) -0.328 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
 
11 Situation - Major change in project scope  
 
1) 0.806 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
2) 0.772 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
3) 0.760 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
4) 0.758 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
5) 0.739 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
6) 0.731 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
7) 0.717 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
8) 0.688 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
9) 0.682 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
10) 0.660 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
11) 0.656 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
12) 0.591 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
13) 0.564 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
14) 0.547 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
15) 0.546 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
16) 0.485 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
17) 0.456 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
18) 0.430 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
19) 0.405 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
20) 0.393 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
21) 0.371 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
22) 0.369 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
23) 0.318 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
24) 0.317 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
25) 0.289 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
26) 0.284 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
 
12 Theme - Path dependency 
 
1) 0.806 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
2) 0.744 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
3) 0.728 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
4) 0.704 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
5) 0.672 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
6) 0.661 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
7) 0.634 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
8) 0.621 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
9) 0.614 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
10) 0.603 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
11) 0.588 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
12) 0.578 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
13) 0.560 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
14) 0.560 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
15) 0.539 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
16) 0.530 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
17) 0.517 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
18) 0.467 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
19) 0.410 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
20) 0.409 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
21) 0.388 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
22) 0.368 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
23) 0.322 Theme - Political will (NP) 
24) 0.307 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
25) 0.304 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
 
12 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project  
 
1) 0.504 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
2) 0.497 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
3) 0.479 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
4) 0.429 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
5) 0.426 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
6) 0.422 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) 
7) 0.421 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
8) 0.401 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
9) 0.395 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
10) 0.380 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
11) 0.379 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
12) 0.367 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
13) 0.362 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
14) 0.349 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
15) 0.334 Implementing the project (NP) 
16) 0.330 Theme - Political will (NP) 
17) 0.329 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
18) 0.297 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
19) 0.290 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
20) 0.283 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
21) 0.273 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
22) 0.266 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
23) 0.259 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
24) 0.254 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
25) 0.233 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
 
13 Theme - Bargaining power  
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1) 0.582 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
2) 0.581 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
3) 0.562 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
4) 0.559 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
5) 0.536 Situation - Forming partnerships - Forming partnerships 1 (NP) 
6) 0.517 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
7) 0.500 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
8) 0.448 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
9) 0.443 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
10) 0.422 Implementing the project (NP) 
11) 0.398 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
12) 0.373 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
13) 0.344 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
14) 0.338 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
15) 0.317 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
16) 0.302 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
17) 0.299 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) 
18) 0.281 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
19) 0.279 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
20) 0.250 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
21) 0.243 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
22) 0.239 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
23) 0.223 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
24) -0.284 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
 
13 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organisational issues 
 
1) 0.830 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
2) 0.637 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
3) 0.585 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
4) 0.564 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
5) 0.557 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
6) 0.535 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
7) 0.517 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
8) 0.502 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
9) 0.458 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
10) 0.450 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
11) 0.446 Implementing the project (NP) 
12) 0.422 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
13) 0.409 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
14) 0.409 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
15) 0.399 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
16) 0.393 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
17) 0.372 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
18) 0.363 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
19) 0.355 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
20) 0.354 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
21) 0.334 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
22) 0.320 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
23) 0.315 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
24) 0.313 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
 
13 Theme - Use of private sector money  
 
1) 0.871 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
2) 0.748 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
3) 0.727 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
4) 0.665 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
5) 0.656 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
6) 0.653 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
7) 0.639 Situation - Alleviating project impacts  (NP) 
8) 0.577 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
9) 0.567 Theme - Tensions between values  (NP) 
10) 0.530 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
11) 0.519 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
12) 0.486 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
13) 0.450 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
14) 0.438 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
15) 0.436 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
16) 0.420 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
17) 0.408 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
18) 0.404 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
19) 0.339 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
20) 0.337 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
21) 0.315 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
22) 0.299 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
23) 0.299 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
24) 0.285 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
 
14 Theme - Public participation or consultation  
 
1) 0.837 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
2) 0.662 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
3) 0.656 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
4) 0.647 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
5) 0.606 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
6) 0.606 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
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7) 0.573 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
8) 0.552 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
9) 0.550 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
10) 0.536 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
11) 0.517 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
12) 0.511 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
13) 0.498 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
14) 0.484 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
15) 0.482 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
16) 0.466 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
17) 0.459 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
18) 0.383 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
19) 0.337 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
20) 0.320 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
21) 0.312 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
22) 0.306 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
23) 0.287 Theme - Political will (NP) 
 
14 Theme - Leadership  
 
1) 0.592 Theme - Political will (NP) 
2) 0.569 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
3) 0.533 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
4) 0.519 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
5) 0.465 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
6) 0.464 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
7) 0.434 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
8) 0.398 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
9) 0.396 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
10) 0.388 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
11) 0.380 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
12) 0.379 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
13) 0.376 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
14) 0.362 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
15) 0.351 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
16) 0.345 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
17) 0.345 Implementing the project (NP) 
18) 0.341 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
19) 0.311 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
20) 0.295 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
21) 0.285 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
22) 0.284 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
23) 0.284 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
 
14 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact 
 
1) 0.864 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
2) 0.784 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
3) 0.750 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
4) 0.749 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
5) 0.689 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
6) 0.650 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
7) 0.636 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
8) 0.633 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
9) 0.596 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
10) 0.580 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
11) 0.535 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
12) 0.513 Theme - Public participation or consultation (NP) 
13) 0.500 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
14) 0.495 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
15) 0.486 Theme - Visions and ideas  (NP) 
16) 0.441 Situation - Major change in project scope (NP) 
17) 0.438 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
18) 0.418 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
19) 0.403 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
20) 0.395 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
21) 0.348 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
22) 0.309 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
23) 0.300 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
 
14 Theme - Political will  
 
1) 0.565 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
2) 0.519 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
3) 0.517 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
4) 0.517 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
5) 0.514 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
6) 0.460 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
7) 0.436 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
8) 0.423 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
9) 0.411 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
10) 0.369 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
11) 0.366 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
12) 0.364 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
13) 0.363 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
14) 0.360 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
15) 0.322 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
16) 0.322 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
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17) 0.317 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
18) 0.314 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
19) 0.292 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
20) 0.277 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
21) 0.272 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
22) 0.253 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
23) 0.232 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
 
14 Theme - Co-operation 
 
1) 0.831 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
2) 0.695 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
3) 0.553 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
4) 0.533 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
5) 0.521 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
6) 0.509 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
7) 0.505 Implementing the project (NP) 
8) 0.498 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
9) 0.473 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
10) 0.466 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
11) 0.449 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
12) 0.446 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
13) 0.408 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
14) 0.390 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
15) 0.377 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
16) 0.360 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
17) 0.358 Theme - Political will (NP) 
18) 0.357 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
19) 0.343 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
20) 0.330 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
21) 0.329 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
22) 0.318 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
23) 0.284 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) 
 
14 Situation - Agreement about project specifications 
 
1) 0.632 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
2) 0.592 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
3) 0.590 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
4) 0.557 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
5) 0.557 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
6) 0.529 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
7) 0.527 Implementing the project (NP) 
8) 0.504 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
9) 0.490 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
10) 0.461 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
11) 0.460 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
12) 0.425 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
13) 0.406 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) 
14) 0.395 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
15) 0.390 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
16) 0.373 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
17) 0.347 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
18) 0.346 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
19) 0.332 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
20) 0.326 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
21) 0.272 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
22) 0.255 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
23) -0.260 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
 
15 Situation - Forming partnerships 
 
1) 0.840 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
2) 0.719 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
3) 0.601 Implementing the project (NP) 
4) 0.564 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
5) 0.544 Theme - Solutions to unforeseen organizational issues (NP) 
6) 0.531 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
7) 0.523 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
8) 0.500 Theme - Treatment of risk in decision making (NP) 
9) 0.499 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
10) 0.498 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
11) 0.457 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
12) 0.455 Theme - Leadership (NP) 
13) 0.455 Situation - Changing partners (NP) 
14) 0.442 Theme - Institutional arrangements (NP) 
15) 0.379 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
16) 0.375 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
17) 0.369 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
18) 0.367 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
19) 0.361 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
20) 0.336 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
21) 0.277 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
 
16 Theme - Scale of project impact 
 
1) 0.625 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
2) 0.605 Situation - Alleviating project impacts (NP) 
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3) 0.590 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
4) 0.577 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
5) 0.563 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
6) 0.525 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
7) 0.518 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
8) 0.517 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
9) 0.493 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
10) 0.464 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
11) 0.456 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
12) 0.448 Theme - Use of private sector money (NP) 
13) 0.424 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
14) 0.394 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
15) 0.378 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
16) 0.377 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
17) 0.314 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
18) 0.276 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
19) 0.261 Theme - Political will (NP) 
20) 0.254 Theme - Private sector power (NP) 
 
16 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation  
 
1) 0.540 Situation - Political intervention into the project (NP) 
2) 0.534 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
3) 0.515 Theme - Political will (NP) 
4) 0.506 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
5) 0.489 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
6) 0.444 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
7) 0.436 Theme - Visions and ideas (NP) 
8) 0.391 Situation - Public outcry about project (NP) 
9) 0.390 Theme - Scale of project impact (NP) 
10) 0.354 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
11) 0.351 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
12) 0.349 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
13) 0.327 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
14) 0.309 theme - Public sector power (NP) 
15) 0.293 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
16) 0.293 Situation - Experiencing financial failure/under performance (NP) 
17) 0.288 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
18) 0.278 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
 
17 Theme - Visions and ideas 
 
1) 0.563 Theme - Scale of project impact - Scale of project impact 1 (NP) 
2) 0.498 Theme - Sustainability concerns/environmental impact (NP) 
3) 0.480 Theme - Globalisation forces (NP) 
4) 0.441 Theme - Tensions between values (NP) 
5) 0.427 Situation - Project start-up/mobilisation (NP) 
6) 0.406 Theme - Path dependency (NP) 
7) 0.363 Theme - Political will (NP) 
8) 0.316 Theme - Use of public money (NP) 
9) 0.303 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
10) 0.297 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
11) 0.297 Theme - Real estate development (NP) 
12) 0.235 Theme - Political intervention (NP) 
13) 0.232 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
14) 0.280 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
15) 0.276 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
16) 0.253 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
 
18 Situation - Implementing developments 
 
1) 0.730 Deciding on developments associated with the projects (NP) 
2) 0.615 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
3) 0.538 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
4) 0.525 Implementing the project (NP) 
5) 0.456 Theme - Degree of central/ad hoc decision making (NP) 
6) 0.454 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
7) 0.412 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
8) 0.396 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
9) 0.312 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
10) 0.295 Situation - Programme slippage/advancement (NP) 
11) 0.286 Situation - Forming partnerships (NP) 
12) 0.279 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
13) -0.356 Theme - Bureaucracy (NP) 
 
19 Situation - Deciding on developments associated with the projects 
 
1) 0.717 Situation - Implementing developments (NP) 
2) 0.434 Situation - Forming vision/objectives for project (NP) 
3) 0.425 Situation - Performance of organisations (NP) 
4) 0.415 Situation - Agreement about project specifications (NP) 
5) 0.358 Situation - Agreement on financing/funding (NP) 
6) 0.350 Theme - Roles and responsibilities (NP) 
7) 0.348 Theme - Technical solutions to problems (NP) 
8) 0.346 Implementing the project (NP) 
9) 0.314 Theme - Bargaining power (NP) 
10) 0.306 Theme - Co-operation (NP) 
11) 0.280 Theme - Financing projects/development (NP) 
